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ABSTRACT
This work proposes to look at the role of  aesthetics within Christian 
theodicy.  Though the recent theodicy literature has often displayed 
suspicion toward the inclusion of  aesthetic criteria, I will argue that 
theological aesthetics can enrich the theodicy discourse and therefore should 
be used as a resource in responding to the problem of  evil.  In Part I, I will 
attempt to lay a foundation for an aesthetically informed theodicy by 
examining some of  the philosophical frameworks that lie behind Christian 
theodicy, and seeking to illuminate a framework that allows theological 
aesthetics to helpfully contribute to the task of  theodicy.  By offering a 
preliminary account of  theological aesthetics, I will aim to further lay a 
foundation for how the two areas of  theology can interact.  In Part II, I will 
look at three distinct aesthetic motifs or “themes” as they are developed by 
three different theodicists (one ancient and two contemporary): Augustine, 
Wendy Farley, and Marilyn McCord Adams.  Each of  the themes developed 
by these theodicists offers a different example of  how aesthetics can 
reorient and enrich our perspective on theodicy.  Though each, in and of  
itself, is incomplete, I will argue that they complement and critique one 
another in helpful ways, and therefore that all of  them are useful for 
Christian theodicy.
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INSCRIPTION:
Beauty is an option for art and not a necessary condition. But it is not an option 
for life.  It is a necessary condition for life as we would want to live it.
       ARTHUR C. DANTO
       The Abuse of  Beauty
DEDICATION:
To my wife, an argument for theological aesthetics in the unity of  her beauty and 
goodness. And to my mother, who has endured many agonies with patience and 
love.
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INTRODUCTION:
1. Musical Prelude: Mozart and the Shattenseite  
What role does the artist play in the world of  theology?  What can art show 
us about God’s goodness in the midst of  evil?  In the small print of  Church 
Dogmatics III, 3  Karl Barth takes time to focus on a part of  this larger query, 
in reflecting on the role of  Mozart in theology.  His question: 
Why is it possible to hold that Mozart has a place in theology, 
especially in the doctrine of  creation and also in eschatology, although 
he was not a father of  the Church, does not seem to have been a 
particularly active Christian, and was a Roman Catholic, apparently 
leading what might appear to us a rather frivolous existence when not 
occupied with his work?1 
Barth’s answer to his own question is this, 
In the face of  the problem of  theodicy [the Lisbon earthquake], 
Mozart had the peace of  God which far transcends all the critical or 
speculative reason that praises and reproves… He heard, and causes 
those who have ears to hear, even to-day, what we shall not see until 
the end of  time - the whole context of  providence.2
Barth’s appraisal of  Mozart’s music here is striking.  Through Mozart, Barth 
proclaims, those with ears to hear can get an auditory sense of  God’s 
providential master plan.  If  this were so, if  we could hear in Mozart God’s 
providence, even in the midst of  evil, then this would indeed give Mozart a 
very prominent place within theology!
Given this, it is worth looking a little more closely at Barth and Mozart, to 
hear what both are ‘saying’.  First we must ask: What is the problem of  
theodicy Mozart faced, and what peace does Mozart pass on to us as we 
face it as well?
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1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol III, 3, The Doctrine of  Creation, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. 
Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), 297-8.
2 Ibid., 298.
The virtual destruction of  Lisbon in 1755 was no mere natural cataclysm, 
but a catastrophe of–as they say–biblical proportions.  Lisbon first shook 
with the earthquake, then flooded with a tsunami, then burned in a raging 
fire.  That so many died in church, celebrating All Saint’s Day mass, further 
added to the confusion about the significance of  the event.  The Lisbon 
earthquake was the great disaster to which minds as diverse as Rousseau, 
Kant, and Voltaire turned their attention.  As Susan Neiman writes, “The 
eighteenth century used the word Lisbon much as we use the word 
Auschwitz today.”3  
Naturally, philosophers found different meanings in the event.  Rousseau, 
characteristically emphasizing the goodness of  uncorrupted nature, 
suggested, in a letter to Voltaire, that nature herself  is not to blame for the 
catastrophe but rather the close proximity in which the citizens were living.4  
Kant, uncharacteristically still in the thrall of  rationalism, attempted a 
justification of  earthquakes fitting with Leibniz’s optimism.5  Standing apart 
from both thinkers, Voltaire rejected any attempt to see the good in Lisbon’s 
destruction.  Writing poetically, he penned these words,  
Leibniz can’t tell me from what secret cause
In a world governed by the wisest laws 
Lasting disorders, woes that never end 
With our vain pleasures, real sufferings blend.6
7
3 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of  Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 1.
4 Hence, Rousseau: “Without departing from your subject of  Lisbon, admit, for example, that 
nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of  six to seven stories there, and that if  the 
inhabitants of  this great city had been more equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the 
damage would have been much less and perhaps of  no account.” (Roger D. Masters, and 
Christopher Kelly, eds. The Collected Writings of  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3 [Hanover, NH: University 
Press of  New England, 2004], 110).
5  Martin Schönfeld, The Philosophy of  the Young Kant: The Precritical Project (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press US, 2000), 74-76.
6 Ben Ray Redman, ed. The Portable Voltaire (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1949), 567.
These thinkers all tried to make sense of  this catastrophe, each within their 
philosophical frameworks.  ‘Lisbon’ challenged God’s goodness by calling 
into question the good order of  creation. Each resolved the problem by 
fitting the destruction of  Lisbon into what they believed about the world, 
though with far different conclusions.  It was into this philosophical world - 
a world dominated by ‘Lisbon’ - that Mozart was born in 1756.  As Barth 
notes, it was a time when God was “under attack and well-meaning folk 
were hard put to it to defend him.”7  But, Barth indicates that in the face of  
such disaster, and surrounded by a host of  minds agonized to understand 
Lisbon’s place within God’s good creation, Mozart had “the peace of  God 
which far transcends all the critical or speculative reason that praises and 
reproves”.8  These are strong words indeed, and it is worth looking more 
closely at why Barth believes this is so.
In an effort to make the connection between Lisbon, Mozart’s music and 
Barth’s theology, it is first important to note the context in which Barth 
deals with Mozart.  In his Doctrine of  Creation, in the section “God and 
Nothingness” Barth distinguishes between “nothingness” (das Nichtige) and 
the negative or “shadow” side of  creation (Schattenseite).  He writes, “this 
negative side is not to be identified with nothingness” but rather, “this 
negative side also belongs to God’s good and perfect creation.”9 
The shadowy side is often identified as “finitude”, or traditionally, 
“metaphysical evil.”  Having been created out of  nothing, Barth notes, the 
Creature is “not ‘nothing’ but ‘something,’ yet ‘something’ on the very 
frontier of  nothingness, secure, and yet in jeopardy.”10  With his own 
terminology, his Yes’s and No’s, Barth seems to stand in the tradition of  
8
7 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol III, 3, The Doctrine of  Creation, 297-8.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 299.
10 Ibid.
thinkers such as Augustine who have seen finitude as part of  God’s good 
creation.  Nicholas Wolterstorff, in his analysis of  Barth’s view of  evil, 
agrees with Barth’s approval of  finitude (and its attendant shadow):
It’s part of  our design plan, part of  being a properly-functioning 
human being, that we should dislike pain, suffering, loss, failure, 
infirmity - that we should experience them negatively… It’s well-nigh 
inevitable that experiences which are in fact negatively valorized would 
come our way.  About all this, there is, as such, nothing bad.  These 
negative experiences are not, as such evils.  To creatures of  our sort, 
living in a world of  this present sort, experiencing these sorts of  
things, and experiencing them negatively, God said Yes.11
For Barth, Mozart’s music exemplifies this very goodness of  this creation 
which yet has a negative side: “he heard the harmony of  creation to which 
the shadow also belongs, but to which the shadow is not darkness, 
deficiency is not defeat”.12  Barth hears in Mozart a sadness, yet not a 
sadness which turns into despair.  For Barth, the darkness included in the 
shadowside includes death and thus even the destruction of  Lisbon may be 
included in the scope of  God’s providence: as he writes, “Life does not fear 
death but knows it well.  Et lux perpetua lucet (sic!) eis - even the dead of  
Lisbon.”13  Thus, Mozart’s music here may then serve as an auditory 
example of  a large, metaphysical premise: that creation, with all its fragility and 
shortcomings may still be harmonious and beautiful.  As Jeremy Begbie notes, 
“Mozart’s music is presented in this context as articulating the praise of  
creation in all its aspects, it sings the praise of  the cosmos in its ‘total 
goodness’, including its shadowside.”14
Key for Barth’s appreciation of  Mozart is that Mozart accepts God’s 
creation as is proper to a creature.  Accepting the limits of  creatureliness 
9
11 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Barth on Evil” Faith and Philosophy 13 (October 1996): 585-608.
12 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol III, 3, The Doctrine of  Creation, 298.
13 Ibid.
14 Jeremy Begbie, Theology, Music and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 95.
and materiality, Mozart “offered himself  as the agent by which little bits of  
horn, metal and catgut could serve as the voices of  creation”.15  These 
diminutive descriptors for Mozart’s orchestral tools highlight the finitude 
and physicality of  musical instruments.  In place of  ethereal descriptors for 
Mozart’s music, Barth begins by drawing attention to the corporeality of  
these revered instruments.  
In his address entitled “Mozart’s Freedom”, Barth invests Mozart’s creative 
process with theological significance.  Where the modern artist often seeks 
to rise above moral, societal, or material restrictions, Mozart’s freedom is 
described, rather, as a form of  “sovereign submission” to “Frau Musica.”16  
Mozart practices moderation, makes music from “a mysterious center, and 
so knows the limits to the right and the left, above and below.”17 Barth’s 
notion of  “sovereign submission” is echoed in Mozart’s own words, when he 
wrote that, “passions, violent or not, may never be expressed to the point of 
revulsion… i.e. music must always remain music.” 18  This center from 
which Mozart makes music, is, however, not “a matter of  balance, neutrality, 
and finally, indifference.”19 Rather, Barth notes,
What occurs in Mozart is a rather glorious upsetting of  the balance, a 
turning in which the light rises and the shadows fall, though without 
disappearing, in which joy overtakes sorrow without extinguishing it, 
in which the Yea rings louder than the ever-present Nay.20
Tellingly for Barth, a theologian who emphasizes the necessity of  obedience 
in human freedom, Mozart’s musical freedom arises out of  his submission 
as a creature to the forms of  creation.  That Mozart’s music, “always 
10
15 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol III, 3, The Doctrine of  Creation, 298.
16 Karl Barth, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (Eugene, OR: Wipf  and Stock, 1956), 51.
17 Ibid, 53.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 55.
achieved this consoling turn”, that without forcing himself  upon his work 
the light of  the music still managed to break forth from the shadow–
suggests a fundamentally “triumphant” quality of  music itself, and creation 
itself.21  “Mozart’s music always sounds unburdened, effortless, light,” Barth 
writes, “This is why it unburdens, releases, and liberates us”.22  This seems 
to be, for Barth, Mozart’s special quality.
George Steiner, in Real Presences, comments that “All serious art, music and 
literature is a critical act… Be it realistic, fantastic, Utopian or satiric, the 
construct of  the artist is a counter-statement to the world.”23  But Barth 
here does not so much see Mozart as making a conscious counter-
statement, as much as a statement about the world as it is.  Perhaps it is 
“critical” in some sense, but Barth is keen to insist that it is not an artificially 
imposed critique.
That Mozart suggests musically, through horn, metal and catgut, that there 
can be a “shadow that is not darkness, deficiency that is not defeat, sadness 
[that] cannot become despair” and so on, embodies a truth about the 
presence of  badness (often referred to, in German as das Übel) within the 
good, and an ultimate “consoling turn” in God’s creation.  But it embodies 
this truth truthfully, so I take Barth to suggest, not because Mozart imposed 
his will on the materials and aesthetic forms of  music, but because Mozart 
served music submissively, hence freely, and in the process communicated 
intrinsic truths about the good structure of  creation.
Thus, Barth is ultimately pointing to music itself  as a medium which may 
enable us to hear God’s providence in the midst of  evil.  Mozart is therefore 
a kind of  “natural theologian” (as Barth himself  once called him) who 
11
21 Ibid, 55-6.
22 Ibid, 47.
23 George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), 11.
speaks, through bits of  horn, tin and catgut, theological truths.  David 
Bentley Hart makes a similar point regarding Bach.  “Bach is the greatest of  
Christian theologians,” Hart writes, “the most inspired witness to the ordo 
amoris in the fabric of  being”.24  Using Bach’s Goldberg Variations as a 
prime example, Hart focuses on Bach’s continual ability to find amazing 
beauty within even the simplest of  chord progressions.  As such, this is 
analogy for the infinite differentiation within the divine work, which yet 
remains peaceful and beautiful.  As Hart writes, “It is in Bach’s music, as 
nowhere else, that the potential boundlessness of  thematic development 
become manifest.”25  Whether or not Mozart or Bach is the greater 
theologian I will leave for others to debate.   Perhaps what is significant, 
though, about both Barth’s and Hart’s claims for this study is that they both 
find deep connections between creation’s beauty, human artistry, and 
theological truths.  For Hart, like Barth, the ultimate focus is not on the 
composer himself, but on the truths within music which he tunefully 
demonstrates.  For Hart, Bach makes audible the beauty of  the infinite and 
the infinity of  beauty.  For Barth, Mozart’s music makes audible the place of  
the shadowside within God’s good creation, as we hear a “Yes” which rings 
louder than, but does not eliminate, the ever-present “No”.  
Yet, as compelling as Barth’s discussion of  Mozart is, most readers will likely 
be left with only a vague suggestion of  how Mozart allows us to hear the 
goodness of  creation despite the presence of  chaos, sadness, death and 
destruction.  In discussing Mozart, Barth often seems to assume that we 
understand the gravity and lightness of  the music, and can make these 
connections on our own.  Thus the musical amateur must turn to the 
12
24 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of  the Infinite: The Aesthetics of  Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
2003), 282.
25 Ibid, 283.
compositions Barth explicitly mentions in hopes of  an auditory glimpse of  
the scope of  God’s providence.  
Barth writes of  Mozart’s 1788 Symphony in G-Minor (what we call ‘No. 
40’), that in this work we get a sense of  both the light and dark sides of  
creation coexisting as a part of  God’s creation.  Barth writes, “he heard the 
negative only in and with the positive.  Yet in their inequality he heard them 
both together”.26  Indeed, in No. 40, we can hear a soft sadness which 
tempers joy, it affects its quality but does not over ride it.  Likewise in The 
Magic Flute, Barth hears a continual breaking forth of  the light from the 
shadow.27    Light always triumphs over darkness.  The two are not equals.
Reviewing the works Barth references in his writings on Mozart (Symphony 
No. 40 in G Minor, the Clarinet Concerto of  1791 (k. 622), The Magic 
Flute, and the Requiem), it is possible to hear this “twofold yet harmonious 
praise of  God” of  which Barth speaks, in that the music contains somber 
and joyful notes which hold together.  There is a restrained quality to the 
music’s exuberance, and also a continual turning toward joy which is 
certainly not frivolous, because it is consonant, musically, with a present 
melancholy.  But it is difficult to hear in any of  these works (even the 
Requiem) the deep sadness of  the events at Lisbon.  The destruction of  
Lisbon was a truly terrifying and horrific event, which Mozart’s music does 
not, to my ears, capture in its fullness.  Thinking of  Lisbon, one is 
reminded, rather, of  Krzysztof  Penderecki’s ear-blistering lament 
“Threnody for the Victims of  Hiroshima”–in which the terror of  the 
annihilation of  a city is more fully felt through string instruments which 
‘scream’ in agony.  That Mozart’s music gives us a deeper understanding, as 
Barth indicates, of  the goodness of  creation cannot be denied, but it does 
13
26 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol III, 3, The Doctrine of  Creation, 298.
27 Karl Barth, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, 55.
not, from my perspective, allow us to hear the “whole context of  
providence.”   
Yet, the significance of  Barth’s theologizing about Mozart is not perhaps 
ultimately hampered by an initial inability to hear the truths of  which Barth 
speaks.  If  in Mozart we might fail to ‘hear’ the whole context of  
providence (as I confess I fail to do), we can certainly understand what 
Barth is trying to affirm: creation’s beauty can suggest a deeper confidence 
and trust in God’s providence than we might have without it; artists can 
show us something of  God’s goodness to his creation which we might 
otherwise overlook.  That Barth finds connections between the problem of  
metaphysical evil and music, as well as between the work of  the theologian 
and the work of  the artist, even if  these connections are slightly more 
modest that Barth suggests, remains inspiring for our task.  At the very least, 
the affirmation of  this great theologian must stand as an initial 
encouragement to explore the power of  artistry and beauty to testify to 
God’s goodness in the midst of  evil.  There is an energizing confidence with 
which Barth affirms the power of  music to resolve the problem of  theodicy.  
If  many of  us do not have ‘ears to hear’ all of  what Barth claims Mozart’s 
music can provide, this does not mean that we should abandon paying close 
attention to the arts, but instead, we should explore other areas of  aesthetics 
which may give us similar ‘glimpses’ into God’s care for us in the midst of  
evil.  
2.  Aesthetics and the Task of  Theodicy 
Expanding our scope, then, beyond Barth, Mozart, the shadowside of  
creation, and music in general, we will seek out other points of  contact 
between theodicy and aesthetics.  What else can aesthetic works, values and 
categories show us about the scope of  God’s providence?  How can artistic 
14
works illuminate the problem of  evil question, and deepen the theodicy 
discussion?  
2.1. Theodicy
To begin to explore these questions, first let us turn to the question “What 
do we mean by theodicy?”  Etymologically speaking, I take theodicy to mean 
an attempt to make sense of  God’s justice despite the existence of  evil.  
Leibniz coined the term (theos ‘god’ + dike ‘justice’) to indicate roughly this.  
Practically speaking, I see the task of  theodicy as helping to resolve the prima 
facie tension between the idea of  God and occurrent evil, with the goal of  
resolving the tension in God’s favor.  This prima facie tension can take a 
number of  forms, be it logical,  evidential, or existential.28  While the focus 
here will be on the intellectual side of  the issue (the logical and evidential 
side), there are no clear borders between these areas, as experience, emotion, 
15
28 And regardless of  what some theodicists or their critics have said, there is no clean line between 
the academic and pastoral practice of  theodicy.  An air-headed but compassionate pastor will be 
unable to provide any intellectual comfort, and may likely give facile answers to hard questions.  As 
Thomas Oden writes, “The parishioner has a right to expect that the pastor has thought deeply 
about the coalescence of  God’s power, love, and human suffering” [Thomas Oden, Pastoral 
Theology: Essentials of  Ministry (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 223]. On the flip side, a cold 
and cloistered academic, even with patience and study, if  he cannot empathize with those who suffer, 
will produce stillborn and useless theories.
and critical reflection inform one another.29  Milton, in Paradise Lost, wrote 
of  a desire to “assert th' Eternal Providence / And justifie the wayes of  
God to men”.  Justifying the ways of  God to man has often been taken to 
be the goal of  theodicy, but in practice few theodicies have so grand a 
vision.  More likely, a theodicy will arise in response to some specific 
question or attack on God’s goodness, power or purposes.  The goal of  the 
theodicist is usually responsive, rather than assertive, and thus the field of  
theodicy is not so much defined by reflection on either providence or evil as 
16
29 A word here about prima facie in this context. I intend here to convey the idea, first, that we must 
take this contradiction seriously, as, in the philosophical usage, “correct until proven otherwise”.  
When the specter of  evil arises and raises the very natural question of  why God would allow it to 
occur, the theodicist must do something to respond, either by dismissing, or answering the question.  
But there is another sense in which the theologian believes that this prima facie tension is based upon 
“first impressions” and, drawing on its Latin origins, superficial.  This does not imply the apparent 
logical mismatch is superficial in the pejorative sense, but rather to emphasize the point that since 
the Christian (I assume) believes both in the occurrence of  evil and the reality of  God’s perfect 
goodness, power and so forth, any contradiction between the two must be a contradiction arising 
from our limited perspective. 
Resolving this contradiction may involve any number of  factors. Though we may need to think 
carefully and critically, we must also often expand the scope of  our perception in order to see how 
apparent contradictions are actually compatible.  Perhaps the best example I could give for an 
analogous sort of  problem might be a lateral thinking puzzle, where a paradox seems to exist, but 
only because of  faulty (if  natural) preconceptions.  Example:
Responding to an anonymous tip, the police raid a house to arrest a murder suspect. They 
don't know what he looks like but they know his name is John and that he is inside the 
house. Inside, the police find a carpenter, a bus driver, a mechanic and a fireman playing 
poker. Without hesitation or communication of  any kind, they immediately arrest the 
fireman. How do they know they've got their man?
The puzzle presents a 'prima facie' conundrum, but only because our natural assumption is that 
poker-players with these given professions are all men.  If  only one is a man the police can easily 
identify the murderer.  In more serious and complicated ways, the problem of  evil may present to 
us challenges which require 'lateral thinking'. Innovative shifts in perception must often aid critical 
reflection.  Perhaps an even more relevant example is as follows:
You are driving down the road in your two-seater car on a wild, stormy night, when you 
pass by a bus stop and you see three people waiting in the rain for the bus:
• An old lady who looks as if  she is about to die.
• An old friend who once saved your life.
• The perfect partner you have been dreaming about.
Knowing that there can only be one passenger in your car, whom would you choose?
This solution requires mild cleverness and moral astuteness. To sort out one’s obligations and 
desires for a variety of  people requires a bit of  critical thinking. To properly value true love over 
retaining temporary safety and comfort is a small, if  significant, moral insight.  The problem is 
crafted to create for us an apparent dichotomy which must be overcome through a small act of  
selflessness.  Once we have broken through with an 'aha' solution, however, the answer seems 
obvious.  Before this breakthrough is made, however, the solution (you give the car to your old 
friend to drive the old woman to the hospital, and stand in the rain with your perfect partner) can 
seem unfathomable. 
Though this analogy is surrounded by pitfalls, it helps to clarify how we can be befuddled by a 
problem and yet be confident that a solution exists, even if  we cannot yet see it. 
much as driven by a perennially arising conflict within theology, which takes 
a multitude of  forms. 
My definition of  the task of  theodicy as “helping to resolve the prima facie 
tension between the idea of  God and occurrent evil” is therefore 
intentionally broad, as it includes both full blown theodicies like Richard 
Swinburne’s or John Hick’s, as well as more modest “defenses” like Alvin 
Plantinga’s “logically possible” free-will defense, and even unhelpful 
attempts to resolve the tension by denying any apparent contradiction - say, 
by denying that evil events actually occur.30  The term theodicy, then, is not 
designed to be exclusionary.  There are good theodicies and bad theodicies, or, 
at least, ones that are more successful than others.
The test of  a Christian theodicy, however, goes beyond its ability to resolve 
the tension between the idea of  God and the fact of  evil.  Christian 
theodicy must also fit with our other affirmations about God and creation.  
A dualistic theodicy succeeds in resolving the tension (by saying that this 
world embodies the never-ending conflict between Good and Evil) at the 
expense of  the Christian doctrine of  creation and our affirmation of  God’s 
sovereignty. 
2.2. Aesthetics
The second question is: “What do we mean by aesthetics?”  This question is 
even more difficult to answer than the question of  the meaning of  theodicy.  
The word ‘aesthetics’ denotes perception (coined by Alexander Baumgarten 
from the Greek aisthetikos or ‘perceptibles’), and connotes anything from 
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30 Notably, this definition still retains the kernel of  what is most repellent in theodicy to many 
contemporary theologians.  So much as any theodicy tries to “reconcile” intellectually or otherwise, 
God and evil, there will remain the unshakable sense that we are attempting to justify evil itself.  
The caveat which I hold out to such criticisms is that theodicy, at its most basic level, seeks to 
alleviate the contradiction between the ‘idea’ of  God, and the occurrence of  evil, but does not 
necessarily imply that God is not in conflict with evil in many meaningful ways.  Not all conflicts 
imply contradictions.
philosophical reflection on beauty, to the study of  art (and attending theories about 
it), to the wider range of  reflection on human creativity, taste, imagination and 
sense experience.  Monroe Beardsley, in attempting to write a brief  history of  
the subject calls for “a certain measure of  generosity in conceiving 
[aesthetics’] scope” and notes that “it is probably not necessary to be 
extremely scrupulous in marking the boundaries of  the subject.”31 For the 
purposes of  this study, I will generally be focusing on philosophical 
reflection on beauty (which has traditionally taken pride of  place in 
aesthetics) and the range of  surrounding aesthetic values such as ugliness, 
intensity, and complexity, as well as a number of  theories about artistic 
genres and styles, and the way that artistic works (e.g. plays and paintings) 
and genres (e.g. comedy, tragedy, horror) can affect the way we see the 
world. 
2.3. Aesthetic Theodicy
Aesthetic theodicy, then, seeks to relate the task of  theodicy to aesthetic works, 
criteria, or values.  Following Richard Viladesau’s definition of  aesthetic 
theology, aesthetic theodicy “(to varying degrees) depends on the aesthetic 
realm for its language, content, method, and theory”.  Despite Hans Urs 
von Balthasar’s reservations about “aesthetic theology” as the degraded 
form of  “theological aesthetics”, I mean to use and adapt the former term 
to imply, not a theology slavishly dedicated to an “inner-world theory of  
beauty” (Balthasar’s worry), but the application of  theologically-informed 
aesthetics to the task of  theodicy.32  
The varying aesthetic theodicies I will examine are multiform (as probably is 
anything with ‘aesthetic’ attached to it).  And though aesthetic theodicy may 
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31 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics From Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of  Alabama Press, 1966), 13.
32 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of  the Lord:  A Theological Aesthetics, vol. I, Seeing the Form, trans. 
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 37-8.
certainly consist in, as Viladesau distinguishes, “theopoiesis” (aesthetically-
excellent discourse as in Anselm or Julian of  Norwich) as well as 
“theopoetics” (discourse about aesthetics), it is this latter mode that I intend 
to examine and enter into.33  The writers whom I will examine are involved 
more in thinking after, rather than creating, aesthetic value.  A study of  the 
way that aesthetic works (novels, paintings, music) may function as theodicy 
is, as far as I can tell, still warranted.
My study will begin by attempting to deflect objections and suspicions of  
aesthetic theodicy, while seeking to carve out a place for such reflections in 
the theodicy conversation.  I will continue by examining three attempts to 
do aesthetic theodicy (theodicy informed by aesthetics), in an effort to show 
that there is more to God’s providence than simply the moral dimension.
My thesis is this: that aesthetic considerations play a valuable role in the task 
of  theodicy, and, hence, theodicists should seek to highlight aesthetics as 
part of  their goal to attempt to resolve the prima facie tension between the 
idea of  God and the fact of  evil.   In my thesis I will argue this by first 
laying the philosophical and aesthetic foundations for such an attempt, and 
second by looking at three aesthetic themes within theodicy which I think 
would be helpful for Christian theodicy to incorporate.  But this is not to say 
that all elements of  an aesthetic theodicy are wholly positive.  By opening 
the door to beauty, we must also admit ugliness.  By straining to hear the 
harmony of  creation, we must also attend to the discordant clashes which 
seem to echo throughout the world.  Aesthetics deepens and enriches 
theodicy as a discourse by giving us more to hear, both of  God’s goodness 
and of  human suffering.  However, as I will suggest, though aesthetic 
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University Press, 1999), 19.
considerations disrupt the discourse at their first arrival, they also leave 
deeper and more substantial resources behind for us to utilize.
3.  A Word on the Thesis
At the outset, two caveats must be made.  First, in structuring my thesis in 
the first part a methodological investigation, and in the second part a 
comparative inquiry,  I have invariably done injustice to the excellent work 
of  Marilyn McCord Adams, whose theodicy Horrendous Evils and the Goodness 
of  God, investigates skillfully and brilliantly the relationship between 
aesthetics and theodicy.  Injustice is done, I believe, because though I devote 
a chapter to Adams’ aesthetic theme (and to a lesser extent, theodicy) at the 
end of  the thesis, her book is foundational for this thesis.  Adams paves the 
way, by attempting to invest in the discussion and the aesthetic dimension, 
harvesting many valuable benefits and noting some major challenges.  
Though most of  Adams’ reflections occupy only a single chapter of  her 
work, she nevertheless introduces many suggestive and helpful concepts.  In 
an effort to catalogue as many aspects of  Adams’s theodicy as I can, I have 
been forced (because of  the structure of  this thesis) to handle separately 
some of  the issue she raises, so as to properly note her various contributions 
to the discussion.  
Second, the recent thesis by Hohyun Sohn, “Evil and Beauty: Theological 
Aesthetics and Theodicy in Augustine, Whitehead, and Hegel”  must go 
underdiscussed in these pages.34  Sohn’s thesis mirrors my own in several 
respects, in that it owes to Adams significant debts in insights and criteria, 
and that he attempts to chart the use of  theological aesthetics in theodicy, 
and provide the first full-length academic treatment of  the subject.  The 
surprise and initial chagrin with which I discovered Sohn’s work has largely 
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and Hegel”, Ph.D. diss. December 2004, Vanderbilt University.
been ameliorated, however, by the significant differences between our 
theses.  “Evil and Beauty” is comparative in its task, seeking to juxtapose, 
not only the aesthetic details of  Augustinian, Whiteheadian, and Hegelian 
theodicies, but much more so the larger project of  those theodicies 
themselves, and the varying theologies which they represent.35  As such, 
Sohn’s study is rather open to the differences in theological viewpoint, a trait 
which my thesis, for worse or better, does not share.  Navigating classical 
theism, process theology and Hegelian idealism (all rich with aesthetic 
motifs), Sohn opens his study to the differing interpretations of  
omnipotence, personal immortality, and divine passibility.   Though his 
focus is often on the aesthetic dimension of  these theodicies, the 
conversation between these theologians and the import for his thesis is 
primarily theological, rather than aesthetic.  By contrasting Augustine, 
Whitehead, and Hegel, for instance, Sohn concludes that Augustine’s 
emphasis on divine impassibility and personal immortality is unhelpful for 
theodicy, and thus embraces process and Hegelian notions of  divine 
development and person immortality only within God’s being.  
By contrast, my intention is to look at organizing aesthetic motifs within 
varying theodicies, and to seek to discover if  these motifs (or “themes”) are 
compatible with a classical Christian theism (e.g. a more Augustinian 
conception of  the Divine perfections) and the contemporary task of  
Christian theodicy.  That Sohn’s study, and the work of  Whitehead and 
Hegel could inform my study even in this sense is beyond doubt, and I think 
that many of  the insights therein are significant, but I have neither the desire 
nor the space to discuss seriously the metaphysical claims of  Hegel or the 
process theologians.  The main overlap shared by Sohn’s thesis and my own 
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35 As Sohn writes, “even though classical theism has functioned as the major theoretical 
framework of  the Christian tradition,” he believes that “there are some irresolvable problems 
within this classical model” (Ibid., 38) and therefore he moves outside of  classical theism in 
formulating his theodicy. 
is in the area of  Augustine (whose aesthetic theodicy has also been 
discussed by others, often negatively), and it is here alone that I will 
reference his thesis, albeit briefly.  Otherwise, our projects share only in the 
more general task of  charting an area of  theological discourse which has 
been over neglected, and so I must acknowledge my gratitude to him as a 
fellow traveler and scholar.  
My intention in choosing what may seem to be an asymmetrical triad of  
motifs (harmony, tragedy, horror) has been to find three well-developed 
aesthetic themes which seem to be ‘live options’ within the literature.   
Harmony, tragedy and horror, are helpful to compare and contrast, for, 
though it may seem that harmony is oddly-matched with tragedy and horror 
because the former is more of  an aesthetic canon or value, where the latter 
two are more like poetic genres, as aesthetic themes they represent the three 
most prominent aesthetic themes within the theodicy discussion.  
Augustine’s aesthetic of  harmony is still alive and well (I dwell on one recent 
advocate, C. S. Lewis); Tragedy has been often invoked and used in the 
19th- and 20th-century; and Horror is, perhaps more than ever, a category 
for reflection (especially by atheistic philosophers).  To complete the poetic 
triad, comedy would seem to be a better fit than harmony, but perhaps 
understandably, comedy has rarely been invoked as a major motif  in 
theodicy.  In attempting to take evil seriously, theodicists rarely try to be 
funny.  That these three do fit together, however, is more than a simple 
observation of  the literature.  The underlying principle (though I do not 
reflect overmuch on this in the thesis itself) is a simplistic diagram relating 
beauty and justice (the latter, the traditional concern of  theodicy; the 
former, the perennial if  oft-ignored concern of  theological aesthetics).  
Though this diagram is in need of  some defense and much nuance, I believe 
that it nevertheless helpfully elucidates some of  the underlying structures.
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Harmony Beauty Justice
Tragedy Beauty ~Justice
Horror ~Beauty ~Justice
Specifically, each of  the examined theodicies seek to find fitting aesthetic 
categories for their reflections on evil.  Though they differ in many respects 
regarding their conclusions on evil, there is a consonant methodology in 
their aesthetic reflections.  There is also a historical movement between the 
categories, as the dominant Medieval Christian aesthetic theme of  Cosmic 
Harmony (which affirms both ultimate beauty and ultimate justice) is 
gradually critiqued by a new theme of  Tragedy (which denies justice, but 
also finds some fleeting beauty or poetic nobility in the midst of  suffering).  
Finally, the latest aesthetic theme to develop, Horror, presents the darkest 
and most nihilistic vision of  evil, critiquing both Harmony and Tragedy by 
denying even the vestiges of  justice or beauty to certain kinds of  evil.  
Because of  these connections, the dialogue between these theodicists is 
illuminating for a more developed aesthetic theodicy.  
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PART I: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AESTHETIC THEODICY
John Hick on the Aesthetic Theme
At the outset of  this thesis, it is helpful to first look at criticisms of  the kind 
of  project I want to undertake.  Since aesthetic considerations in theodicy 
have recently met with a fair amount of  opposition, it is easy to lay hands on 
critical opinions.  However, not all such critiques, fortunately or 
unfortunately, are fully developed.  One major exception, however, that 
appears in one of  the best works of  theodicy over the last fifty years, gives 
an extended treatment to the aesthetic theme, which, through close 
examination, will help to clarify the idea and the discussion of  its usefulness.  
John Hick’s book, Evil and the God of  Love, is, to quote Rowan Williams, a 
“near-classic” survey of  the history of  Christian theodicy, and diachronically 
traces two different ‘types’ of  theodicy, the Augustinian and Irenaean.36  
Anyone remotely familiar with Hick’s work will know which type he favors 
in constructing his ‘soul-making’ theodicy.  The Irenaean type is, for Hick, 
more clearly in the right, and on many points the opposing Augustinian type 
is clearly in the wrong, specifically the way that Augustine utilizes what Hick 
calls the “aesthetic theme”.  The running dichotomy in Hick’s book 
necessitates that, before looking at Hick’s critique of  Augustine, it is first 
helpful to understand Hick’s own interpretation of  Irenaean theodicy.   
1. No Paradise Lost. 
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eds. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000), 105.
Central to Hick’s theodicy is the distinct Irenaean emphasis on the process 
of  maturation and perfection God intends for humans.37  Among other 
places, we see this in Irenaeus’ notion of  an Edenic immature fall from 
grace.  Irenaeus, writing Against Heresies, assumes that while God can do 
anything, His human creation was “infantile, and untrained in the perfect 
discipline, [and so] could not have received [moral] perfection owing to his 
weakness, just as a babe cannot receive stronger nourishment than milk.”38
Hick highlights the contrast between Augustine and Irenaeus here:
Instead of  [following Augustine] the doctrine that man was created 
finitely perfect and then incomprehensibly destroyed his own 
perfection and plunged into sin and misery, Irenaeus suggests that 
man was created as an imperfect, immature creature who was to 
undergo moral development and growth and finally be brought to the 
perfection intended for him by his Maker.39
Here Hick ties the Irenaean doctrine of  the fall to the purpose of  human 
life, which is to be perfected gradually into the likeness of  Christ.  Besides 
taking time, this gradual perfection also requires, according to Hick, “a 
world with rough edges, a place in which man can live only by the sweat of  
his brow, and which continually presents him with challenges, uncertainties, 
and dangers”.40  In short, growing from infantile immaturity into the 
likeness of  Christ is not an easy process.  It will hurt.  It is these features of  
the world which, according to Hick, “paradoxically underlie the emergence 
of  virtually the whole range of  the more valuable human characteristics.”41  
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37 Hick’s movement away from traditional Christian theology is well documented in his works, and 
makes any uniform statement about his beliefs difficult to maintain without careful documentation.  
However, the shape of  Hick’s theodicy has remained roughly the same, from Evil and the God of  
Love (1968), through his essay in Encountering Evil (1981, 2001), on to “Response to Mesle” (2004).  
The reader will note some changes across his career, for instance, Hick’s discussion of  reincarnation 
in his more recent work.  But while his position toward God has changed, Hick still finds the “soul-
making theodicy” to be “mythically true” in that it evokes a proper disposition toward ultimate 
reality; so it is still therefore, as Hick says, “a valid guide for life” (Encountering Evil, ed. Stephen T. 
Davis [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001], 66). 
38 Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, trans. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock (London: SPCK, 1916), 79.
39 John Hick. Evil and the God of  Love, Revised ed. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1978), 220.
40 Ibid., 362.
41 Ibid., 362-3.
Hick’s Irenaean theodicy therefore immediately embraces some measure of  
suffering as simply part of     the warp and woof  of  God’s plan for us.  Hick 
therefore finds little reason, unlike many Augustinian theodicists, to locate 
the source of  human suffering in sinful decision making.   
The advantage of  the Irenaean trajectory from immaturity, through 
suffering, to perfection is, for Hick, tied to his methodological requirements 
for theodicy.  Elsewhere, he writes:
The two main demands upon a theodicy hypothesis are that it be (1) 
internally coherent, and (2) consistent with the data both of  the 
religious tradition on which it is based, and of  the world, in respect 
both of  the latter’s general character as revealed by scientific enquiry 
and of  the specific facts of  moral and natural evil.42
Though a historical fall from Edenic grace and subsequently worldwide 
punishment may fit with the Biblical witness, Hick finds the notion 
problematic on three fronts: scientific, moral, and logical.43  Since scientific 
findings generally show the world to have been in much the same state of  
difficulty and danger before the existence of  humans and hence before any 
human fall from grace, it seems unlikely that the Genesis account can be 
taken as literal.  Morally, Hick finds fault with the notion of  inherited guilt 
for Adam’s sin, describing it as “unjust”.44  And logically, Hick takes issue 
with the possibility of  a finite creature being both perfect and also capable 
of  sinning.  In order for humans (or angels) to be able to sin, Hick writes, 
“There must have been some moral flaw in the creature or in his situation to 
set up the tension of  temptation”.45
On the whole, Hick labels the Pauline and Augustinian “cosmic drama” of  
historical fall and historical redemption as “mythological”.  This statement, 
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42 John Hick, “An Irenaean Theodicy” in Encountering Evil, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001), 38.
43 John Hick, Evil and the God of  Love, 285.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 286.
however, is not entirely pejorative, as Hick finds some good in the mythic 
power of  the “great cosmic drama”, specifically its clarity in communicating 
the central role of  Christ in the universal story.46  But the illuminating power 
of  the Augustinian myth pales next to the more scientifically coherent, 
logically consistent, and morally excellent soul-making theodicy.
Certainly, Hick’s theodicy does have its strong points.  Specifically, a soul-
making theodicy of  Hick’s variety is situated to counter the a priori argument 
that this world is not of  the sort that we would expect God to design.  
David Hume famously compares the world to a house where the “windows, 
doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of  the house were the 
source of  noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of  heat and 
cold”.47  In other words, Hume questions the world’s effectiveness of  design 
for the sorts of  purposes a good God would have.  Hick, however, 
challenges the notion that this world is poorly designed, and therefore 
unlikely the work of  a benevolent designer.  Of  the world, Hick writes, “its 
value is to be judged, not primarily by the quantity of  pleasure and pain 
occurring in it at any particular moment, but by its fitness for its primary 
purpose, the purpose of  soul-making.”48  He continues:
Such critics as Hume are confusing what heaven ought to be, as an 
environment for perfected finite beings, with what this world ought 
to be, as an environment for beings who are in the process of  
becoming perfected.  For if  our general conception of  God’s purpose 
is correct the world is not intended to be a paradise, but rather the 
scene of  a history in which human personality may be formed 
towards the pattern of  Christ.49
Without intending to sound pejorative, it is difficult to overestimate the 
‘anthropocentric’ nature of  Hick’s theodicy.  Siding (on this one point) with 
27
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47 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), 68. 
48 John Hick, Evil and the God of  Love, 295.
49 Ibid., 293-4.
Hugh of  St Victor, who believed that “Adam and Eve, for the sake of  
whom all other things were made”  are the center of  creation, Hick is intent 
on tying everything into the purpose of  soul-making, even, for instance, 
animal pain.  Hick writes, “If, then, the animal kingdom plays its part in this 
indirect way in the forming of  man as a child of  God in this ‘eighth day of  
creation’, the process must be justified by its success.  The problem of  
animal pain is thus subordinate to that of  human sin and suffering”.50 
It is beyond my task to attack or defend Hick here, though I do find much 
of  his work compelling and helpful to the task of  theodicy.  For now it is 
enough to note the emphasis and tenor of  his theodicy, which, contrary to 
free-fall theodicies such as Augustine’s, dispenses with the ‘Paradise Lost’ 
scenario, placing his main focus on a ‘Paradise Future’ for which this world’s 
sufferings exist to prepare us51 and further centers our understanding of  the 
wider world around the purpose of  soul-making.52
2. Augustinian Theodicy and the Aesthetic Theme.  
Having set the context for Hick’s theodicy, we can now approach the 
critique of  the “aesthetic theme” laid out in Evil and the God of  Love.  As 
mentioned above, Hick’s book is dominated by a comparison between these 
two trends in theodicy, and as Hick’s critique of  the Augustinian type is 
quite lengthy, I will merely try and highlight those elements of  the 
Augustinian theodicy which are relevant to the aesthetic theme.
The Augustinian “aesthetic theme”, for Hick, is definable as an “affirmation 
of  faith that, seen in its totality from the ultimate standpoint of  the Creator, 
the universe is wholly good; for even the evil within it is made to contribute 
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which is yet to come in its full glory and permanence” (Evil and the God of  Love, 297).
52 Notably, Hick writes, “Nature has a permanent significance; for God has set man in a creaturely 
environment, and the final fulfillment of  our nature in relation to God will accordingly take the 
form of  an embodied life within ‘a new heaven and a new earth’” (Evil and the God of  Love, 296).
to the complex perfection of  the whole.”53  In other words, in the big 
picture, all good and evil is integrated in the perfect work of  art.  One 
example of  this is Augustine’s discussion of  antitheta, or the rhetorical use of 
opposites, in discussing the world’s aesthetic value.  Referring to the 
rhetorical contrapositives of  St Paul, Augustine writes, “Thus as these contraries 
opposed do give the saying an excellent  grace, so is the world’s beauty composed of  
contraries, not in figure but in nature.”54  Sin and righteousness, pleasure 
and pain, beauty and ugliness all fit into a larger, lovely totality.
This affirmation of  beauty in totality can be traced through Augustine, 
Boethius, Aquinas and on to Leibniz.  Boethius writes of  God, 
You draw out all things, and being yourself  most fair, A fair world in 
your mind you bear, and forming it In the same likeness, bid it being 
perfect to complete itself  In perfect parts.  You bind its elements with 
law, so that the cold Come together with flames, the dry with liquids... 
You, binding soul together in its threefold nature’s midst, Soul that 
moves all things, then divide it into harmonious (consona) parts.”55 
Jacques Maritain describes Aquinas’ theology in this way, “St. Thomas 
considers reality from a particular point of  view, from the point of  view of  
the order of  nature, of  the universe as a work of  art made by God”.56  
Commenting on Leibniz, Hick writes, “[T]he principle which accommodates 
these evils into the best possible world is the aesthetic principle that a good 
whole may contain parts that would in isolation be bad”.57  For an example, 
he cites Leibniz’s comparison of  the contrast of  evil with how “shadows 
enhance colors; even a dissonance in the right place gives relief  to 
harmony”.58  The Augustinian aesthetic theme, as echoed here in other 
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57 Ibid. 158.
58 Ibid., 158-9. cf. G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 
1993), 130.
thinkers, connotes a sort of  perspective, a stepping back to appraise the canvas 
of  creation from an aesthetic vantage to appraise its totality.
Within Augustinian theodicy, three alliterative ideas particularly embody this 
view: privation, punishment, and plenitude.  The concept that evil is merely a 
privation of  the good, that misused free will is justly punished, and that the 
universe is arranged according to a scale of  being from lowest to highest (all 
concepts I will cover in my chapter on Augustine), for Hick, are all 
“embraced” by the aesthetic theme, in that each seeks to secure the 
harmony of  the whole against possible disruption.
Through his discussion of  punishment and plenitude, Hick mounts his critique 
on the Augustinian aesthetic theme: 
The Augustinian theodicy, especially in Thomist thought and in the 
Protestantism of  the eighteenth-century ‘optimists’ (as distinct from 
that of  the Reformers and of  twentieth-century neo-Reformation 
theologians), sees God’s relation to His creation in predominantly 
non-personal terms.  God’s goodness is His overflowing plenitude of  
being bestowing existence upon a dependent realm; man has 
accordingly been created as part of  a hierarchy of  forms of  existence 
which would be incomplete without him; evil is traceable to the 
necessary finitude and contingency of  a dependent world which 
however exhibits an aesthetic perfection when seen from the divine 
standpoint; and the existence of  moral evil is harmonized within this 
perfect whole by the balancing effect of  just punishment.  These are 
all ideas to which the category of  the personal is peripheral.59
Hick renders the same verdict on privation when he writes, “The notion of  
evil as non-being is essentially an impersonal conception.”60  
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In chapter 3, we will discuss this more fully, but for now it is enough to note 
why Hick reacts against the aesthetic theme.61  It is not that he simply takes 
issue with Augustine’s version.  As a point of  fact, Hick notes a similarity 
between the Augustinian and Irenaean conception of  the aesthetic 
perfection of  the universe.  Both thinkers offer similar aesthetic reflections 
on the universe.  Though Hick rightly describes how the Augustinian 
conception is continually balanced (displaying moment-to-moment justice 
and harmony), while the Irenaean conception is eschatological in focus, 
looking to a future resolution.  Redrawing the Augustinian aesthetic sketch 
of  creation, Hick describes an eschatologically focused alternative to the 
Augustinian atemporal aesthetic: 
Some music includes unfulfilled beginnings and even an element of  
clash and disharmony at one stage of  the musical development in 
order to make possible a later triumphant resolution in which the 
dissonant notes are worked into a complex harmony that would not 
be possible without them.  On this analogy the aesthetic perfection of  
the universe is no longer that of  its state at any one moment.62
Yet, Hick warns, “even this improved version of  the aesthetic theme, 
making use of  the added dimension of  time...is still open to a fundamental 
objection which, since it operates against other aspects of  the Augustinian 
tradition of  theodicy as well, will be presented in a separate section.”63  The 
“fundamental objection” Hick intends to bring in the following section is 
this: the Augustinian picture of  the universe is fundamentally flawed 
because it draws our attention away from the personal dimension of  
Christian theology.  Hick then concludes his formal critique of  the 
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in the book:
The whole aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic understanding of  the perfection of  the universe is 
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(Ibid., 201)
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Augustinian type (though he continues critiquing it throughout the book), 
perhaps ironically, with excellent rhetorical employment of  antitheta.  “[I]f  
God is personal,” Hick writes, “we must see man as standing in a quite 
different relationship to Him from that in which the material universe stands 
to its Creator”.  A number of  propositions follow: “construing evil [not] as 
metaphysical non-being” but rather as “a failure of  personal relationship”; 
seeing “human life [not] as a link in the great chain of  being” but rather as 
central to God’s intention for fellowship; “upholding [not] the perfection of 
the universe as an aesthetic whole” but rather as “suited to the fulfillment of 
God’s purposes for it”.64  Hick’s explicit critique of  the previously described 
Augustinian aesthetic theme, then, amounts to a systematic rejection of  the 
impersonal nature of  all these theological conceptions.  
Thus, it is not so much the nature of  the aesthetic picture which is 
presented, so much as the presentation of  creation as a picture, which is a 
problem.  “[T]he medium is the message”, Marshall McLuhan famously 
stated; for Hick, the medium of  the aesthetic theme cuts against the 
message of  God’s personal intentions for his creation.65  So, ironically, given 
this argument, even an Irenaean “eschatological” aesthetic theme will not 
properly do for a truly Irenaean theodicy.  As focused on the importance of  
persons, Hick’s ‘Irenaean’ theodicy seeks to relate the wider world to God’s 
purposes for humans, rather than relating humans to the wider fabric of  
creation, which then reflects its creator in its totality.  The importance of  
Hick’s objection to both an Augustinian and an Irenaean aesthetic theme 
must again be re-emphasized.  Hick is explicit that any kind of  emphasis on 
global aesthetic analogies depersonalizes our perception of  the universe, and 
hence distorts our vision for God’s purposes and the nature of  sin, no 
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matter how effective the theodicy behind the picture.  His argument must 
ultimately end in the conclusion that theodicy cannot be complemented, let 
alone supplemented, by aesthetic categories.  If  even his favored theodicy 
cannot be rendered as art, then all such attempts must be ultimately ruled 
out.
3. Meta-Theodicy and the Aesthetic Theme.  
Hick’s analysis of  the “aesthetic theme” is a helpful starting point, as it 
brings into focus several issues.  First, Hick begins to clarify what we may 
call the aesthetic theme in theodicy.  Regarding the Augustinian tradition, as 
cited before, Hick uses this to mean that “seen in its totality from the 
ultimate standpoint of  the Creator, the universe is wholly good; for even the 
evil within it is made to contribute to the complex perfection of  the 
whole.”66  Tyron Inbody, likewise commenting on Augustine’s theodicy, 
echoes Hick’s definition of  the aesthetic theme as an attempt to see creation 
in its totality, including evil, as an “aesthetic cosmic harmony.”67  
For Augustine, Aquinas, and others in this strain of  the Medieval tradition, 
the undefeated perfection of  the universe was seen through the lens of  the 
aesthetic.  Even when considering hell, John Scotus Eriugena writes, 
Thus, what in part seems discordant, in the whole is found to be not 
only not discordant, but an addition to its beauty… not only does 
[hell] show forth the severity of  the most just of  all judges and the 
irrevocability of  his judgments but it also adds to the glory and 
embellishes the beauty of  the blessed state of  the angels and the 
Saints.68
This is the Medieval mind at work, seeking to unite all aspects of  heaven, 
hell and the cosmos under a single, beautiful aesthetic.  
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But the Augustinian tradition does not represent the only manifestation of  
the aesthetic theme.  Though Hick describes only Augustine’s aesthetic 
theme, I will put forward that we may take the aesthetic theme to more 
generally indicate a certain way of  seeing elements of  the theology, and more 
specifically, theodicy, through the lens of  aesthetic values, categories, or works.  The 
aesthetic theme, then, is not necessarily inclusive of  all aesthetic elements 
(such as, say, the beatific vision) which can be included in a straightforwardly 
moral theodicy, but rather is defined by an attempt to see from the perspective of 
the aesthetic (if  only for a moment) in order to glimpse something perhaps not visible 
from other vantage points.
Second, Hick’s sustained argument against the aesthetic theme shows us that 
our larger methodology in doing theodicy will affect what kinds of  values 
and categories we will allow to play a role.  As mentioned above, Hick seeks 
internal coherence as well as agreement with the findings of  science and the 
religious data.69  To be sure, it is difficult to quarrel with a theodicy that 
seeks coherence and rationality.  But reading Hick carefully may lead us to 
question the methods of  Hick’s theodicy.  In his conclusion to his lengthy 
discussion of  the Augustinian type of  theodicy, Hick boldly states that “man 
alone among God’s creatures is, as far as we know, capable of  personal 
relationship with Him.”70  This shores up, in Hick’s mind, the likelihood that 
God created “the great frame of  nature, with all its sources of  evil, as the 
deliberately mysterious environment of  finite personal life.”71  Sensing 
potential objections from his more biblically-minded readers, Hick adds the 
qualification that the existence of  higher beings like angels is perfectly 
consistent with the Christian tradition, but that “we do not know enough 
about them to draw them within the scope of  the rational discussion”.72  
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Immediately thereafter Hick also notes that we also lack positive knowledge 
of  life on other planets, as if  belief  in angels and belief  in aliens were on the 
same level of  likelihood, given Christian presuppositions.  
Hick then grants the possibility that “the material universe and the ranges of  
sub-human life within it have very important further significances to their 
maker than simply as an environment for personal life”, but comments that 
we cannot “properly build any specific theological conclusions upon 
them.”73  Hick’s comment here, that we cannot build “theological 
conclusions” on the elements of  the aesthetic theme (specifically, in this 
case, plenitude), seems hastily dismissive in isolation, and though I think he is 
mistaken, he helpfully contrasts this element of  the aesthetic theme with 
something which he finds much more helpful.  In the next paragraph, Hick 
writes, 
Whatever realms of  life and dimensions of  meaning there may be 
beyond our present awareness and concern [e.g. the aesthetic theme], 
our positive knowledge of  God’s nature and purpose still derives from 
His incarnation in Jesus Christ… The actions constituting Jesus’ 
impact upon the world were the actions of  an agape which was 
continuous with, and directly revelatory of, the eternal agape of  
God.74
Specifically, as Hick observes, the gospels witness to “the active agape of  
God at work in human life.”75  Thus “in light of  the Incarnation, then, any 
justification of  evil must,” Hick suggests, “be a justification of  it as playing a 
part in bringing about the high good of  man’s fellowship with God, rather 
than as necessary to the aesthetic perfection of  a universe which, in virtue 
of  its completeness, includes personal life.”76  Hick concludes his entire 
section on Augustinian theodicy with the provocative statement: “A 
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Christian theodicy must be centered upon moral personality rather than 
upon nature as a whole, and its governing principle must be ethical rather 
than aesthetic.”77  This suggests that Hick advocates a kind of  moral 
minimalism, a compression of  theodicy’s “spectrum” to include only those 
parts of  the theological bandwidth which touch directly on the moral and 
personal elements of  God’s providential plan. 
Given the above discussion of  Hick’s treatment of  the aesthetic theme, it is 
now possible to grasp more solidly why he resists its inclusion in Christian 
theodicy.  Two key elements inform this eschewal: 1) the “scope of  rational 
discussion” is not such that speculative elements such as human pre-
lapsarian existence, the existence of  angels, or the aesthetic theme could 
play a significant role; and 2) the point of  the theodicy discussion is God’s 
active agape for human persons, and if  the aesthetic theme is not directly 
revelatory of  this, it is beyond theodicy’s concern.
The remainder of  Part I is my attempt to examine these two assumptions.  
Chapter 1 will deal with the task and scope of  theodicy as I seek to explore 
how the shape of  theodicy has affected the sorts of  categories allowed into 
the discussion.  Chapter 2 will address the role of  the aesthetic theme in the 
communication of  God’s agape for persons.  Further, in Part II, Chapter 3 
will take on some of  the issues Hick has raised in regard to Augustinian 
theodicy as I seek to defend the Augustinian type of  theodicy more 
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specifically.  The remaining chapters seek further to explore how various 
aesthetic themes affect the practice of  theodicy.78
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CHAPTER 1: AESTHETICS AND THE SCOPE OF THEODICY
 I pray thee, cease thy counsel,
 Which falls into mine ears as profitless
 As water in a sieve: give not me counsel;
Nor let no comforter delight mine ear...
For there was never yet philosopher
 That could endure the toothache patiently,
       SHAKESPEARE
       Much Ado About Nothing
 There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
 Than are dreamt of  in your philosophy
 
       SHAKESPEARE
       Hamlet 
1. Contemporary Theodicy and The Aesthetic Theme
John Hick has raised two related objections which I will allow to be 
determinative for the remainder of  Part I.  In an attempt to address the first 
objection in this chapter it will now be necessary to look at the wider range 
of  problem of  evil literature.  Here we will find that Hick is not alone in 
doubting the value of  the aesthetic theme in the theodicy discussion.  First, 
I will look at specific objections in the wider literature.  Then, I will explore 
more fundamental reasons why the aesthetic theme has met with 
indifference, if  not resistance.  In the final section, I will explore some 
developments in the recent literature which point to modes of  theodicy 
which are much more inclusive of  the aesthetic theme.
1.1. Philosophical Theodicy and the Aesthetic Theme 
Though the theodicy literature of  the last sixty years is formidable and 
specialized (Barry L. Whitney records 4200 works on the subject between 
1960 and 1991) there is a paucity of  literature on the role of  aesthetic 
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considerations in the area.79  As theodicists have diverged into detailed 
discussions of  the logical argument from evil, the evidential argument from 
evil, the probabilistic problem of  evil, and a host of  other issues, the role of 
aesthetics has gained virtually no attention.  Those mentions aesthetics does 
warrant are rarely positive.  
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and plentiful as it is.  In his annotated bibliography of  theodicy, Barry Whitney cites 4200 works on 
the subject between 1960 and 1991 [Barry L. Whitney, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the 
Problem of  Evil, 1960-1991 (Charlottesville, VA: The Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998)].  
Such a literature is beyond summary.  Further complicating study of  the voluminous publications 
are two key polarities.  First, though the problem of  evil is a fundamentally a theological issue - it 
has no force apart from belief  in a supreme being - study of  this field is relevant to theists and 
atheists alike.   Systematic theology is understandably more insular, an internal dialogue between 
theologians, but theodicy is often defined by an interchange between believers and unbelievers.  
This first dichotomy understandably leads to a second one between theologians and philosophers.  
Since those outside the faith are not often primarily in theology, but in the wider realm of  secular 
inquiry, the atheistic component of  the theodicy is understandably philosophical.  The theological 
response to the problem of  evil then, has recently been very philosophical in nature, and thus a 
large portion of  recent theodicy is produced by Christian philosophers.
Adding to this, theologians of  recent years have tended to steer away from theodicy as it has been 
classically defined.  Though Barth’s writings on evil are significant and often discussed, the 
Barthian critique of  Leibniz and natural theology in general has taken much of  the wind out of  
theodicy’s sails by removing theological reflection on evil from the reach of  the atheistic argument.  
Hume’s inconsistent triad in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion rests on an ability to abstract the 
content of  theology from an explicitly Christian context and thus exists in the realm of  natural 
theology.  By focusing on the problem of  evil as an internal question, and thus removing theology 
from the realm of  secular understanding, it is removed from secular dialogue.
P. T. Forsyth, paralleling many of  Barth’s observations, likewise focuses his theodicy as an internal 
justification of  God’s goodness rather than an explication of  the occurrence of  evil to outsiders:
The object is not to bring God’s ways to the bar either of  man’s reason or man’s 
conscience, but rather to the bar where all reason and conscience must go at last, to the 
standard of  a holy God’s own account of  Himself  in Jesus Christ and His Cross. A 
philosophical theodicy or vindication of  God’s justice has not yet been found. [P. T. 
Forsyth, The Justification of  God: Lectures for War-Time on a Christian Theodicy (London: 
Duckworth, 1916) v]
Theologians such as Moltmann have eschewed speculative theodicy, in favor of  a more “critical” 
one.  For Moltmann, a Christian should not “rest content with any slickly explanatory answer to 
the theodicy question. And he will also resist any attempts to soften the question down. The more a 
person believes, the more deeply he experiences pain over the suffering in the world, and the more 
passionately he asks about God and the new creation" [Jurgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom 
(New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1991) 49].  Liberation theology and feminist theology share 
much of  the same focus, as they seek to avoid speculative comfort in favor of  practical action.
In the 20th-century Protestant context, Pannenberg stands out as a something of  an exception in 
that he acknowledges the problem of  evil as it challenges the Christian doctrine of  the goodness of 
God’s creative act, and offers a modest response to the problem by drawing on contemporary 
philosophers such as Hick.  More recently, however, the trend has continued in theology to cast 
doubt on theodicy in the philosophical tradition, as is evinced (in differing ways) by the writings of  
theologians such as Donald MacKinnon, Richard Bauckham, Kenneth Surin, T. W. Tilley, Sarah 
Katherine Pinnock, and David Bentley Hart.  Undoubtedly the greatest focus on theodicy as an 
attempt to resolve the prima facie contradiction between the idea of  God and the fact of  evil has 
been within the field of  the philosophy of  religion, and thus it is reasonable to focus our attention 
here at the outset in order to get a sense of  the prevailing trends in theodicy.
In his essay, “Divine Goodness and the Problem of  Evil”, Terence 
Penelhum warns against the idea that “minor aesthetic advantages could 
outweigh major moral and physical disadvantages.”80  Penelhum’s example is 
of  the aesthetically pleasing side-effects” of  tuberculosis, the sufferers of  
which “acquire a charming pink flush, and according to Puccini can often 
sing better than healthy people.”81  Here Penelhum is referencing the 
medical symptoms of  tuberculosis, as well as wittily alluding to Puccini’s La 
Boheme, where the character of  Mimì, afflicted with tuberculosis, can 
amazingly sing with clarity, despite the lung-ravaging nature of  the disease.
To be sure, in either case it would seem silly to hold up a natural blush 
(caused by fever) or enhanced singing ability as compensation for the 
affliction of  consumption.   We too would combat the idea that “minor 
aesthetic advantages could outweigh major moral and physical 
disadvantages.”82 Yet, while Penelhum’s witty warning against such silly 
suggestions is certainly valid, the reader is left wondering why anyone would 
value the pink flush of  tuberculosis over the attendant sickness and death?  
Penelhum doesn’t say, though he later imagines “a consistent disciple of  
Oscar Wilde, who believes that aesthetic values can properly take 
precedence over ethical ones”.83   
Timothy O’Connor, however, in giving advice to theodicists in “The 
Problem of  Evil: An Introduction”, goes further than Penelhum in warning 
against the dangers of  aesthetics.  In his general advice O’Connor lays down 
the rule that “Grave evils cannot be morally justified by their service of  
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aesthetic or other non-moral value.”84  Thus O’Connor establishes a ‘chain 
of  command’ within theodicy, with all aesthetic and other non-moral goods 
disallowed from standing in as potential justifying reasons.  
Eleonore Stump seems to take this line as well.  In her essay “The Problem 
of  Evil”, she attempts to find some room for “other goods” (including, 
perhaps, such goods as the Augustinian contrastive beauty):
Finally, for the many other goods sometimes said to be produced by 
evil, such as punishment of  sins or aesthetic contemplation of  the 
whole canvas of  creation if  any of  these are in fact both good and 
produced by evil, I welcome them into my account… I have singled 
out one good produced by evil, [free will] as the good which justifies 
all the evil in the world, but nothing in this claim rules out the 
possibility that evil produces various other lesser goods as well which 
may contribute to the justification of  some sorts of  evil.85
Stump’s mention of  aesthetic goods is more positive sounding than 
O’Connor’s, in that Stump welcomes a variety of  other goods which “may 
contribute” to justification of  certain evils, while O’Connor simply lays out 
his maxim against their use in justifying serious evils.  
Perhaps the most negative statement about the role of  aesthetic values 
appears in Philip Quinn’s essay “God, Moral Perfection, and Possible 
Worlds”.  In discussing the relative value of  possible worlds, Quinn assumes 
that moral goodness is the dominant category for deciding between them.  
He writes, “I shall assume that the sort of  goodness which would be 
important from the point of  view of  a perfectly good moral agent 
envisaging a possible world is moral goodness”.86  Quinn acknowledges 
other criteria, specifically aesthetic value, but denies that this should be a 
serious consideration.  He writes,
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[O]ne possible world might be judged better than another just in case 
the first ranked higher on a scale combining considerations of  
simplicity and variety…  Of  course, it is by no means evident that 
possible worlds which are very simple and chock full of  variety are 
also particularly morally edifying.  Perhaps simplicity and variety 
constitute an appropriate basis for comparative judgments of  aesthetic 
goodness and yet are utterly irrelevant to moral goodness.”87
1.3. Reasons Behind this Suspicion
These four shorter examples, in addition to Hick’s longer critique, are 
among the clearest attempts to deal with aesthetic value in thinking about 
the practice of  theodicy.  Though each comes with its own background, 
some continuity may be found between them.  All four show a desire, on 
the part of  theodicists, to bracket out or bar aesthetic considerations from 
the main focus of  theodicy.  In all cases, aesthetics is more-or-less discreetly 
pushed to the side. 
Marilyn Adams, in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of  God, uses three brief  
citations of  Penelhum, Stump, and Quinn (respectively) to chart a sliding 
scale set of  assumptions which lead to, as Adams writes, “a full-scale 
compartmentalization of  aesthetic from moral value and from goodness to 
persons”.88   
In observing this trend, Adams is not interested in looking at the particular 
motivations behind the varying statements, nor is it, as she writes, “to charge 
individual authors with invalid references”.89  For her it is enough to observe 
the trend, which may be due to a wide number of  reasons.  Adams 
highlights one main reason she suspects lies behind much of  this suspicion, 
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the “enormous influence of  Kant, whose Critique of  Judgment enforces a 
separation of  aesthetics from science and morals”.90  
Here I certainly agree with Adams that the Kantian legacy has been 
powerfully determinative of  the way that aesthetics has been utilized (or, 
more accurately, barred from being “useful”).91  But while I find Adams’ 
treatment of  Penelhum, Stump, and Quinn to be fair-minded (she levels no 
unfair accusations against them) both her sliding-scale trend and her 
intimations of  Kantian influence do not get to one major part of  the 
problem with moral- and aesthetic-value integration in theodicy, and thus 
overlooks why aesthetics is excluded in this context.  
Adams’ charted trend seemingly implies only an underlying suspicion of  
aesthetic value.  Which is to say that some aesthetic values are “insufficient” 
for defeating evils, that some are “at most supplementary, to the defeat of  
evils”, and finally that they are “utterly irrelevant to the defeat of  evils”.92  But 
I believe there is more to be said about why aesthetics is given so little 
attention in theodicy, and why, when it is mentioned, it is often dismissed, or 
separated from the main discussion.  In his lengthy treatment of  the issue, 
John Hick’s extended critique of  the aesthetic theme points to a more 
serious problem, that aesthetic values lie at the edges (or outside) the scope 
of  rational theodicy.  Penelhum, O’Connor, Stump and Quinn imply an 
insufficiency to aesthetic values, which Adams takes to be representative of  
widespread attitudes toward aesthetics as a discipline.  
However, the more basic problem for the aesthetic theme, it seems to me, is 
the way that the practice of  theodicy is typically set against integrating non-
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92 Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of  God, 130-1.
moral values.  Even if  the Kantian trend can be stopped and the usefulness 
of  aesthetics affirmed in theory, we must also lay out a model (or models) 
for the use of  aesthetics in the task of  resolving the tension between the 
idea of  God and occurrent evils. 
Giving due respect to Adams, her theodicy does lay out a model for 
integrating aesthetics (see Chapter 5), though she seems to overlook, within 
her discussion of  other theodicies, how the goals and methods of  
theodicists affect their inclusion of  the aesthetic theme, and therefore fails 
to advance the use of  the aesthetic theme in other forms of  theodicy beside 
her own.  
In order to remedy this, it is necessary to lay out several key barriers that 
prevent more mainstream theodicists from integrating the aesthetic theme.  
In the next section I will lay out two key reasons why theodicy has this 
problem, and therefore begin to deal with Hick’s primary objection to the 
aesthetic theme based on the limited “scope” of  theodicy.
2. Philosophical Frameworks in Theodicy: Morally Sufficient Reasons
2.1. Finding the Reasons. 
The practice of  theodicy over the last fifty years (since J. L. Mackie’s 
landmark “Evil and Omnipotence” in 1955), like most fifty-year-olds, has 
acquired comfortable habits.  These habits may be good or bad (I make no 
broad judgment here), but they have certainly been determined by the 
ongoing discourse between atheistic and theistic philosophers within the 
problem of  evil area.  
In Mackie’s famous essay, he puts forward not only that atheism is more 
likely, based on the presence of  evil in the world, but that theism is 
“positively irrational,” given the logical conflict between 1) God’s goodness, 
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2) God’s power and 3) Evil’s existence.93  Plantinga’s reply to Mackie, the 
equally landmark free-will defense, establishes the back-and-forth pattern 
for much of  the pursuant discussion.  To refute Mackie, Plantinga sets out 
to “Conceive of  a possible state of  affairs such that, if  it obtained, an 
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly Good God would have a good reason 
for permitting evil.”94  To this end, Plantinga conjoins the axiological 
assumption that
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely 
perform more [morally] good than [morally] evil actions) is more 
valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures 
at all.95
with the premise that 
it is possible that God could not have created a universe containing 
moral good (or as much moral good as this world contains) without 
creating one that also contained moral evil.96
Thus, by imagining a great enough good, and positing that that good could 
not come about without the possibility of  some evil, Plantinga aims to 
provide a morally sufficient reason (be it, according to his definition of  
‘defense’, a merely possible one), and so rebut the attack on theism.  This 
effort by Plantinga is generally taken to be quite successful on two counts.  
First, as William Alston comments, it is “now acknowledged on (almost) all 
sides that the logical argument [especially as it is put forth by Mackie] is 
bankrupt.”97  Second, free will has become quite entrenched in the theodicy 
discussion, with many others advocating it strongly.  Eleonore Stump, 
quoted above, finds free exercise of  the will essential to explaining evil when 
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she calls it “the good which justifies all the evil in the world”.98  Jerry Walls 
is equally emphatic on this point when he writes, “there is no other possible 
explanation of  the moral evil in our world apart from free will.”99
Other theodicies, while not holding exclusively to free will, employ much the 
same pattern.  John Hick’s soul-making theodicy holds up the value of  
character development, and like Plantinga, attempts to show that this 
particular good is connected to some portions of  evil in the world.  In 
Hick’s case, the connection is much stronger, in that suffering is often 
necessary for human spiritual growth. 
Richard Swinburne’s theodicy holds to this pattern, combining the 
emphases of  Plantinga and Hick’s theodicies on free will and soul making 
with emphasis on the importance of  human knowledge.  Swinburne 
emphasizes the value of  God giving humans significant responsibility.  
“[W]hat an awful world it would be if  the only good or harm we could do 
was to ourselves”, he writes.100   Given this, it follows that the high degree 
of  responsibility we are given will increase the probability that we will cause 
a great amount of  pain.  Hence, humans have a responsibility not to cause 
harm to others, and this requires that we learn more about the world as well 
as about our moral responsibilities.  Swinburne writes, 
But if  our choices are to be choices which make a difference to things 
for good or ill - not just choices made in a simulator - we need, as has 
been pointed out earlier, knowledge, factual and moral, of  the 
consequences of  our choices.101  
For those who find this line unpersuasive, Swinburne also argues that God 
could not give us free will, and yet protect us and others from the full effects 
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of  our bad choices.  Proposing the Principle of  Honesty, Swinburne tries to 
further elucidate why God has morally sufficient reasons to allow evils. 
“God has an obligation not to make a world,” he writes, “in which agents 
are systematically deceived on important matters without their having the 
possibility of  discovering the deception.”102  Thus, free will and significant 
responsibility must not be thwarted by God’s systematic intervention.
The above are three examples of  the form theodicy often takes in trying to 
answer the problem of  evil question.  Each noticeably focuses on finding 
one or more morally sufficient reasons for God to allow evils.  By contrast, 
a number of  more recent attempts to rebut the evidential argument from 
evil take the opposite approach. 
2.2. Explaining their Absence.  
Though the logical argument from evil (as Mackie proposed it) seems to be 
defeated, a more recent iteration of  the argument from evil, the evidential 
argument, seems to be more difficult to push back.  In its most popular 
version, framed by William Rowe, the evidential argument states that “There 
exist instances of  intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being 
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”103  Rowe gives two examples of  
this kind of  evil, one of  a fawn burnt and dying alone in the woods,104 and 
the other a five-year-old girl, raped, beaten, and murdered by her mother’s 
drunken boyfriend.105
Since, Rowe goes on to argue, an omnipotent, wholly good God would 
prevent all such instances of  suffering, this God must not exist.  The 
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difference between the evidential argument and the logical argument is that 
the logical problem depends upon the incompatibility between the idea of  
God and the fact of  evil, where the evidential argument depends upon the 
likelihood of  the existence of  gratuitous evils.
Most common among the responses to Rowe’s evidential argument has been 
the effort to challenge the notion that there exist “instances of  intense 
suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented 
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally 
bad or worse.”106  Stephen Wykstra, in his essay “Rowe’s Noseeum 
Arguments from Evil”, challenges Rowe by proposing the principle of  
CORNEA (Condition of  Reasonable Epistemic Access), which states that a 
person is only entitled to believe something does not exist, if  things would 
appear differently if  that thing did exist.  Since we cannot assume that we 
would be privy to God’s morally sufficient reasons, Wykstra’s argument 
goes, what appear to be gratuitous evils may very well not be, for all we 
know.107
Wykstra’s development of  CORNEA is compelling, but not without its 
problems.  Richard Swinburne has raised the criticism that Wykstra’s 
skeptical maneuver is too simplistic.  The crux of  Wykstra’s argument is the 
assumption that God’s ways are so much higher than our ways, that we lack 
the understanding to label certain evils gratuitous.  Swinburne writes:
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But the trouble with this version of  the argument is that while our 
moral beliefs (and factual beliefs, we may add) may indeed be in error 
in relevant respects, we need some further argument to show that 
they are more likely to be biased in the direction of  failing to 
understand that some apparent bad states really serve greater goods, 
rather than in the direction of  failing to understand why some 
apparent good states really serve greater bad states.108
William Alston advances an “agnostic thesis” that takes on Rowe’s 
arguments from gratuitous evils, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls 
Swinburne points out with Wykstra’s argument.  Alston writes,
I will not be proceeding on the basis of  any general skepticism about 
our cognitive powers either across the board or generally with respect 
to God.  I will, rather, be focusing on the peculiar difficulties we 
encounter in attempting to provide adequate support for a certain very 
ambitious negative existential claim, viz., that there is (can be) no 
sufficient divine reason for permitting a certain case of  suffering…109 
Alston combats the idea that our cognitive powers are incapable of  
understanding evil at all. He does this by assembling a list of  partial reasons 
why God might allow evils: these include allowing evil as a punishment for 
sin, allowing evil as a result of  free will, allowing evil for the purpose of  soul 
making, and allowing evil because of  the redemptive power of  suffering.110  
The fact that none of  these reasons seem to strongly outweigh the 
gratuitous evils Rowe brings up does not mean that Alston’s attempt fails.  
True, no single reason or set of  reasons we can think of  acts as the trump 
card to horrendous evil, but the fact that we can think of  a wide range of  
reasons for serious, but not horrendous evils, leads us to believe that it is 
likely that there are such reasons, we just can’t quite grasp them.111  
Our inability to summon perfect reasons Alston chocks up to six factors:
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a.“Lack of  data,” including full knowledge of  the past and future, the 
workings of  the human psyche, and so on.  
b.“Complexity greater than we can handle.”
c.“Difficulty determining what is metaphysically possible or 
necessary.”
d.“Ignorance of  the full range of  possibilities,” our imaginations are 
often limited in what they can conceive.
e.“Ignorance of  the full range of  values.”
f.“Limits to our capacity to make well-considered value judgments.” 
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So Wykstra, Alston and others attempt to deflect Rowe’s argument from 
gratuitous evil by finding reasons why we may not have access to God’s 
reasons.
2.3. Application.  
The above summary of  some major elements of  the contemporary theodicy 
discussion is helpful to show the prominent role of  morally sufficient 
reasons in the theodicy discussion.  While there are exceptions (some will be 
discussed below) the majority of  the theodicy question centers around 
finding morally sufficient reasons, or otherwise explaining why we need not, 
or cannot, find them.  Richard Swinburne states well one side of  the 
methodology for theodicy as it is often practiced, while Stephen Wykstra 
shows us the other side of  the pendulum swing:
Swinburne: If  the theist can provide for states of  each kind a reason 
why God could justifiably allow a state of  that kind to occur - e.g. pain 
deliberately caused by humans being justified in terms of  the good of  
humans having a free choice of  whether or not to cause pain 
deliberately to others - he will have provided a total adequate 
theodicy.113
Wykstra: [The theist’s account is that] behind the universe there is 
God, who cares for us (and sparrows and fawns as well); we cannot, 
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however, however, see the purposes for which God allows many of  
the things he does.  The Christian specification of  theism, in 
particular, promises no insight into God’s purposes, but assurance of  
his love.114  
Whether or not one agrees with Swinburne or Wykstra (or neither) is beside 
the point.  The key here is gaining a sense of  the major emphasis in 
theodicy on reasons, whether probable, plausible, possible, or hidden.  These 
reasons are proposed in an effort to acquit God of  culpability for an action 
- specifically, the action of  permitting (or perhaps causing) a certain evil or 
type of  evil.  The problem this poses for theodicy, I suggest, is that aesthetic 
values have fared very poorly when employed exclusively within the context of  morally 
sufficient reasons.  Though I cannot back up this statement completely, by way 
of  example, I will invoke one part of  the aesthetic theodicy tradition, 
process theodicy, which falls into this trap, as a way of  elucidating the 
challenges of  introducing aesthetic criteria in this  framework. 
2.4. Aesthetic Values as Morally Sufficient Reasons?
Penelhum, above, raised a warning against the idea that “minor aesthetic 
advantages could outweigh major moral and physical disadvantages” citing 
an imaginary disciple of  Oscar Wilde as the potential advocate of  such 
views.115  O’Connor vaguely puts forward a warning against such similar 
employment of  “aesthetic or other non-moral value” in justifying grave 
evils, though without any apparent target in mind.116  It seems likely, 
however, that lying behind these warnings against aesthetic values is a fear of 
slipping into modes of  theodicy like those in process theology, which often 
invoke goods that are deemed as less-than-sufficient to morally compensate 
for evil.
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Two recent process theologians, David Ray Griffin and Barry L. Whitney, 
have weighed aesthetic value on the scales of  theodicy, and attempted to 
show a substantial aesthetic benefit which outweighs occurrent evil. In this 
way, both stand in the tradition of  Alfred North Whitehead, who placed 
heavy emphasis on aesthetic categories when formulating his theodicy. In 
Religion in the Making, Whitehead writes, “All order is aesthetic order; and the 
moral order is merely certain aspects of  aesthetic order.”117  Griffin follows 
in Whitehead’s steps, championing the two central aesthetic criteria of  
“harmony and intensity” as central to the world’s purpose: following 
Whitehead and Griffin, the former is ideal, the latter is guaranteed.118  For 
Whitehead, the highest form of  beauty consists in harmony, together with 
the quality of  intensity.  In his Adventures of  Ideas, Whitehead differentiates 
between “minor” and “major” beauty to make a bigger point.  Minor beauty 
is merely harmonious, merely “the absence of  painful clash”.119   But major 
beauty is bigger and better.  It contains contrasts.  Whitehead writes, “These 
contrasts introduce new conformal intensities natural to each of  them, and 
by so doing raise the intensities of  conformal feeling”.120  In other words, 
contrasts raise the level of  intensity and make beauty bigger.  For Whitehead, 
all of  life is like a big work of  art, so it’s no surprise that he sees the purpose 
of  the universe in the same way that he views beauty: “God’s purpose in the 
creative advance is the evocation of  intensities.”121 
Griffin elaborates on Whitehead’s maxim that “Perfection at a low level 
ranks below Imperfection with higher aim”122 to hold up intense discord as 
preferable to trivial harmony, and thus to argue that:
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Recognizing that unnecessary triviality is an evil provides a basis for 
understanding the evolutionary development of  our world as 
manifesting the creative purposes of  a good God.123
Both Griffin and Whitehead strongly emphasize the importance of  intensity 
and the danger of  triviality.  However, Griffin is keen to point out that 
harmony, for both thinkers, is a value that God desires to bring about.  
Griffin writes, “Aesthetic goodness requires harmony as well as intensity, 
and physical pain is a primary example of  dis-harmony or discord.”124  
Griffin’s process deity desires harmony, then, but also wants to avoid trivial 
harmony, hence the process God brings about more intense experiences, 
and therefore “risk[s] the possibility of  more intense discord.”125  Applying 
his aesthetic insights to the world of  human life, Griffin asks whether God 
ought to have avoided the “possibility of  Jesus, Gautama, Socrates... 
Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Ghandi [etc.]” in order to avoid “the possibility 
of  persons such as Hitler, and horrors such as Auschwitz”?126  
Here Griffin makes his strongest call for the value of  increased intensity in 
human history, but even here we may still feel a nagging sense of  worry 
about the calculus which Griffin (and other process philosophers) use.  
While we may heartily approve of  the valor of  the kind of  people that this 
intensity makes possible, the very language of  intensity and triviality 
somehow seems inadequate to make sense of  how this world’s immense 
suffering might be justified.  In critiquing process theodicy, Stephen Ely has 
commented that the process God “is not primarily good.  He does not will 
the good.  He wills the beautiful.”127  Though Griffin attempts to say that  
“‘physical’ goodness cannot be played off  against aesthetic goodness” and 
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seeks to avoid the charge that aesthetic values are somehow separate from 
personal ones, it seems reasonable to say that something in the language of  
aesthetics, as Griffin uses it, seems inadequate to provide a satisfactory 
justification.128  I think it is safe to say that Griffin here seems to overvalue 
the conceptual power of  aesthetics to communicate the core idea of  his 
theodicy.  This tendency to overvalue aesthetics as a way of  providing a 
large-scale justification for evil can be seen in other process theodicy, such 
as that of  Barry Whitney.
Barry Whitney, in his article “An aesthetic solution to the problem of  evil”, 
stands faithfully in the tradition of  process theodicy when he attempts to 
“outline a version of  the aesthetic solution that seems to [him] the basis of  
an intellectually viable rational theodicy.”129  Whitney’s article sides with 
Griffin and Whitehead in defining aesthetic value as “the experience of  
intensity and harmony.”130  Whitney does not, like Whitehead and Griffin, 
believe that harmony will be absolute, but rather that aesthetic experience 
“strives toward and incorporates unity amid the diversity, harmony amid the 
chaos.”131  In fact, absolute harmony, according the Whitney would be 
“stifling”, and so he clearly places primary emphasis, alongside other 
process thinkers, on the view that the main function of  the aesthetic is the 
“evocation of  intensities.”132 
Whitney’s key thesis is that
[D]espite our finite, vulnerable, and precarious nature as human beings, 
we have an inherent creativity, an inner drive that seeks meaningful 
experiences… I submit that creatures not only have this need for 
meaning and value (the former gained through the latter, as aesthetic 
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value) but we also have this opportunity – at every moment… to 
experience it.  Indeed, no matter how bleak, limited, or disadvantaged 
our circumstances may be at particular moments, there is always an 
opportunity to experience at least some aesthetic value.133
This is the core justification at the center of  Whitney’s theodicy. 
The first thought that jumps to mind is that this seems a bit anemic to 
function as a total justification, but Whitney combines this premise with the 
further assumption that “there is no reason why any creature should expect 
to experience anything other than minimal value, let alone maximum value, a 
surplus of  value, or complete fulfillment.”134  Here he is also clearly drawing 
on Whitehead, who also shares the assumption that “something is better 
than nothing.”135  Even combining his two premises, that there is always 
some opportunity for aesthetic value, and therefore meaning, and that all we 
can expect as creatures is minimal value, Whitney’s process theodicy seems 
unlikely to ever succeed.  Neither premise, I believe, is correct.  
First, Whitney seems convinced that there is always some “opportunity for 
aesthetic value”, but he seems too easily to assume that all aesthetic values 
are positive, and that there is “some minimal value in each experience”.136  
Here Whitehead’s affirmation that “Perfection at a low level ranks below 
Imperfection with higher aim” probably lies behind Whitney’s assumption, 
but this cannot always be true.  It is surely not the case that a spoiled soufflé 
is preferable to eat than simple baked bread, or that one would rather see a 
terrible orchestra perform than sing camp songs around a fire.  Disvalues 
can defeat organic wholes such that an artwork, experience, action, and so 
on, in its entirety, takes on negative value.  
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Second, Whitney’s lowering of  the bar to merely “minimal value” is 
unacceptable to most theodicists who seek to find values that are deeply 
satisfying to humans on par with our ability to experience value and 
meaning.  Since we have the capacity for more than minimal value, it is 
reasonable to expect that God would provide us with such.  At the very 
least, it is reasonable to believe that God would provide us with value that is 
on par with our experience of  disvalues such as injustice and suffering.
In sum, it is difficult to imagine the sort of  goods Whitney proposes being 
very satisfactory when proposed as great enough to outweigh occurent evil.  
Imagine a certain situation, say, a man named Polk takes his ten-year-old son 
to the beach.  While swimming, Polk's son is dragged out to sea by a rip-tide 
and drowns.  A year later Polk seeks the advice of  four philosophical 
detectives who have researched the case extensively, in order to discover if  
his son’s death was a gratuitous evil.  The Plantingan detective informs Polk 
that the lifeguard on duty neglected to put up a rip-tide warning and instead 
freely willed to get drunk at 11 A.M.  Thus the lifeguard is to blame for 
choosing to sinfully neglect his duties.  The Hickean detective tells Polk that 
God does not stop all suffering, because he can use this sad event as a 
means to shape his character so that he can experience ultimate happiness 
through loving union with God.  The Swinburnian informs Polk that rip-
tides are a natural occurrence, and thus if  God stopped all such nautical 
events he would be deceiving us about the functioning of  the natural world, 
and as well as our responsibilities for parental care and beach safety.  Finally, 
the Whitneyan detective informs Polk that in this, as in every, situation we 
have the opportunity to experience a minimum of  aesthetic value, and since 
this is all we can expect, the son’s death is not gratuitous.  
While I accede that the first three explanations also sound a bit tinny in the 
face of  such suffering, there is a clear quality difference, I think, between the 
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first three and the final process explanation.  The shared denominator 
between the first three is, of  course, that each seems more closely connected 
with what many Christians take to be God’s ultimate purpose for us–to 
freely grow in knowledge and love as we become conformed to the likeness 
of  Christ.  
Given the structure of  considering a specific evil and seeking to discover a 
morally sufficient reason God might have to cause or permit such an 
occurrence, it seems unlikely that the aesthetic explanation could ever stand 
on its own.  If  we are seeking to acquit a moral agent of  charges against 
him, partial reasons may often appear worse on that agent’s record.  If, by 
way of  explanation, I told a lifelong friend that I couldn’t come to his 
birthday party because I had to give my dog a haircut, this would make me 
seem much worse of  a friend to value my dog’s grooming over my friend’s 
celebration.  Analogously, if  we are seeking to find large-scale morally 
sufficient reasons why God allows evil, it can often seem confusing or 
callous to offer only partial explanations.  If  we are seeking a good reason 
why God allows us to suffer greatly, and are given an insufficient answer, 
this will do very little to show how God is good.  More likely, a partial 
answer will make God appear callous to human misery.  Partial answers, in 
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the context of  providing morally sufficient reasons, guarantee very little 
ability to solve the problem.137
Some may raise the point that process theism is shielded from the same 
sorts of  scrutiny as traditional theism because of  its alternative theology.  
But it is noteworthy that Whitney himself  does not isolate his theodicy to 
the process community:
[T]he version of  the aesthetic theory I have proposed here does not 
necessarily assume the process metaphysics nor a specialist’s 
familiarity with it.  The aesthetic theory stands on its own, although 
process metaphysics provides a favorable context.138
Further, process theology as a whole cannot avoid traditional criticisms.  As 
William Hasker has keenly pointed out, the process God is still responsible 
for evil (though powerless to stop it) because the process God coaxed this 
world into its current state of  evolution, and thus brought about the 
environment in which we live and suffer.139  
Thus, Edward Madden and Peter Hare critique the process God (as 
described in Whitehead) as “a being who sacrifices human feeling to 
aesthetic ends” and is therefore “not totally good”.140  They write, 
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“Certainly a God who is willing to pay any amount in moral and physical 
evil to gain aesthetic value is an unlovable being.”141
In the end, Whitney’s theodicy (and process theodicy on the whole) 
ultimately succumbs to the sorts of  criticisms raised by Penelhum, who 
would no doubt find Whitney’s ‘experience of  intensity and harmony’ 
insufficient to justify major moral or physical harm.  The failure of  sorts of  
theodicies like Whitney’s, I think, leads people such as O’Connor to state 
that grave evils should not be justified  by appeal to aesthetic or other non-
moral values.  Thus, returning to Adams’ citation of  the suspicious trend in 
theodicy toward aesthetics, it is not necessarily a suspicion based on Kantian 
values segregation, perhaps so much as a desire to avoid guilt by association 
with process theology’s inability to effectively integrate aesthetic values into 
the framework of  contemporary theodicy.
Yet, the failure of  process theodicy to enter aesthetic value into the realm of 
morally sufficient reasons does not, I think, indicate that aesthetic values can 
make no contribution to theodicy done in this way–but it is certainly not 
obvious how this would be so.  Eleonore Stump ‘welcomes’ other values to 
“contribute to the justification of  some sorts of  evil”, but exactly how they 
would play this supplemental role, given the general success of  free will in 
explaining evil, is still unknown.142
3. Philosophical Frameworks in Theodicy: Best-of-all-Possible-Worlds 
Scenarios
Having briefly looked at the ‘shape’ of  contemporary theodicy, with its 
focus on morally sufficient reasons, we can see the impetus behind the 
desire to provide such reasons (which seek to alleviate the why question as it 
focuses on the occurrence of  specific evils), and also the way that 
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insufficient reasons seem impotent to provide satisfaction within that 
framework.  There are, however, other ways of  considering the problem of  
evil question.  One way of  framing this discussion, famously associated with 
Leibniz, is the best-of-all-possible-worlds argument.
In essence, the argument from evil can be reformulated in an effort to 
contradict the notion that this is the most optimal world, which if  combined 
with the idea that God must create the best, may contradict rational theism.  
Leibniz formulates the best-of-all-possible-worlds argument well when he writes:
One may say that as soon as God has decreed to create something 
there is a struggle between all the possibles, all of  them laying claim to 
existence, and that those which, being united, produce the most reality, 
most perfection, most significance carry the day.  It is true that all this 
struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it can only be a conflict of  
reasons in the most perfect understanding which cannot but act in the 
most perfect way, and consequently to choose the best.143 
Following Leibniz, if  we assume “the best” to include aesthetic values as 
well as moral ones, it seems likely that the role of  the aesthetic will factor 
well into any theodicy in this vein.  If  the most optimal world includes the 
best combination of  happiness, goodness, and beauty, then any argument 
for this world’s optimality will include consideration of  all these factors.  In 
The Monadology, Leibniz argues that there is perfect relationship between all 
the parts of  reality (at basis, simple substances, the eponymous ‘monads’), 
by which the universe is provided with “the greatest possible variety, 
together with the greatest order that may be” and through this means the 
universe has “obtained the greatest possible perfection.”144  
Throughout his various theological works, Leibniz reflects on the optimality 
of  the world by reference to beauty.  In Theodicy, he writes, “Every time we 
see such a work of  God [the heavens and the rest of  the universe], we find 
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it so perfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty 
thereof ”.145  Though we cannot conceive of  the totality of  creation we may 
see in isolated works such as a plant, animal or human, “a certain point of  
perfection”, and therefore “the wonderful contrivance of  the author.”146  
Here we see an area where aesthetic values can obviously contribute, in that, 
given a best world scenario, their absence might be considered a challenge to 
theism.  Allen Carlson, in Aesthetics and the Environment imagines an 
analogous “problem of  ugliness”:
Since an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-moral deity would 
presumably have perfect aesthetic judgment, how is he or she to be 
reconciled with the existence of  ugliness or more specific negative 
aesthetic qualities in the world that he or she has created?147
One can imagine this sort of  consideration weighing more heavily given a 
best world framework.  One might combine an argument using morally 
sufficient reasons explaining God’s allowance of  evil, and then “top it off ” 
with aesthetic arguments for the world’s harmonious perfection.  Thus an 
aesthetic apologetic could become a regular part of  the problem of  evil 
argument.  Is this the place for aesthetics that we have been seeking?
On the whole it seems that the larger question of  the world’s general 
goodness admits more easily of  aesthetic considerations than the question 
of  God’s permission of  specific evils.   Thus one could argue that by 
shifting focus from a framework of  morally sufficient reasons to an 
emphasis on highlighting the optimal value of  the world, one can better 
make room for the aesthetic theme.  But this move may be overly hasty. 
Recent work on the concept of  a best possible world has shown the idea to 
be incoherent, and otherwise generally unhelpful.  
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3.1. Could There Be a Best Possible World? 
Though Leibniz, as quoted above, seems convinced that God could weigh 
all the possibilities and emerge with a single, perfect world, there is good 
reason to doubt Leibniz’s position.  In evaluating the coherence of  the idea 
of  “optimality”, Bruce Reichenbach imagines two ways that we might 
conceive of  the best possible world.  
The first way is in terms of  the world’s richness and variety.  Following 
Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas and others, Leibniz imagines the world as an 
immensely diverse plenitude of  forms, ascending from the lowest to the 
highest.  Yet Reichenbach notes that even given the widely diverse forms of  
this world, interstitial gaps are always present.  He writes, “Between various 
life forms, whether actual or possible, there is an infinite variety of  other life 
forms.”148  Hence, “regarding the richness of  the actual or any possible 
world, for any degree of  richness n, there could be n+1 richness.”149  A 
second way of  construing the world’s “optimality” would be in the degree 
that it exhibited some positive state of  affairs, whether it be happiness, or 
beauty, or pleasure, or morality.  But, as before, no upper limit could clearly 
be proposed.  For any amount of  beauty or happiness n, one could always 
imagine n+1.   Reichenbach concludes, “Thus, there could be no best 
possible world, since for any world which we would name there would 
always be another which was more optimific.  Again, the notion of  best 
possible world proves to be meaningless.”150  Following Reichenbach I am 
inclined to agree that, whether one construes the world’s optimality in terms 
of  a maximum amount of  variety, or a maximum amount of  value, there 
can be no conceivable upper limit to such value, and thus no truly “best” 
possible world.
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There are further problems with best of  all possible worlds scenarios, 
because the notion that there could be no best possible world, if  adhered to 
without abandoning the notion that God must create the best world, creates 
an internal contradiction.  If  we retain a Leibnizian notion of  God as the 
creator of  only the best, then this world, less than the best, is not created by 
God.  This is clearly an unattractive option, and so we must be led to 
assume that God need not, according to His perfection, create the best 
world.  
3.2. Need God Create the Best Possible World?  
In his article, “Must God Create the Best?”, Robert Adams argues that 
“even if  there is a best among possible worlds [which he doubts], God 
could create another instead of  it, and still be perfectly good.”151  Central to 
Adams argument is the assumption that if  major aspects which contribute 
to one’s personhood were radically different, one would, in fact, be a 
different person.  Leaning on Adams’ understanding, then, though Philip 
Tallon might have had a far more felicitous life in some better world 
(perhaps I would be an athletic astronaut and also a fashion model), this 
other Philip Tallon would not be me.  Thus I am not wronged by not being 
an incredibly famous astronaut.  Also key to Adams’ case is the idea that 
God does not have obligations to uncreated possible people.  Thus world-
famous astronaut Philip Tallon is not wronged by God not creating him.  
Given these two assumptions, Adams proposes three characteristics that a 
world which a good God would create must possess:
(1) None of  the individual creatures in it would exist in the best of  all 
possible worlds.
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(2) None of  the creatures in it has a life which is so miserable on the 
whole that it would be better for that creature if  it had never existed.
(3) Every individual creature in the world is at least as happy on the 
whole as it would have been in any other possible world in which it 
could have existed.152
Adams summarizes:
It seems obvious that if  God creates such a world He does not thereby 
wrong any of  the creatures in it, and does not thereby treat any of  
them with less than perfect kindness.  For none of  them would have 
benefited by His creating any other world instead.153
The best-possible-world discussion can be riddling, but I think that Adams’ 
point is sufficiently clear now, in that God could be justified in creating a 
good (but not necessarily maximally good) world (such as one where 
everyone’s lives are on-the-whole positive), and that this could be done 
without wronging any created (or uncreated) person.154  A position such as 
Adams’ is obviously helpful in resolving the apparent contradictions 
generated by the best world scenario.  It shows that Christians and other 
theists need not be worried by the conflict between the somewhat intuitive 
notion that God must create the best world, together with the worrisome 
thought that the best world is impossible to create, by offering a coherent 
account of  a good (but not optimal) world.
However, in revising our criteria for the kind of  world that a good God 
could create, it seems likely that aesthetic values will play a far less necessary 
role in arguing for the minimal goodness of  the world.  Where Leibniz 
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sought to find perfection in all things, including the harmony of  the nature, 
one who argues that this world possesses a minimum level of  goodness–
such as described in Adams–will feel much less need to discover harmony in 
every aspect of  creation.155  This is not to say that the aesthetic values 
cannot be integrated into an argument for the minimally-necessary goodness 
of  a world, merely that a minimal-goodness scenario doesn’t seem to 
mandate appeal to these values in the way that a best-world scenario 
obviously does.156  However, just as the role of  aesthetic value in pointing to 
the world’s optimality is taken away, so is the strength of  the atheistic 
argument from evil.  God’s aesthetic judgment could be “reconciled with the 
existence of  ugliness or more specific negative aesthetic qualities in the 
world” by simply arguing that bits of  ugliness, a diffuse blandness, or other 
negative aesthetic values do not necessitate that anyone’s life will be on the 
whole negative rather than positive.157
I therefore argue that we will need to leave behind best-of-all-possible-
worlds scenarios, despite their prima facie compatibility with aesthetic values.  
However, I suggest that Robert Adams’ schema of  the minimal goodness of 
the world might lend itself  to the inclusion of  aesthetic criteria, though it by 
no means necessitates this.  
Marilyn Adams, appropriately enough, has built on Robert Adams’ schema 
in her theodicy, by arguing that certain aesthetic values can help humans to 
have an on-the-whole positive life.  By shifting to an individualistic focus for 
aesthetic categories, Marilyn Adams recasts the argument in a way which can 
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be very helpful for this study.  Though I will discuss Adams’ use of  aesthetic 
benefits more fully in Chapter 5, for the moment, I will mention that Adams 
invokes the beatific vision as a powerful aesthetic benefit which can 
contribute to the ultimate well-being of  individuals.  The beatific vision, 
though not exclusively an aesthetic phenomenon, would possess great value 
as a sight to behold, and thus enrich the afterlives of  those who suffer, as 
indicated by St Paul in Romans.  Adams here opens up new possibilities for 
aesthetic value in the theodicy discussion, though I will not discuss her work 
yet, as I think that a more helpful model for aesthetic interaction with 
theodicy is laid out by Eleonore Stump, which I will discuss in the next 
section.
3.4. Summary.  
In this section, and the last section I have laid out two ‘paradigms’ for 
theodicy within which aesthetic criteria have played a role in the past.  
Regarding morally sufficient reasons, we can see why theodicists may have 
been resistant to incorporating these values: 1) aesthetic values do not easily 
function as morally sufficient reasons for God’s permission of  evil, and 2) in 
order to avoid guilt-by-association with process theodicy, many mainstream 
theodicists no doubt stay away from aesthetics.
Regarding best-of-all-possible-world scenarios, we can see quite easily how 
aesthetic criteria (or the lack thereof) have played and could play a role in 
arguing for (against) the optimality of  the world.  However, given the 
problematic nature of  best world scenarios, we can see how aesthetic criteria 
can come to play next to no role at all in arguing for the minimally-necessary 
goodness of  the world, except insofar as aesthetic values contribute to the 
ultimate well-being of  an individual.    
4. Philosophical Frameworks in Theodicy: Perception as Theodicy
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Though we read Eleonore Stump above–noting that she could find no 
obvious place for aesthetic categories to play a role in theodicy–
appropriately enough, perhaps in some sense answering her own question, 
several of  Eleonore Stump’s more recent essays have tackled the theodicy 
question from a vantage point which is distinct from much of  the other 
recent work in the area.  In two essays, “The Mirror of  Evil”, and “Second-
Person Accounts and the Problem of  Evil” Stump introduces new 
considerations which are suggestive for the scope of  theodicy and may open 
the door for the full range of  Christian distinctives, which Hick places 
outside the scope of  rational theology.
4.1. The Mirror of  Evil.
In “The Mirror of  Evil” Stump reflects on the obsessive and nearly morbid 
inability some people have to look away from the evils of  the world.  Some, 
Stump notes, can look into the mirror, “take note, shake their heads sadly, 
and go about their business.”158  Stump compares these people to Tolkien’s 
hobbits.  Others, however, like Philip Hallie, who studied the cruelty of  the 
Nazis, cannot stop gazing at the miserific visions of  our world, no matter 
how dark.  Hallie writes of  his research into the Nazi medical experiments, 
“My study of  evil incarnate whose bars were my bitterness toward the 
violent, and whose walls were my horrified indifference to slow murder… 
Between the bars and the walls I revolved like a madman…over the years I 
had dug myself  into Hell.”159 
Stump uses our perception of  evil to dig deeper into the nature of  our 
ability to arrive at beliefs and value judgments, especially regarding evil.  
“[H]ow do we know”, she writes, “that the torture of  Jewish children by 
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Nazi doctors is evil?”160  The answer Stump gives is, I think, correct: such 
evil is immediately and intuitively felt to be wrong.  We begin with strong 
intuitions, which are later organized and revised, but “our original intuitions 
retain an essential primacy.”161  If, in the process of  organizing and revising 
our insights, “we found that our ethical theory countenanced those Nazi 
experiments”, Stump says, “we’d throw away the theory as something evil 
itself.”162  While we don’t know how exactly we form these intuitions they 
retain a primacy which is irreplaceable, even if  it is not completely 
explicable.
In a similar way, we also cannot completely explain how we recognize 
persons.  “When I see my daughter’s face” Stump says, “I know who she is, 
and not by reason, memory, or perception.”163  Stump buttresses her case 
with the example of  “prosopagnosics”, people who cannot recognize 
friends or family, despite the fact that these poor people have their reason, 
memory, and senses in working order.164  Though our understanding of  this 
faculty is underdeveloped, both here and in Stump’s essay, her conclusion 
seems sensible: that we have “cognitive faculties that we don’t understand 
much about but regularly and appropriately rely on”.165  
What Stump wants to suggest here is that our judgments of  evil, like our 
ability to recognize faces of  people that we know, operate in similar, and 
similarly mysterious ways.  On seeing some atrocity (Stump gives an example 
of  a Bosnian woman’s baby being decapitated and its head thrown into her 
lap) we instinctively perceive the evil at work, without recourse to memory 
or reason.  We do not need to recall the sixth commandment given to 
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Moses, or abstract to the categorical imperative in order to discern the evil 
at work, we simply recognize it for what it is.
Stump builds on this faculty for perceiving evil, arguing that ‘it’ can also 
discern true goodness “without needing to reflect much or reason it out.”166  
The story of  Philip Hallie comes back in again, as Hallie, in the midst of  his 
research into Nazi atrocities, discovered the account of  the residents of  
Chambon, and their effort to hide Jews in order to protect them.  Reading 
the story, Hallie reached up to brush some dust from his cheek and 
discovered that tears covered both his cheeks.  “Why tears, do you 
suppose?” Stump asks, and then answering herself, writes, “good news 
cracks your heart.  It makes it feel keenly again all the evils to which it had 
become dull.”167
[W]e sometimes weep when we are surprised by true goodness.  The 
latest tales of  horror in the newspaper distress us but don’t surprise us. 
We have all heard so many stories of  the same sort already.  But true 
goodness is unexpected and lovely, and its loveliness can be 
heartbreaking.  The stories of  the Chambonnais rescuing Jews even on 
peril of  their own imprisonment and death went through him like a 
spear, Hallie says.  Perhaps if  he had been less filled with the vision of 
the mirror of  evil, he would have wept less over Le Chambon.168
The modus operandi for Stump’s essay rests on the way this mirror enables a 
certain kind of  perception:
So, in an odd sort of  way, the mirror of  evil can also lead us to God.  
A loathing focus on the evils of  the world and ourselves prepares us 
to be the more startled by the taste of  true goodness when we find it 
and the more determined to follow that taste until we see where it 
leads.  And where it leads is the truest goodness of  all - not the boss 
of  the universe whose word is moral law or to sovereignty that must 
not be dishonored, but to the sort of  goodness of  which the 
Chambonnais’s goodness is only a tepid aftertaste.  The mirror of  evil 
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becomes translucent, and we can see through it to the goodness of  
God.  There are some people, then, and I count myself  among them, 
for whom focus on evil constitutes a way to God.169
Stump builds on this to argue that depending on where we start, in our 
reflections, will determine how we see the mirror of  evil and the goodness 
of  God.  If  we start only with the vision of  evil, then the problem of  evil 
will be more pressing.  But if  we can see both God’s goodness and the 
vision of  evil, we may be assured that there is a “morally sufficient reason 
for God to allow evil...a reason in which true goodness is manifest.”170  
Stump is ultimately, in my opinion, vague on the details as to how the mirror 
of  evil might work for the rest of  us, though this is hardly a fatal flaw for 
her argument, especially as it rests largely on the (twice quoted) Biblical 
invocation to “Taste and see that the Lord is good” (Psalm 34:8).  If  Stump 
is arguing that there are ways of  perceiving God’s goodness in uniquely 
phenomenological ways somewhat distinct from philosophical discourse, 
then it makes sense that an essay would not be able to clearly convey this 
notion.
The mirror of  evil is not the only route we can use to arrive at a vista of  
true goodness.  “Some people glimpse true goodness by seeing it reflected 
in other people,” she writes, “Others approach it more indirectly through 
beauty, the beauty of  nature or mathematics or music.171  This sense of  
God’s goodness, though, for Stump, is “found first and most readily in the 
traces of  God left in the Bible.”172  This leads us to Stump’s second essay.
4.2. Second-Person Accounts and the Problem of  Evil
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In her analysis of  the Book of  Job, Stump develops her ideas from “The 
Mirror of  Evil” in a more concrete context, if  one perhaps less universally 
applicable.  She attempts to counter the prevailing notion (common, she 
says, to Biblical interpreters) that Job never gets the one thing he wants from 
God, an answer to why he suffers.  Stump writes:
Contrary to the common interpretation, I think that Job does get what 
he wants in this story, namely, an explanation of  why he suffers.  
Consequently, I also think that the Book of  Job is helpful for thinking 
about solutions to the problem of  evil, but only if  it is read with 
careful attention to its character as a second person account.173
Stump utilizes the distinction between first-, second-, and third-person 
accounts (perhaps most commonly discussed in literary criticism) to point to 
unique content that might exist in a personal, face-to-face experience.  
Where first-person accounts describe experiences subjectively (“I am 
wearing tattered khakis”) and third-person accounts describe experiences 
objectively (“Philip is wearing tattered khakis”), second person accounts 
seem to bridge the two types (“You are wearing tattered khakis”).  The 
factual content of  the third statement is essentially the same, but the 
relational content is surely different, specifically, if  someone says this to me, 
there is the added content of  being addressed by someone.
In the Book of  Job, Stump’s essay argues, we must not overlook the 
relational content present in God’s address to Job at the end of  the book.  
As described by many commentators (Stump here holds up the Anchor 
Bible Dictionary as her main foil), there is a relational disjuncture in the 
divine-human communications in the story.  Job calls for an account by his 
adversary (Job 31:35), but God’s address to Job apparently gives no such 
account.  Instead God’s speech to Job is merely an opportunity for him to 
hit a different set of  ‘talking points’ - especially his role as the all-powerful 
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overseer of  creation (Job 38-40).  As described by Stump, this way of  
construing the narrative is typically the basis for the notion that Job gets no 
answer to his request.  Stump, however, disagrees, and finds in the divine 
speeches the indications of  God’s second-person relationship with creation 
itself.  As when God describes his relationship to the sea, and says to it, 
“Thus far come, but no more. Here your wild waves halt” (38:11), or when 
God notes with motherly interest that He “marks” when the hinds and she-
goats calve (39:1-2). 
Stump writes about these passages that they “show God having personal 
interactions with all his creatures.  He relates to everything he has made on a 
face-to-face basis, as it were; and in these personal interactions, God deals 
maternally with his creatures”.174  Job too is, by extension, included in this:
Nothing in God’s speeches to Job specifically describes God’s 
relations with human beings, of  course, but there is certainly a ready 
inference - both for Job and for the readers of  the book - from the 
way God deals with the rest of  his creation to the way in which he 
deals with human persons.175 
But again Stump is keen to note that the content of  God’s speeches about 
his creation is not propositional in any obvious way.  “The divine speeches 
don’t make claims about God’s relations to creation,” she writes, “If  they 
did, they would be a third-person account laying out some general 
theological claims.  Instead, they constitute a second-person account that 
lets us participate, to some limited extent, in the perception of  God’s 
relation to inanimate things, plants, and animals”.176  
It is this form of  perception which is key to Stump’s argument here, as she 
shows us how the experience of  coming face-to-face with God, regardless 
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of  a seeming absence of  “answers” would have content which might answer 
Job’s deepest questions.  Stump writes,
Job does, then, have an explanation of  his suffering; but it isn’t of  the 
sort that philosophers have been interested in when they considered 
theodicies, because it isn’t a third person account.  A second-person 
experience can constitute a good explanation of  a mistaken charge of  
betrayal for the person who has that experience, but it will be hard for 
him to use that experience to convince a third party, for just the 
reasons I gave when I was explaining why second-person accounts 
differ from third-person accounts.177
I think that Stump’s suggestions are compelling when reading the Book of  
Job, though an exegetical evaluation is beyond my interests.  Her comments 
above, that second-person accounts may provide explanations for the 
person who experiences them, but are unconvincing in the larger sphere, 
raise the question of  application for the problem of  evil, generally.  
Assuming that most of  us do not have similar face-to-face experiences with 
God, the philosopher may well ask, at this point, what second-person 
accounts contribute to theodicy, aside from helping us read the Book of  Job 
more clearly?
Stump, in reflecting on the insights of  second-person accounts and Job, 
emphasizes the benefit for those already inside the Christian faith.  Thinking 
about how compelling Job’s story will be for readers, she writes that Job’s 
encounter “can’t compel a certain view of  things as arguments can”, and 
that “they are much more likely to be persuasive to those who have had 
some experience of  their own of  the sort being described in the story”.178  
In essence, Stump seems to concede that second-person accounts are of  
limited use, but here she quietly unmasks, I think, a tacit assumption in 
much contemporary theodicy, that theodicy must be addressed to those 
outside the faith.  
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Stump’s essay concludes by reflecting that 
The problem of  evil presents itself  differently to those within and 
those outside a religious community.  Believers come to the problem 
of  evil with what they take to be some sort of  history of  relations 
with the God they believe in.  They can and should draw on that 
history in reflections on suffering... Furthermore, the second-person 
accounts of  God, the stories about God in Scripture, will be read 
differently by believers, who have their own religious experiences to 
draw on as they read them… Consequently, believers will not and 
need not think about the problem of  evil in the same way as 
nonbelievers  do, and the believer’s resolution to the problem of  evil 
may be successful, even if  it isn’t persuasive to nonbelievers.179
4.3. Reflection.
Stump’s suggestions, thus presented, seem only to form the beginnings of  a 
response to John Hick’s skepticism about the role of  the aesthetic theme (or 
other such notions) in the scope of  rational theodicy.  In the “Mirror of  
Evil” Stump points to our ability to recognize evil, and draws on our faculty 
to do so to bring out the mysterious way in which the mirror of  evil may 
prepare us for the taste of  true goodness.  In “Second-Person Accounts and 
the Problem of  Evil” she notes the unique content gained by face-to-face 
contact (prototypically, by Job), and suggests that we too can gain a similar 
vision through our own experiences, or through reflection on the story of  
Job.
What is crucial for me to bring out here is that Stump points to several ways 
that we can perceive God’s goodness in which are not amenable to the 
straightforward practice of  theodicy.  If  there is content that is not easily 
transmitted in the standard practice of  theodicy–if, in more classic words, 
we must “Taste and see that the Lord is good”–then it is reasonable to 
introduce a spectrum of  modes of  perception which may have bearing for 
theodicy.  Stump has introduced two, neither of  which I feel it necessary to 
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defend, but both of  which, I believe, form the beginnings of  a critique of  
Hick’s doubts.  They work to undermine, not merely Hick’s explicit 
arguments, but the general assumption which one finds throughout 
contemporary theodicy, that theodicy exists to counter accusations by career 
philosophers of  the unbelieving variety.  
In essence, theodicy’s goal is often seen to be to defend the outer edges of  
Christian belief  (or generically theistic belief) against atheistic incursions.  
Given this framework, we see more clearly why, say, Hick takes umbrage 
with angelology as a resource for theodicy.  When he says that it is beyond 
the scope of  rational theology (in the same breath as saying that belief  in 
aliens is beyond its scope) Hick is attempting to convince an audience that 
probably believes in neither.  Many Christians, however, have no problem 
accepting the reality of  angels (in fact, will affirm gladly based on nothing 
other than scriptural testimony).  To construct a theodicy that brackets out 
internal Christian resources such as angels or aesthetics is surely no crime, 
but to state that such categories are beyond theodicy’s scope is far too 
restrictive.  
While I grant that theodicy’s task is somewhat specific–to alleviate the 
tension between the idea of  God and the fact of  evil–its resources are 
ultimately catholic.  In doing theodicy we can, I argue, and should, draw on 
the richness and complexity of  all of  God’s design.  If  creation is to be any 
indicator for God’s modus operandi we should expect a richly layered account 
of  providence.  God’s creation is filled with incredible variety.  Gerard 
Manley Hopkins writes of  a world filled with “Pied Beauty”, “All things 
counter, original, spare, strange, / Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows 
how?) / With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim. / He fathers-forth 
whose beauty is past change / Praise Him”.  This poetic awareness of  the 
variety and beauty of  creation is a striking reminder of  the immensity of  
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God’s creation, and the unique ways in which each part reflects God’s glory.  
Chesterton raises a similar point.  “If  Christianity should happen to be true–
that is to say, if  its God is the real God of  the universe–then defending it 
may mean talking about anything and everything”, Chesterton writes, 
“Things can be irrelevant to the proposition that Christianity is false, but 
nothing can be irrelevant to the proposition that Christianity is true.”180  
This comment is remarkably apropos for our study in general, and this 
context specifically.  If  everything that exists is created by God, then it 
seems foolish to look away from aspects of  this reality in order to perceive 
more clearly God’s purposes.  But even more than the variety of  God’s 
creation, God Himself  is revealed to us in a multiplicity of  ways: as Creator, 
Judge, King, Father, Redeemer, and Shepherd.181  To hold up one aspect of  
God’s person to the exclusion of  other aspects distorts our picture of  God’s 
person and purposes.  Not only does it hamper the task of  theodicy, but it 
weakens the importance of  it.  To defend a God who is a just Judge but not 
a great Artist - who is Goodness but not Beauty - is to defend a God in 
whom I do not believe.182
Stump’s work points to unique ways that we can grow in our perception of  
God’s goodness in the midst of  evil which are not encompassed within the 
traditional calculus of  morally sufficient reasons (though they do not 
overturn, but rather complement this calculus, as Stump herself  would no 
doubt suggest.)  Though I have, through examining several different 
frameworks for theodicy, argued for varying roles (marginal though they 
may be) for aesthetic values to play, I believe that Stump’s work is the most 
hospitable to the aesthetic theme, in that the aesthetic theme could be 
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employed as a unique mode of  perception (akin to the mirror of  evil or a 
second-person experience) which allows us to see the larger issue of  God’s 
providence from a unique vantage point.  While Stump argues that certain 
kinds of  perception are only available to those within the Christian faith, I 
make no identical claim for the aesthetic theme, but a related one in that the 
aesthetic theme may not be amenable to all addressees of  theodicy.  
Nevertheless, this says little about the usefulness of  the aesthetic theme, so 
long as we make no requirement that all attempts at theodicy must be 
addressed to all reasonable people. 
In the next chapter we will attempt to move toward an account of  seeing 
theodicy through the aesthetic theme.
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APPENDIX A: Kellenberger and the Epistemic Power of  Beauty
There is a possible fourth paradigm for theodicy which is worth mentioning 
briefly, specifically, there is an argument that other factors give us such 
strong insight into the goodness of  God that, though the problem of  evil as 
such remains unresolved, in the face of  other epistemological evidence, the 
problem of  evil is reduced, as Nelson Pike phrases it, “to a noncrucial 
perplexity of  relatively minor importance.”183 Into this framework aesthetics 
might possibly be fit because the argument from beauty could act as an 
epistemological booster shot.  James Kellenberger, for one, proposes this 
sort of  scenario. Kellenberger’s recent article “God’s goodness and God’s 
evil” also sees Job as a prototype for some believers.  “His belief  in God’s 
goodness does not require an understanding of  God’s reason for allowing 
or creating evil,” Kellenberger writes of  Job, “It is, however, essential that 
Job unfalteringly believes in God’s goodness and the goodness of  God’s 
creation.”184  The beauty of  creation is especially key in Kellenberger’s 
argument, because it is through creation that the Job-like believers will 
perceive God’s goodness.
[W]e humans are such that when we are allowed to lift up our eyes and 
to behold God’s creation, we will behold God’s goodness, 
righteousness, and love in it, so that, in our addition to standing in awe 
before the transcendent majesty of  creation, we might well be moved 
to bless the name of  the Lord and to be joyful.185
Kellenberger thus combines Stump’s insights about Job’s “second-person” 
encounter with God and our mysterious recognition of  God’s goodness in 
the beauty of  nature under the moniker “Job-like faith.”   But Kellenberger 
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seems more ambitious with his use of  “Job-like faith”–more than simply a 
confidence that God must have a morally sufficient reason, as Stump 
argues–Kellenberger’s believer “would not regard evil as evidence of  any 
sort or degree against God’s goodness or existence.”186  Just as Job found 
comfort after a face-to-face encounter with God, we too, Kellenberger 
thinks, may well experience a comfort and trust in God after seeing the 
divinely-designed “transcendent majesty of  creation”.187
He further provides an example that indicates how strongly we ought to 
take evidence for God’s goodness perceived in creation.  The example 
provided in the essay  is of  a clever houseguest who steals the family jewels 
and frames the butler.  Clues are left by this clever criminal to implicate the 
butler, and when the police arrive they discover these clues.  Kellenberger 
raises that point that even despite the presence of  clues, it would be “quite 
irrational” if  the criminal took such evidence as proof  of  the butler’s guilt.  
Since the criminal has special (incorrigible) knowledge, no amount of  
evidence would serve to convince him that the butler committed the crime.  
By extension, “the Job-like believer knows that God is good and that God’s 
goodness shines through creation, she/he would not, should not, see evil as 
any evidence against God’s goodness”.188
Given the apparent value of  this sort of  perception, we must ask how likely 
it is that we might also possess Job-like faith?  Kellenberger’s essay is 
unhelpfully vague here, as he gives few clues as to the availability of  this 
perception, though he does seems to suggest that it might be widely 
available.  Citing an example raised from H. H. Farmer, “Walking in a 
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garden, or through the fields, a man of  sensitive spirit may suddenly become 
livingly aware, through the contemplation of  the beauty and richness and 
orderly reliability of  nature, of  the steadfast goodness of  God toward 
man…”189 Kellenberger invokes the long-standing tradition that the beauty, 
richness, and orderliness of  nature provides awareness of  God’s goodness, a 
la Augustine.190  But would this awareness likely provide third-person 
evidence of  “God’s goodness, righteousness, and love”?191  In Farmer’s 
example, it is the “beauty and richness and orderly reliability” of  nature 
which makes us aware of  God’s goodness.  This is indeed part of  the 
traditional argument for the existence of  a good God.  Beauty and 
orderliness act as a set of  evidence for God’s goodness, but it must also be 
remembered that evil acts as a competing set of  evidence.  
Given these two competing sets of  evidence, we must seriously consider 
how much weight to assign each of  the sets of  evidence.  Without denying 
that for some, the experience of  created beauty may well be powerfully 
compelling and even mystical, I find it difficult to believe that created beauty 
can be confidently assigned the sort of  evidence of  which Kellenberger 
speaks (i.e. being as incorrigibly sure of  God’s goodness as of  the 
knowledge of  our own recent criminal actions).  Philosopher Paul Draper, 
writing about the epistemic “weight” of  beauty says,
theism is supported by the fact that the universe contains an 
abundance of  beauty... Thus, a beautiful universe, especially one 
containing beings that can appreciate that beauty, is clearly more likely 
on theism than on naturalism, and so is evidence favoring theism 
over naturalism.192
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Yet, even acknowledging this epistemic advantage, Draper denies that beauty 
overturns the argument against God’s existence, because, as he asserts, 
“[a]rguments from evil against theism are much more powerful than the 
argument from beauty in favor of  theism.”193  Here I am inclined to agree 
with Draper that the power of  the problem of  evil argument (as it presents 
itself  prima facie) is greater than the argument for God’s goodness/power/
existence which we can base on the amount of  beauty in the world.  Thus, I 
think that Kellenberger likely overestimates the evidential weight of  beauty 
in the midst of  evil.
However, even if  we assigned beauty the sort of  evidentiary weight which 
Kellenberger does, there may still be problems with his argument: 
specifically, if  the traditional theistic picture were the only option for belief  
in the divine, then perhaps the epistemic weight of  beauty could be said to 
outweigh and upset the weight of  the problem of  evil, but there are other 
options for making sense of  both sets of  evidence.  C. S. Lewis comments 
on the observation of  nature as a clue to God’s character when he writes
One [bit of  evidence we have about God] is the universe he has 
made.  If  we used that as our only clue, then I think we should have 
to conclude that He was a great artist (for the universe is a very 
beautiful place), but also that He is quite merciless and no friend to 
man (for the universe is a very dangerous and terrifying place).194
If  we followed Lewis’s line of  thought, trying to synthesize both good and 
bad sets of  evidence, the resulting picture of  God would likely be a deistic 
one.  God is viewed as a distant artist, winding up the lovely clockwork and 
letting it alone.  Or perhaps something like the process theologian’s view of  
God will work: where God is involved in the world, providing some goods, 
81
193 Ibid.
194 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, Book I, Chapter 5.
but unable or unwilling to ensure perfect harmony.  The two problems with 
Kellenberger’s argument, in my view, are that it likely overestimates the 
evidentiary power of  beauty, and that (even if  beauty could be assigned such 
strong value as Kellenberger would like) it does not take into account quasi-
theistic positions that might easily account for both created beauty and 
serious evils.
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PART I, CONTINUED:  THE FOUNDATIONS OF AESTHETIC THEODICY
John Hick on the Aesthetic Theme, Continued.
In the previous chapter we have attempted to confront John Hick’s claim 
that the scope of  theodicy is not such that elements such as the aesthetic 
theme can play any role.  In examining differing frameworks for theodicy, I 
have tried to show how aesthetic values generally may play a role, as lesser 
morally sufficient reasons and as contributors to God’s goodness to persons 
(and hence the minimal goodness of  a world).  Yet, while these are certainly 
suggestive that aesthetic values cannot be cleanly divorced from theodicy’s 
larger moral considerations, I have favored a third framework for the 
inclusion of  aesthetics (and one which is closer, I think, to Hick’s original 
critique): that of  the aesthetic theme as a way of  perceiving God’s 
providence.
In Evil and the God of  Love, Hick describes the Augustinian picture of  the 
universe as “seen as a complex picture or symphony or organism whose 
value resides in its totality”.195  It is this picture which Hick critiques in 
writing that “A Christian theodicy must be centered upon moral personality 
rather than upon nature as a whole, and its governing principle must be 
ethical rather than aesthetic.” 196  Again, it is not simply that Hick finds fault 
with the constituent elements of  Augustine’s theodicy (plenitude, balanced 
punishment, evil as privation), though he does challenge them; rather Hick 
also finds fault with an aesthetic rendering of  key elements of  Hick’s 
Irenaean theodicy (soul-making, eschatological rather than original focus, 
universal redemption).  Writes Hick, “even this improved version of  the 
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aesthetic theme, making use of  the added dimension of  time, and pointing 
to an eschatological resolution of  the interplay between good and evil, is still 
open to a fundamental objection,” which Hick labels as “sub-personal.”197 
I have played upon Hick’s use of  the visual metaphor (“The universe… is 
seen as a complex picture or symphony or organism”) to indicate a 
fundamental objection with any attempt to look at theodicy from the scenic vista of 
aesthetic categories.  Following Hick’s use of  the term, I have called this vista 
the “aesthetic theme”, and extracted it from its Augustinian context to apply 
to all attempts to look at theodicy aesthetically.   
I have conceded that not all frameworks for doing theodicy are perfectly 
amenable to the inclusion of  aesthetic goods.  In arguing against the 
atheistic arguments from evil we may find them less-than-helpful, even 
distracting in offering a tight, logical defense.  But I have not conceded that 
all theodicy must operate in this particular mode.  Theodicy connotes an 
attempt to help resolve the prima facie tension between the idea of  God and 
occurrent evil, with the intention of  resolving it in God’s favor.  Invoking G. 
K. Chesterton, I have tried to suggest that in arguing for the truth of  
Christianity, “nothing can be irrelevant”.  If  indeed this world is brought 
about by a sovereign creator (i.e. all is either performed or permitted by Him 
for some good purpose), no matter how varied His intentions, all things can 
be connected to our understanding of  God.  By extension, we can believe 
that sensing God’s providence in the midst of  evil will therefore be 
connected to a wide range of  affairs, and ultimately, somehow connected to 
all creation.  Attempting to avoid, however, steering theodicy into exploring 
endless minutiae, I have held up two recent essays by Eleonore Stump which 
point to unique modes of  perception that have relevance for theodicy.  
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In person-to-person contact with God (or in perceiving someone else’s 
contact), and in observing the stark contrast between obscene wickedness 
and true goodness, we sense something of  providence perhaps otherwise 
hidden.  I suggest that these modes of  perception are non-trivial, and 
hypothesize that other such modes of  perception may be equally helpful.  In 
this framework, I put forward the aesthetic theme as a way of  perceiving 
elements of  God’s providence which is helpful for the purposes of  
resolving the prima facie tension which seems to arise so naturally for fallen 
humanity.
As such, the previous chapter counters Hick’s general suspicion of  elements 
such as the aesthetic theme playing a role in the “rational discussion” of  
theodicy, and attempts to counter the wider suspicion of  aesthetic values in 
theodicy by providing a context within which they can play a role without 
“stealing thunder” from moral values or contributing to confusion about 
God’s purposes.  
Yet a second objection is still in play, and, though it requires less conceptual 
shifting, it is, I think, the more challenging to answer.  Hick, anticipating the 
sort of  response that I have brought in the previous chapter, admits that 
whatever other “realms of  life and dimensions of  meaning there may 
be...our positive knowledge of  God’s nature and purpose still derives from 
His incarnation in Jesus Christ”.198  This revelation, following Hick, suggests 
that “any justification of  evil must be a justification of  it as playing a part in 
bringing about the high good of  man’s fellowship with God, rather than as 
necessary to the aesthetic perfection of  a universe which, in virtue of  its 
completeness, includes personal life.”199  In this context, Hick is questioning 
the Augustinian “aesthetic theme”, which places emphasis on a certain sort 
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of  aesthetic perfection, moment-to-moment harmony.  Hick is rightly 
skeptical of  Augustine’s attempt to affirm the continual justice of  the entire 
universe at any given moment.  But Hick is further skeptical of  all attempts 
to construct aesthetic analogies, even within a more eschatological model, 
because a focus on creation’s aesthetics would distract from the relational 
elements of  any theodicy.  Following Hick’s line of  thought, if  the fullest 
revelation of  God’s character is in the God-man Jesus, sent to redeem 
humans and reveal God’s personal love for them, why bother with 
impersonal pictures and analogies?  If  indeed, as Hick indicates, the most 
direct form of  God’s revelation is in Jesus, why take detours down the 
‘back-roads’ of  theological aesthetics?200   
Given the urgency of  the anguished “why” question, and the specific 
challenge that the problem of  evil poses for trust in God, mightn't 
theodicists drive a bit more directly toward the destination, rather than stop 
for so many scenic vistas?  Hick’s case carries with it the power and tradition 
of  Occam’s Razor, which seeks to shave away unnecessary complications 
when simpler ones will do.  It is therefore necessary to suggest that 
aesthetics is not a diversion for Christian theology, but another important 
angle from which to view it.  Though aesthetic theodicy may not be blessed 
with the benefit of  making the theodicy conversation simpler in the short 
term, its operating assumption is that (as the church fathers saw again and 
again) any basic account of  reality should include the beautiful alongside the 
good and the true.  A purely moral account may be simpler, but only at the 
cost of  being reductionistic. 
Yet, it must be noted that there is a pastoral context for Hick’s comments, 
and these need to be taken seriously. “A Christian theodicy,” he writes, 
“must be centered upon moral personality rather than upon nature as a 
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whole, and its governing principle must be ethical rather than aesthetic.”201  
We must agree that theodicy as we are concerned with it is centered on human 
suffering.  The suffering of the animal world is a serious question, but we 
must keep in mind that the problem of  suffering as we understand it is not a 
problem for the animal world.  It is we who must grapple with this question 
as it appears to us and affects us, and thus respond to it from our situated 
epistemic and moral position.  The sufferings of  long-extinct species or the 
chaotic collapse of  a distant galaxy are not within our network of  moral 
affections nor much within our grasp of  understanding.  To focus on such 
distant ‘evils’ would be a wasted exercise in sympathy.  As a member of  a 
thinking, feeling, and suffering species - further, one which has been 
honored by the miracle of  the incarnation - we ought to take our own 
experience as the central focus of  theodicy.  Thus, we can hardly blame 
Hick’s intentions in taking human life so seriously.
The proper question for theodicean method, then, is not where the center of  
the discussion should be located, but how widely the circumference should 
be extended.  It is the purpose of  this chapter to argue that aesthetic 
considerations enrich our perception, and thus make it worthwhile to widen 
the circumference of  theodicy to include them. 
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CHAPTER 2 - AESTHETICS AND THEOLOGICAL INSIGHT
God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the 
fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom 
he hath appointed heir of  all things, by whom also he made the worlds; Who 
being the brightness of  his glory, and the express image of  his person, and 
upholding all things by the word of  his power, when he had by himself  purged our 
sins, sat down on the right hand of  the Majesty on high. 
HEBREWS 1: 1-3, KJV
1. The Divorce of  Theology and Aesthetics: The Duck/Rabbit Phenomenon 
Over the last fifty years, while the problem of  evil discussion has flourished 
and specialized into a variety of  areas, the relationship between theodicy and 
aesthetics has remained almost entirely unexplored–with very few mentions 
scattered across the literature.  When aesthetics is mentioned it is often 
treated briefly and/or dismissively.  As I argued in the last chapter, this is 
understandable because the way that the problem of  evil argument is framed 
often admits little room for aesthetic considerations.  But there is more to 
the matter than the framing of  the theodicy question.  
Philosophically speaking, aesthetics itself  can be resistant to inclusion.  As 
an area of  study, it often generates little interest in mainstream philosophy 
and theology.  For philosophers, the area can seem to be more the domain 
of  artists, while for artists, it may seem to be too philosophical.  For 
theologians, the area may likewise seem too philosophical or too artistic, and 
thus be ignored.  Protestant theologians in particular have been at times 
(though not always) especially desensitized to the role of  the senses in 
theological insight.  
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But part of  the blame for the dysfunctional relationship between theodicy 
and aesthetics must be attributed to the way aesthetics itself has been 
understood.  It is difficult to pinpoint all the exact issues which have 
contributed to the division of  these two areas, but there are a number of  
recent trends which have likely contributed and should be addressed in an 
attempt to bring these two areas back together.
1.1. The Modern Aesthetic Attitude: Irresponsible Aesthetics
Oscar Wilde opens his novella, The Picture of  Dorian Gray, with an 
epigrammatic reflection on the interaction between art and morality.  
“Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things are corrupt without 
being charming”, Wilde writes, “Those who find beautiful meanings in 
beautiful things are the cultivated”.202  But neither of  these camps have 
reached the apex of  aesthetic enlightenment, Wilde indicates, rather, “They 
are the elect to whom beautiful things mean only Beauty.”203  
Throughout his preface, Wilde describes a divorce between artistic making 
and moral meaning:  “No artist has ethical sympathies.  An ethical sympathy 
in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of  style.”204  Utility is equally 
verboten; in Wilde’s words, “All art is quite useless.”205  The author’s famously 
sardonic wit and the preface’s complicated relation to the following story 
(Dorian Gray’s painting is, in fact useful, and we do find ugly meanings in 
Dorian’s beauty) make taking Wilde too literally a bit dangerous.  But the 
import of  Wilde’s words here lies not so much in his ability to lay out a 
systematic philosophy of  art, but rather his ability to evoke a certain mood 
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prevalent in modern thought, where aesthetics was philosophically locked in 
a gilded cage–protected from moral significance as well as moral reproach.
The separation of  aesthetics from utility looms large in philosophy of  art 
over the last two-centuries.  Wilde’s discussion of  art presses this point again 
and again as aesthetic artifacts are separated from ‘meanings’, ‘ethics’ and 
‘uses.’  This Wildean way of  thinking fits well into what John Hospers calls 
the “aesthetic attitude”.  Hospers describes it thusly,
The aesthetic attitude, or the “aesthetic way of  looking at the world,” 
is most commonly opposed to the practical attitude, which is 
concerned only with the utility of  the object in question.  The real 
estate agent who views a landscape only with an eye to its possible 
monetary value is not viewing the landscape aesthetically.  To view a 
landscape aesthetically one must “perceive for perceiving's sake,” not 
for the sake of  some ulterior purpose.206
The two main dimensions of  “ulterior purpose” which are alien to the 
aesthetic attitude thus described are the cognitive and the moral.  Under this 
legacy of  thought, certain questions must be off-limits, such as the question, 
“What does this aesthetic object show us?” or the question, “What is this 
aesthetic object good for?”  
This attitude, cited here by Hospers in the Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, is 
undoubtedly the influential legacy to which Marilyn Adams, quoted in the 
last chapter, refers.  Adams sees rightly that one of  the contributing factors 
to theodicy’s distrust of  aesthetics is this prevalent attitude.  “From the side 
of  the art world,” she writes “the art-for-art's-sake movement protested 
utilitarian values of  an industrialized society with the declaration that art is 
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Hospers’ use of  the real estate agent’s dilemma, that he can see aesthetically or practically but not 
both, is indicative of  the almost religious commitment to the autonomy of  “Beauty” as described 
by Wilde.  In the real estate example, for instance, we could see easily how a piece of  property’s 
loveliness could positively correlate to its monetary value (i.e. more beautiful = more valuable), but 
for a Wildean sensibility, “Beauty” capitalized is somehow tainted by association with utility.
and ought to be useless and irrelevant to-anything else!”207  More than 
simple irrelevance to the worlds of  truth and goodness, however, the 
writings of  Wilde (and many lesser ‘aesthetes’) suggest that art should be 
unfettered from truth and goodness. 
This Wildean attitude is often seen in the artistic world as painters, 
photographers, sculptors, writers and filmmakers dismiss moral evaluations 
of  their work as irrelevant, or even deliberately seek to shock the viewer by 
violating their ethical norms.  Nabokov hand-waves questions about the 
morality of  his book Lolita by noting that, 
No writer in a free country should be expected to bother about the 
exact demarcation between the sensuous and the sensual... Lolita has 
no moral in tow.  For me a work of  fiction exists only insofar as it 
affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss... The rest is either 
topical trash or what some call the Literature of  Ideas, which very 
often is topical trash coming in huge blocks of  plaster...208
Nabokov here does not deny that morality is important, but his preference 
for art and his disinterest in whether that art is morally beneficial or 
detrimental is clear.  A more shocking quote comes from Norman Mailer, 
who helped to free a convicted criminal named Jack Abbott from prison 
because Abbott was a talented writer.  Very soon after his release, Abbott 
murdered a young man, and Mailer's response was, reportedly, "Culture is 
worth a little risk.  I'm willing to gamble with a portion of  society to save 
this man's talent."209  It would be hazardous to suggest that Mailer and 
Nabokov deeply believe that a good novel is worth moral or physical harm–
but their quotes none the less evoke a prevalent attitude in artistic culture: 
that all may be permitted if  done in the service of  creativity. 
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We hear responses to this prevalent attitude in the writings of  theodicists.  
Reviewing the problem of  evil literature, it is easy to discern that Adams is 
on to something, as the explicit discussion of  aesthetics shows a divide 
between the worlds of  art and theology.  But there is obviously a deeper 
worry at play, as aesthetics comes to be associated with prodigality and 
untrustworthiness.
In the last section, Terence Penelhum held up a Wildean disciple who valued 
all aesthetic value above all moral and physical values as an imagined 
opponent for his argument against the trivial use of  aesthetics.  That 
Penelhum is deeply worried about a Wildean theodicist making this proposal 
seems doubtful.  In the context of  Penelhum’s argument, he seems to use 
aesthetic benefits such as a rosy-pink flush on the cheeks of  tuberculosis 
sufferers as a kind-of  short-hand for a value insufficient to defeat moral and 
physical evils.  What is most suggestive about Penelhum’s use of  the 
Wildean theodicist is, perhaps, the apparent ease with which he connects the 
“art for art’s sake” aestheticism with irresponsibility.  This suggests, at the 
least, that, at the popular level, aesthetics and aestheticism may be closely 
linked in the popular imagination.  Gordon Graham, for one, believes that 
this kind of  amoral aestheticism is a real, live option within philosophy, and 
one which we must oppose:
Oscar Wilde in some of  his writings (The Portrait of  Dorian Gray may 
plausibly be thought to advance a contrary view) shows a marked 
preference for the aesthetic over the ethical and seems to hold that 
the beautiful is more important than the good, a view other 
'aesthetes' (Edmund Burke to a degree) have held... In our own time 
close study of  some of  the century's most notorious serial killers 
(about which I shall have more to say at a later stage) reveals an 
indifference to morality which is not easily dismissed as madness or 
psychological deformity... It is in my view naive to think that egoism, 
amoralism, aestheticism and militarism are merely logical possibilities 
in the philosopher's lexicon, to be invoked only to any purpose in the 
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relatively idle business of  exploring the foundations of  morality. They 
are, rather, realities in both history and contemporary experience, 
demanding responses from what, borrowing a phrase of  Onora 
O'Neill's, we might call 'the friends of  virtue'.210
Graham here suggests that we take aestheticism seriously as a worldview to 
be opposed. If  indeed this is so, perhaps it is appropriate that Penelhum 
takes time to warn against minor aesthetics superseding moral values.  
In his essay, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?”, David Lewis likewise invokes the 
figure of  the immoral artist as a possible explanation for evil.  Why does 
God allow evil? Lewis asks, 
maybe He is a fanatical artist who cares only for the aesthetic quality 
of  creation... and cares nothing for the good of  the creatures whose 
lives are woven into His masterpiece?  (Just as a tragedian has no 
business providing a happy end out of  compassion for his 
characters.)211  
Lewis, like Penelhum, rightly rejects this aestheticism as improper within the 
scope of  theodicy.  To value aesthetic delight to the exclusion of  the well-
being of  humans does not fit with our most basic understandings of  
Christian love.  As such, both Penelhum’s and Lewis’ critiques are accurate; 
but the problem they point out, while easily dismissed, is not easily 
forgotten.  The ‘irresponsible aestheticism’ of  the kind Wilde or Mailer 
seem to advocate still lingers.  At the back of  the public consciousness there 
remains the specter of  the aesthete, which suggests an untrustworthiness to 
artistic considerations in serious undertakings like theodicy.  That Timothy 
O’Connor feels necessary to point out that “Grave evils cannot be morally 
justified by their service of  aesthetic or other non-moral value” may further 
suggest a felt need on behalf  of  theodicists to oppose this attitude.212  The 
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natural temptation of  reductionism, simply bracketing out aesthetics from a 
largely moral issue, may thus seem like the best approach.  Because 
aesthetics is so rarely understood, and because it seen to have so little moral 
or cognitive value, the move to eliminate aesthetics from theology may 
seem, in this light, to be quite sensible. 
1.2. The Modern Aesthetic Attitude: Kantian Aesthetics
If  the modern aesthetic attitude presents itself  in one form as a kind of  
reckless aestheticism, which is antithetical to a compassionate theodicy, there 
is at least one other form of  this attitude which is more fundamental, which 
(though less obviously anti-Christian) may likewise contribute to the divorce 
of  theodicy and aesthetics.  
John Hospers earlier described the modern aesthetic attitude as “opposed to 
the practical attitude, which is concerned only with the utility of  the object in 
question.”213  Where an irresponsible aesthetic takes the divorce between 
aesthetics and cognitive or moral usefulness and runs with it, taking such 
liberty as an excuse for playful prodigality - there is a deeper and more 
serious strain of  the modern aesthetic attitude which seeks to affirm 
morality, but keeps it separated from aesthetic perception.
The bracketing out (described by Hospers, above) of  moral and cognitive 
concerns in the aesthetic attitude can be traced back to its most influential 
proponent, Immanuel Kant, whose notions of  ‘disinterestedness’ and the 
‘free play of  beauty’, if  not first found in his thought, were powerfully 
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transmitted through his writings.214 Kant’s Critique of  Judgment presents a 
bold attempt to resolve the apparent antinomy between our subjective 
sensing of  the world, and our desire to make universal statements about an 
object’s beauty.215  Kant’s account of  aesthetic judgment is fitting with 
Baumgarten’s coinage of  the term “aesthetic” as being the domain of  
“perceptibles”, in that in his Critique of  Judgment, Kant wants to differentiate 
aesthetic perception from other faculties, such as cognition (pure reason) or 
morality (practical reason):
Every reference of  representations, even that of  sensations, may be 
objective... save only the reference to the feeling of  pleasure and pain, 
by which nothing in the object is signified, but through which there is 
a feeling in the subject as if  it is affected by the representation.  To 
apprehend a regular, purposive building by means of  one’s cognitive 
faculty...is something quite different from being conscious of  this 
representation as connected with the sensation of  satisfaction. Here 
the representation is altogether referred to the subject and to its 
feeling of  life, under the name of  the feeling of  pleasure and pain.216 
Kant’s dense prose here indicates two key elements of  his account of  taste: 
the role of  concepts and the quality of  feeling.  Regarding the first, that recognition 
of  something’s function or purpose (as in the case of  a building) is 
something “quite different” from aesthetic judgment.  This marks a sharp 
break between Kant’s theory and the classical, mimetically-driven accounts 
of  Plato and Aristotle.217  Further, Kant is keen to break with the Medieval 
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emphasis on formal properties and principles of  the kind frequently 
described by Augustine as proportion or order (to which Aquinas adds 
integrity and luminosity).  “There is no empirical ground of  proof  which 
would force a judgment of  taste upon anyone”, Kant writes, standing 
against his philosophical ancestors.218  For Kant, neither a thing’s 
conformity to some representational purpose (such as an animal’s species or 
a statue’s lifelike quality) nor its conformity to an abstract value (such as 
luminosity or unity) are enough to arrive at a pure judgment of  beauty.  
“The judgment of  taste can be determined by no representation of  an 
objective purpose”, writes Kant “and consequently by no concept of  the 
good, because it is an aesthetical and not a cognitive judgment”.219  
It should be noted, however that Kant’s account of  taste is not entirely 
divorced from morality: as Roger Scruton notes, judgments of  taste “involve 
the evaluation of  objects as ends rather than means”.220  We can hardly 
quarrel with the consonance Kant finds between the moral and the 
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Kant secures the rationality of  this sensation through the second element indicated above, the quality 
of  feeling which one experiences. On his account, “subjective universality” of  the judgment of  
beauty can be secured by ensuring that the operative desire  in any aesthetic judgment is 
disinterested, and thus pure.  “Everyone must admit,” Kant writes, “that a judgment about beauty, in 
which the least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgment of  taste” (§2).  The 
apprehension of  beauty consists in “entirely disinterested satisfaction” (§6).  
What is most fascinating about Kant’s work here is his rather ingenious attempt to create a 
completely subjective account of  the judgment of  beauty which is not mired in critical relativism. 
On Kant’s rendering, when presented with an object, two faculties are brought into play, the 
imagination, which perceives the object, and the understanding, which posits a cognitive concept of 
beauty specifically for the object perceived.  So the two faculties participate in a sort of  “free play” 
which is aimed neither at identification of  the object as something specific (say, a Palm Warbler or a 
Yellow-rumped Warbler) nor at altering the understanding (for instance, with the added idea of  
“Birds are beautiful”).
In order to consider something good, I must always know what sort of  thing the object is 
[meant] to be… But I do not need this in order to find beauty in something. Flowers, free 
designs, lines aimlessly intertwined and called foliage: these have no significance, depend 
on no determinate concept, and yet we like [gefallen] them (§4).
The end result is an assessment of  the object which is free from ‘distractions’ such as pleasure and 
purpose, and therefore has no obvious conflicts-of-interest, which would prevent one from 
claiming universality.
220 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of  Mind (London: Metheun, 1974), 27.  
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beautiful, even if  we must ultimately part ways in seeking out more points of 
contact.  Kant’s affirmation of  the beautiful as the “symbol of  the morally 
good” is echoed in the work of  Iris Murdoch who sees contact with beauty 
as an “attempt to see the unself ”.221  If  only in a limited way, Kantian 
aesthetics holds together the essence of  moral goodness and the faculty of  
taste by using the former’s capacity for disinterestedness to arrive at an 
aesthetic verdict.
However, despite its brilliant internal resolution of  the antinomies of  
subjectivity and universality, many have questioned the success of  Kant’s 
account of  taste; as Anne Sheppard comments, on the Kantian account of  
taste, “problems of  how aesthetic disputes may be resolved, how aesthetic 
judgments may be justified, and how aesthetic comparisons are possible at 
all become particularly acute in relation to works of  art.”222  One suspects, 
reading Kant’s work, that it would be difficult to have a discussion about art 
with the philosopher.  All appeals to  artistic canons or poetic principles are 
seemingly ruled out by Kant.  Imagining a situation where the authority of  a 
critic might be invoked, Kant writes that he will stop his ears and “listen to 
no arguments and no reasoning”.223  Amusing as this image may be, there is 
a troubling undercurrent to Kant’s account of  taste.  One wonders if  a 
Kantian aesthetic has room for growth.  Can this faculty learn to judge more 
disinterestedly, or see more perceptively?  And if  so, is it possible to make 
universal statements, knowing that one could still be in need of  
development of  taste?  Further, Kant’s aesthetic may seem to apply well to 
certain aesthetic objects, such as abstract designs, but seem ill-fitted to the 
world of  narrative, where the excellence of  a story is often judged in 
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relation to a specific genre or other.  The works of  Shakespeare, though 
genius works, must be understood as existing within, and subverting, genres 
of  fiction.  Finally, while one agrees that a critic’s writings are not sufficient 
to judge a work beautiful or not, for those who have learned from critics 
such as Aristotle, Sidney, Eagleton, Lewis, Beardsley or Frye, it is hard to 
believe that our sense of  the beautiful cannot be aided by the guidance of  
others.  It seems obvious that I have often learned to see and appreciate 
beauty through the advice of  others.
But what is most problematic about the modern aesthetic attitude or, more 
specifically, Kant’s Critique of  Judgment for a theological aesthetic, is the 
emerging picture of  the autonomy of  aesthetic objects qua aesthetic 
objects.224 Following Kant, though the beautiful is not, contra Wilde, 
necessarily useless–even quite useful objects may possess beauty–
consideration of  an object’s usefulness is contrary to a judgment of  its 
beauty.  The critic, Orpheus-like, cannot look back upon the object with 
other interests, lest the beauty of  the object vanish in front of  his eyes.225
Frank Burch Brown describes this ‘either/or’ thinking fittingly as the “duck/
rabbit mentality” (making reference to the well-known optical illusion 
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popularized in Wittgenstein’s discussion of  gestalt shifts).226  The ‘duck-
rabbit’ figure can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit, but not both.227  On 
Kant’s conception, perception of  beauty and perception of  purpose must 
exist in alternate dimensions of  thinking, and cannot mutually inform one 
another.  While beauty and other aesthetic categories can be affirmed under 
this model, its value for theodicy will likely be minimal to non-existent.228  
Further, if  our judgment of  all aesthetic value is free of  governing concepts, 
purposeless, and disinterested, we can sense why those who follow after 
could see aesthetic value as useless and thus an unnecessary consideration 
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The modernist, prone to exhibit what we can now term the ‘duck/rabbit’ mentality, tends 
to think of  an experience or object as either aesthetic or non-aesthetic.  Since the work of  
art is regarded as an aesthetic object par excellence, the modernist takes great pains to 
establish the extraordinary autonomy and self-referential ‘meaning’ of  the art object.  Thus 
we are told that the artwork’s function is merely to shine forth in its fullness of  being - a 
plenitude to which all cognitive, social, moral, or religious meanings are supposedly 
irrelevant. (31)
227 One gap in my coverage here is, of  course, the absent Kierkegaard, whose division of  aesthetic 
and ethical stages is famously held up as an example of  either/or (Either/Or!) thinking. Though 
Kierkegaard’s division is in many senses defensible and often misread (as Kant’s is), his dilemma is 
none the less telling of  a perceived divide between sensation and morality which is widely held:
The only absolute Either/Or is the choice between good and evil, but this is also 
absolutely ethical.  The esthetic choice is either altogether immediate, and thus no choice, 
or it loses itself  in a great multiplicity… Consequently, either a person has to live 
esthetically or he has to live ethically. (in Theissen 199)
Kierkegaard’s ‘esthetic’ stage is notably marked by giving one’s self  over to particulars, allowing one 
to live a life determined by contingencies instead of  actualizing one’s self:
To a certain degree, the person who lives ethically cancels the distinction between the 
accidental and the essential, for he takes responsibility for all of  himself  as equally 
essential… Insofar as the esthetic individual, with ‘esthetic earnestness’, sets a task for his 
life, it is really the task of  becoming absorbed in his own accidental traits, of  becoming an 
individual whose equal in paradoxicality and irregularity has never been seen, of  becoming 
a caricature of  a human being. (Theissen, Theological Aesthetics: A Reader, 200-1) 
Certainly Hick’s dichotomizing of  the ethical and the aesthetic in Evil and the God of  Love utilizes 
the same vocabulary as Kierkegaard, and also sees the aesthetic particulars of  theodicy as distractive 
in a way which fits well with Kierkegaard’s general description of  the ‘esthetic stage’.  Kierkagaard’s 
statement that “Christianity does not at all emphasize the idea of  earthly beauty, which was 
everything to the Greeks” would further seem to fit with Hick’s general critique of  Augustinian 
theodicy as “neo-Platonic” against Irenaeus’ more thoroughly Christian theodicy (Theissen, 196).  
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Hence, beauty’s only “truth” is the truth of  a certain power of  judgment, while everything 
of  graver import dwells beyond the aesthetic altogether.  The beautiful adumbrates 
nothing beyond the self, and thought must traverse it, even transgress it, to escape either 
triviality or illusion: the beautiful leaves off  where the sublime begins, and the sublime itself 
falls away when it has sufficiently suggested to reason the formless power of  the infinite. 
(46-7)
for theodicy.  While the beautiful, according to Kant, may be the ‘mascot’ of  
the moral, so to speak, it cannot ‘play on the team’.229  Theodicy seeks to 
find order and purpose in a world disrupted by evil, but, as Jeremy Begbie 
writes, for Kant a “Judgment of  taste does not add to our stock of  
knowledge about the world; it is not a claim to knowledge; it never asserts 
that there is purpose and order in the world”.230  If  this is the case then 
aesthetic judgment must be irrelevant to making judgments about God’s 
goodness.  Nor can we look to the aesthetic with any eye for its application 
to religious concerns, as such desires would cancel out our capacity for 
disinterested judgment.  Thus, though Kantian aesthetics and the modern 
attitude it influences may perhaps be able to give a coherent account of  
judgment, its nature and structure prevents cooperation with theodicy’s task. 
Yet even in philosophical circles that would otherwise be opposed to 
Enlightenment assumptions, there may still be found a widespread prejudice 
against aesthetics put into practice.  Of  course, the problem may not be, as 
Frank Burch Brown phrases it, “that too many people have been reading 
Kant”, but rather that his ideas express “in a sophisticated way many of  the 
kinds of  convictions and habits of  mind that do, in fact, underlie our 
everyday ways of  thinking about taste”.231  Just as the figure of  the immoral 
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artist remains in the public consciousness, so too the notion that artistic 
evaluations are “all subjective” (and therefore not the basis for rational 
inquiry) remains.  It is easy to find a near-Kantian philosophy in many art 
critics.  Among even the most eloquent critics, one often finds a dual 
mentality, where aesthetic judgments are firmly voiced, while at the same 
time the perceptions of  the critic are qualified with a brief  statement that 
‘This is but one person’s opinion.’  Thus, it seems probable that, though the 
modern aesthetic attitude may not be held to dogmatically, the Kantian 
legacy remains widely influential among everyday consumers of  culture, 
eloquent critics and theodicists as well.  
In the last chapter, Philip Quinn suggested that aesthetic criteria are “utterly 
irrelevant” to moral goodness in a way that seems derivative of  Kantian 
thinking.  For Quinn, as he considers whether Leibnizian aesthetic 
categories such as “unity-within-variety” have relevance for the overall 
moral goodness of  a world, he can find no inherent benefit.  Even on 
Kantian principles, this would seem to be an extreme view - Kant affirms a 
fitting correspondence between the movement of  aesthetic judgment and 
the movement of  moral reasoning - disinterested evaluation is necessary.   
But it is easy to see how Quinn could so easily miss the benefits of  beauty 
given the prevalent modern aesthetic: aesthetics is simply assumed to be 
peripheral to serious moral and intellectual matters.  
Likewise, John Hick has plainly contrasted the ethical and the aesthetic in a way 
that suggests that Hick might well affirm the modern aesthetic attitude’s 
separation of  aesthetics from all other dimensions of  “ulterior purpose”.  
Thus, if  we are to inquire into some effective purpose (more than a merely 
affective quality) to aesthetic categories, values or works, in order to suggest 
that there may be a place for the “aesthetic theme” within theodicy’s task, 
we must first deal with some of  the widespread assumptions about the 
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nature of  art and aesthetics.  If  indeed contemporary philosophers of  
religion have tacitly absorbed modern attitudes toward aesthetics, it will be 
helpful to oppose this view as a preliminary move in any aesthetic theodicy.
The most telling evidence, however, of  the absorption of  the modern 
attitude must be the loud silence about aesthetics within theodicy.  Where 
once great theologians such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Boethius, strained to 
include considerations of  beauty within their reflection on evil, the subject 
is now rarely mentioned.  In his systematic theodicy, Providence and the Problem 
of  Evil, Richard Swinburne discusses beauty in a very short chapter given to 
the consideration of  the value of  creation.  Here Swinburne addresses the 
beauty of  creation as an intrinsic property to all creation, one that is 
disrupted by the entrance of  man onto the world-stage:
If  one thinks of  ugliness as a negative quality, as opposed to being 
the mere absence of  beauty, one would be hard put to think of  any 
part of  the pre-human world which is ugly; ugliness in this sense 
seems to arrive with the arrival of  humans, who, knowingly or 
unknowingly, make something which could be beautiful ugly 
instead.232
But this is as deeply as Swinburne explores the relation between beauty and 
evil in creation, and quickly leaves behind the subject by turning to “even 
better” considerations of  “belief  and thought, desire, sensation and 
purpose”.233  That beauty is raised and then left behind so quickly is 
indicative, not so much of  any fault with Swinburne’s work, but of  a 
pervasive discomfort with the subject among theodicists.  Swinburne’s 
mention of  beauty is the exception that proves the rule, in that it stands out 
prominently as an example of  a theodicist trying to do something with 
beauty, even though he does so little with it.  Thus, though the modern 
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aesthetic presents a prima facie obstacle to the integration of  aesthetics in 
theodicy, the even more difficult challenge before us is to offer an account 
of  how the two areas may fruitfully interact, after such a long period of  
division.
Specifically, a theological aesthetic which theodicy would seek to appropriate 
should be able to allow aesthetic judgments and categories to add to our 
experience of  God and the world conceptually and morally.  Fortunately, 
Christian theology is not neutral about the role of  images, but rather places 
central emphasis on a concrete image as fundamental to cognitive 
understanding.  It also makes sense theologically that the direction that a 
Christian aesthetic should move is away from an account of  aesthetic taste 
which places all emphasis on the judgment of  the individual (no matter how 
disinterestedly he judges).  
In the next section, I seek to lay out a preliminary theological aesthetics 
which may inform theodicy.  I hope this account will counteract some of  
the inherent suspicion of  aesthetics by offering a positive and Christian 
account.  
2. A Preliminary Theological Aesthetic: Fides Quaerens Aestheticum 
2.1. Christian Faith and Poetic Faith
In order to oppose the prevalent, if  unexamined modern aesthetic attitude, 
it is important to begin with a basic, if  all too brief, account of  Christian 
aesthetics.  Though there is no standard account to which we can appeal, it 
will be helpful to begin with a look at the form and content of  a Christian 
aesthetic derived from fundamental theological assumptions.  Two guides 
here will be especially helpful, Dorothy Sayers and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
as they (respectively) cover questions of  the importance of  creativity in 
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expressing truth, and as they raise the subject of  beauty as a manifestation of  
God’s being–both looking to the incarnation of  Christ as the starting point 
for reflection.   
Undoubtedly, after emerging from the tight calculations of  Kant’s aesthetic, 
the work of  Sayers and Balthasar may seem overly presumptive about what we 
can assume to be true.  Sayers writes with confidence that “if  we commit 
ourselves to saying that the Christian revelation discovers to us the nature of 
all truth, then it must discover to us the nature of  the truth about Art 
among other things”.234   Sayers’ point seems a bit too broad, as we will 
discuss in the next section, but she is certainly pushing a valid point, that it 
would be ludicrous to approach aesthetics as if  it were an entirely secular 
enterprise, when we must, by the nature of  our faith, believe that Christian 
truth has bearing on all areas of  human life.  
Balthasar, like Sayers, sees that aesthetics has been trapped for too long in 
worldly understandings, from which it cannot escape with the tools left to us 
by Enlightenment thinkers.  Though he does not mention Kant explicitly, it 
is easy to hear in his words a response to Kant’s subjective aesthetics:
Are we justified in restricting the beautiful to the area of  inner-
worldly relationships between ‘matter and form’, between ‘that which 
appears and the appearance itself ’, justified in restricting it to the 
psychic states of  imagination and empathy which are certainly 
required for the perception and production of  such expressional 
relationships?  Or: May we not think of  the beautiful as one of  the 
transcendental attributes of  Being as such, and thereby ascribe to the 
beautiful the same range of  application and the same inwardly 
analogous form that we ascribe to the one, the true, the good?235
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Balthasar favors the latter course, citing precedent in the church fathers, 
who presuppositionally “regarded beauty as a transcendental and did 
theology accordingly”.236  Balthasar writes on beauty, “Yet if  the 
philosopher cannot begin with this word, but can at best conclude with it 
(always assuming that he has not forgotten it under way), should not the 
Christian for this very reason perhaps take it as his first word?”237  
Balthasar’s opposition to the style of  the ‘philosophical person’ (read as 
‘Kant’) is undoubtedly an opposition to an overly mechanistic style which 
cannot handle the ambiguities of  beauty.  In seeking exactness, the sciences, 
according to Balthasar, “no longer have any time to spare” for beauty.238  
More sadly in Balthasar’s eyes, theology has followed suit in seeking 
respectability in following a scientifically exact method which occludes such 
considerations.239  “[P]recisely for this reason”, he writes, 
it is perhaps high time to break through this kind of  exactness, which 
can only pertain to one particular sector of  reality, in order to bring 
the truth of  the whole again into view - truth as a transcendental 
property of  Being, truth which is no abstraction, rather the living 
bond between God and the world.240
What George Steiner describes in Real Presences as a “wager on 
transcendence” sounds remarkably similar to what Sayers and Balthasar have 
suggested.241  Such a wager is not, as Steiner notes, a mere stab in the dark, 
but a necessary step in any intellectual undertaking.  All intellectual ventures 
require such wagers.  “There is no construct, there is no intuitive imaging, of 
our identity in being, of  our relations to the world,” Steiner writes, “which 
does not include at least one hiatus in the chain of  definition and 
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demonstration.”242  Perhaps the most shocking element of  Thomas Kuhn’s 
paradigm theory about the structure of  scientific revolutions was how un-
scientific the nature of  scientific progress seemed to be.  Paradigm shifts, as 
Kuhn himself  admitted, have a strongly aesthetic dimension, which in itself  
would seem to suggest little about the veracity of  the new paradigm.243  Yet, 
the nature of  scientific progress often requires such intuitive leaps, which 
are only later discovered to be highly accurate.  Discoveries in science often 
begin with gut intuitions, such as a preference for a new, more elegant 
theory.    Presumptions are often necessary in a wide range of  human 
endeavors, ranging from the scientist’s hypothesis to the critic’s search for 
meaning in a work of  art.  
Steiner, in discussing the possibility of  meaning in art, notes that to 
experience art is to gamble on a genuine encounter with the other.  
Engaging with art, whether abstract painting or fantastic fiction often 
requires of  us various levels of  trust.  The reader of  a novel must trust the 
author in order to receive the artwork as it is intended.  To skip blithely 
through the pages in search of  the “good parts” or to read the end of  a 
mystery first can be a violation of  the small trust necessary for enjoyment.  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously describes in his Biographia Literaria a need 
for a “willing suspension of  disbelief ” in the reading of  imaginative 
literature; such a suspension constitutes an act of  “poetic faith.”244  Steiner 
describes this rightly, then, as a “wager”, an act of  trust where the recipient 
of  a work of  art must exhibit some measure of  faith.  He writes, “there is in 
the art-act and its reception...there is in the experience of  meaningful form, 
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a presumption of  presence.”245  In order to engage in any intellectual 
venture, then, a Steiner-ian “wager on transcendence”, or a Coleridgian act 
of  “poetic faith”, is clearly needed.  If  this is true, then it seems fitting to 
begin with the Christian faith as a starting point for our account of  
theological aesthetics
2.2. Incarnation and Christian Creativity
In 1944, Dorothy Sayers publicly bemoaned the absence of  a Christian 
philosophy of  art and aesthetics in the church.  She acknowledges, of  
course, that there have been “plenty of  writers on aesthetics who happen to 
be Christians, but they have seldom made any consistent attempt to relate 
their aesthetic to the central Christian dogmas.”246   Sayers’ comment is 
perhaps a bit broad (neo-Scholastics such as Jacques Maritain might put in a 
word of  defense for Christian aestheticians like Augustine, Aquinas and 
perhaps himself), but it nevertheless points truthfully to a loud silence about 
aesthetics in theological discourse in Sayers’ time.  Further, as Sayers notes, 
“as far as the European aesthetic is concerned, one feels that it would have  
developed along precisely the same lines had there never been an 
Incarnation to reveal the nature of  God - that is to say, the nature of  all 
truth.”247  Again, Sayers is vague about the details of  the “European 
aesthetic” (she leaps from Plato and Aristotle to the contemporary context 
as if  the Western aesthetics had never gone through a period called the 
Middle Ages) but her comment is remarkably apropos regarding the legacy 
of  Enlightenment thought which, as discussed above, is so powerfully 
inaugurated by Kant.  Regarding the dis-carnate quality of  much 
Enlightenment philosophy, focused as it is on the autonomous thinker (cf. 
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Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum”), and separated from the messy particularities 
of  authority and tradition as sources of  knowledge, it is no surprise that the 
European aesthetic as Sayers glosses it has little room for the incarnation.  
Regarding the pagan aesthetic, Sayers’ main focus, she points to Plato’s 
moral and ontological objections to the arts.  Where Plato first objects to 
the corrupting influence of  all but the simplest and most edifying forms of  
art (Book III of  The Republic), he later denounces imitative art on grounds of 
its increasing removal from the Ideal (Book X of  The Republic).  Here and 
elsewhere (Ion, for instance), Plato’s low view of  representational art marks 
it out of  bounds for serious consideration as having conceptual benefits.  If, 
as argued in The Republic, representational art is just a mimeograph of  a 
mimeograph of  a mimeograph, its value can hardly reside in its truth-telling 
capacities.  Plato’s austere aesthetic, then, leads one to consider primarily the 
moral characteristics of  art.  As Sayers notes, where Plato attacks “art for 
entertainment”, even the highest forms of  drama, for their dissipating effect 
on the psyche, Aristotle’s defense of  the representational arts simply finds 
some use for this dissipating effect, rather than challenging Plato’s deeper 
suspicions about the limitations of  art.248  At best inspirational and at worst 
distracting from action and degrading to good character, Plato’s aesthetic, 
Sayers observes, is still found in modern-day England: 
Like the people of  Plato’s decadent Athens [the average British 
citizen] has forgotten or repudiated the religious origins of  all Art.  He 
wants entertainment, or, if  he is a little more serious-minded, he wants 
something with a moral, or to have some spell or incantation put on 
him to instigate him to virtuous action.249
Fortunately, Christianity does not need to begin at the same point from 
which Plato (or Kant) originate, because Christian theology is neither 
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committed to the Greek metaphysics of  Ideals (nor an Enlightenment 
epistemology).  Rather, as Sayers argues, there are powerful internal 
Christian resources which guide us in discerning a properly Christian 
aesthetic.250  
Sayers’ specific focus at the end of  her address sketches an ontology of  
creativity which uses presuppositions about what the incarnation must be 
theologically, and then applies this to an account of  human creativity.  
Specifically, Sayers stresses a quality of  coming into being which accompanies 
the act of  creation, even in the very nature of  the Trinity.  At the roots of  
Divine life is an ongoing creativity which is not merely mimetic but truly 
generative:
God, who is a Trinity, creates by, or through, His second Person, His 
Word or Son, who is continually begotten from the First Person, the 
Father, in an eternal creative activity.  And certain theologians have 
added this very significant comment: the Father, they say, is only 
known to Himself  by beholding His image in the Son.251
The eternal generation of  the Son by the Father is an expression which is 
more than mimetic, the Son is the Image of  the Father, but cannot be the 
copy of  the Father (else, could not be ‘Son’), and is yet indispensable to the 
Father’s expression of  His father-hood (else, could not be ‘Father’).  Christ’s 
incarnation, Sayers emphasizes, is thus an expression of  God’s purposes, but 
also an express expression, an indispensable image.  Elaborating on the 
author of  Hebrews (whom she ‘reveals’ to be Paul), Sayers writes, 
‘God...hath spoken to us by His Son, the brightness of  this glory and 
express image of  His person.’ - Something which, by being an image, 
109
250 Ibid., 30.  It is hard to disagree with Sayers’s polemical point here: 
It is absurd to go along placidly explaining Art in terms of  a pagan [or, one may add, 
Enlightenment] aesthetic, and taking no notice whatsoever of  the complete revolution of  
our ideas about the nature of  things that occurred, or should have occurred, after the first 
Pentecost (36).
251 Ibid.
expresses that which it images.  Is that getting us a little nearer to 
something?  There is something which is, in the deepest sense of  the 
words, unimaginable, known to Itself  (and still more to us) only by the 
image in which it expresses Itself  through creation; and, says 
Christian theology very emphatically, the Son, who is the express 
image, is not the copy, or imitation, or representation of  the father, 
nor yet inferior or subsequent to the Father in any way - in the last 
resort, in the depths of  their mysterious being the Unimaginable and 
the Image are one and the same.252
Having drawn on the incarnation as a resource for a theology of  creativity, 
Sayers then applies this deep connection between the transcendent Trinity 
and its economic expression to an account of  human experience which is 
mediated through creative expression.  Against an overly Greek notion of  a 
static deity, the Christian God is fundamentally creative in His innermost 
being, and thus His ongoing creativity is an outer expression of  a perpetual 
inner perichoresis.  But, unlike the neo-Platonic ‘One’ God’s involvement with 
the world is not merely an unconscious out-flowing of  goodness which is, in 
a sense, fixed.  Rather, the incarnation points to a unique event in the life of  
God and the world which brings about something ‘new’ for both parties.  
This incarnation is a part of  the life of  God, not merely a reflection of  it.  
In the same way that the act of  saying “I do” is both an expression of  love 
for one’s wife and the means by which one becomes married, the 
incarnation is God’s love in a way that is not interchangeable with other 
actions.  Sayers’ argument parallels in many ways the work of  Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, whose book Truth and Method argues that art is not a self-
contained phenomenon but a genuine source of  knowledge of  the ‘other’.  
Gadamer sets out to oppose the “radical subjectivization of  aesthetics” 
which followed Kant’s Critique of  Judgment.  He asks,  
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Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of  art 
contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of  
science, but equally certainly is not inferior to it?253
For Gadamer, art does lay claim to truth, as it draws us into its own inner 
essence (Wesen) where in we experience a kind of  ‘play’ which can alter our 
understanding of  the world: “The work of  art has its true being in the fact 
that it becomes an experience changing the person who experiences it.”254  
Using Gadamer’s game terminology, the kind of  artistry which Sayers 
describes is a form of  gamecraft, wherein the artist is able to draw us into 
the ‘play’ of  the poem, film, novel or play.  Just as sports highlight certain 
abilities which players possess, within the internally coherent world of  a 
work of  art, we can perceive and experience structures, concepts, and values 
which might be more difficult to grasp outside of   the microcosm of  the 
work of  art.  
Yet Sayers is not arguing that we can construct works of  art in order to 
express truths which we comprehend already, but rather than in 
constructing these works, we come to understand certain truths more 
clearly.  The poet, Sayers writes, “is simply a man like ourselves with an 
exceptional power of  revealing his experience by expressing it, so that not 
only he, but we ourselves, recognize that experience as our own.”255  Given 
this line of  thinking, an experience is not simply translated into the language 
of  creativity in order to be expressed artistically, but rather the creative 
expression itself  enables a certain kind of  experience.  Sayers writes, 
This recognition of  truth we get in the artist’s work comes to us as a 
revelation of  new truth… I am not referring to the sort of  
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patronizing recognition we give to a writer by nodding our heads and 
observing: ‘Yes, yes, very good, very true - that’s just what I’m always 
saying.’  I mean the recognition of  a truth which tells us something 
about ourselves that we had not been ‘always saying’ - something 
which puts a new knowledge of  ourselves within our grasp.256
Key here is the idea that new knowledge is made available to us through 
creative expression.  Just as Barth suggested earlier about Mozart, his music 
makes audible a certain “twofold yet harmonious praise of  God” in which 
sadness and joy can both be present.  Barth suggests that it is not simply 
that we find this truth also in Mozart, but that Mozart’s music is a unique 
mediator of  this insight.  To hear Barth speak about Mozart, then, is not 
equivalent to hearing Mozart’s music.  The work of  the art–like the work of  
Christ–reveals to us new truths by mediating those truths through 
themselves.  It is not as if, as an act of  communication, Christ reveals to us 
the Father’s love and then is done with his work.  But rather that Christ is 
the manifestation of  this love in God and in the world.  Christ’s physical 
incarnation is likewise a statement of  God’s love for us which remains even 
after his ascension.  That Christ retains his physical body suggests  perhaps 
more strongly than any communicated idea that God loves us deeply.  In an 
analogous sense, a sonnet of  Shakespeare might be the best possible 
expression of  his love, one which does not merely communicate the truths of 
Shakespeare’s feelings after which it can be discarded, but remains a 
necessary link in the truthful expression of  his love.  Sonnet 18 is, perhaps, 
the perfect example of  this:
Shall I compare thee to a summer's day? 
Thou art more lovely and more temperate. 
Rough winds do shake the darling buds of  May, 
And summer's lease hath all too short a date. 
Sometime too hot the eye of  heaven shines, 
And often is his gold complexion dimmed; 
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And every fair from fair sometime declines, 
By chance, or nature's changing course, untrimmed; 
But thy eternal summer shall not fade, 
Nor lose possession of  that fair thou ow'st, 
Nor shall death brag thou wand'rest in his shade, 
When in eternal lines to Time thou grow'st. 
So long as men can breathe, or eyes can see, 
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.
Here Shakespeare invests his admiration for the beauty of  the beloved into 
the poem itself.  The poem not only communicates Shakespeare’s internal 
admiration for the beloved’s beauty, but externalizes it in a beautiful manner 
(fitting form and content perfectly).  But Shakespeare seeks to preserve this 
praise of  beauty for all to share, and thus, in a sense, preserve the beloved’s 
fleeting beauty, so long as the poem “lives.”  If  one wanted to know how 
Shakespeare felt about his beloved, it would be difficult to find a better 
expression of  his feeling than the sonnet itself.  In this sense there is no 
“sneaking behind” certain expressions to find a more significant truth.
It is this irreducibility which aesthetic phenomena possess which can easily 
be overlooked in analytical circles.  Though excellent at using precise 
language in well-structured arguments, analytic philosophers may, at times, 
lose sight of  more aesthetic (read as ‘tangible’) elements of  life.  The 
ambiguities of  life and literature are sometimes impossible to fully analyze.  
Sayers sums this up well in The Mind of  the Maker when she writes, “To 
persist in asking, as many of  us do, ‘What do you mean by this book?’ is to 
invite bafflement: the book itself  is what the writer means.”257  Elements of  
Christ’s incarnation are likewise irreducible.  It is possible to ask of  Jesus’ 
death, “What does it mean?”–providing answers like substitution, moral 
influence, or ransom–but the event itself  has a significance which cannot be 
abstracted.  This strikes very close to the position Eleonore Stump takes in 
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her essays discussed in the above chapter.  It is not that Job is given an 
answer, but rather that Job is given a vision of  God, and thus a comforting 
presence in the midst of  his intellectual confusion.  Likewise, the mirror of  
evil immerses us in dark and heart-wrenching visions, but enables true 
goodness to shine forth more brightly by comparison.  After almost a 
century of  demythologizing in theology and deconstruction in literature, it 
can still be difficult to take Sayers’ point here seriously.  But for theological 
aesthetics to retain its importance it must be that there are certain insights 
which must remain ‘sights’.  If  theodicy is to incorporate aesthetics, then, it 
must take seriously the idea that aesthetics may offer us insight which 
cannot be fully translated into analytic language.258  
2.2. Incarnation and Christian Aesthetics
Balthasar describes beauty in similarly concrete ways.  In his theological 
aesthetics, The Glory of  the Lord, Balthasar too holds up the particular Christ 
as the concrete, express manifestation of  God’s glory.  Where Sayers reflects 
on the incarnation as a model for creativity in general, Balthasar is more 
focused on the beauty of  God’s glory, as is revealed in Jesus.  Beauty as a 
category is a powerful resource for Christian theology, in that it ties 
universal truths to the particulars of  history.  Where Sayers focused on the 
more expressive elements of  the form, Balthasar’s work is more focused on 
the affective quality of  beauty.  The beautiful is a form, and as we behold it we 
experience, not merely a disinterested satisfaction, but a stronger response 
which it is not inappropriate to call erotic:  
We ‘behold’ the form; but, if  we really behold it, it is not as a 
detached form, rather in its unity with the depths that make their 
appearance in it.  We see the form as the splendour, as the the Glory 
of  being.  We are ‘enraptured’ by our contemplation of  these depths 
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and are ‘transported’ to them.  But, so long as we are dealing with the 
beautiful, this never happens in such a way that we leave the 
(horizontal) form behind us to plunge (vertically) into the naked 
depths.259
In The Glory of  the Lord, Balthasar seeks to give an account of  the beautiful 
as a key element in our knowledge of  God’s truth and goodness.  If  God’s 
glory is aesthetically beautiful, then our grasp and understanding of  God’s 
being must remain sensuous.  Thus the erotic quality of  ‘enraptured’ 
contemplation mediates agapeic relationship.  Not all surfaces are superficial 
in importance; the beauty of  the beloved (as in Shakespeare’s sonnet) is truly 
significant.  As beauty is “lifted from [religion’s] face as a mask,” Balthasar 
writes, “its absence on that face exposes features which threaten to become 
incomprehensible to man.”260  The nuptial quality of  Balthasar’s theology is 
unavoidable.  Marriage provides analogous understanding to both 
relationships in its commitment to particulars.  Marriage’s emotional and 
biological factors of  attraction, love, sex, family and death yet manage to 
transcend insecurity, romanticism, lust, stress, and sadness not by attending 
to larger matters, but by attending properly and precisely to the beloved as 
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uniquely “Thou”.  Balthasar’s view of  marriage is keenly perceptive of  its 
agonies, while still positive about its effects:
What could be stronger than a marriage, or what shapes any 
particular life-form more profoundly than does marriage?… Marriage 
is that indissoluble reality which confronts with an iron hand all 
existence’s tendencies to disintegrate, and it compels the faltering 
person to grow, beyond himself, into real love by modeling his life on 
the form enjoined.261
By placing Christian theology under the sign of  beauty, Balthasar intends to 
likewise enjoin dogmatics to aesthetics, and therefore prevent the vertical 
knowledge of  God from leaving behind its horizontal manifestation: “To 
dispel the charm of  beauty by reducing its ‘appearance’ into some ‘truth’ 
lying behind or above it is to eliminate beauty altogether and to show that it 
was never really perceived in its distinctiveness.”262  Beauty draws our 
attention to, and grounds us in the particular details of  reality.  
Central to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Glory of  the Lord is the role of  Christ as 
the “radiant form” of  God’s self-revelation.  The form is indissoluble, 
beautiful, and revelatory.  Here we see a distinctively anti-Kantian strain. 
“We ‘behold’ the form”, he writes, “but if  we really behold it, it is not as a 
detached form, rather in its unity with the depths that make their 
appearance in it.”263  Opposed to the “free play” of  judgment in Kant’s 
account of  beauty, which renders an aesthetic verdict but nothing else, 
Balthasar’s account of  perception gives priority to beauty’s sensuous 
qualities, but denies that beauty is mute to transmit further revelation of  
truth and goodness.  A proper grasp of  the “effect” of  beauty, Balthasar 
writes, “will not be attained unless one brings to bear logical and ethical 
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concepts, concepts of  truth and value: in a word, concepts drawn from a 
comprehensive doctrine of  Being.”264  
Beauty is thus a call which establishes knowledge of  God by creating a sense 
of  and a desire for God’s goodness and truth.  In this, Balthasar stands 
alongside other thinkers such as Iris Murdoch and Elaine Scarry, who both 
describe the deep connections between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions 
of  reality.  In The Sovereignty of  the Good, Murdoch stakes a claim for the 
rightness of  the Platonic tradition regarding the unity of  the 
transcendentals:
Goodness and beauty are not to be contrasted, but are largely part of  
the same structure.  Plato, who tells us that beauty is the only spiritual 
thing which we love immediately by nature, treats the beautiful as an 
introductory section of  the good.  So that aesthetic situations are not 
so much analogies of  morals as cases of  morals.265
The appreciation of  beauty, Murdoch indicates, is not just a symbol of  
morality, but is properly moral in itself.  Beauty draws us out of  ourselves in 
a very Christian way, in that it calls us to appreciate and love something 
beside ourselves:
Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and 
to respond to the real world in the light of  a virtuous consciousness 
and join the world as it really is… ‘Good is a transcendent reality’ 
means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of  selfish 
consciousness and join the world as it really is.  It is an empirical fact 
about human nature that this attempt cannot be entirely successful.266
Elaine Scarry takes up a similar point in On Beauty and Being Just, when she 
notes that  “beauty prepares us for justice... the fact that something is 
perceived as beautiful is bound up with an urge to protect it, or act on its 
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behalf ”.267  This truth can often be observed in human life, where the 
destruction of  beautiful things is seen with deep moral disapproval.  The 
anger we feel at the vandalism of  Van Gogh’s Night Watch or the death of  a 
young child surpasses the emotional or physical damage, and may be most 
keenly felt in the destruction of  the beautiful.  As in Shakespeare’s sonnet 
(quoted above) we feel the desire to preserve and protect beauty, not for 
ourselves, but for itself.  Balthasar’s observations about the glory of  God, 
then can easily be seen to be grounded in the common experience of  
beauty.  That God’s glory is given both an erotic and agapeic quality is entirely 
fitting with the nature of  beautiful and the moral call it places on us.  
Balthasar further reflects that a Christian theory of  beauty should take as its 
guide the person of  Christ.  Reflecting his Barthian influence, Balthasar is 
adamant that revelation is Christocentric, and makes little or no room for a 
natural theory of  aesthetics: 
[J]ust as we can never attain to the living God in any way except 
through his Son become man, but in this Son we can really attain to 
God in himself, so, too, we ought never to speak of  God’s beauty 
without reference to the form and manner of  appearing which he 
exhibits in salvation-history.268
Jesus’ passion and death are then included in our account of  beauty, 
included as they are in salvation-history.  Balthasar writes:
As Karl Barth has rightly seen, this law extends to the inclusion in 
Christian beauty of  even the Cross and everything else which a 
worldly aesthetics (even of  a realistic kind) discards as no longer 
bearable.  This inclusiveness is not only of  the type proposed by a 
Platonic theory of  beauty, which knows how to employ the shadows 
and the contradictions as stylistic elements of  art; it embraces the 
most abysmal ugliness of  sin and hell into that divine art for which 
there is no human analogue.269
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In one sense, this flies in the face of  classical aesthetics, which would have 
little place for what we would traditionally consider the true ugliness of  
Christ’s torture and death.  Yet Balthasar does not deny that the 
irreducibility of  Christ’s beauty indicates that it would be naturally 
incomprehensible.  Trying to hold together a more Barthian doctrine of  
revelation and the Platonic/Medieval view of  aesthetics, Balthasar 
emphasizes that we can speak meaningfully of  God’s glory with natural 
categories.  He is keen to avoid placing theological aesthetics outside the 
realm of  human understanding:
The fundamental principle of  a theological aesthetics, rather, is the 
fact that, just as this revelation is absolute truth and goodness, so also 
is it absolute beauty; but this assertion would be meaningless if  every 
transposition and application to revelation of  human categories from 
the realms of  logic, ethics (‘pragmatics’), and aesthetics, if  every 
analogical application of  these categories, were simply forbidden.270
Those who have experienced the beauty of  Christ have not had to abandon, 
but modify, their natural conceptions, as they have been “inflamed by the 
most sublime of  beauties–a beauty crowned with thorns and crucified.”271  
If  Christ possesses not merely a type of  beauty, but rather its greatest form, 
then the most excellent aesthetic judgment cannot exist apart from 
knowledge of  Christ.
Balthasar’s theological aesthetic thus attempts to attest the contributive role 
of  the horizontal in God’s vertical revelation.  While self-authenticating, 
experiential and ultimately “from above”, beauty also has a discernible 
structure which can be elucidated with creaturely categories like symmetry 
and harmony.272  So God’s action in creation gives us “true vision of  the 
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course of  divine revelation”,  Balthasar proclaims. “If  there were no such 
contemplation, God’s revelation would not in fact be worthy of  man”.273  
For the dialectic of  revelation “to be conformable to man and the world” it 
cannot be totally other; else, “it would be spiritualistic and irrational.”274  
Against the modern aesthetic attitude, Balthasar’s nuptial theology uses 
beauty as a direct invitation to a deeper understanding of  Being.  To move 
from aesthetic delight to moral or cognitive reflection is not a violation of  
proper perception of  the beautiful, but a proper response to it.
Though Balthasar’s navigation of  Kant and Barth is nowhere stated as a 
goal, it is difficult not to see his theological aesthetic as an attempt to give an 
initiating priority to the beautiful - thus keeping us from being stranded in 
Enlightened subjectivity – yet without denying a commensurate quality 
between God’s action of  self-revelation and creaturely ways of  
understanding.  Experience of  art and the natural world illuminate our 
understanding of  beauty which, Balthasar positively affirms, “when we 
approach God’s revelation with the category of  the beautiful, we quite 
spontaneously bring with us in its this-worldly form.”275  Here Balthasar 
attempts to maintain the tension between Barthian discontinuity and 
Scholastic continuity, while noting that “it is very difficult to retain the two 
dimensions simultaneously, that of  the transcendent event impinging from 
above and that of  an immanent object bound up with a certain structure.”276  
He further comments that “All the compromises in Catholic thought thus 
stop short of  this parallelism.”277  In an effort to navigate these two 
parallels, Balthasar affirms that “the beautiful can be materially grasped and 
even subjected to numerical calculation as a relationship of  numbers, 
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harmony, and the laws of  Being”, while at the same time holding that the 
beauty of  divine revelation cannot be equated with this-worldly accounts of  
beauty which may well gravitate toward the pretty over and against the truly 
beautiful.278  God’s work in Christ, though shocking, then, is thus not purely 
generative of  an understanding of  God, but also re-generative of  pre-
existing Divine-human relations:
Now, admittedly the divine principle of  form must in many ways stand 
in sharp contrast to the beauty of  this world.  This contrast 
notwithstanding, however, if  God’s will to give form really aims at 
man as God truly wants to shape him – aims, that is, at the perfecting 
of  that work begun by God’s ‘hands’ in the Garden of  Eden – then it 
appears impossible to deny that there exists an analogy between God’s 
work of  formation and the shaping forces of  nature and of  man as 
they generate and give birth.279
Thus, though Balthasar begins by placing primary emphasis on Christ as the 
premier form of  God’s beauty, he ultimately affirms natural beauty as 
analogous to divine beauty, and thus worthy of  reflection.  
A Christian aesthetic which places Christ as the center for reflection, then, 
helpfully responds to both Wildean aestheticism and Kantian aesthetics.  By 
placing faith in the incarnation as a true expression of  God’s glory, we 
establish an initial trust in ‘carnal knowledge’ of  the invisible God.  By 
giving Christ the premier place of  honor in the realm of  the beautiful, we 
thus send the message that morality does not need to be circumvented for 
purposes of  aesthetic delight.  Here is the greatest beauty yet perceived, 
which lures us into a deeper love and understanding of  the Divine Being.280  
3. Toward a Theological Aesthetic
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280 Thus a Christian aesthetic, at the level of  participation and appreciation, seeks neither the 
autonomy of  the aesthetic in itself nor the autonomy of  the critic in himself, but rather an ongoing 
relationship which is informative and transformative. 
3.1. Neo-Aesthetics and Nuance
The proper starting point for theological aesthetics, then, is in theology, 
where we find the incarnation as a rich resource for establishing the 
importance of  artistry, creativity, and beauty.  Yet the powerful and 
suggestive work of  Sayers and Balthasar needs further nuance.  In Religious 
Aesthetics, Frank Burch Brown discusses both Sayers’ claim that “Christian 
revelation discovers to us the nature of  all truth”, and Balthasar’s claim that 
theological aesthetics “does not primarily work with extra-theological 
categories of  a worldly philosophical aesthetics [but] develops its theory of  
beauty from the data of  revelation itself ”.281  Though these arguments are 
laudable in their intentions, Brown argues, they are “specious” in their 
reasoning.282  Regarding Sayers’ statement  Brown points out that Christian 
revelation has not shown us the truth about a great number of  things such 
as “the nature of  the truths of  logic or quantum mechanics, of  language or 
the interpretation of  dreams.”283  Regarding Balthasar’s statement, Brown 
takes pains to argue that it does not stand to reason that “just because 
theology can make its own contribution to aesthetics, only aesthetics that 
begins with revelation can be pertinent to theology itself.”284  Brown’s 
critique is acutely correct and also slightly obtuse at the same time.  It is true 
that both claims are slightly grandiose in tone, but it seems that Brown may 
have a bit of  genre confusion.  Both Balthasar and Sayers introduce a 
positively polemical note into the aesthetically stagnated theological 
conversation.  Sayers addresses a wide audience, seeking to waken the crowd 
to pay attention to artistry.  That Balthasar’s work spans seven volumes does 
little to change the fundamental simplicity of  his theological aesthetics–which 
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hand-waves worries about scientific precision, in favor of  simply taking 
beauty as the first word for theology and exploring it confidently as a 
resource.  Neither thinker is concerned primarily to appeal to aesthetics as a 
shared value between Christians and non-Christians, and thereby build up a 
case for the Christian faith.  Rather, both seek to spur Christians to recognize 
those aesthetic elements already present in Trinitarian theology.
Yet, there is danger in overconfidently taking the Christian faith as a guide to 
aesthetics.  Brown’s umbrage at Sayers and Balthasar lies in the way in which 
their quoted statements seem to assume too much about Christian theology’s 
power over aesthetics.  To speak of  a Christian aesthetic may sound as if  
Christian thought were somehow in a position to survey aesthetics from 
above, and make pronouncements thereupon.  It is this idea which Brown 
seeks to oppose, more than the overall contributions of  Balthasar and 
Sayers.  Arguing that even special revelation is already mediated by aesthetic 
factors, in his chapter “Can Aesthetics be Christian?” Brown makes the case 
that there can be no truly absolute starting point in the theology/aesthetics 
discussion, because our experiences of  both are already affected, to some 
degree, by the other.  Dubbing his approach “neo-aesthetics”,  Brown is 
determined to surmount the modern divide between aesthetic and practical, 
and any purely dialectical opposition between Christian truth and secular 
inquiry.  This approach is helpful because it responds well to both Kantian 
aesthetics and any overly confident Christian aesthetic: 
A more adequate understanding of  the relation of  the aesthetic realm 
and its truth(s) to that of  the theological concepts is that they exist in 
mutually transformative, dialogical relationship.  Aesthetic 
perceptions give rise to thought (to paraphrase a familiar slogan), and 
thought modifies aesthetic perceptions in such a way as to give rise to 
further aesthetic creation and insight.285  
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Brown’s passing allusion to Paul Ricoeur’s writings is fitting, as Ricoeur also 
presses the idea that our sayings and doings display a freedom from 
antecedent forms of  expression, and a dependence on these antecedent 
expressions.286  Our understanding is already shaped by symbols and ideas 
which ‘give rise’ to our thinking, but which we do not fully understand, and 
thus must seek to interpret.  In The Symbolism of  Evil, Ricouer discusses this 
‘knot’ of  interpretation which we inevitably engage in when we seek to 
understand and interpret our experience.  Thus, Ricouer, “Such is the circle: 
hermeneutics proceeds from a prior understanding of  the very thing that it 
tries to understand by interpreting it.”287  For Christian theology, as we try 
and interpret the language of  the faith–such as our understanding of  God 
‘the Father’–we are already shaped by our prior understanding of  what these 
symbols imply, even as we try to reform, redeem, or alter their meaning. 
Theological aesthetics is likewise engaged in this ‘knotty’ discourse–where 
the most basic elements such as creation, expression, beauty, and glory are 
already actively present in their natural state, giving rise to our ability to 
examine their proper significance.  
In place of  a single account of  aesthetic perception (following Kant) what 
Brown proposes as a model for aesthetics sounds much like the kind of  
‘cumulative case argument’ often put forward in discussions of  
epistemology.  In Faith and Criticism, Basil Mitchell argues that, contrary to 
rigid notions of  rationality, 
Much of  our reasoning is tacit and informal.  It cannot be neatly 
displayed as a set of  conclusions derived by a straightforward process 
of  inference from clear-cut premisses... Thus most arguments are 
cumulative in form.  A wide range of  considerations of  very varied 
124
286 See Paul Ricoeur, “Nature and Freedom” in Political and Social Essays, eds. David Stewart and 
Joseph Bien (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), 29-37.
287 Ricouer, The Symbolism of  Evil, 352.
character is involved.  No one of  them suffices to generate the 
required conclusions, but, taken together, they converge irresistibly.288
Further, if, as Brown indicates, theological understanding arises from 
aesthetic perception, then we cannot speak too quickly about a purely 
theological account of  aesthetics.  If  we are to have any powers of  
recognition of  divine beauty, then it must be assumed that these powers may 
also respond to this-worldly beauty as well.  For example, I find it significant 
that Jesus’ analogies often centered on weddings, which represented not 
only moral principles such as fidelity, but the sensuous enjoyment of  food, 
wine and celebration.  For the image of  kingdom of  God as a wedding 
celebration to have purchase, it must be assumed that the hearers already 
have some sense of  the delights of  God’s kingdom.  
Brown is right, then to make a special point of  affirming our natural, ‘pagan’ 
experience of  the aesthetic.  It is upon these desires, senses and values 
which a theological aesthetic begins to take hold and redeem.  Writes 
Brown, 
[I]t seems plain, that however illuminated the human mind may be by 
what some theologians call ‘special’ revelation, one is still human and 
usually responds to those media that speak most vividly to the human 
being as a whole.289  
Artists who create beautiful objects can also be affirmed as agents of  
illumination, as they help to connect us to reality through media which we 
respond quite strongly to. 
Though Brown took issue with him above, Balthasar would, I think, 
fundamentally agree with this idea.  Though we must worry about 
theological aesthetics “degrading” into a purely this-worldly account of  
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beauty, Balthasar writes with approval of  the power of  art to illuminate our 
understanding:
[A]ll those who have been once affected inwardly by the worldly 
beauty of  either nature, or of  a person’s life, or of  art, will surely not 
insist that they have no genuine idea what beauty is... This is why, 
when we approach God’s revelation with the category of  the 
beautiful, we quite spontaneously bring this category with us in its 
this-worldly form.290
It is safe, then, to take Brown and Balthasar to be in agreement that our 
experience of  this-worldly aesthetics is not to be distrusted a priori.
Against any purist account of  taste, Brown brings up multiple examples of  
aesthetic objects whose impact is mediated by non-aesthetic factors.  We are 
invited to imagine Chartres Cathedral, identical in every respect, but 
constructed of  space-age materials in Florida’s Disney World.  Brown argues 
that while the building might be identical in every sensory aspect, our 
aesthetic appreciation would undoubtedly be lessened.  Unlike its French 
counterpart, “it would never occur to us to call the pseudo-cathedral 
sublime.”291  Brown’s point with this example is that there is more to 
enjoying an aesthetic object than merely sensuous perception.  Though 
Chartres Cathedral can be appreciated primarily as an aesthetic object–e.g. 
non-Christians can appreciate it apart from desiring to use it religiously–part 
of  even this appreciation is affected by its age, history, and original purpose.  
Obviously many aesthetic works do possess a high level of  stability in a 
variety of  contexts.  But the way that other aesthetic works change in 
significance and value quite radically, suggests that in practice, it will be 
impossible to bracket out all religious from  aesthetic judgment.  Brown 
writes, 
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Clearly a better model for thinking about aesthetic experience would 
be one that allowed for the integrity and uniqueness of  works of  art 
or aesthetic objects without completely severing their connection 
with what is not already inherently artistic or aesthetic.  This would 
allow us to justify in theory our common perception that, for 
example, the beauty and sublimity of  Chartres Cathedral - its grace, 
dizzying height, and powerful integrity - are at once aesthetic and 
religious, with its religious import modifying its aesthetic impact, and 
vice versa.292
Holding up as a model of  such interaction, Frank Burch Brown gives the 
example of  Sir Thomas Browne’s comments on music.  Where Chartres 
Cathedral suggests being seen in a religious light, Sir Thomas Browne notes 
that even “Taverne Musicke” can have some religious meaning.293  “It is an 
Hieroglyphicall and Shadowed lesson of  the whole world, well understood, 
would afford the understanding,” Browne writes in 1643,  “In briefe, it is a 
sensible fit of  that Harmony, which intellectually sounds in the eares of  
God.”294  The example of  drinking music here obviously provides 
analogous application to larger theological themes.  Secular musical 
harmony is a “sensible fit” for the intellectual harmony of  the world seen by 
God.  But Frank Burch Brown is intent on pointing out that here may be a 
complex interaction which is multi-directional.  Not only does Sir Thomas 
Browne’s perception of  the music affect his understanding of  God (he 
perceives God’s plan as music), but his beliefs about God’s providence affect 
his perception of  the music itself.  Frank Burch Brown argues that to see 
only how the aesthetic modifies the conceptual is to miss an important 
alternative, 
that the music really sounds different to Browne because he brings to 
the sound a mentality and sensibility that allows him to hear the 
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graceful and harmonious features of  the music as the adumbration of 
Grace and Harmony writ large.295
Just as when we see the moon on the horizon it looks larger than it does 
alone in the sky, religious ‘seeing-in-relation’ may alter our perception 
(‘seeing-as’) of  aesthetic object themselves.  Returning to the example of  
Mozart employed by Barth, it is undeniable that Barth hears Mozart’s music 
differently because of  its rich theological connections.  It seems very likely 
that Barth found more to appreciate aesthetically in Mozart’s music, because 
of  his already present theological framework.  Thus it may be too 
presumptuous to assume that Mozart can allow anyone with “ears to hear” 
an auditory insight into the scope of  God’s providence – as if  a good will 
and a little patience was all that was required.  Very likely, a rich theological 
training (such as Barth himself  had) might be necessary to hear the sounds 
of  which he speaks.
Frank Burch Brown’s ‘Neo-Aesthetic” approach thus similarly emphasizes 
the role of  cognitive (and other non-aesthetic) elements in perceiving and 
valuing aesthetic objects.  If  our appreciation of  aesthetica is so 
conditioned, this offers a more practical response to the duck/rabbit 
mentality.  The modern separation of  aesthetics from other aspects of  life is 
simply untenable when we begin to consider the complex way that we 
interact with aesthetic objects.  But a theological aesthetic must also 
acknowledge, right at the outset, that it is already shaped by both theology 
and aesthetics.  A religious aesthetic then, seeks to examine the way that 
theology is shaped by, and shapes, aesthetic perception.
3.2. Theological Aesthetics in Outline
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Having dwelt for some time on aesthetics as an aspect of  discourse which 
Christian theology fundamentally supports and enriches, it remains to spend 
a bit more time examining theological aesthetics with a mind toward 
application to aesthetic theodicy.  Our above readings of  Balthasar and 
Sayers stand clearly as an example of  theological aesthetics, in that both seek 
to interpret aesthetics from a theological starting point.  As such, both clear 
the way for the latter, an aesthetic theology.  Perhaps most significantly, in 
the context of  our discussion of  John Hick’s work, the theology of  Sayers 
and Balthasar suggests that aesthetic considerations are not peripheral to 
our reflection on Jesus and the incarnation, but an important factor of  it.  
In Evil and the God of  Love, Hick suggests that since “our positive knowledge 
of  God’s nature and purpose still derives from His incarnation in Jesus 
Christ... any justification of  evil must be a justification of  it as playing a part 
in bringing about the high good of  man’s fellowship with God”.296  In 
focusing on the incarnation as a fundamental resource for theological 
aesthetics, we can see that Hick’s dichotomy is ultimately a false one.  If  
Christ’s incarnation has deep connections with theological aesthetics, then 
we are much more justified in pursuing it as a resource for theodicy. 
Aesthetic theodicy, then, having a theological aesthetic in its background, 
seeks to interpret theodicy with the help of  aesthetic methods.  In his book, 
Theological Aesthetics, Richard Viladesau writes:
[Theological aesthetics] comprises both an “aesthetic theology” that 
interprets the objects of  theology - God, faith, and theology itself  - 
through the methods of  aesthetic studies, and a more narrowly 
defined “theological aesthetics” that interprets the  objects of  
aesthetics - sensation, the beautiful, and art - from the properly 
theological starting point of  religious conversion and in the light of  
theological methods.297
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Viladesau breaks this down even more helpfully into three main areas of  
discourse:  
• First is a “theological account of  human knowledge on the level of  
feeling and imagination”.  
• Second is a “theology of  beauty” which reflects on the role of  beauty in 
our doctrine of  God, as well as in our doctrines of  revelation and 
theological method.  
• Third is a “theological reflection on art and on the individual arts” 
which seeks to understand what role the arts play in revelation, 
conversion and theology.298
These three levels of  discourse clarify how theological aesthetics can affect 
the discourse of  theology in general and theodicy in particular.  In the 
comparison between Kant, Sayers and Balthasar, much of  the focus rested 
on the first issue, how our contact with aesthetics affects (or doesn’t) our 
knowledge of  other areas.  Balthasar, in placing theology under the banner 
of  beauty, combines his theology of  perception with a theology of  beauty, 
and thus attempts to show how the best apologetic is a good systematic 
theology, by uniting a “theory of  vision (or fundamental theology)” and a 
“theory of  rapture (or dogmatic theology)”.299  
In place of  a precise account of  aesthetics as a source of  knowledge, I have 
opted to approach the first issue through the writings of  Sayers and 
Balthasar, who offer a theological account which is based on a sort of  
“wager” on aesthetics as a source of  genuine contact with reality.  
Integrating the insights of  Frank Burch Brown, I suggest that such a wager 
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is not without thoughtfulness, but rather invites us to engage with the arts in 
order to find more connections between aesthetics and theological insight.  
This sort of  messiness is appropriate, as Basil Mitchell suggests, because 
even within rational argumentation we find that many arguments depend 
more on an accumulation of  details which must all be taken together.  The 
inclusion of  artistic considerations into any field opens the door to a certain 
degree of  messiness.  “Beauty crosses boundaries”, David Bentley Hart 
writes, “Among the transcendentals, beauty has always been the most 
restless upon its exalted perch.”300  Much the same could be said about 
aesthetics more generally as a discourse practice, where the inherent 
imprecision of  this field undoubtedly wards off  many theologians and 
philosophers.  To attempt to pin down this ‘boundary-crossing’ discipline is 
surely impossible, yet a failure to discern its effects reconciles the discipline 
all the more to triviality and neglect.  While various trends have no doubt 
contributed to the alienation of  aesthetics, the field’s elusiveness is 
undoubtedly a root cause as well.  
Second of  Viladesau’s delineated areas is the theology of  beauty.  What 
‘aesthetics’ denotes is theoretical reflection on sensation (roughly from 
aisthetikos or ‘perceptibles’, c.f. Baumgarten).  Yet it has rarely been the case 
that this adapted term by Baumgarten has connoted mere perception.  
Aesthetics has often focused upon art and artistic taste.   Carrying on the 
classical and especially medieval interest, as Umberto Eco notes, aesthetics 
has often been centered around reflection on “a whole range of  issues 
connected with beauty - its definition, its function, [and] the ways of  
creating and enjoying it.”301  Philosophical aesthetics has gone back and 
forth on the concept of  beauty in recent years, not only questioning its 
central role, but even doubting beauty’s relevance or validity altogether.  
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Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, in his excellent essay, “The Great Theory of  Beauty 
and Its Decline”, writes that “one seldom finds [the concept of  beauty] used 
in twentieth-century aesthetics.  Its place has been taken by other words less 
weighed down by equivocation (notably the word aesthetic)”.302 Though 
beauty is not the entirety of  aesthetics, if  has continued to remain 
fundamental, whether as a figure of  adoration or scorn.  Even, as Arthur 
Danto observes, in The Abuse of  Beauty, the reactive works of  artists like 
Marcel Duchamp (e.g. Duchamp’s “Fountain”: a readymade urinal presented 
as art) are still, in some sense “about beauty” in their rejection of  the 
tradition.303   
Questioning the role of  beauty is not altogether inappropriate.  Classic and 
medieval aesthetic theories focus on beauty to the exclusion of  other related 
aesthetic values.  And yet, while aesthetic theories sometimes strain under, as 
Frank Burch Brown phrases it, “tyranny of  the beautiful”, it seems fitting 
that Christian aesthetics will always, in some sense, focus on beauty as 
crucial to its theorizing.  Beauty and holiness, or worldly beauty and God’s 
creative action, have been linked in scripture (as in Psalm 29:2’s “worship 
the LORD in the beauty of  holiness” and Wisdom 13:5’s “from the 
greatness and beauty of  the creation, the creator of  these things can easily 
be recognized”).  Likewise, the concept of  “glory”, central as it is to Old 
and New Testament understandings of  God, certainly carries with it an 
aesthetic element quite fitting with the concept of  beauty.  
Taking a page from Balthasar, it seems more appropriate to allow the riches 
of  Christian thought to stretch and enrich our concept of  beauty, rather 
than dispense with the idea as an unhelpful Greek import.  Without the 
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notion of  beauty as a key figure, with all of  its self-evident allure, aesthetics 
will likely further sink into the background of  Christian thought.  Alfred 
North Whitehead once wrote, “Truth matters because of  beauty.”304  
Balthasar would undoubtedly agree with this assessment, and add that 
without beauty’s call, “the good also loses its attractiveness.”305  Much the 
same might be said about aesthetics, that without its most lovely feature, this 
difficult field would lose much of  its allure.  Given the biblical emphasis on 
“beauty” as well as “glory”, as well as the traditional connection of  Christian 
truth and goodness with beauty, it is no surprise that theological aesthetics 
will remain centered, while certainly not exclusively focused, on issues 
surrounding beauty.  Beauty must not be allowed to tyrannize the field, but 
its authority can hardly be ignored.306 
Thirdly, as we seek to understand what role the arts play in revelation, 
conversion and theology, we must acknowledge, as Frank Burch Brown has 
in Religious Aesthetics, that aesthetic and cognitive categories are often 
interdependent.  As such, much of  his work is dedicated to finding 
paradigms wherein aesthetics, ethics and concepts can exist in the same 
space.307  Richard Viladesau’s work complements much of  Brown’s thought.  
Often, Viladesau focuses on the way that aesthetic works mediate cognitive 
understanding, particularly the ways that artistic expressions “are themselves 
a way of  thinking and communicating”.308  
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The wide variety of  effects which aesthetic works may have is dizzying.  
Artistic media may “serve a complementary role to words and concepts”, 
Viladesau writes, “expressing ideas, illustrating them, extending their reach 
into the realm of  affect and desire, sometimes adding to ideas another 
meaning that has an ambiguous relationship with their purely conceptual 
content.”309  Similarly, Nicholas Wolterstorff, in Art in Action, rejects the 
usual question, “What is art for?” as ridiculous,  given the diverse purposes 
for which it is created.  “Works of  art are instruments” he writes “by which 
we perform such diverse actions as praising our great men and expressing 
our grief, evoking emotion and communicating knowledge”.310   Following 
this, Wolterstorff  provides a laundry list of  functions: arts may benefit a 
society by confirming its ideas by embodying them in concrete ways; the arts 
may illuminate our understanding by showing us something new about 
reality; the arts may entertain us; the arts may model behavior for us through 
the imitation of  human action; and the arts “can serve as instrument in our 
struggle to overcome the fallenness of  our existence while also, in the 
delight which it affords, anticipating the shalom which awaits us.”311  
3.3. Reordering and Enrichment
Within this range of  possible effects, two main foci desire attention: re-
ordering and enrichment.  Writing about music, Jeremy Begbie highlights 
these two key benefits to doing theology through the arts, that “music can 
‘take our time’ and give it back to us, enriched, re-ordered in some manner, 
and that its capacity in this respect can be of  considerable theological 
interest.”312  In the context of  Begbie’s work, music functions as a concrete 
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example of  the “fruitful transience” present in musical performance.  
Learning patience, as well as gaining a sense of  the value of  time as part of  
God’s good creation, music’s coherent chronological-embeddeness draws 
our attention to certain aspects of  creation and engenders a sense of  
creation’s value.  It reorders and enriches our perception.  Begbie’s comments 
about music and time, though specific in context, are a good example of  the 
benefits of  aesthetic theology, in that we can experience both illumination 
and delight simultaneously.    While aesthetic experience is not fully 
described by the effects of  reordering and enrichment, these two categories help 
fill out the shape of  much aesthetic experience.  “Human experience is both 
cognitive and affective” John Navone writes, affirming the interdependency 
yet difference of  these two criteria.  
In being affected by a work of  art, or some otherwise aesthetic object, we 
often experience a transfer of  understanding similar to the way that 
metaphor works.  Janet Martin Soskice in her magisterial study, Metaphor and 
Religious Language, points out that while metaphors have only one subject, 
they inevitably involve “at least two different networks of  associations.”313  
By drawing together two differing networks, the metaphor intends to 
illuminate our understanding of  a single subject.  Thus, the metaphor from 
Shakespeare, “What light through yonder window breaks? / Tis the east, 
and Juliet is the sun”, draws together the worlds of  the Capulet household 
and the sunrise, to generate a new understanding of  Romeo’s effulgent 
feelings for his beloved.  
Poetic ‘inspiration’ often consists of  making such connections between two 
initially disparate worlds.  New and striking metaphors can help us to 
recognize features of  the world which we never before observed.  Old and 
tested metaphors and similes, though no longer striking, become so 
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necessary in everyday speech that we find it difficult to avoid them: as Sally 
McFague writes, “modern languages are for the most part composed of  
dead metaphors; common sense or discursive language was once 
metaphorical but now has attained a univocal meaning.”314 To speak of  
having a “heart of  stone”, of  avoiding something “like the plague”, of  
turning “on a dime”, of  feeling  your “blood run cold”, or of  knowing 
“beyond a shadow of  a doubt” is to invoke some poetic trope aimed at 
aiding our understanding of  the world.  Though these tropes have become 
clichéd through time (they are often no longer even recognized as 
metaphorical), their efficacy in mediating understanding remains. 
In doing theodicy, it is often helpful and illuminating to find such 
connections, as new ways of  understanding God’s work in the world are 
comprehended by alternate means.  J. R. Lucas, in Freedom and Grace uses an 
artistic example to help “carry across” a specific idea to a theological 
context.  Explaining how God can providentially oversee creation, while 
being unaware of  the future free decisions of  humans, Lucas writes,
God’s plan for the future must be like that of  the Persian rugmakers, 
who let their children help them.  In each family the children work at 
one end of  the rug, the father at the other.  The children fail to carry 
out their father’s instructions exactly, but so great is their father’s skill, 
that he adapts his design at his end to take in each error at the 
children’s end, and work it into a new, constantly adapted, pattern.  So 
too, God.  He does not, cannot, have one single plan for the world, 
from which we, by our errors, ignorances, and sins, are ever further 
departing.315
Lucas’s example here helps to place within our grasp an additional 
theological understanding by means of  artistic analogy.
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Yet, if  it is incorrect to label all such comparisons strictly metaphorical, at 
the very least there is a quality to aesthetic theology which is analogously 
metaphorical.  Conceptual models (such as the comparison of  evolutionary 
progression to a tree) share much in common with metaphor.  Again, as 
Soskice points out, as with metaphors, with models “we regard one thing or 
state of  affairs in terms of  another.”316  ‘Metaphorical’ discourse this runs 
the range from large-scale comparisons of  two networks of  associations, to 
much more restricted comparisons with very focused connections.  Where 
Lucas’s discussion of  Persian rugmakers as one key has point of  contact 
between the artistic and theological networks, illuminating one element of  
God’s providence, other metaphorical comparisons may be far more 
general, with multiple overlaps between the two networks of  associations.  
Barth’s connection between Mozart’s music and creation’s finitude, for 
instance, draws together two such networks of  associations, allowing for 
much wider overlap between the networks of  Mozart’s music and creation’s 
light and shadowed sides. 
Artistic metaphors and models thus invite us to see things differently.  Yet these 
conceptual shifts will less likely be experienced in a significant way, without 
an affective quality within the subject.  At the very least, one’s understanding 
of  value will likely need to play an informative role in the reordering that 
may occur through aesthetic theology.  Patrick Sherry, in Spirit and Beauty, 
points out that “beauty has an eschatological significance, in that it is an 
anticipation of  the restored and transfigured world which will be the 
fullness of  God’s kingdom.”317  Sherry’s connection has a metaphorical cast 
to it, in that we are seeing a theological doctrine through a somewhat 
distinct concept.  The joy and splendor of  beauty help us perceive the 
delight of  God’s new creation.  Yet the transference of  meaning which 
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occurs would be impossible without a strong perception of  the value of  
beauty as an experience.  Similarly, Barth’s use of  Mozart would admit very 
little reordering of  our understanding of  creation without some notion of  
the beauty of  The Magic Flute or other such works.  
One powerful feature of  artworks, natural wonders, and other aesthetic 
experiences, is their power to engender a sense of  value quite naturally.  
Without ever considering the conceptual transformations which may occur 
through aesthetics, it is rare not to notice the enriching quality it has on our 
lives.  Rarely do we meet someone who is not entranced with some form of  
the arts.  Even those whose reading goes no further than mysteries or 
romance novels would undoubtedly acknowledge some excitement and 
delight.  Jacques Maritain, writing on the nature of  the arts, praises the 
power of  music to do precisely this:
Music no doubt has this peculiarity that, signifying with its rhythms 
and its sounds the very movements of  the soul – cantare amantis est – it 
produces, in producing emotion, precisely what it signifies.  But this 
production is not what it aims at, any more than a representation or a 
description of  the emotions is.  The emotions which it makes present 
to the soul by sounds and by rhythms, are the matter through which it 
must give us the felt joy of  a spiritual form, of  a transcendent order, 
of  the radiance of  being.318
Yet it is not music alone which has this power, Maritain also points to 
tragedy as well as a source of  enriching emotion: “tragedy... purifies the 
passions, by developing them within the limits and in the order of  beauty, by 
harmonizing them with the intellect, in a harmony that fallen nature 
experiences nowhere else.”319  Beyond music or tragic drama, it must be 
assumed that a wide range of  aesthetic objects can provide for us not only a 
138
318 “Thus music, like tragedy, purifies the passions, by developing them within the limits and in the 
order of  beauty, by harmonizing them with the intellect, in a harmony that fallen nature 
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reordering (Maritain’s “form”), but also an enriching experience of  tangible 
joy (Maritain’s “matter”).320   
Another example of  the enriching power of  the arts comes from C. S. 
Lewis, who, in discussing fairy stories, praises their many features, but takes 
time to comment that fairy stories “can give us experiences we never had 
and thus, instead of  ‘commenting on life’, can add to it.”321   These 
experiences are more than just new vistas, however, but enable an enriched 
vision of  that which we have already experienced.  Elsewhere, Lewis 
describes the power of  fantastic stories to enrich our enjoyment of  
mundane experiences.  In the same way that a dinner of  beef  may be made 
more palatable to a child by imagining that it is buffalo, tales of  the strange 
may well enliven our appreciation of  the actual.  Lewis phrases it this way, 
“This excursion into the preposterous sends us back with renewed pleasure 
to the actual.”322  Chesterton takes up a similar point in regard to fairy tales.  
For Chesterton, one of  the key values of  fairy tales is the ability they 
possess to reawaken a nascent wonder at God’s creation.  Dulled by 
familiarity, tales of  the fantastic rekindle our original amazement at the 
world.  He writes: 
These tales say that apples were golden only to refresh the forgotten 
moment when we found that they were green. They make rivers run 
with wine only to make us remember, for one wild moment, that they 
run with water... All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means 
that for one awful instant we remember that we forget.323 
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Here again we have an affirmation of  value, in that fairy stories may add to 
our experiences and enrich (or re-enchant) our enjoyment of  the world.  
3.4. Artistic and Aesthetic Models: Collecting the Insights  
Within the contexts of  this study, the area of  theology we wish to examine 
is theodicy which is shaped by larger scale artistic and aesthetic “models”.  
Harmony, tragedy and horror function as aesthetic and artistic categories 
which invoke a range of  artistic works and critical theories.  Large-scale 
aesthetic themes can function as metaphorical models, aiding our 
understanding of  theodicy by bringing together two networks of  
associations.  That large-scale artistic themes have often been invoked in 
theological discussion is not surprising, as they immediately spark to life the 
evil discussion and open up new conversations that can take place.  
The use of  artistic genre, especially, can provide an immediate accessibility 
and interest to our consideration of  the world.  Though Barth’s use of  
Mozart is compelling, our grasp of  the connections he draws between the 
master composer and the scope of  God’s providence is largely dependent 
on our knowledge of  the music itself.  Genres such as tragedy, comedy, 
horror, or fairy tale are more likely to engage a wider audience, as most 
culturally literate people have some exposure to specific works within these 
categories.  In browsing for books or movies, contemporary people often 
think in terms of  genre, seeking out a comedic film to enjoy with friends, or 
a tragic love story to stir the emotions.   
Aside from their use in contemporary culture, genre has a venerable literary 
tradition.  Before Aristotle and Plato, the Greek arts had separate muses to 
inspire different works: Thalia for comedy; Melpomene for tragedy; Erato 
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for erotic poetry, and so on.324  Plato, no true friend of  the artist, 
acknowledged the muses in Ion as a source of  inspiration (if  inferior) and 
gave attention to the forms of  art which they inspired; even adding to their 
pantheon a tenth muse, Sappho.  That the Greeks recognized different 
muses standing behind different kinds of  works is suggestive of  the 
perennial human desire to categorize the arts.
Apart from heavenly inspiration, the form of  a genre is a helpful guide to 
the creator of  an artwork and the perceiver of  an artwork.   Since Aristotle’s 
Poetics, the study of  genre has played a continual role in Western criticism.  
In his Poetics, Aristotle strives to lay out the nature of  tragedy’s artistic 
imitation, noting what separates it from comedy is a particular “criticism of  
life”, a difference in mimesis of  manner and subject: notably, comedy “aims 
at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life.”325  What 
is most striking about Aristotle’s Poetics is the scientific tone to his criticism, 
as he seeks largely to describe the form of  tragedy as if  it were a living 
species, distinct from others, not because of  any affectation or inspiration 
on the part of  the artist, but because of  the work’s internal DNA.  By 
ascribing to tragedy in particular a comprehensible structure, Aristotle 
allows the arts to be solidly seen as techne, a skill in imitation which may be 
studied and even mastered.  Paul Ricouer’s words echo this point, when he 
writes, “To master a genre, is to master a ‘competence’ which offers 
practical guidelines for ‘performing’ an individual work.”326  Following 
Aristotle, poets, playwrights, and actors, then do not have to be mere 
madmen, which Plato’s Ion seems to suggest, but can be true craftsmen.
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The benefits of  genre for the audience, however, are less about proscribing 
or even describing what an artwork is or should be, and are more centered 
around a facilitation of  significance.  “Genres,” Larry Bouchard writes, “are 
generative and productive of  meaning.  They comprise traditional and 
formal means by which an author shapes the play of  language into a 
particular work, and the ways a reader discovers and follows the work’s 
ordered play of  expression”.327 Likewise, Northrop Frye, whose work, The 
Anatomy of  Criticism, charts the divergent forms of  mimesis down their 
evolutionary paths, arriving at four central mythoi (Comedy, Romance, 
Tragedy, and Satire) emphasizes the power of  genre to enable deeper 
engagement by the audience or critic:  
The purpose of  criticism by genres is not so much to classify as to 
clarify such traditions and affinities, thereby bringing out a large 
number of  literary relationships that would not be noticed as long as 
there were no context established for them.328
Genre, in this sense, helps mediate the reader’s understanding of  the story 
by associating itself  with other works with related meanings.  In 
comprehending a work as satire, for instance, a reader can more fluidly 
comprehend the intention of  the author and connect his work to the larger 
world of  ideas.  Without, for instance, recognizing Jonathan Swift’s A Modest 
Proposal or Gulliver’s Travels as satirical, one may bypass the underlying point 
of  the piece.  The more ably we comprehend the genre, the more quickly we 
can extrapolate its deeper social purpose.  Understanding the way that a 
comedy utilizes or subverts the traditions of  humor can likewise increase 
enjoyment.  In theology, utilizing genre categories can facilitate our 
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connection to the subject matter and our connection of  the subject matter 
to the world.   
To be sure, the use of  genre is prone to the dangers of  exaggeration (it may 
be too easy to speak blithely of  “comedy” as if  all instances of  the form 
were perfectly unified).  To compare life to ‘a comedy’, runs the risk of  
projecting onto life too many of  our assumptions about comedy and about 
life.  Life rarely is experienced as a pure comedy, or a pure tragedy.  
Comedies and tragedies, are likewise rarely ‘pure’ examples of  the form.   
Metaphors and other similar tropes, of  course, carry with them limitations.  
The now-familiar critique against masculine-gendered God-talk forces us to 
recognize the tentativeness of  metaphorical models.  Yet there is still much 
to be said for taking the risk.  As Sallie McFague writes: 
What, in fact, do we learn about the "principal subject" through 
metaphors? On the face of  it, we seem to learn a good deal. To say 
God is "father" appears to be a direct assertion with no qualifications. 
Actually, however, what we know is the conventional wisdom 
associated with the subsidiary subject – we know about fatherhood 
and about God only through the screen of  fatherhood, or as Black 
says, "the principal subject is ‘projected upon’ the field of  the 
subsidiary subject."329
To engage in metaphorical theological discourse is to run the risk of  
“projecting” onto our subject matter (be it God or theodicy) unhelpful 
associations.  McFague acknowledges this when she writes that 
‘metaphorical knowledge’ is a “highly risky, uncertain, and open-ended 
enterprise – a maneuver of  desperation”.330  For McFague, the risk seems 
worth it because, as she writes, “all that we know prior to the metaphor is, at 
most, inchoate and confused; and it is only in and through the metaphor that 
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we can speak of  it at all.”331  The best route for avoiding the pitfalls of  
projection, then, is to allow metaphors to speak, but also to converse with 
each other.  McFague calls for many metaphors, which “support, balance, 
and illuminate each other.”332
Large-scale aesthetic and artistic models run similar risks, of  course, but 
possess many  advantages which makes the risk worthwhile.  Like McFague, 
the best way to utilize these models is to allow multiple visions to 
complement each other.  
Paul Fiddes, in Freedom and Limit, reflects on the work of  Shakespeare as a 
guide to the significance of  genre for theology.  “Shakespeare shows us that 
comedy and tragedy are two views of  the same universe”, he writes, 
pointing to the bard’s skill for working within, yet subverting, dramatic 
genres.  In Shakespeare’s tragedies, such as Romeo and Juliet, Othello, and 
Hamlet, Fiddes argues, there is a resounding note of  triumph amidst the 
destruction, and in the comedies, such as Love’s Labours Lost, Much Ado about 
Nothing, Twelfth Night, and The Merchant of  Venice, there are sad, unresolved 
issues which remain as the story ends.  Christian theology can appropriate 
these inner tensions within Shakespeare’s work, by maintaining a “line of  
tension” between artistic visions of  the world.  Literary imaginings, as 
Fiddes notes, are far less clear-cut than dogmatic theology, as artists rejoice 
in opening up new avenues of  understanding:  Literature emphasizes playful 
freedom of  imagination, while doctrine aims to create a consistent and 
coherent system of  thought, putting into concepts the wholeness of  reality 
that imagination is feeling after.333
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Yet, as Fiddes argues, theology is often in need of  such openness and 
ambiguity, as real life is itself  messy:
Creative literature can also help the theologian in deciding between 
various options of  interpretation; there are alternative ways in which 
the multiple meanings of  the metaphors and stories of  faith might be 
fenced around by concepts, imaginative writing can enable the 
theologian to make judgments.334      
Having thus attempted a brief  survey of  the field of  theological aesthetics, 
it is now time to turn to aesthetic theology, specifically aesthetic theodicy.  
As Richard Viladesau describes it, aesthetic theology “interprets the objects 
of  theology–God, faith, and theology itself–through the methods of  
aesthetic studies”.335  Having examined theological aesthetics as a 
background for this, we ought to then turn to the application of  aesthetic 
studies to theodicy.  We will want to make special reference, however, to the 
ability of  large-scale themes to reorder and enrich our understanding, and so it 
is important to turn now to the work of  some theologians who have used 
aesthetics to modify our theological understanding of  evil.  
145
334 Ibid.
335 Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art, 23.
PART II: TOWARD AN AESTHETIC THEODICY
CHAPTER 3 
FEARFUL SYMMETRY: THEODICY AND  AUGUSTINE’S VISION OF COSMIC 
HARMONY
And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon 
the face of  all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of  a tree yielding 
seed; to you it shall be for meat. And to every beast of  the earth, and to every fowl 
of  the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I 
have given every green herb for meat: and it was so. And God saw every thing 
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good..
     GENESIS 1: 29-31, KJV
You have ordered all things by measure and number and weight. 
     WISDOM OF SOLOMON 11: 20, KJV
As his ways are plain unto the holy; so are they stumbling blocks unto the wicked. 
For the good are good things created from the beginning: so evil things for sinners. 
The principal things for the whole use of  man's life are water, fire, iron, and salt, 
flour of  wheat, honey, milk, and the blood of  the grape, and oil, and clothing. All 
these things are for good to the godly: so to the sinners they are turned into evil. 
There be spirits that are created for vengeance, which in their fury lay on sore 
strokes; in the time of  destruction they pour out their force, and appease the wrath 
of  him that made them. Fire, and hail, and famine, and death, all these were 
created for vengeance.
     ECCELESIASTICUS 39:25-29, KJV
1. Introduction
In Part 1, we attempted to make room within the theodicy conversation for 
aesthetic ways of  seeing God’s providence.  As such, the foregoing 
discussion was largely theoretical, defending aesthetic theodicy against the a 
priori suspicion that it is unhelpful, distracting, or otherwise irrelevant.  In 
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Chapter 1, we discussed the way that the structure of  the theodicy question 
can affect, unsurprisingly, the sorts of  answers which seem appropriate.  In 
attempting to widen the scope of  theodicy to include a variety of  
approaches (each of  which seeking, in their own ways, to resolve this 
apparent tension between the idea of  God and the fact of  evil), we sought 
to open the field to a wider range of  values which are relevant to this human 
question.  Seeking to affirm a positive role for aesthetics and poetics in 
theodicy, we then discussed the way that natural and artistic aesthetic objects 
can re-order and enrich our understanding of  the world, including God’s 
providence.  
We now turn to more a posteriori considerations, by examining specific 
theodicies which make use of  aesthetic categories, in order to see how they 
affect the theodicy conversation.  My thesis from the outset has been that 
theodicists should seek to incorporate aesthetic considerations into the 
theodicy discussion because they enrich the discourse and enable us to 
perceive more of  God’s providence.  However, I am not arguing that 
aesthetic categories will enable an easy victory for Christian theologians and 
philosophers in defending God.   In the next three chapters, I will examine 
three different ‘types’ of  the aesthetic theme, only one of  which may be said 
to be ‘cheerful’ in its use of  aesthetics.  The latter two themes enrich our 
understanding of  theodicy, but may not be said to ‘buttress’ theodicy as it is 
often practiced by philosophical theologians.  As aesthetic themes, the latter 
two are challenging, but I think that all three themes do enable a deeper 
understanding of  God’s providence, though they are not all intended to 
serve as an aesthetic argument for God’s all-powerful love, but rather to 
enrich our vision of  God’s providence.  What is more, these three differing 
themes are intended to function as conversation partners, enlightening and 
critiquing one another in order to enable a more fluid and lucid 
understanding of  the aesthetic ways of  envisioning God’s providence.  
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In order to examine each of  these related aesthetic theodicies, it will first be 
necessary to briefly situate them in context, then I will move to examine the 
shape of  the respective theodicies in order to get a sense of  their aesthetic 
themes, and finally, through conversation with the criticisms of  these 
aesthetic theodicies, to glean what is best from their work.  
Beginning with Augustine, the fountainhead of  a grand tradition in theodicy, 
we intend to examine the aesthetic theme of  ‘harmony’.  Though 
Augustine’s works are diverse, I will argue that a basic pattern for a 
‘harmonious’ aesthetic theodicy is present in a wide range of  his writings, 
spanning many decades.  Against those who would dispute the coherence of 
Augustine’s writings, or the presence of  a theodicy, I intend to defend the 
general outline of  Augustine’s aesthetic theodicy as drawn by John Hick.    
Hick’s outline has the benefits of  clarity, directness and relevance to the 
conversation.336   
2. Theodicy on Mars Hill: Defending God in a Classical Context
It seems rare to find a theologian who cannot, in some way, improve upon 
the work of  Augustine.  Even those who have little or no familiarity with his 
work will gladly take issue with his person.337  Even those who praise the 
Bishop of  Hippo highly nearly always reserve a breath or two for criticism.  
Augustine, unlike Aquinas, does not seem to have any ‘pit bulls’ at his side.  
Besides objections from feminists, pluralists, postmoderns and others who 
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do not share many of  the basic tenets of  Augustine’s outlook338, even those 
who seek to defend Augustine on some dogmatic point must often qualify 
their praise because of  the shifts in Augustine’s theology.339 
Most notably, Augustine is ambiguously situated in the philosophical debate 
about libertarian and compatibilist freedom.  For instance, recent scholars 
have argued that Augustine is a compatibilist from start to finish340, or, 
alternately, that his compatibilist views are later developments.341  For some, 
Augustine’s compatibilism is seen as an unfortunate failing, in others, a sign 
of  his maturity.342  Augustine himself  is vague on whether his later writings 
are in conflict with his earlier thought.  Discussing De libero arbitrio, his 
central work on the will, in his Retractations, Augustine acknowledges that he 
said little about grace, except in passing, and that the Pelagians made use of  
this.343  But Augustine contends that even though this work was written 
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against the Manichees, it applies just as much to the Pelagians, and thus 
makes no move to ‘retract’ or distance himself  from the work.  Yet, while 
Augustine seems comfortable with the way in which his earlier theodicy fits 
with his later theodicy, current scholars disagree on whether Augustine’s 
later compatibilism fits naturally with his earlier thoughts on evil, which 
seem, on the surface to be quite libertarian.344  Katherin Rogers contends 
that Augustine’s views on the will hold together, while G. R. Evans and 
Eleonore Stump find a shift in Augustine’s thought which is at odds with his 
earlier writings.345  Moving from De libero arbitrio to De civitate Dei and on to 
Enchiridion it is possible to chart the bishop’s change in tone, as he worries 
less and less about the role of  the will, and emphasizes ever more strongly 
the divine prerogative of  God to save whomever he wishes.346  
Yet, despite the fact that there is no clear consensus on many of  Augustine’s 
views surrounding the nature of  the will, and despite the noticeable changes 
in Augustine’s thinking, even within his writings surrounding the problem of 
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346 There is a distinct shift in tone, between Augustine’s De libero arbitrio, wherein he stresses the 
importance of  active agency in humanity, else misery would not be justified, and Enchiridion, where 
Augustine’s concern to stress the goodness of  God’s grace overshadows his concern to relate the 
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of  grace as both the material and efficient cause of  right choosing (12.6-7).  In Enchiridion we find 
this kind of  argument repeated (Ench. 32), as Augustine finds the source of  all humanity’s choosing 
in God’s divine prerogative. 
evil, there is a widespread unity in the general pattern of  his argumentation 
and reflection on evil, and especially within his reflections on theodicy and 
aesthetics.  The thread that runs through much of  his writing is a continual desire, 
wherever possible, to discern the beautiful logic whereby God has providentially ordered the 
cosmos.  “No-one has praised God so assiduously as the supreme beauty or 
attempted so consistently to capture the true and the good with the 
categories of  aesthetics as Augustine”, Balthasar writes.347  
Furthermore, the continual desire to capture the true and the good within 
the categories of  aesthetics plays a part in Augustine’s desire to defend God, 
and to illuminate the just governance of  creation by God despite the 
presence of  sin, corruption, and misery in the world.  For Augustine, 
creation is filled with signposts which point to God’s goodness.  We find 
them in nature, the principles that govern the arts, and in the natural 
intuitions of  humanity.  Yet we must look carefully to see this (sometimes 
hidden) beauty.  “Anyone who thinks the oar is broken in the water and is 
restored when it is taken out has nothing wrong with his senses,” Augustine 
writes in De vera religione, “but he is a bad judge of  what they convey to him... 
[in such a person] the mind operates perversely, for it and not the eye was 
made to contemplate supreme beauty.”348  Likewise in De musica, Augustine 
describes the way that our thinking must rise to a higher level, in order to 
discern the beauty in the whole: “In this array there are many things which 
to us appear out of  order and confused, because we have been attached… 
to their order, their station in existence, according to our own limited merits, 
not knowing the glories which Divine Providence has in operation (gerat), 
concerning us.  It is as if  some one were put to stand like a statue in a 
corner of  a fine, large house, and found that, being a part of  it himself, he 
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could not perceive the beauty of  the structure, (fabrica).”349 Augustine, 
wherever possible seeks to see past the ‘broken oar’ of  evil in order to 
discern the bigger and more beautiful picture.  
I therefore support John Hick’s effort in Evil and the God of  Love to see in 
Augustine a central set of  concerns which form the foundation of  an 
‘Augustinian’ theodicy which can be gathered under an ‘aesthetic theme’.350  
As discussed in Part I, Hick draws out three crucial facets of  Augustine’s 
theodicy: essential goodness of  creation, the value of  plenitude, and the just visitation of 
misery on the sinful.  Though somewhat simplistic, this outline marks out the 
key elements in Augustine’s theodicy which are not only important to his 
own work, but are also widely shared (if  altered in some ways) by later 
theologians, (Boethius, Hugh of  St Victor, Aquinas, and down the line to 
thinkers such as C. S. Lewis).  These three focal points form the basis of  
this foundational aesthetic theodicy.  
2.1. EXCURSUS: Answering Tilley’s Objections to an Amalgamated Theodicy
Despite the influence of  John Hick’s work, and the praise which is often 
attached to his “near-classic survey” of  Western theodicy, there are several 
objections to Hick’s amalgamation which must be addressed, and are helpful 
in the long run to discern the patterns of  Augustine’s thought more fully.  In 
The Evils of  Theodicy, Terrence Tilley has questioned the very existence of  an 
‘Augustinian theodicy’, charging Hick with “attribut[ing] to Augustine a 
system of  ‘theodicy’ which goes far beyond what he actually claimed and 
said.”351  This accusation of  Hick takes two forms.  First, Tilley charges 
Hick and other theodicists with an attempt to shoehorn Augustine into the 
mold of  theodicy, into which Augustine, according to Tilley, never properly 
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fits.  Second, Tilley charges that the attempt to “amalgamate Augustinian 
‘themes,’ ‘doctrines,’ ‘teaching,’ etc., into a single theodicy”, as Hick does, is a 
“diatessaron” which obliterates the unique character of  the individual works 
from which these ideas sprang.352  Since I aim to spend a fair amount of  
space discussing Hick’s argument against Augustine, while accepting Hick’s 
general reading of  Augustine, I think that Tilley’s objection is worth 
disputing.353  In an effort to counteract Tilley’s work, I will oppose the ideas 
that Augustine’s writings ought not to be considered to contain a ‘theodicy’, 
properly speaking, and that Augustine’s writings are not unified enough to 
allow for harmonization.  I believe that both positions are mistaken, and 
intend to briefly rebut them.  This refutation, however, is doubly helpful as a 
way to look at some of  the elements of  Augustine’s theodicy which might 
escape our attention otherwise.  It is my purpose for this first section then, 
to defend a priori Hick’s amalgamation, and also to provide a helpful context 
for Augustine’s own thoughts on beauty and evil, by showing them to be 
driven by a central concern - to ‘make credible’ the Christian faith.   
2.1.1. Is Augustine’s Theodicy not a Theodicy?.  To make his case against 
Augustine’s theodicy, Tilley first lays out a strict definition of  the practice:
A successful theodicy demonstrates either that a person can justly 
move from the data of  the actual world, including its evils, to the 
claim that an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent deity created 
it; or that the actual world is as good as or better than any other 
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Essentially, Tilley’s argument seems to be that by holding up Augustine as a propagator of  theodicy, 
contemporary thinkers wrongly invoke precedent for their position, both obscuring Augustine’s 
meaning and perpetuating the harmful practice of  theodicy at the same time. 
possible world ; or that its picture of  the world is at least as plausible 
as any other available alternatives.354
In his attempt to argue that Augustine offers no theodicy, Tilley turns to a 
number of  key Augustinian sources where he points out that Augustine’s 
treatment of  evil therein attempts none of  these tasks.355  Discussing, at 
length, the Enchiridion, Tilley reads Augustine’s handbook for Christians as 
offering a ‘defense’.  Using Plantingan terminology, then, Enchiridion is only 
defending “the compatibility of  belief  that God exists and that there is evil 
in the world”.356  According to Tilley, the discussion of  evil in Enchiridion 
should only be taken to be a possible explanation, not one that purports to 
say what God’s reasons “really are”, and thus, is not theodicy.  Likewise, 
according to Tilley, passages from De civitate Dei, ought not be used to apply 
to theodicy, because Augustine here is writing a apologetic account of  
history, not a justification of  God, strictly defined.  Other works are likewise 
placed beyond the pale for theodicists: Confessiones is too autobiographical, 
and De libero arbitrio and De natura boni are too stridently polemical to be 
mined for content of  Augustine’s genuine thinking.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, I believe ‘theodicy’ should be viewed as a rather 
wide field whose general aim is to alleviate (not necessarily to dispel or 
destroy) tension between the idea of  God and the fact of  evil.  Included in 
this definition would be the idea of  a merely logical defense, a la Plantinga, 
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but also even more modest attempts.  Under my rather latitudinarian criteria, 
Augustine does offer a theodicy.  But even under Tilley’s criteria, a pattern of  
thought in Augustine’s work may well be described as ‘theodicean.’  
Specifically, when Tilley defines a successful theodicy as one which 
demonstrates that “its picture of  the world is at least as plausible as any 
other available alternatives” it is hard not to think of  Augustine’s struggles 
against Manichaenism in Confessiones or De libero arbitrio, or of  his grand 
work, De civitate Dei contra Paganos, which pits Christian truth against Pagan 
falsehoods. 
In his Retractations, Augustine writes that De libero arbitrio was composed to 
dispute with the Manichees “who deny that evil derives its origin from the 
free choice of  the will and who contend accordingly that God the creator of 
all things is to be blamed.”357 In De civitate Dei, Augustine sought “to write 
against [pagan] blasphemies and errors” and to “refute them”.358  Further, as 
Michael Patrick Foley has argued, Augustine’s first entry into theodicy, De 
ordine, is fundamentally a response to Cicero’s three theological dialogues, On 
the Nature of  the Gods, On Divination, and On Fate.359  A large number of  
Augustine’s most significant writings on evil are situated in the context of  
defending Christianity against other theologies.  If  theodicy thus attempts 
to, as Tilley says, “demonstrate” Christian truth, against “other available 
alternatives”, then Augustine’s work repeatedly can be said to do so.  Thus I 
take Tilley’s attempt to be de-theodicize Augustine’s work to be misled; an 
unnecessary imposition of  strict criteria on Augustine’s work.   
Further, when Tilley writes that De civitate Dei “is not a theodicy but a highly 
politicized apologetic theology of  history” he seems to reflect a rather 
modern segregation    of  the categories of  history and theology.  These 
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days, it would be uncommon for a historian to mix together apologetics and 
theodicy, but this does not mean that Augustine’s historical polemic is not 
also intended to defend God’s goodness.  Specifically, Tilley seems to 
overlook the fundamentally religious context within which Augustine’s 
theology of  history is written.360  In Retractations, Augustine notes how the 
first five books of  De civitate Dei were written to refute those who believed 
the misfortunes of  sacked Rome were due to the prohibition of  the worship 
of  the pagan gods.361  Augustine’s goal is so situated in his context that his 
purposes often seem odd to contemporary readers.  In De civitate Dei, 
Augustine begins with a rather unusual perspective, arguing that those who 
suffered at the hands of  Visigoths ought, if  they were wise, to attribute their 
pains 
to that divine providence which is wont to employ wars to the 
castigation or humiliation of  morally corrupt characters, as well as 
else to provide a trial by such affliction for righteous and 
praiseworthy men, and after they have been approved, either to 
translate them to a better world or to keep them longer on this earth 
for further services.362 
Going further, by citing Horace and Virgil, Augustine attacks the notion that 
piety toward the Roman gods would have saved them from their misfortune.  
If, as Virgil notes, piety to the gods did not save Troy, why should it have 
saved Rome?363  Here Augustine must take a position rather foreign to 
moderns, in that he must put forward his theodicy, not against sheer 
atheism, but against competing theisms.  The context of  Augustine’s 
writings in De civitate Dei is nearly opposite to modern theodicy.  In 
discussing the problem of  evil, it is necessary to keep in mind the difference 
between ‘responsibility’ and ‘culpability’.  Where contemporary theodicists, 
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often sparring against their atheistic colleagues, are primarily concerned to 
explain why the Christian God is not culpable for occurrent evil, Augustine, 
sparring against polytheistic worship, must argue why the Christian God is 
responsible for occurrent evil.  Phrased more succinctly, contemporary 
theodicy is more about avoiding blame for evil, where De civitate Dei must 
begin by laying claim to evil.  
Since the existence of  the supernatural was then not generally a live option 
for debate–it was simply assumed–it should be no surprise that Augustine’s 
notion of  theodicy is markedly different from Terrence Tilley’s or even John 
Hick’s.  Both thinkers use a set of  definitions for theodicy which are 
primarily derived from an Enlightenment context, where the authority of  
the church is no longer assumed, and thus theodicy must begin from 
scratch, appealing to ‘universally’ held facts and assumptions.  Notably, Hick 
assumes that, given the problem of  evil, the default setting for human belief 
is atheism when he writes: that “theodicies proceed by bringing other facts 
and theories into account so as to build up a wider picture which includes 
the fact of  evil but which is such that it is no longer more natural to infer 
from it that there is no God than that there is.”364  But this is not 
Augustine’s context.  The default setting in the early Christian era was 
undoubtedly polytheism.  St Paul’s passage in Romans 1 is often invoked 
these days as a challenge to atheists, to convert wonder at nature into 
thankfulness to God.  But for Paul and Augustine, who cites the passage at 
length in De civitate Dei, the theological error in question was not sterile 
atheism but fecund idolatry: “images made like to corruptible man, and to 
birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things” (Romans 1:21-24).365   
Paul’s apologetic on Mars Hill is likewise situated, when he observes an altar 
to an “unknown god” and utilizes it in advocating monotheism: 
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Now what you worship as something unknown I am going to 
proclaim to you.  The God who made the world and everything in it 
is the Lord of  heaven and earth and does not live in temples built by 
hands. And he is not served by human hands, as if  he needed 
anything, because he himself  gives all men life and breath and 
everything else.” (Acts 17:24-5) 
Here Paul plays upon the pagan desire for knowledge of  new gods, which, 
in its own way, is as much an obstacle as a stubborn refusal to stretch one’s 
religious ideas at all: as we read in Acts 17:21, “All the Athenians and the 
foreigners who lived there spent their time doing nothing but talking about 
and listening to the latest ideas.”  Romans especially were known for seeking 
out new gods, as the pagan orator Caecilius writes, “[Romans] search out 
everywhere these foreign gods, and adopt them for their own; nay, they have 
even erected alters to the unknown gods.”366 Against this background, it is 
easy to discern Augustine’s perpetual desire to situate evil in the context of  
the Christian story, so as to prevent evil from pointing toward another 
theology.  
A second and perhaps equally powerful force is at work in Augustine’s 
theodicy.  Besides seeking to avoid a pagan solution to the problem of  evil, 
Augustine strives to show Christian theology to be a fulfillment of  the best of 
pagan thought.367  In this vein, Augustine navigates the waters of  Paganism, 
seeking to find points of  connection wherever he can (yet unafraid to 
demolish pagan obstacles):
For we ought not to refuse to learn letters because they say that 
Mercury discovered them; nor because they have dedicated temples 
to Justice and Virtue, and prefer to worship in the form of  stones 
things that ought to have their place in the heart, ought we on that 
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account to forsake justice and virtue. Nay, but let every good and true 
Christian understand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to 
his Master; and while he recognizes and acknowledges the truth, even 
in their religious literature, let him reject the figments of  superstition, 
and let him grieve over and avoid men who, "when they knew God, 
glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in 
their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing 
themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of  
the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, 
and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."368
Thematically, from the very beginning, it is easy to see that Augustine seeks 
to, in Pauline language, “take captive every thought”, Pagan or Christian, 
ethical or aesthetic and in order to reflect upon, and to reflect back, the 
glory of  God.  On Mars Hill, it may be said that Paul inaugurates this 
tradition, (which Augustine cites approvingly in De civitate Dei) when he 
quotes Epimenides and Aratus in Romans 17:28: “‘For in him we live and 
move and have our being.' As some of  your own poets have said, 'We are his 
offspring.’”369  That Augustine sought to find resonance between pagan 
philosophy and Christian theology is fitting with the pattern of  thought held 
by early Christian apologists.  As Hans Urs von Balthasar states, the 
theological projects of  Justin, Origen, and Athanasius (to name a few) share 
similar objectives, to make the Christian message ‘credible’ by showing it to 
fulfill the partial understanding of  the divine nature obtained by natural 
observation (Rom 1:20).  “Against this backdrop”, Hans Urs von Balthasar 
notes, “Christianity represented not only a fulfillment, but also a call to 
conversion, insofar as all of  the fragmentary logoi absolutized themselves and 
thus put up a sinful resistance to the true Logos”.370  Thus, the sort of  
argument which Paul gives on Mars Hill is also present in the early Christian 
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philosophers who sought to show that Christianity fulfilled many of  the 
Pagan values, as a key point of  connection to enable conversion.  
Key to the Pagan philosophy of  the time, especially the Pythagorean, 
Platonic and Plotininan tradition, was a keen emphasis on the study of  
beauty.  Sextus Empiricus (speaking of  the philosophy of  the Pythagoreans) 
asserts, “No art comes about without proportion, and proportion resides in 
number.”371  Plato, in Timaeus, writes, “Now all that is good is beautiful, and 
what is beautiful is not ill-proportioned.  Hence we must take it that if  a 
living thing is to be in good condition, it will be well-proportioned”.372  And 
Plotinus, who we must pass over far too quickly, says in the Enneads, “being 
beautiful is being well-proportioned and well-measured.”373  
Athenagoras, the 2nd-century theologian, explicitly draws on Platonic 
categories in praising the beauty of  creation and its craftsman: 
The world, to be sure, is beautiful (kaloj) and excels in its size, in 
the arrangement of  the things in the ecliptic and about the pole, and 
in its spherical shape… Thus if  the world is a harmonious (a&rmosa/
menon) instrument rhythmically moved, I worship not the instrument 
but the one who tuned and strikes the strings and sings to its 
accompaniment the melodious strain… If, as Plato says, the world is 
God’s craftsmanship, though I admire its beauty (ka5llov), I 
reverently draw near to the craftsman.374
Athanasius also display this aforementioned trend well, as they both draw 
upon Greek conceptions of  beauty and yet also seek to affirm, against 
Greek theology, the truth of  Christianity:
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But since there is not disorder (atacia) but order (tacij)in the 
universe, and not chaos but symmetry, and not confusion but system 
and a harmonious ordering of  the world (panarmo5niov su5ttacij), 
we must consider and form an idea of  the master who unites and 
binds the elements together, bringing them into harmony 
(sumfi5wnia5n).375
And the universe is good, as it was so created and thus we see it, since 
this is what he wills; and no one could disbelieve it.  For if  the 
movement of  creation was meaningless and the universe was carried 
about haphazardly, one could well disbelieve our statements.  But if  it 
was created with reason, wisdom, and understanding and has been 
arranged with complete order, then he who governs and ordered it 
can be none other than the Word of  God (Logos).376
For if  there were many leaders of  creation, then such order in the 
universe would not be preserved; but all would be in disorder on 
account of  the many leaders…377
These writers, existing in the midst of  a pagan world, are thus offering an 
apologetic offensive.  By attempting, as the Greek philosophers had done, to 
offer a picture of  the world which is unified and orderly, they seek to fulfill 
the requirements of  philosophy, while also asserting an argument for the 
primacy of  the Christian paradigm.  Invoking Greek concepts these 
theologians proceeded with a heartening trust.  “Everything that is good 
and beautiful belongs to us” Justin Martyr writes.378  Augustine stands in this 
tradition.  As Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz notes, Augustine “took over the 
aesthetic principles of  the ancients, transformed them and transmitted 
them”.379  
161
375 Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and trans. Robert W. Thompson (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1971) 103.
376 Ibid., 111.
377 Ibid., 38.
378 Quoted in Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, 17.
379 As Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz notes, Augustine “took over the aesthetic principles of  the ancients, 
transformed them and transmitted them in their new form to the middle ages.” From History of  
Aesthetics, vol. 2, Medieval Aesthetics, trans. R. M. Montgomery (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 48.
Balthasar describes the drive of  such reflections:  “The Christian message 
could thus be made credible, both because it unified what was fragmented 
and also because it ransomed what was held captive by converting what was 
perverted.”380  The Greek ideals of  beauty, truth and goodness, organized 
under a logos (as in the Timaeus) were thus turned on their head, in an effort, 
as Balthasar writes, not to pacify the Greeks, but to show that the pagan 
philosophy “failed to recognize that which is clearly there to be seen” and 
was thus “punished with humiliating idolatry”.381  So strong was his 
confidence in the way that Christian truth fulfilled these Greek categories, 
Augustine was convinced that if  Plato and his followers were alive in the 
Christian era they would quickly become Christians, as he notes, many 
recent Platonists had done.382  
With this apologetic emphasis in mind, Augustine’s frequent appeal to the 
category of  beauty is yet another attempt to assert the truth of  Christianity, 
not a mere attempt to embroider the edges of  his theology with aesthetic 
concerns.383  
2.1.2. Inconsistency in Augustine.  This brings us to Tilley’s second argument 
against Hick’s amalgamation.   Tilley brings up the critique (discussed briefly 
above) that Augustine’s works, in a theological sense, “are too inconsistent 
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381 Ibid., 17.  One is reminded, by comparison, of  the apologetic Paul gives upon Mars Hill, which 
seeks to find commonality with pagan piety (the worship of  an unknown god, the poet’s 
confidence in one in whom we live and move and have our being) in order to demolish pagan 
idolatry (temples built by human hands).
382 VR 4.5-7.
383 Thus, in his own way, Augustine appeals to the data of  the world in order to make the Christian 
message credible.  John Hick, for instance, integrates the scientific theory of  evolution into his 
theodicy for much the same reason.  By incorporating widely held notions of  the nature of  reality 
into one’s theodicy, one commends the response to evil as credible. 
I hear Tertullian clearing his throat somewhere in the distance, preparing to ask what Athens has to 
do with Jerusalem, and rush to point out that the background for Augustine’s reflections on beauty, 
however, was not merely derived from the philosophical tradition.  Scripture inspires Augustine’s 
reflections on the goodness of  the world (CD 11.23), on how measure, number, and weight (in 
other words, beauty) originates in God (NB 3, CD 5.11, Conf. 10.27), and how nature points to 
God, in its own way (Conf. 10.6, 11.4, VR 42-3, Trin. 15.1, CD 11.4).
to yield a coherent position”.384   Tilley saves his strength however, to argue 
that assuming even a unified theology, an amalgamation of  Augustine’s 
writings constitutes a sort of  “diatessaron” (i.e. an unhealthy compression 
of  sources which destroys the unique purposes for which they were 
written).385  Tilley argues: 
Augustine did not write a theodicy.  He wrote numerous works to 
various audiences, for various purposes, and with various 
illocutionary forces which touch on God and evils at various points 
and in various ways.386
Thus, to extract from these books nuggets of  wisdom for our contemporary 
struggle to defend God’s goodness (as Hick does) is to do violence to 
Augustine’s work. 
The fuel powering some of  Tilley’s critique of  an ‘amalgamated’ 
Augustinian  theodicy is speech-act theory.  In the first three chapters of  his 
book Tilley argues that speech act theory “shows the actions we perform in 
speaking and gives a way of  understanding their power and moral worth.”387  
Believing that theodicists have ignored the basics of  speech act theory, Tilley 
argues that theodicists have misunderstood Augustine’s writings, which were 
written for speculative, polemical or ecclesiastical purposes.  Thus, that Hick 
“never adverts to the differences among these communicative actions” 
fundamentally deforms his understanding of  Augustine’s work.
Tilley intends this as his trump card against Hick, that in Augustine’s works, 
his views on evil are not put forward “with equal and identical assertive 
illocutionary force”, but by opening the door to a consideration of  the 
differences between Augustine’s works, I believe Tilley ultimately weakens 
his own case.  Firstly, unless one assumes that a theodicy must have a certain 
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illocutionary character (assertive/declarative or institutionally/non-
institutionally bound), which I do not, then this accusation has little weight.  
Set as he is against theodicy – for Tilley, it is “a discourse practice which 
obscures evils and marginalizes the agents of  reconciliation” – one would 
hope that the diversity of  Augustine’s reflections on evil might suggest 
varying approaches to the subject, including autobiography.  By retaining a 
rigid definition for theodicy, which he unmercifully declares “evil”, Tilley in 
the end seems in danger of  creating a straw man out of  the practice.  
Secondly, if  we accept Tilley’s point that there is great variety in Augustine’s 
works (both theologic-ally and locution-ally) which prevents us from 
pretending as if  each were identical, then by examining a  range of  differing 
texts, covering a span of  decades, we discover a rather observable pattern to 
Augustine’s reflections. If  we select De libero arbitrio, Confessiones, De civitate 
Dei, and Enchiridion, works which all, admittedly, have different ‘illocutionary 
forces’ (roughly, taking Tilley’s criteria: polemical theology, autobiography, 
polemical history, and authoritative instruction) what is perhaps most 
destructive to Tilley’s argument is how consistently Augustine handles the 
problem of  evil in all of  these contexts.  Without casting the net too widely, 
it is fair to say that these works represent a good range, and yet we find that 
the nature of  evil, the goodness of  the world, and the importance of  the 
will (however construed) are all handled with seriousness and with similar 
results.  In each case, but in varying ways, Augustine seeks to understand 
where evil fits within Christian truth.  But even more notably, if  we look 
through the lens of  Augustine’s aesthetic apologetic we find, from the very 
beginning, a concern to ‘make credible’ the Christian mysteries through 
continued appeal to the categories of  beauty.  Beginning with his lost work 
on ‘The Beautiful and the Fitting’, through his later most Christian doctrine, 
Augustine is desirous to understand the beautiful logic of  God’s goodness.  
That Tilley himself  is rather tone-deaf  to the strains of  beauty running 
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through all of  Augustine’s work - especially Enchiridion in which, Tilley 
notes, the “aesthetic theme... is not an important motif ” –  means that he 
must miss this vital unity that spans the variety of  Augustine’s work.388  As I 
will show in the next section, I believe Tilley’s attempt to reprimand Hick’s 
amalgamation is misguided, and that Hick has correctly discerned the shape 
(if  not the significance) of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme.
On the whole, however, Tilley’s argument is helpful to bring to light 
significant differences between Augustine’s writings on evil and current 
theodicy, as well as an important pattern in Augustine’s thought which can 
be overlooked. So, while I do not think that Augustine’s work must be said 
to fit perfectly into the frameworks of  contemporary theodicy, I believe that 
by casting him against the background of  pagan religion and philosophy, we 
can see that his work goes beyond merely defending the logical coherency of 
Christian belief, to contrasting it positively against other pagan beliefs, and 
finally to establishing its credibility by appeal to the central philosophical 
notions of  his day.  That there is, contra Tilley, real coherence in Augustine’s 
thoughts on evil must be defended in the next section by quotation of  a 
range of  consistent sources, but at the very least, I believe that Tilley’s case 
that amalgamating an Augustinian theodicy does violence to the thinker can 
be dismissed.  Thus,  I take Hick’s summary to be warranted.  If  Augustine, 
in a variety of  differing illocutionary acts, returns again and again to a set of 
very similar ideas, then it can be safely assumed that continuity in his 
thinking is more strongly affirmed because of, rather than in spite of, the 
differences in these writings.389 
3. Augustine’s Aesthetic Theodicy: The Grammar and Poetics of  Evil
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thought is but one long proof  for God’s existence consisting of  various stages (quoted in Frederick 
Copleston, The History of  Philosophy, vol. 2 [NY: Image, 1993], 70.)
3.1. Privation.
Augustine’s response to the problem of  evil is deservedly influential.  In his 
writings he carries the question forward carefully, making sure to address a 
range of  issues which are fundamental to the problem of  evil discussion.  
The first element of  Augustine’s theodicy, evil as privation, resolved a basic 
challenge which evil posed to the goodness of  God, if  it possessed a nature.  
The problem of  evil, at its most basic, runs like this: If  a good and powerful  
God created everything, unde malum, whence evil?  Is evil a part of  God, or a 
necessary element in creation?  Or, is evil a separate thing neither in God 
nor a part of  creation, but self-existent?  What we mean by evil 
fundamentally affects the issue at hand.  To grant evil a nature suggests that 
the creator God is, in a completely unqualified sense, the creator of  this thing 
called evil. 
Augustine saw, he writes, with “imperfect piety” that a good God would not 
willingly create such a substance, and thus gravitated to the Manichaean’s 
“fabulous opinion” (that evil, like the good, is an ultimate and eternal force 
unto itself) as a way of  resolving the problem.390 If  evil is the self-existent 
opposite the good, then the good needs no justification for allowing it to 
exist.  Problematizing Augustine’s theology was a belief  that both God and 
evil necessarily possessed a corporeal dimension.  Augustine writes,
I believed evil (mali) to have been a kind of  substance (substantiam), 
and had a bulk of  earth belonging to it, either deformed (deformem) 
and dense (crassam), which they called earth; or else thin and subtle, 
(like the body of  the air)... I supposed two bulks, contrary to one 
another, both infinite, but the evil to be lesser and the good to be 
larger...391
This picture thus seemingly grants evil not only a nature but almost the 
form of  a monster: whether grotesque and heavy like ‘the Blob’ or thin and 
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airy like a wraith.  Thus Augustine, understandably, felt that a dualistic 
system was necessary to acquit God of  creating evil.  He felt it “safer for me 
to believe thee never to have created any evil,” he writes, “than to believe 
that any could have come from thee created of  that condition”.392  It is 
striking here to note how Augustine, as J. Patout Burns notes, “never really 
abandoned” the Christian conviction that “God was all-powerful and 
exercised governance over the world.”393  Thus it is not surprising that in the 
end Manichaean metaphysics failed to satisfy him theologically.  Even within 
the Manichaean view that evil is pre-existent, and occupied physical space, 
there was still, for Augustine, a challenge in affirming God’s (or ‘the 
Good’s’) benevolence and power.  Self-existing evil challenged God’s 
goodness, as Burns goes on to write, because “a God who was the all-
powerful creator and ruler of  the world would have the power to destroy 
evil root and branch, and replace it with a good reality”:394 or as Augustine 
says it, “Was he not able so to turn and change the whole lump, that no evil 
should have remained in it, seeing he is able to do anything?”395
Augustine’s breakthrough is, as Balthasar notes, contemporaneously 
theological and philosophical.396  Through Ambrose, the problem of  divine 
corporeality was overcome, as Augustine came to understand that the 
“image” in which humans were created did not entail that God himself  was 
carnal.397  Augustine’s metaphysical breakthrough came through Plotinus (to 
whom he alludes in Confessiones 5.14), whose declaration that evil is “non-
being” provided the second insight.398  Augustine’s dual discovery, then, that 
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396 Balthasar, Glory of  the Lord, 2: 96.
397 Conf. 6.3.
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God may have substance without being physical, and that evil might have a 
description without having substance, unlocks the first element in his 
theodicy.  Taking and transmuting Plotinus’ insight, Augustine writes in De 
natura boni, that “nothing is evil save a diminishing of  good”.399  To become 
evil is to become less than what one was created to be; to become, not the 
good thing that God made, but something else, a perverted thing of  our 
own doing. 
Perhaps the most apt description for Augustine’s insight is provided by 
Rowan Williams who calls this metaphysic a “grammar” of  evil.  The 
descriptor is an especially apt one as Augustine helpfully parses out the 
problem of  evil discussion like a good teacher of  rhetoric.  Evil is never the 
subject of  any action.  We can never say “Evil did x”.  Nor even, in some 
sense, is evil a noun - there is no undistilled ‘evil’ which we could see, taste, 
or touch.  There is also no verb “to evil” - in that all sins must be done by 
means of  some other action such as talking, thinking, or moving) .  To say 
that someone sinned only begs the question, of  “How did they sin?”  Thus, 
regarding the subject, verb and object of  any statement, there can be no 
place for evil.  But there may be a disjunctive quality between subject, verb 
and object.  The phrases, “Philip worshipped God” and “Philip played 
Frisbee” both consist of  only positive terms.  Yet these phrases, consisting 
of  exactly the same terms, “Philip played God” and “Philip worshipped 
Frisbee” indicate a state of  affairs which, because they are disordered, are 
evil, and therefore degrade the subject, verb and object through their 
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disjuncture.400  Rowan Williams says this much more simply when he writes, 
“Evil is not some kind of  object... but we give the name of  evil to that 
process in which good is lost.”401  
The emphasis with which Augustine takes up this metaphysical point is 
understandable, given his cultural and autobiographical context.  The 
definition of  evil is the crucial battleground on which Augustine fights off  
the Manichaeans.  Evil has “not merely no such existence as the Manichees 
introduce,” he writes, “but no such existence as anyone can imagine.”   But 
the logic of  privatio boni retains its force regardless of  context.  Assuming 
that qualities such as power, knowledge, and the ability to form intentions 
are intrinsically good, it is nonsensical to describe any force as capital-‘E’ 
evil.  Such a force would retain these positive qualities on a metaphysical 
level and thus be partially good.  In the 5th century or the 21st, evil must be 
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mythological definition for evil without doing much damage to Christian theology: if  so, it is 
possible to portray evil in more poetic and figurative terms as a sort of  ‘negative potency’ (rather an 
absolute negation) only because dualism has been so thoroughly trounced.
401 Rowan Williams “Insubstantial Evil” in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of  Gerald Bonner, 
ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000).
a privatio boni, not the opposite of  the good as a negative, but the opposite of 
the good as a negation.402  
The goodness which created things possess is definable in specific terms: 
“From him comes every measure, every form, every pattern, and apart from 
his measure (modus), form (species), and pattern (ordo) nothing can be found 
existing or imagined to exist.”403 Augustine does not imply here that as a 
thing becomes evil it becomes somehow less extant–a more vaporous 
version of  itself–but rather that it loses good attributes which it once 
possessed.   Augustine continually adds, however, that a thing which has lost 
all its goodness would be non-existent.  He writes in Confessiones about 
things, “whatsoever are, are good (bona), and the evil which I sought, 
whence it should be, is not any substance.”404  In affirming that the various 
levels of  creation are all good, Augustine draws on the Plotinian notion that 
even lower things possess goodness by having a “certain degree of  unity 
and a certain degree of  Existence and by participating in the Ideal-form”.405  
In affirming that existence terminates when privation is absolute, Augustine, 
however, opposes the Plotinian conception that the scale of  goodness, 
descending from the highest to the lowest, terminates in an existent evil. 
“The Good is not the only existent thing,” Plotinus writes, “As necessarily as 
there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last: this last is 
Matter, the thing which has no residue of  good in it: here is the necessity of 
Evil.”406 
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Thus Augustine navigates his contemporary context in producing a 
definition of  evil which is fully compatible with Christian theology.  
However, this definition does not overturn the problem of  evil.  As many 
commentators have pointed out, denying being to evil is not a sufficient 
apologetic in and of  itself.  So long as any state of  affairs can be 
meaningfully called ‘evil’, whatever the nature of  the cause, one must 
wonder why it is allowed.  The lynchings of  minorities are just as troubling 
if  they arise from the absence of  tolerance as from the presence of  racism.  
Madden and Hare raise the problem well when they write,
Suppose, for example, one accepts St. Augustine’s definition of  evil as 
“the privation of  good”… The problem of  evil still remains, 
however, because one now has the problem of  asking why, in the 
present world, there is so much prima facie gratuitous absence of  
good, so much apparently needless privation.407  
Madden and Hare are correct to raise this objection, as the ontology of  evil 
is sometimes taken to be an argument in Augustine’s theodicy, rather than an 
undergirding element in his theology.408  Augustine’s metaphysic of  evil is 
not intended to complete a Christian theodicy, but to avoid the immediate 
trap which, various non-Christian philosophies would offer.  The remaining 
elements of  Augustine’s theodicy, however, flow from and depend on this 
initial step.
But the significance of  Augustine’s definition of  evil does not stop with his 
avoidance of  Manichaean or Plotinian theology, but continues as he 
successfully integrates Greek metaphysical aesthetics.  Among the attributes 
of  being, beauty is clearly present.  For Augustine, creation’s most basic 
construction can be said to have an aesthetic dimension.  Each thing, being 
what it is, is already in possession of  this form of  sensible goodness.  
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Augustine’s Latin already implicitly suggests this metaphysical aesthetic, as 
Carol Harrison notes, 
Shape and form - species and forma - give Latin its words for the 
beautiful - speciosus and formosus; they are also the Latin words for the 
transcendent archetypes of  reality, the Platonic forms... Latin holds 
together what other languages might allow to drift apart: actual 
shapes, ideal ultimate realities, and beauty as characteristic of  them 
both.409
Augustine likewise makes this connection explicit, “Every corporeal 
creature, when possessed by a soul that loves God, is a good thing of  the 
lowest order, and beautiful in its own way, for it is held together by form 
and species.”410 
Plato had already said as much in Timaeus (a book which was widely 
influential in the Middle Ages as one of  the few available Latin manuscripts 
by the Greek philosopher):   “Now all that is good is beautiful, and what is 
beautiful is not ill-proportioned.  Hence we must take it that if  a living thing 
is to be in good condition, it will be well-proportioned.”411  Augustine’s 
metaphysics of  form is therefore aesthetic by birthright, as he repeatedly 
emphasises that measure, proportion, order and number are likewise 
involved in overlapping ways to suggest the beautiful:  
For all bodily beauty is a good congruence in the members, joined 
with a pleasing color.”412
Examine the beauty of  bodily form, and you will find that everything 
is in its place by number.413
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This Platonic aesthetic is not, however, an addendum for Augustine on the 
scriptural affirmation of  creation’s aesthetic goodness.  Though we find few 
references to creation’s beauty in scripture, the strong affirmation of  God’s 
glory, and the “beauty of  holiness” make it easy to find a clear consonance 
between the idea of  beauty, God’s being and right behavior.  A reading of  
the Septuagint reveals a likewise explicit connection between creation’s 
goodness and creation’s beauty.  Surveying creation, God deems it 
“καλα” (beautiful, fair, good), implying in the Greek, like the Latin and the 
Hebrew, a deep connection between being and beauty.
3.2. Plenitude  
In a number of  ways, the issue of  metaphysical evil, which Augustine deals 
with in a variety of  texts, is inaccessible to modern readers.  Where moral 
and natural evil seem more obviously straightforward, the question of  
metaphysical evil is often barely understood.  The Catholic Encyclopedia 
defines metaphysical evil succinctly as the problem of  finitude and 
limitation.414  But even with this clear definition, it can be difficult to see 
exactly why this feature of  reality would ever be considered a problem.  The 
general irrelevance of  the issue is further backed up by the contemporary 
literature, where the issue of  finitude is rarely raised - either by atheists or 
theists.  That something is less than it could be does not register these days 
as an objection on the philosophical radar.  
The problem of  metaphysical evil is also easier to ignore in the comfortable 
Western world, where we live relatively free from lice and other pests, 
without high rates of  infant mortality, with air conditioning for the summer 
and heating for the winter.  In our present situation as Westerners, we are 
simply not faced with the fierceness of  nature in the way that the ancients 
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and medievals were, and thus perhaps a bit more inclined to praise nature as 
we would a domesticated pet.  In a world without air conditioning or 
pesticide, even the wealthiest of  rulers would still have had to contend with 
the difficulties of  creation far more often than the average modern-day 
American. Living in an age with far less sanitation, Augustine is not merely 
being rhetorical when he asks, “who would not rather have bread in his 
house than mice, or money rather than fleas?”415
Perhaps as a result of  an evolutionary paradigm combined with a modern 
environmentalist awareness, it seems unlikely that many contemporary 
people would - either because of  a sense of  the scientific necessity of  lower 
forms of  life, or out of  an attempt at egalitarian appreciation - “rashly 
dispraise” lower forms of  life, or lower forms of  matter.  That Augustine 
feels it necessary to warn against this suggests that we have lost much of  the 
world-view in which Augustine worked.
Deeper reasons behind the disjuncture between Augustine’s concerns and 
our own are fairly discernible.  Where Medievals were concerned with 
metaphysics, moderns and postmoderns tend to have different concerns 
(epistemology and hermeneutics, respectively).416  Susan Neiman affirms 
this shift, if  reflecting perhaps an overly restricted view of  philosophy.  She 
writes “Leibniz was clearly the last philosopher to give a metaphysical, as 
opposed to a purely theological, account of  evil, before philosophy deemed 
both to be out of  bounds.”417  If  we must disagree that theology is not “out 
of  bounds” for philosophers (I cite Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne and 
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Marilyn Adams as evidence), we must also agree that overarching concern 
for metaphysics in philosophy has lost its sway.  This has no doubt 
contributed to the vestigial quality of  this element of  the discussion, even 
among those philosophers who are still concerned with metaphysics (Anglo-
American analytic philosophers especially), the issue still lacks the force it 
had in the Medieval period.  Even for the metaphysically-inclined, the nature 
of  any finite creature’s goodness is not a hot topic.418
Yet despite the distance from which many of  us must view this matter, the 
subject of  finitude, the attendant question of  metaphysical evil, and the 
principle of  plenitude is crucial for tying together Augustine’s ontology of  
evil and formulation of  moral evil.  Against the background of  its time it 
also has a certain apologetic warrant, as Balthasar mentions.419  Yet 
commentators often overlook the issue when discussing Augustine, and so it 
will be necessary to try and see why Augustine on numerous occasions, 
reflected on the subject, and what he made of  it.420
First, the problem of  metaphysical evil, and Augustine’s responding solution 
to it again must be situated in his philosophical context.  In De civitate Dei, 
after expounding on the goodness of  all created things, he turns to potential 
objections from “certain heretics” who, in inquiring into the origin of  the 
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universe, do not discern this goodness.  The heretics in question here are 
most likely Manichaeans, to whom Augustine later in the chapter refers by 
name, and their objection to the inherent goodness of  all things is based 
upon, according to Augustine, a lack of  “a religious eye”.421  Augustine 
writes of  these heretics, that they fail to see how the universe’s good order 
includes finitude.  Seeing only “our mortal state, which cannot do without 
the flesh and is a brittle thing” these heretics miss how lesser things 
contribute “to the universe as if  to their common polity (publicam)”.422  
I admit that I do not know why mice and frogs were created, or flies 
or worms. Yet I see that all things are beautiful in their kind, though 
on account of  our sins many things seem to us disadvantageous. For 
I observe the body and members of  no living thing in which I do not 
find that measures, numbers, and order contribute to its harmonious 
unity. I do not understand where all these things come from if  not 
from the highest measure, number and order, which lies in the 
immutable and eternal sublimity of  God.  If  those silly chatterboxes 
would think of  this, they would stop bothering us and, considering all 
the beauties, both the highest and the lowest, they would praise God 
their craftsman in all of  them.423
Whether invoking the image of  a city  or of  nature itself, Augustine pushes 
us to dig deeper in our understanding in order to see the underlying 
consonances between all things.  Augustine’s overall position may well be 
summed up in the following quote:
Hence, does God’s providence advise us not to dispraise anything 
rashly, but to seek out the use of  it warily, and where our wit and 
weakness fails, there to believe the rest that is hidden, as we do in 
other things past our reach: for the obscurity of  the use either 
exercises the humility, or beats down the pride, nothing at all in 
nature being evil (evil being but a privation of  the good), but 
everything from earth to heaven ascending in a scale of  goodness, 
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and so from the visible unto the invisible, unto which all are 
unequal.424
In Confessiones,  having just affirmed that all things created are “very good”, 
Augustine moves on to the common sense objection that to us, some things 
do not appear to be very good, but rather, evil.  Augustine goes far enough 
to admit that some parts of  creation seemingly clash together, but that this 
clash does not discredit the goodness of  creation.  His language is notably 
mild regarding creation’s difficult spots.  “But in some particulars of  the 
creation,” Augustine writes, “some things there be that agree not with some 
other things (non conveniunt), they are conceived to be evil.”425  Aware of  the 
dangers of  creation, (he cites dragons, deeps, hail, fire, snow, ice, stormy 
wind, mountains, beasts, and creeping things, along with nice things such as 
hills, fruitful trees, cedars, cattle and flying fowl) Augustine affirms that all 
of  these things praise God in their individual excellence and collective 
excellence.  
Augustine’s defense of  the clashes within God’s creation seems close to 
Austin Farrer’s discussion of  the “mutual interference of  systems”, in Love 
Almighty and Ills Unlimited, wherein Farrer discusses the natural way that parts 
of  God’s creation collide unknowingly, causing distress and destruction.  
Like Augustine, Farrer upholds creation’s plenitude as a good which 
outweighs any natural evils.  “The grand cause of  physical evil,” Farrer 
writes, “is the mutual interference of  systems.”426  In a diverse creation, 
Farrer argues, it is inevitable that some species will feed on other species, or 
that hot and cold weather fronts, though good in themselves, will collide 
and form tornadoes or hurricanes.      
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In defense of  creation, Augustine argues for the value of  all of  creation’s 
variety.  Though carnivorous animals may be inferior to angels, or cloudy 
days to sunny days, he presses, the whole is greater than the sum of  its parts.  
Augustine writes “[though] those superior things were better than these 
inferior things, but yet all things together [were] better than those superior 
by themselves”.427  Phrased more simply, Augustine is arguing “non essent 
omnia, si essent aequalia” (if  all things were equal, all things would not be), and 
all things together are better than a lesser number of  higher things alone.428  
Thus we should not impugn the divine wisdom in creating weeds, fleas, or 
raccoons since we can discern why God would desire nature’s variegated and 
humble beauty over a more austere set of  celestial beings.  Augustine here 
articulates a definitive rationale behind God’s good act of  creation – more is 
better.  In this, Augustine is treading upon a philosophical path which, 
though often helpful, is also lined with traps.  
The Platonic view, represented in Timaeus, however, led to a difficult 
challenge within Christian theology.  Plato’s god, never jealous of  anything 
created (for that would be a fault) could do nothing less than create the best, 
and thus “wanted to produce a piece of  work that would be as excellent and 
supreme as its nature would allow.”429  Entailed in producing this excellent 
product is a creation which exhausts all possibilities for proportions, ratios, 
and mixtures of  essential elements.  In The Discarded Image, C. S Lewis 
describes Plato’s guiding principle here as “The Principle of  the Triad”, 
which is well described in Timaeus: “it is impossible that two things only 
should be joined together without a third.  There must be some bond to 
bring them together”.430  This principle, together with the Principle of  
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Plenitude, fit together very naturally, for if  the former is physical the latter is 
aesthetic.  Lewis describes the classical position: “If  between aether and 
Earth there is a belt of  air, then, it seems to Apuleius, ratio herself  demands 
that it should be inhabited.  The universe must go fully exploited.”  Here 
Platonic physics and aesthetics fit together with Platonic theology to suggest 
that the creator must, by his benevolence, fill creation to the brim with every 
variation and combination of  elements.  
That the supreme good must do the best leads quite naturally into neo-
Platonic theology, which states that “the One” must simply emanate 
creation in all its variety by its very nature.  Plotinian theology sees creation 
as a cascade of  substances, from the highest to the lowest, flowing 
downward automatically from the highest being.  As Frederick Copleston 
describes it, 
In the Plotinian emanation-theory the world is depicted as proceeding 
in some way from God without God becoming in anyway diminished 
or altered thereby, but for Plotinus God does not act freely (since 
such activity would, he thought, postulate change in God) but rather 
necessitate naturae, the Good necessarily diffusing itself.431
The question raised by this tradition is essentially the old Euthyphro 
dilemma with minor variations.  Is God somehow bound to create “the 
good”, or is what God creates, de dicto, “the good”?  To praise creation as 
fulfilling an aesthetic principle (filling creation with variety) seems to indicate 
that for God to do otherwise would be less than fully praiseworthy.  Abelard 
describes this tension well, when he writes, “We must inquire whether it was 
possible for God to make more things or better things than he has in fact 
made... Whether we grant this or deny it, we shall fall into many difficulties 
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because of  the apparent unsuitability of  the conclusions to which either side 
leads us.”432
On the one side, affirming that God could not have made better things, 
leads toward a Leibnizian affirmation of  the necessity of  this world as the 
only creatable world.  Christian philosophy has sometime veered toward this 
view.  Which is often labeled under the moniker of  ‘the principle of  
sufficient reason’ (though it may perhaps also go under the name of  act 
utilitarianism). It is, in many ways, a very natural position to take regarding 
the divine creativity.  On the other side, voluntarism affirms that God could 
have, should he have decided to do so (hoc volo, sic jubeo), created a world 
entirely the opposite of  this one.  This naturally leads to exactly the sort of  
question Leibniz asks, “why praise him for what he has done, if  he would be 
equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary?”433  
The principle of  plenitude rather naturally introduces this problem, creating 
a tension between the nature of  the goodness of  creation and God’s 
freedom to create as He wishes. In his classic book, The Great Chain of  Being, 
Arthur Lovejoy suggests that from Augustine onward, all medieval 
philosophy suffers from this “internal strain” between optimism and 
voluntarism.   Lovejoy describes this problem as a “fruitful inconsistency” 
which Augustine embraced, which sought to hold on to the contingency of  
creation, and yet affirm the perfection of  creation.  If  once one has 
admitted the world to be a manifestation of  “the good” Lovejoy notes, “this 
means that in it all genuine possibility must be actualized; and thus none of  
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its characteristics or components can be contingent, but all things must be 
precisely what they are.”434 
Yet, against Lovejoy and Platonic philosophy, I do not find that the idea that 
God’s creation is invested with rationally-discernible excellence demands the 
position that God must therefore create, or even that God must create a 
world of  maximum goodness if  he creates.  Augustine’s thinking does not 
seem to be troubled with this question, and his handling of  the matter 
avoids falling prey to the difficult conundrums which accompany it.  In De 
civitate Dei,  Augustine offers a simple discussion of  God’s creation as 
reported in Genesis:
In fact there were three chief  matters concerning a work of  creation 
that had to be reported to us and that it behoved us to know, namely 
who made it, by what means, and why.435
The answer to all three of  these questions are minimalistically drawn from 
Genesis.  Who? “God.”  How? “God said, ‘Let it be’” Why? “Because it is 
good.”436  There is something refreshing in Augustine’s sparsity of  prose 
here, as he seem to willfully avoid straying into territory which is, on either 
side, littered with mines.  Thus he writes with a sense of  finality that “Nor is 
there any originator more excellent than God, any skill more effective than 
God’s word, any purpose better than that something good should be created 
by a good God.”  Even when addressing the thought of  Plato himself, 
Augustine seems to deliberately avoid straying into questions of  the world’s 
optimality,  but rather retains what he sees as the kernel of  Plato’s thought, 
which in his eyes is essentially Christian:
Nor is there any originator more excellent than God, any skill more 
effective than God’s word, any purpose better than that something 
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good should be created by a good God.  Plato too gives this as the 
proper reason, beyond all other reasons, for the world’s creation, 
namely that good works might be created by a good God.  He may 
have read our passage, or may have got knowledge of  it from those 
who had read it, or else by his superlatively keen insight he gained 
vision of  the unseen truths of  God through understanding God’s 
creation, or he too may have learned of  these truths from such men 
as had gained vision of  them.437
Augustine’s handling of  the matter is, to my mind, the best Christian 
response, which (with the Greeks) powerfully affirms the beautiful and good 
logic by which creation was necessarily made, without giving way to excessive 
worries about whether a better world might have been made instead.438  
Thus Augustine’s view of  creation does not entail a best possible world 
scenario, but the simpler and more Biblical affirmation of  the world’s 
goodness and beauty (which is compatible with the model of  non-maximal 
goodness which I offered in Chapter 1). 
Yet, as noteworthy as these issues are, the more suggestive element of  
Augustine’s principle of  plenitude is the way that he ties it in so closely to 
his moral philosophy.  Notably, Augustine ties the variety of  creation to the 
nature of  virtue, describing the true nature of  virtue as “a due ordering of  
love”.439  This ordo amoris must be exercised in a world filled with diverse 
values, because, though all things are good in themselves, it is a perennial 
possibility to love improperly. Augustine states this more mellifluously when 
he writes of  each created thing, “it can be loved in a good way and in a bad 
way - in a good way, when due order is preserved, in a bad way, when due 
order is disturbed.”440
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We must not hate what is below us, but rather with God’s help put it 
in its right place, setting in right order what is below us, ourselves, 
and what is above us, and not being offended by the lower, but 
delighting only in the higher. “The soul is weighed in the balance by 
what delights her”, delictatio quippe pondus est animae.  Delight or 
enjoyment sets the soul in her ordered place.  “Where your treasure 
is, there will your heart be also”.441
For Augustine, the metaphysical goodness of  creation, the fruitful and 
delightful pleasures of  creation’s beauty, functions as a medium for moral 
activity.  Creation’s varied goodness demands a proper responsiveness - an 
ordo amoris - in which “Reason judges by the light of  truth,” as Augustine 
writes, “and correctly subordinates lesser things to those that are greater.”442  
The Augustinian account of  human virtue, then, is deeply connected to 
creation’s delightful properties.  Being situated in a world filled with 
different natures, learning to ‘weight’ each nature as it deserves is a moral, as 
well as aesthetic, activity.  
Notably, however, Augustine’s aesthetic finds no place for the enjoyment 
(frui) of  these lower beauties, only a rather severe sounding use (uti):  “I am 
saying that we enjoy a thing which we love for itself, and that we should 
enjoy only a thing by which we are made happy, but use everything else.”443  
This principle, then effectually rules out the ‘enjoyment’ of  all earthly 
beauty, higher or lower, and seems to suggest that a proper “ordering of  the 
loves” would render any earthly loves deeply insignificant.  Augustine’s 
thinking about worldly aesthetics is often rhapsodic and withering in nearly 
the same breath.  In one of  his most famous passages from Confessiones, 
Augustine waxes on the beauty of  God, poetically reflecting on the irony of 
his own sin:
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Late it was that I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new, late I loved 
you!  And, look, you were within me and I was outside, and there I 
sought for you and in my ugliness I plunged into the beauties that 
you have made.  You were with me, and I was not with you.  These 
outer beauties kept me far from you, yet if  they had not been in you, 
they would not have existed at all.444
Beauty is equally delightful and dangerous, a reflection of  God’s being and 
yet also a distraction from that being.  Thus, though we may well love 
beauty, a deeper understanding of  created beauty calls us to its creator:
See, there are the heaven and the earth...They cry aloud also that they 
did not create themselves: “We exist because we were created; 
therefore we did not exist before we were in existence, so as to be 
able to create ourselves.”  And the voice of  the speakers is in the very 
fact that they are there to be seen... It was you, Lord, who made 
them, you who are beautiful (for they are beautiful), you who are 
good (for they are good), you who are (for they are).  But they have 
neither the beauty, nor the goodness, nor the existence which you, 
their creator, have; compared with you they are not beautiful, not 
good, not in existence.  This, thanks to you, we know, and our 
knowledge compared with your knowledge is ignorance.445
For Augustine, all beauty is a scattered reflection of  the divine beauty, which 
must, on reflection, force our vision away from it, an incomplete reflection 
of  its source, to the originating light.  Frederick Copleston describes this 
reflection on beauty as part of  the search for God, “The mind, therefore, 
finding both body and soul to be mutable goes in search of  what is 
immutable.”446  
The value of  beauty, then, one might glean from such passages, is of  a sheer 
signpost, painted by God to point us on to himself, but terribly misused if  
we stop to focus on it for more than a moment.  There is something correct 
in Augustine’s emphasis, but also troubling.  Frank Burch Brown has 
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helpfully criticized Augustine’s writings such as these as perhaps unhelpfully 
worded.  As Augustine notes, we are to use created beauty and enjoy God 
alone, but Brown wonders if  this is even possible, given the truly aesthetic 
nature of  beauty:
Augustine himself  states that we are to “use created things that are 
lower than ourselves... What Augustine neglects to emphasize is that 
one cannot even perceive the beauty of  these objects without 
focusing on them attentively and delighting in them, rather than 
focusing only on God and delighting only in sheer holiness (whatever 
that might mean).  It is thus in God’s interest, as it were, that we allow 
ourselves to enjoy and love created things as conditional “ends in 
themselves”...447
One is inclined to agree with Brown here, that Augustine’s stridency against 
enjoying created things may cause problems for his own position, in that we 
may not be able to “use” a flower to move us closer to God, if  we do not 
first “enjoy” it fully.  That Augustine seemed to be aware of  and sensitive to 
created beauty cannot be ignored, thus his tacit aesthetic may seem to be 
much closer to what Brown is suggesting, but even if  it is not, there is in the 
idea of  the “ordo amoris” a sense in which we can love even the least of  
creation, so long as we love it rightly.  Brown ultimately suggests new 
terminology which is perhaps more fitting for this adapted position, when 
he writes that a Christian can join God’s affirmation of  creation as good or 
“καλα” and, as such, can enjoy created beauty “with God.”
In any case, however one construes the moral nature of  aesthetic use/
enjoyment, there is clearly an option for perversion, a “disordered love” 
which violates creation.  Moral trespass and the resulting punishment must 
both be understood against the background of  Augustine’s moral/aesthetic 
vision of  plenitude.  
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3.3. Perversion and Punishment.
The most famous and central aspect of  Augustine’s aesthetic theodicy is his 
view of  sin and the attendant consequences.  The ‘Free Will Defense’, so 
widely used, is most powerfully and influentially found in Augustine’s works.  
In the writings of  Plantinga and others, Augustine’s thoughts on the will are 
often utilized to argue within a greater-goods defense of  evil.448  The free-
will defense straightforwardly argues that the possibility of  sin is entailed in 
the endowment of  free will, and that this good capacity outweighs the 
disvalue of  moral evil.  Hence, God is not unjust for creating a free humanity 
which quickly becomes fallen humanity. This moral focus does no injustice to 
Augustine’s theodicy, and the free will defense can be helpfully employed in 
even the narrowest of  moral contexts, but it is helpful to broaden the scope 
of  Augustine’s views on sin to include his wider concerns about the order 
and beauty of  the universe.  
As we have laid out, Augustine’s thinking on creation and evil leads him to 
deny evil a nature.  On top of  this, Augustine finds beauty in the panoply of 
natures brought about by God, and thereby defends creation in even its 
basest variety from the accusation of  evil.  Finally, Augustine sets this model 
in motion, by describing the beautiful order which creation remains, despite 
the defects and defections of  the human will.  
As we discussed above, Augustine’s moral/aesthetic picture of  virtue fits 
well with his principle of  plenitude.  Loving rightly, the soul finds its delight 
in God.  Loving wrongly, the soul defects from the highest good in favor of  
some lower beauty.  Turning to our own “private goods” is a sinful 
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defection away from the “unchangeable and common good”.449  As such, 
the sinful soul becomes disordered, and its desires disproportionate.  
Willful defection, then, necessarily entails a ‘defect’ in the sinner, and a 
violation of  right order.  As Augustine understands it, misery is also a 
negative state of  affairs, an evil in itself, but it may be fittingly applied to 
those who violate the right ordering of  things.  Augustine’s analogy is of  a 
household, in which there is a drain (presumably some form of  household 
cloaca for refuse and human waste), which it is dishonorable for a person to 
clean out.  Yet also within this household there may be a  sinful slave, who, 
as punishment, is fittingly assigned the task of  cleaning the drain.  
Considered separately, these two factors are negative, but taken together, as 
Augustine says “The slave’s dishonor and the cleansed drain together form 
one whole.”  Thus a right order is restored to the household by the 
appropriate punishment of  the slave and the cleaning of  the drain.  Sin and 
misery are paired in this way.450
Fitting with Augustine’s sense of  beauty as “congruence” “order” 
“proportion”, the sinful soul is therefore ugly.  Yet, as Augustine phrases it 
well in De musica the stain of  sin does not mar God’s grand artwork: “God 
made sinful man ugly, but it was not an ugly act to make him so.”  As 
Augustine saw in his early but ‘misplaced’ aesthetic treatise De pulchro et apto 
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(On the Beautiful and Fitting), there is a difference between that which is 
beautiful in itself  and that which finds its rightness by relation to other 
states of  affairs.  The universe remains unmarred by ugly sin because of  the 
fitting punishment which follows any sin:
Again, if  there were sins and no consequent misery, that order is 
equally dishonored by lack of  equity.  But since there is happiness for 
those who do not sin, the universe is perfect; and it is no less perfect 
because there is misery for sinners.  Because there are souls whose 
sins are followed by misery and whose righteous conduct is followed 
by happiness – because it contains all kinds of  natures – the universe 
is always complete and perfect.  Sin and punishment are not natural 
objects but states of  natural objects, the one voluntary the other 
penal.  The voluntary state of  being sinful is dishonorable.  Hence the 
penal state is imposed to bring it into order, and is in itself  not 
dishonorable.  Indeed it compels the dishonorable state to become 
harmonized with the honor of  the universe, so that the penalty of  sin 
corrects the dishonor of  sin.451
In De vera religione Augustine summarizes his aesthetic theme (as described 
by Hick).  The universe, when seen from the vantage point of  totality, 
remains beautiful, just, and rationally ordered by the providence of  God.  
“All have their offices and limits laid down so as to ensure the beauty of  the 
universe”, Augustine writes, “That which we abhor in any part of  it gives us 
the greatest pleasure when we consider the universe as a whole.”  To furnish 
the aesthetic metaphor in De vera religione, Augustine invokes painting, as 
black pigment may be lovely when fitted into a larger composition, so sin 
may likewise find its place in God’s masterpiece.452  Though the world is 
filled with a mixture of  victory and defeat, happiness and misery, pain and 
pleasure, Augustine remains confident that, in all these cases, “there is no 
evil except sin and sin’s penalty, that is, a voluntary abandonment of  highest 
being.”453 
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 So, human sin being integrated into a chiaroscuro composition, the 
contemplative Christian finds beauty and order within creation.  This 
symmetry within the composition of  the universe is the goal of  Augustine’s 
contemplation:
In all arts it is symmetry that gives pleasure, preserving unity and 
making the whole beautiful.  Symmetry demands unity and equality, 
the similarity of  like parts, or the graded arrangements of  parts which 
are dissimilar.  But who can find absolute equality or similarity in 
bodily objects?… True equality and similitude, true and primal unity, 
are not perceived by the eye of  flesh or by any bodily sense, but are 
known by the mind.454
The free-will theodicy which Augustine draws upon has a venerable 
tradition and a great deal of  explanatory power.  From the very first 
chapters of  scripture, human choosing is closely correlated to the onset of  
misery and destruction, but Augustine’s heavy reliance on human sin as the 
sole source of  misery remains troublesome.  Though he does make room 
for sin to spread outward and infect the lives of  others, Augustine never 
adverts to the implication that some may well suffer unjustly.  Rather, in De 
libero arbitrio especially, Augustine appeals to the fall as the source all our ill, a 
grand catastrophe from which humankind labors to recover.  The justice of  
this is never questioned in Augustine’s thought, and so a more nuanced 
picture of  sin and punishment is left to others to develop.   As unbelievable 
as Augustine’s suggestion that all misery is the result of  sin is, his further 
suggestion that all misery follows immediately on sin is even more 
preposterous. “[T]here is no interval of  time between failure to do what 
ought to be done and suffering what ought to be suffered,” Augustine 
writes, “lest for a single moment the beauty of  the universe should be 
189
454 VR 55.
defiled by having the uncomeliness of  sin without the comeliness of  
penalty.”455  
Balthasar, commenting on Augustine’s aesthetics, takes time to express his 
umbrage at Augustine’s attempts to ‘close the gaps’ of  his philosophy, by 
reducing the data of  the world and of  scripture to a single vision of  
harmony.  That “immanent evil” if  viewed from a God’s view, becomes 
good, is, for Balthasar, an unfortunate holdover from the influence of  
Plotinus, whose theodicy of  pure contemplation is thrown “like a cloak” 
over the tragic occurrence of  evil.  Even Augustine’s discussion of  the plot 
of  scripture suffers the defect of  this transcendent vantage point, Balthasar 
argues, since not even “the great aesthetic turning point of  Christian 
salvation history, the dialectic of  the Testaments, receives full justice... 
[because] the kingdom of  God is always present, veiled, un-recognized, both 
before and after Christ, but present.”456  Yet, Balthasar interjects, 
The dilemma we have outlined is not Augustine’s last word.  It is 
possible to be true to him without accepting the tragic consequences 
of  his static model of  the world, since all that is really positive in his 
thought is contained in the dynamic of  the light of  truth and love.457
I am inclined to agree with Balthasar here, that Augustine’s insistence on the 
moment-to-moment quality of  cosmic justice is not central to Augustine’s 
aesthetic theodicy. 
Though Augustine grants that he never receives a pure vision of  cosmic 
harmony, postulating, at times, possibilities, rather then observations or 
deductions, (in De libero arbitrio, for instance, Augustine opines that the death 
of  children is possibly a punishment for the parent’s sin) there is no doubt 
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that Augustine believes he can see large portions of  this moral/aesthetic 
vision.458 Fitting together his vision of  sin and punishment in symmetrical 
balance with his vision of  the plenitude of  the universe, Augustine weaves 
the place of  miserable souls into the ‘pied beauty’ of  the universe itself:
But the analogy suggested from the celestial luminaries teaches us this 
lesson.  When you contemplate the differences between bodies and 
observe that some are brighter than others, it is wrong to ask that the 
dimmer ones be done away with or made equal to the brighter ones.  
All must be contemplated in the light of  the perfection of  the 
universe; and you will see that all differences in brightness contribute 
to the perfection of  the whole.  You will not be able to imagine a 
perfect universe unless it contains some greater things and some 
smaller in perfect relation one to the other.  Similarly you must 
consider the differences between souls.  In them you will also 
discover that the misery you lament has this advantage.  The fact that 
there are souls which ought to be miserable because they willed to be 
sinful contributes to the perfection of  the universe.  So far is it from 
being the case that God ought not to have made such souls, that he 
ought to be praised for having made other creatures far inferior to 
miserable souls.459
Invoking plenitude, Augustine thus fits his model of  contrastive beauty 
together with his model of  creation’s comparative beauty: each thing, being 
what it is (beautiful), if  fitted in the (beautiful) scale of  creation, and even so 
far as it defects from its original place, is yet fit into some other, though 
lower, place within God’s design.  
3.4. Reflecting on the Aesthetic Theme. 
Though multi-layered and (in our contemporary context) somewhat 
counter-intuitive in places, Augustine’s cosmic symphony, as an aesthetic 
model, is fundamentally straightforward.  For the bishop of  Hippo all evil is 
integrated seamlessly into a larger, more complex and beautiful whole.  That 
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there are remaining questions, variant interpretations and notable 
fluctuations in Augustine’s thought is beyond doubt, but the central 
aesthetic motif  is nevertheless established: in the words of  Hick, that “seen 
in its totality from the ultimate standpoint of  the Creator, the universe is 
wholly good; for even the evil within it is made to contribute to the complex 
perfection of  the whole.”460   
Augustine’s ‘theme’, then, is less an aesthetic metaphor than an aesthetic 
metaphysic.  Yet we can clearly see, through Augustine’s repeated appeal to 
artistic analogies, that he intends the arts to reflect and illuminate our 
understanding of  cosmic justice, helping us to discern that, though the oar 
‘looks broken’ it, in fact, is perfectly whole.  Through appeal to artistic 
works and aesthetic principles, Augustine intends to make credible the claim 
that God is perfectly good, and his creation is providentially ordered.  Stated 
simply, Augustine’s aesthetic theme aims to show the universe to be an 
awesome place.
As developed above, it is especially noteworthy that Augustine’s aesthetic 
theodicy is part of  his opposition to and interaction with Pagan philosophy.  
As Carol Harrison notes, in Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of  Saint 
Augustine, 
In order to assess these [aesthetic] ideas fairly...one must set them in 
the context of  Augustine’s anti-Manichean, anti-dualistic polemic, 
where he was at pains to illustrate God’s providential working and 
ordering throughout his entire Creation: spiritual and material, good 
and evil.  This aesthetic is therefore not so much a justification of  
evil, as a consideration of  its place in God’s universe–not as a hostile, 
alien principle which thereby tells against God’s omnipotent rule (as 
192
460 John Hick, Evil and the God of  Love, 88. 
in Manicheism) – but as something which is comprehended in His 
beautiful, providential ordering of  it.461
To see the universe as a song, or a painting, or a sculpture, which is 
beautiful, further intuitively allows us to feel the rightness of  the whole, by 
invoking that which is delightful.  The big picture Augustine paints, because 
of  his frequent appeals to specific art-forms and aesthetic categories, cannot 
be confused with anything but a beautiful work of  art.
4. The Betrayal of  Beauty: Problems with Augustine’s Poetics of  Evil
A key underlying purpose of  Augustine’s thought on evil can be discerned, 
then, as being driven by the theological and apologetic concerns of  his day, 
and the outworking of  this in Augustine’s theodicy can be seen as an 
attempt to account for moral, metaphysical, and aesthetic dimensions of  the 
cosmos.  This is no small task, indeed, and one which we and Augustine do 
not hesitate to consider incomplete.462  Yet there are more issues within 
Augustine’s writing on the matter, and the best route to continue exploring 
Augustine’s aesthetic theme of  cosmic harmony is to do so in conversation 
with his critics.  
The very notion of  an aesthetic theodicy is one which naturally troubles 
contemporary thinkers.  In his Essays on Aesthetics, Jean-Paul Sartre takes time 
to discuss the work of  Titian, the famous 16th-century painter.  “Titian 
spends most of  his time soothing princes, reassuring them through his 
canvases that everything is for the best in this best of  all possible worlds,” 
Sartre writes, “Discord is but an illusion...Violence? only a ballet danced 
half-heartedly by spurious he-men with downy beards.”  As such, Sartre sees 
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in Titian’s desire to create beauty a perpetual downplaying of  the harshness 
of  reality.  Such art, he writes, “borders on the apologetic, becomes a 
theodicy: suffering, injustice, evil do not exist; nor does mortal sin... The 
result is treason of  the worst sort: the betrayal of  Beauty.”463  
Sartre’s flowing indictment of  Titian here is specifically aesthetic – Titian’s 
art betrays reality – but its deeper point is clearly applicable to the aesthetic 
theme developed by Augustine: as Augustine uses beauty as a tool to see 
past the apparent discord, the ‘broken oar’ in the water, to catch sight of  a 
more fundamental unity.  The criticism of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme, in 
one way or another, echoes some version of  Sartre’s accusation of  Titian.  
True, this beauty is consoling, but is it too consoling?  
The perennial desire of  humans to ‘look on the bright side’ of  things may 
well have its dark side, if  in straining to see some ultimate beauty we blur 
the reality of  suffering.  Discussing Augustine’s theodicy, Frank Burch 
Brown notes that the “attempt to weave apparent evil and ugliness into the 
beauty of  the whole fabric of  creation presents difficulties of  its own, since 
it can seem to ‘aestheticize’ and trivialize evil and suffering.”464  Likewise, we 
read Richard Viladesau praising the power of  beauty, yet worrying about the 
danger of  beauty’s betrayal.  “[T]he experience of  beauty may calm our 
hearts’ fears,” he writes, “[b]ut as with every ‘theodicy,’ [as with] that 
contained in sacred art, one must beware the twin dangers of  an implicit 
masochism, on the one hand, and, on the other, a facile acceptance of  evil 
and suffering – especially that of  others – as being part of  ‘God’s plan.’”465  
Theologians ought rightly to be wary of  de-emphasizing human suffering in 
194
463 Jean-Paul Sartre, Essays in Aesthetics, ed. Wade Baskin (NY: Citadel, 1963), p. 41.
464 Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste and Christian Taste, 105.
465 Richard Viladesau, Theology and the Arts: Encountering God through Music, Art and Rhetoric (NY: 
Paulist Press, 2000) 55
their work, and so the proper question to now explore is how might 
Augustine’s aesthetic theme trivialize suffering and evil?  
In an effort to look more deeply at Augustine’s aesthetic theme, we will 
examine three related critiques.  First, we will turn to the work of  Madden 
and Hare, whose work, Evil and the Concept of  God, attacks, from outside the 
faith, the Augustinian notion of  a harmonious universe.  Next, we will 
examine internal critiques of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme, such as the 
problematic nature of  concordia discors for a morally-valid theodicy discussed 
by Pannenberg, Mackie and Balthasar.  Then we will examine the critique of 
John Hick, raised above, in more detail. 
4.1. Higher Harmony and Moral Sense: The Critiques of  Madden and Hare
In their book, Evil and the Concept of  God, Edward Madden and Peter Hare 
argue that “the theistic effort to take the problem [of  evil] seriously fails.  
Each solution offered fails, in turn, to do the job required of  it and no 
combination of  them is sufficient to solve the various problems of  physical 
and moral evil.”466  In an attempt to argue this point, the authors range over 
a host of  issues and arguments surrounding the problem of  evil.   Among 
them Madden and Hare treat the issue of  cosmic harmony, and though their 
discussion is concise, the issue that they raise for Augustine’s position is the 
first and most fundamental question for examination: Does cosmic 
harmony undercut moral effort? 
In their work, Madden and Hare distinguish helpfully, as John Hick does, 
between two versions of  “ultimate harmony”.  On the one hand we have 
“All’s well in God’s view”, a position which affirms that, given the right 
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perspective, the universe displays perfect moment-to-moment harmony; on 
the other, we have “All’s well that ends well”, wherein the universe is leading 
toward, but does not yet display, this attractive order.467  Madden and Hare 
describe well the “all’s well in God’s view” position like this:
Just as a chord when heard in isolation may sound dissonant but 
when heard in context sounds harmonious, so it is with evil: An event 
seen in isolation is called evil by man, but this event seen in relation 
to all other events is called good by God.468
This is the Augustinian aesthetic theme as we have defined it, and Madden 
and Hare make a basic attempt to undercut the position, by arguing that 
ultimate harmony undercuts our deepest moral intuitions, and thus is 
antithetical to classical theism.  
Madden and Hare take aim at what they see as an implicit fatalism in 
Augustine’s thought.  If, as Augustine affirms in Confessiones, there is 
ultimately no evil in the world, then, as they argue, “any efforts to remove 
prima facie evil are necessarily morally wrong.  Any reform movement is by its 
nature pernicious.”469  If  this were indeed so, that any efforts to remove evil 
were pernicious, this would have serious ramifications for any decent system 
of  ethics.  The authors suggest, in fact, that this negative ramification can 
already be seen in the Christian laissez-faire attitude common in American 
politics.470  Following this line of  thought, if  the suffering of  the poor, or 
the plight of  ‘crack babies’ can be incorporated into a lovely cosmic whole, 
then doing something for them will not raise the total excellence of  the 
universe even a fraction, it is already as good as it gets.  As such, Madden 
and Hare present the most obvious and direct accusation against ultimate 
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harmony, that it leads to social and moral unconcern for others, by assuming 
that cosmic harmony undercuts the personal responsibility in the face of  
evil.  But is this the case?
In response to Madden and Hare, it must first be said that even assuming that 
there is “really no evil in the universe” it is difficult to see how any act of  
justice could be morally pernicious as they indicate.  Barring any details of  a 
more specific theology, and assuming that the world is, in fact, “ultimately 
harmonious”, no attempts at meddling or reform could disrupt the harmony 
of  the universe.  Assume, for example, that one saw an infant crawling 
across a busy street, about to be struck by an oncoming station wagon.  
Even if  one believed strongly that there was no evil in the universe, and that 
all was harmonious, including the impending death of  this little child, how 
could it be morally wrong to rush into traffic and rescue the infant, as 
Madden and Hare suggest?  One could not introduce evil into the universe, 
on this scenario, because, again, there can be no evil in the world.  It would 
be more accurate to voice the more modest proposal that cosmic harmony 
merely undercuts the impetus to do moral actions, as one can neither improve 
nor lower the ultimate excellence of  the universe by personal action.  This 
criticism, though modest in tone, seems sufficiently harmful to the 
Augustinian picture.471
But digging more deeply into the theology of  Augustine, we must argue that 
Augustine’s system does nothing to promote fatalistic moral laxity.  If  
misery is meted out according to just desert, as Augustine puts forward in 
De libero arbitrio, then an initial suggestion might be that all who suffer do so 
justly, and thus there is no need for us to prevent evils wherever we see 
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them.  But Augustine’s vision of  cosmic harmony does little to undercut the 
desire for justice, if  we believe that in doing so we are 1) observing the 
commands of  God, and 2) acting as a tool of  God to bring deliverance 
from misery, and 3) helping to prevent our own misery by abstaining from 
sinful actions and performing good ones.472  By tying misery to sin, as he 
does explicitly in his writings, Augustine creates a personal and charitable 
impetus for justice.  If  God has decreed that we prevent murders, give to 
the poor, and tend to those in prison, then by failing to do so we ourselves 
may become sinful and miserable.  To use an artistic analogy of  Augustine’s, 
if  a beautiful picture can be composed of  both black and white paint, we 
cannot make it less beautiful by choosing to be either black or white.  
However, we ourselves may desire not to be the miserable, dark paint for 
good reasons.  Just because God is a grand enough conductor such that his 
desired harmony cannot be disrupted by meddlesome musicians does not 
mean that there is no reason not to be meddlesome.  Therefore, Madden 
and Hare’s fundamental objection to the “all’s well” view, does not hold up 
as a discouragement to our moral efforts in a specifically theological context 
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such as Augustine’s, nor does it render our efforts to stop evil morally 
pernicious in a more generally philosophical context.473    
The external critiques of  higher harmony, by no means exhaustive, fail to 
connect with the realities of  Augustine’s position, and so do not do anything 
much to damage it.  It is therefore more helpful to turn to critiques which, 
because they focus on internal elements of  Augustine’s argument, are more 
formidable.
4.2. Concordia Discors: The Problem of  Aesthetic Contrast
In Chapter 1, I argued that aesthetic values functioned rather poorly in 
theodicy when held up on their own as morally sufficient reasons.  In that 
context, I held up process theodicy’s appeal to beauty as an ever-present 
value which can contribute to any situation, no matter how bleak.  
Undiscussed, however, was the often-invoked value of  aesthetic contrast.  
This raises the question: Does evil contribute to the beauty of  the universe?  
And if  so, is evil necessary to the beauty of  the world, as the color black is 
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necessary to the beauty of  Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro paintings?   And finally, 
does this constitute a morally sufficient reason for God’s allowance of  evil?
To be sure, there are some initial benefits which we can think of  for 
contrast within God’s creation.  Contrast provides the most accessible 
aesthetic notion one can invoke in discussions of  theodicy.  Folk wisdom 
often dictates that contrast is necessary in order to heighten or perceive 
value (e.g. pain is necessary to enjoy pleasure, bad smells in order to enjoy 
good smells, bad weather in order to enjoy good weather, etc.).  Leibniz 
describes the idea clearly when he writes “a little acid, sharpness or 
bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; shadows enhance colours; even 
a dissonance in the right place gives relief  to harmony”.474 Augustine 
himself  recognizes the value of  contrast.  Describing the fall of  Adam and 
Eve he writes of  the benefit of  their knowledge of  good and evil: “For 
experience of  discomfort in sickness gives a clearer insight into the joys of  
health as well.”475
Some theologians have argued that the aesthetic analogy of  contrast 
functions to provide, not so much an explanation for evil, as Thomas Oden 
notes in his Pastoral Theology, as a sense of  comfort in the midst of  evil.  
Since, as Oden writes, “suffering puts goodness into bolder relief... when it 
must be faced, it may increase our capacity for joy.”476  However the danger 
and difficulty of  this position quickly surface as we may begin to wonder 
whether, if  evil is psychologically necessary for enjoyable contrast, we can 
ever be released from its effects?  Oden notes the limited nature of  the 
analogy, and encourages pastors to use it “sparingly”.477  But if  the contrast 
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argument raises troubling questions about God being complicit in the 
occurrence of  evil, we may well wonder, should we use it at all?
J. L. Mackie, in his famous essay, “Evil and Omnipotence” discusses the 
argument that  “contrasts heighten beauty” such as in Mackie’s example of  
“a musical work [where] there may occur discords which somehow add to 
the beauty of  the work as a whole.”478  Thus, as Mackie lays it out, first-
order goods and evils can combine to make up a second-order good, a 
nicely contrastive “complex pattern”.479  Mackie acknowledges the relative 
strength of  this argument, in that it takes a seeming evil and puts it to some 
good purpose, but he notes that the natural conclusion of  this view is that 
God does not share our moral motivations to minimize suffering and 
injustice, and thus has a morality which contrasts unpleasantly with our own.  
As Mackie writes, a God who promotes first order evil “is not in our sense 
benevolent or sympathetic: he is not concerned to minimize evil... but only 
to promote good.”480  Lying behind Mackie’s critique is a sense that God’s 
omnipotence dictates against God being required to allow first-order evils in 
order to attain second order goods.  If  God is omnipotent, why can he not 
bring about the level of  value he desires without bringing about evil?481  
This is indeed a troubling question, and one which the fictional Ivan 
Karamazov forcefully and famously deals with in Fyodor Dostoevski’s The 
Brothers Karamazov.  Speaking with his brother Alyosha, a Christian monk, 
Ivan lays out a laundry list of  atrocities perpetrated upon children.  Ivan 
then wonders why they might have to suffer so terribly.  Surely not, he 
conjectures, to “pay for the eternal harmony... Why should they, too, furnish 
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material to enrich the soil for the harmony of  the future?”482  If  “higher 
harmony” requires the suffering of  innocent children, Ivan proclaims, he 
“renounces” it altogether.  What Ivan is rejecting here, then, is not so much 
the idea of  harmonious contrast in general, but the notion that the horrors 
which are perpetrated upon the innocent are intended to feed into this 
higher harmony.  This is an astute point to draw, as a general discussion of  
beautiful contrast may well overlook the reality of  suffering as it is 
experienced in real life.      
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar both raise the troubling 
issue of  Augustine’s sometime endorsement of  evil as beneficial and 
necessary to the ultimate harmony of  the universe.  In his discussion of  
theodicy and creation, Pannenberg notes the theological necessity for 
Augustine of  maintaining that God foresaw and ‘oversaw’ the fall.  To do 
otherwise, Pannenberg observes, would open the door to “Manichaean 
objections”.  If  God did not, in some sense, permit the fall, then evil could 
be viewed as being a separate force, coming from outside of  God’s control. 
Yet, as Pannenberg notes, Augustine sometimes moved beyond the position 
of  mere permission, into God’s approving of  evil for some higher purpose.  
Pannenberg writes, “Unfortunately we cannot deny that in [certain] places 
Augustine justified that which seems to be evil us as part of  the multiple 
perfection of  the universe”.483  Likewise Balthasar observes, “The weighing 
of  the formulation [of  ultimate harmony] varies between the simple 
statement that God’s unshakable order includes equally good and evil...and 
the much more extreme statement that beauty even requires its opposite.”484  
Both cite relevant passages of  De civitate Dei, where Augustine draws our eye 
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to the value of  contrast, with Balthasar further noting where Augustine 
emphasizes the necessity of  contrast in lovely objects.  For instance, 
Augustine: 
Thus as these contraries opposed do give the saying an excellent 
grace, so is the world’s beauty composed of  contraries, not in figure 
but in nature.  This is plain in Ecclesiasticus, in this verse: ‘Against 
evil is good, and against death is life; so is the godly against the 
sinner:  so look for in all the works of  the highest, two and two, one 
against one.’485
Likewise, in De ordine, Augustine seems to suggest that the beautiful depends 
on the antithetical: “The beauty of  all things is derived, as it were, from 
antithesis, or contrasts.”486  That Augustine invokes Ecclesiasticus here, a 
work that focuses on the punishment of  sinners by things ‘created’ for their 
chastisement further suggests the necessity of  contrast in God’s ultimate 
design, and that within the beautiful there must be contraries, light as well as 
dark, and thus that a beautiful universe requires evil of  some form or other.  
Yet, as both Pannenberg and Balthasar advert, Augustine never gives full 
expression to this notion, as suggestive as his writings may sometimes be.  
This was left to Aquinas and others such as Hugh of  St Victor to say more 
strongly that evil is somehow necessary to God’s good ordering of  the 
world.487  Augustine himself, when he dwelt on the issue most thoughtfully, 
however, desired to take the opposite opinion.  In De libero arbitrio Augustine 
pauses after musing poetically on the place of  evil in God’s carmen 
universitatis to temper such reflections:
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But one who does not quite understand what has been said may have 
this urge against our argument: If  our being miserable completes the 
perfection of  the universe, it will lose something of  its perfection if  
we should become eternally happy.  If  the soul does not come to 
misery save by sinning, are sins also necessary to the perfection of  
the universe which God has made.  How then does he justly punish 
sins without which his creation could be neither complete nor 
perfect?  The answer is: Neither the sins nor the misery are necessary 
to the perfection of  the universe, but souls as such are necessary 
which have power to sin if  they so will, and become miserable if  they 
sin...488
That De ordine and De civitate Dei suggest a necessity of  contrast cannot be 
denied, and we may, if  we so choose, lay at Augustine’s feet an apparent 
inconsistency, but it is suggestive that when Augustine dwelt on the nature 
of  contrast most thoroughly he sought to deny the implication that contrast 
was an essential part of  God’s design.  Chiaroscuro contrast, to use the 
language of  the philosophers, seems to provide for Augustine a sufficient, 
but not necessary, condition for beauty.  
But the best defense of  this chiaroscuro contrast is precisely how Augustine 
so often uses it, not as a defense of  God in the sense of  being an excuse, 
but as a way of  seeing the scope of  God’s providence, even in the midst of  
evil.  To construe the mixture of  evil and goodness in the world as a mosaic 
(De ordine), a painting (De civitate Dei), or as a mixture of  stars in the night 
sky (De libero arbitrio), is, in the way Augustine primarily uses these examples, 
a way of aesthetically seeing, not an act of  explicitly justifying, God’s goodness.
4.3. Hick and The Aesthetic Theme
Hick’s critique of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme has been with us since the 
beginning of  the thesis – being held up as a key example of  opposition to 
aesthetic considerations in the theodicy discussion – and now deserves a 
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more detailed examination.  For Hick, it is not primarily that Augustine’s use 
of  aesthetic considerations is faulty (though he thinks that as well), but more 
so that any such considerations distract us from God’s agape for human 
persons.  By trying to see the cosmic harmony in creation’s variety, or sin’s 
punishment, Hick is arguing, we are losing focus on theodicy’s purpose.  “A 
Christian theodicy must be centered upon moral personality,” Hick writes, 
“rather than upon nature as a whole, and its governing principle must be 
ethical rather than aesthetic.”489   
Because of  the heavy influence of  Irenaeus on Hick, it is ironic that Hick 
takes his stand not just against Augustine’s “aesthetic theme” of  perfectly-
balanced harmony, but also against Irenaeus’s  “aesthetic theme” which 
includes an eschatological dimension.  The Irenaean alternative to the static 
Augustinian picture, resembles more of  a beautiful symphony, than a 
beautiful painting, but even so, Hick warns, this improved version of  the 
aesthetic theme is still open to the same basic objection.  “[I]f  God is 
personal,” Hick writes, “we must see man as standing in a quite different 
relationship to Him from that in which the material universe stands to its 
Creator”.  The propositions which follow are that we should see “human 
life [not] as a link in the great chain of  being” but rather as central to God’s 
intention for fellowship; and that we should not be “upholding the 
perfection of  the universe as an aesthetic whole” but rather as “suited to the 
fulfillment of  God’s purposes for it”.490  For Hick, God’s purposes center 
around creating persons with whom He can have fellowship.
Theodicy’s concern, then, according to Hick, is relational instead of  creational, 
and ethical rather than aesthetic, and hence any cosmic aesthetic, no matter 
how skillful or sensitive, cannot effectively communicate God’s agape for 
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humans.  Yet, Hick argues, even we concede that something could be made of 
the aesthetic themes of  Augustine or Irenaeus, it would be trivial.   Such 
considerations would be peripheral to the rational discussion.  “Whatever 
realms of  life and dimensions of  meaning there may be beyond our present 
awareness and concern”, Hick writes of  the aesthetic theme, they have little 
to do with “the high good of  man’s fellowship with God”, and are therefore 
beyond the scope of  theodicy’s concern.491  Aesthetic considerations, if  at 
all possible, are therefore relegated to the scholastic dust pile, with other 
questions like “How many angels can dance on the head of  a pin?”
We have tried to suggest in Part I that theodicy should not marginalize 
aesthetic concerns out of  a priori suspicion or because aesthetics only has 
marginal value for theology.  Given the right framework, aesthetic 
considerations are perfectly amenable to the goals of  theodicy, and provide 
a rich resource for theological insight.  Yet Hick’s accusation of  Augustine 
runs deeper than these initial doubts, and attacks the very nature of  
Augustine’s aesthetic of  cosmic harmony.  
4.3.1. Hick and the Aesthetics of  Theodicy. Hick challenges Augustine’s aesthetic 
theme in two key ways.   First, because theodicy’s concern is relational, 
rather than metaphysical, Augustine’s concern to defend creation’s beauty 
undermines the theodicist’s goal to communicate God’s concern for us.  
Thus, Hick cites Adolph von Harnack approvingly:
Augustine never tires of  realizing the beauty (pulchrum) and fitness 
(aptum) of  creation, of  regarding the universe as an ordered work of  
art, in which the gradations are as admirable as the contrasts.  The 
individual and evil are lost to view in the notion of  beauty; nay, God 
himself  is the eternal, the old and new, the only, beauty.  Even hell, 
the damnation of  sinners, is, as an act in the ordination of  evils 
(ordinatio malorum), an indispensable part of  the work of  art.  But, 
206
491 Ibid., 204.
indeed, the whole work of  art is after all – nothing; a likeness, but ah! 
only a likeness of  the infinite fullness of  the one which alone exists.492
To worry overmuch with creation’s beauty, as Hick and Harnack suggest, is 
to overlook the individual who suffers the effects of  evil.  By analogy, 
Augustine in this sense would be like a fireman who arrives at the scene of  a 
house fire and first rapturously takes several photographs of  the lovely 
effect of  the flames against the sky.  
To be sure, focusing on the beauty of  the whole must entail ignoring some 
of  the suffering of  its parts.  But are evil and individual suffering lost to 
view in Augustine’s aesthetic theme?   In raising this question, Hick’s critique 
against Augustine is the most effective so far, because it is an aesthetic 
critique.  Hick accuses Augustine of  blurring our sensitivity to evil because 
of  his use of  aesthetics, and thus strikes at the heart of  aesthetic theodicy.  
That Augustine runs foul of  this very problem, an instinctive turning away 
from suffering to reflect on cosmic beauty cannot be denied.  There is little 
place in any of  Augustine’s works for a detailed examination of  individual 
suffering.  Yet, it must be argued that an incomplete aesthetic is not the 
same as a flawed one.  There is a place within theodicy for examination of  
the beauty of  the whole, and it must be argued that seeing humanity 
through the lens of  created beauty does not automatically diminish our 
value.  
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Here, I will again refer to Sohn’s thesis on aesthetic theodicy, because Sohn’s objection to 
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C. S. Lewis’s work, which precedes Hick’s own, helpfully anticipates some of 
Hick’s objections.  Lewis, in a variety of  works, has sought to use cosmic 
beauty as an aesthetic motif  in theodicy, most notably in The Problem of  Pain.  
For Lewis, God’s unfathomable love is difficult to conceive, and, he writes, 
“can be apprehended only by analogies: from the various types of  love 
known among creatures we reach an inadequate, but useful, conception of  
God’s love for man.”493  The first rung on this ladder of  analogies, is of  the 
love of  an artist for his creation.  St. Peter’s analogy of  the church as a 
spiritual house, of  which we are “living stones” is, Lewis admits, limited by 
the static quality of  the analogy (1 Pet. 2:5).  Humans here are only sentient 
bricks, useful for supporting something else, but not very valuable for their 
unique characteristics.   What architect is concerned about individual stones?  
This seems exactly the sort of  “aesthetic theme” to which Hick originally 
objected.  For Hick, the problem with Augustine’s principles of  plenitude 
and punishment, which sought to incorporate humans into an aesthetic 
scheme, was that they downplayed the dynamic purpose for which God 
made us.   Yet Lewis does not, unlike Hick, abandon the analogy as useless 
because it is impersonal.  He writes, 
it is an important analogy so far as it goes.  We are, not 
metaphorically but in very truth, a Divine work of  art, something that 
God is making, and therefore something with which He will not be 
satisfied until it has a certain character.494
Lewis here affirms the impersonal artistic analogies drawn by Augustine, but 
overcomes some of  Augustine’s problems by delving more deeply into the 
nature of  the art which we are.  What Lewis sees correctly is that the 
question is not whether we should see ourselves as God’s artwork, but rather 
what kind of  artwork are we?  A decorative ashtray?  A limerick?  Or an epic 
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poem?  In Lewis’s view, we are not merely a sketch which God has idly 
drawn to amuse himself, but a masterpiece, over which “he will take endless 
trouble” and to which he would “thereby give endless trouble”.495  Lewis 
thus overcomes some of  the problems of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme, not 
by making his analogies less aesthetic, but by delving more deeply into the 
quality of  our beauty.  Highlighting the deep love God has for us as Creator, 
Lewis bypasses the facile notion that to be a work of  art is always to be 
dispensable.  Who could calculate what Paradise Lost was worth to Milton, or 
the Mona Lisa to da Vinci? 
Yet Lewis does not stop with artistic analogies, but counts many more ways 
in which God loves us, as a master loves a dog, as a father loves a son, and 
as a man loves a woman.496  Each analogy captures some aspect of  the 
intolerable compliment which God has paid us by loving us so much.  
Though he affirms that the romantic analogy is the most useful for theodicy, 
as it stresses both the commitment of  the relationship and the desire within 
that commitment for perfection, Lewis also acknowledges that the romantic 
metaphor is also the most dangerous, as it invites us to imagine that 
humanity, like the beloved, is the focus of  all God’s attention.497  To see 
humanity only as a work of  art would be troublingly incomplete.  But to see 
God only as a lover would be to imagine ourselves equal with God, or 
perhaps to fancy God as somehow emotionally codependent with his 
frustrating human creations.  Whatever their limitations, then, creational 
analogues may help to offset the personal analogies, which would collapse 
the distance between God and humanity. 
This suggests a new approach with regard to Hick’s criticisms, as well as the 
problems with an Augustinian aesthetic which focuses too much on the 
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beauty of  everything and not enough on the reality of  suffering.  An 
opposite approach to Hick’s would be to enrich the aesthetic picture of  the 
world with a wider range of  aesthetic motifs.
4.3.2. Hick and the Problem of  Plenitude.  Secondly, a problem which Hick finds 
with plenitude is that it implies a chain of  being with humans merely ‘filling 
one of  the slots’.  “Perhaps the most fundamental criticism”, Hick writes of 
Augustine’s theme, 
is the impersonal or subpersonal way in which God’s relation to His 
creation is prevailingly conceived… God’s goodness and love are 
understood – as they are typically understood throughout medieval 
theology – primarily as His creative fecundity, His bestowing of  the 
boon of  existence as widely as possible. (199)
Siding with Hugh of  St Victor, Hick believes humans to be central to God’s 
purposes in creation.  According to Hugh of  St Victor, the rest of  creation 
was designed with Adam and Eve in mind.  Whether or not this is true, 
however, indicates little as to the benefit of  reflecting on creation.  Without 
plunging into deep speculations, whether or not the variety of  creation was 
intended as an environment for humanity to flourish one can still maintain 
that humanity ‘fits’ into a certain place within creation, and, taken together 
with all creation, the effect is rather beautiful.  Bracketing out worries about 
plenitude’s internal consistency as a doctrine highlights what I take to be 
Hick’s deeper worry, and more fundamental difference from Augustine.  In 
keeping with his emphasis on soul-making, Hick seems to take issue with 
the loveliness of  creation, as if  it contradicts the very purposes for which 
creation was made.  
The general thrust of  Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy is that God desires us 
to grow to maturity, into the “likeness of  Christ”, and that this process of  
210
perfection often requires pain and struggle.  In his work he skillfully 
responds to David Hume, who attacks creation, comparing the world to a 
house where the “windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole 
economy of  the house were the source of  noise, confusion, fatigue, 
darkness, and the extremes of  heat and cold”.498  If  there were an all-
knowing, all-powerful creator, Hume is suggesting, then this being would be 
able to rig all the “secret springs of  the universe” in order to avoid pain and 
keep all men happy.  Responding to Hume, Hick writes: 
Such critics as Hume are confusing what heaven ought to be, as an 
environment for perfected finite beings, with what this world ought 
to be, as an environment for beings who are in the process of  
becoming perfected.499
Here Hick rightly points out that there may well be good reasons for 
creating a world with suffering.  If  God wants not merely to pacify us, but 
rather to perfect us, then this world may well be the creation of  a good 
God.  But the repeated stridency with which Hick avoids discussing the 
goodness of  creation is troubling.  When discussing the beauty and variety 
of  all lower forms of  life, Hick can take confidence in only two roles for 
nature to play: to provide the evolutionary material which produced 
humanity, and to provide a dangerous world in which humans may grow to 
maturity through difficulty.  Universal beauty, for Hick, downplays the 
central importance of  the universe as a vale of  soul-making.  “Instead, then, 
of  thinking of  the origin and fate of  human personality as a function of  an 
aesthetically valued whole,” Hick writes, “we should see the great frame of  
nature, with all its sources of  evil, as the deliberately mysterious 
environment of  finite personal life.”500  Hick repeatedly emphasizes that we 
can really know very little about God’s purposes for the rest of  creation, 
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seeing only that part of  the story which concerns ourselves.  That God has 
for us a special purpose is beyond question, but it seems troubling that God 
only has a loving purpose for us, and this loving purpose expresses itself  
almost exclusively in suffering.
What Hick fails to grasp, ultimately, is that a satisfactory Christian theology 
must give us a bigger sense of  God’s person and purposes beyond the 
merely moral (and therefore any theodicy must, in some sense, reflect this).  
We must know that God is interested in more than reforming our 
characters.  We must also begin to sense what it is that God needs to break us 
and put us back together.  If  God has no other purposes besides our ethical 
development, then we may begin to question the value of  ethics to begin 
with.  As Balthasar writes, if  beauty is “lifted from [religion’s] face as a mask, 
its absence on that face exposes features which threaten to become 
incomprehensible to man.”501  The same goes for theodicy, in that if  beauty 
is altogether removed from the picture, the portrait of  God’s purposes, 
person and providential plan may become cold and undesirable. 
Lewis is again a helpful conversation partner as he also points out that pain 
is a tool that can used by God for bringing us into right relationship.  Lewis 
admits that while pleasures can be ignored, pain cannot. “God whispers to 
us in our pleasures,” Lewis writes, “speaks in our conscience, but shouts in 
our pains: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf  world.”502  But what of  a 
God who only shouts to us, and never whispers?  That the character-building 
quality of  beauty is lacking from Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy may well 
lead us to think that God is obsessively concerned only with our moral 
development, like a domineering parent who is not concerned with his 
children’s ultimate flourishing.  That Hick emphasizes the formative aspect 
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of  suffering is both appropriate and biblical (Rom. 5:3-5), but that he 
emphasizes this so exclusively leaves his theodicy impoverished.  Defending 
God’s goodness solely in moral terms can lead to a picture of  God which is 
cold, harsh, and generally not worth defending.  
That Augustine’s vision of  plenitude is morally beneficial, a training ground 
within which we can learn to value creation rightly, suggests that 
appreciation of  creation is part of  our development in virtue itself, and thus, 
contra Hick, upholding the aesthetic qualities of  creation is fully compatible 
with a person-focused theodicy.  That nature is so varied, ranging from 
rocks and plants all the way up to animals, humans and angels, does not only 
signify that we are merely one link in this chain, but may have a positive, 
personal dimension. It is nonsensical to think that human life is best 
understood by humanity focusing exclusively on itself.  A more sensible 
suggestion is to attempt to situate human persons within the wider world in 
order to perceive their place more fully.  In this, one is reminded of  the 
paintings of  Frederic Edwin Church, who is best known (as befits a Hudson 
River school artist) for his landscapes.  In his best-known paintings, Church 
creates immense outdoor scenes, but frequently places small figures in each 
painting.  As in Church’s landscape, “The Heart of  the Andes”, a tiny figure 
kneeling by the cross is barely glimpsed amidst verdant wilderness {figures 1 
and 2}, but nevertheless plays an important part in the composition as the 
eye moves from the cliffs closest to the viewer, up the river and further back 
to the more immense mountains behind, and finally to the ice-capped 
mountain {figures 3} which logically must dwarf  these closer mountains in 
size.  Moving back and forth between medium, large, and gigantic objects, 
the viewer is continually drawn to the presence of  the tiny person and white 
cross as an integral part of  the picture - a continual point of  intellectual 
interest and aesthetic fascination.  In an analogous way, the importance of  
human personhood, morality, or any other aspect of  traditional theodicy is 
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not denied by the inclusion of  aesthetic considerations, but may rather be 
seen again with renewed freshness and insight.  Widening the circle to 
include the aesthetic theme offers us deeper insight into the problem of  evil, 
including the human and moral dimensions at the center of  the question.
{figure 1}
 503
{figure 2}       {figure 3}
4.4. Conclusion.
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Augustine’s theodicy of  cosmic harmony presents a lovely vision of  reality, 
where all of  creation continually reflects God’s goodness in its perpetual 
aesthetic excellence.  However, Augustine’s picture remains incomplete, 
because such a picture of  perfect harmony evades our vision, and fails to 
connect with much of  how we experience the world.  To turn continually to 
the perpetual order of  the universe may obfuscate and obscure our attempts 
to see God’s ongoing work in the world.
Recall that Hans Urs von Balthasar, in discussing the strengths and flaws of  
Augustine’s aesthetic theology, observes of  Augustine’s reading of  scripture, 
that not even “the great aesthetic turning point of  Christian salvation 
history, the dialectic of  the Testaments, receives full justice... [because] the 
kingdom of  God is always present, veiled, un-recognized, both before and 
after Christ, but present.”504  Balthasar’s accusation is mild, but effective, in 
that he accuses Augustine, not of  favoring the aesthetic over the personal, 
but of  missing the deeper and more beautiful picture of  God’s great work 
of  salvation in history.  If  we are constantly trying to see the big picture, we 
can miss, not only the tragedies of  the world, but also many of  the triumphs 
that rise out of  these tragedies.  To step back from the evils of  the world 
can also cause us to step back and miss seeing the smaller goods.    
Thus, in turning to other aesthetic themes, we hope to gain a more nuanced 
and holistic picture of  what God’s providence entails.
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CHAPTER 4
 POETIC INJUSTICE:  THEODICY AND WENDY FARLEY’S TRAGIC  VISION
 Absent thee from felicity awhile, 
 And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain,
 To tell my story.
       SHAKESPEARE 
       Hamlet
 The worst is not,
 So long as we can say, “This is the worst”.
       SHAKESPEARE
       King Lear
 
 Death, that hath suck’d the honey of  thy breath, 
 Hath had no power yet upon thy beauty. 
 Thou art not conquered.
       SHAKESPEARE 
       Romeo and Juliet
1. Introduction 
1.1. Augustine Among the Tragedians
Turning from Augustine’s harmonic theodicy, we now wish to look at 
alternate visions of  the problem of  evil, which may complement, inform 
and critique our understanding of  aesthetic themes therein.  As we 
concluded the last chapter, we heard the concerns of  John Hick and Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, that Augustine’s aesthetic theme obscures our perception 
of  human suffering.  Concluding his comments on Augustine, Balthasar 
notes that Augustine’s theodicy throws a “cloak over tragedy”, in failing to 
discern the deeper reality of  suffering.  Yet, as Balthasar rightly sees, the 
proper response to a failing of  aesthetic vision is not to abandon artistic 
reflection, as Hick’s work suggests, but to seek out an aesthetics which is 
more truthful to God’s work in the world.  That Balthasar invokes tragedy 
here, if  only briefly, is nevertheless suggestive for our study.  In the recent 
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literature on the problem of  evil, the genre of  tragedy has provided a locus 
for serious reflection and may perhaps provide an aesthetic theme which 
compensates for some of  Augustine’s mistakes.    
Echoing Balthasar and Hick’s concerns, contemporary theologian Wendy 
Farley has likewise contrasted the aesthetic themes of  harmony and tragedy.  
“[A]esthetic metaphysics turns our eyes to the beauty of  the cosmos,” she 
writes, “by rendering particular sufferings invisible.”505  Observing the 
failings of  the classic emphasis on cosmic harmony, Farley’s response is to 
turn to tragic poetics.  As a mode of  perception, tragedy is firmly planted in 
the midst of  suffering, seeking not to stand apart, or above, but to witness 
responsively and intimately.  For Farley, an emphasis on tragedy allows more 
room for consolation, because it “enters into the hiatus between the longing 
for justice and the reality of  suffering,” and thus resists the short-fallings of  
traditional theodicy’s “cool justifications of  evil”.506   Tragedy seems to 
provide a good conversation partner for Augustine’s aesthetic theme, in that 
it not so much rebuts as refocuses our perception of  evil and providence, and 
thus reorders our perception.  As Augustine and those in his tradition rave 
about the beautiful “big picture”, those who emphasize the tragic vision 
focus on the dark details of  human life.  Though there is no single 
definition of  the “tragic vision” as embraced by theology, one key element 
of  this theme must be an attempt to take suffering seriously as an irreducible human 
experience.  This attempt to ‘read’ reality in this light is different from an 
Augustinian theodicy, which seeks to balance the theodicy equation by 
appeal to the common denominator of  sin.  Tragic theodicists such as 
Wendy Farley find no such perfect balance, but rather focus on the 
remainder which is left over, the excess of  unexplained human agony.507 
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It is worth noting at the outset that comparing these two themes is not an 
altogether foreign juxtaposition – especially not for Augustine.  The Bishop 
of  Hippo was aware of  tragic drama, even offering a perceptive analysis of  
the most fundamental aspect of  its poetic power.  Writing in his Confessions, 
Augustine reflects on his youth, that when he attended the theater he 
reveled in the sad spectacle it offered.  Augustine is attentive to the pleasure 
of  this form of  theater, and (much in the same way that Aristotle does) 
describes its power to move us to pity (misericordia), and provide a cathartic 
experience: 
What is the reason now that a spectator desires to be made sad when 
he beholds doleful and tragical passages, which himself  could not 
endure to suffer?  Yet for all that he desires to feel a kind of  
passionateness, yea, and his passion becomes his pleasure too.508
Here Augustine stands with other thinkers such as Aristotle, Hume, Frye 
and Murdoch in identifying what is sometimes called, “the paradox of  
tragedy”: a perception of  pain which provides a form of  pleasure.509
Yet, within the context of  Augustine’s theology, the pleasures and pains of  
the stage are only a darkened form of  amusement.  On moral principle, 
Augustine expresses umbrage at taking pleasure in others’ misery.  Pity may 
be felt for those in need, he argues, but we should never desire to feel pity at 
someone’s sorrow.  By contrast, Augustine praises God’s own incorruptible 
mercy, which loves perfectly, yet without sorrow.  By far the more troubling 
aspect of  tragedy, however, Augustine sees in his own life, as he describes 
tragic pleasure as little more than the enjoyable scratching of  the “filthy 
scab” which was his soul.  Such ‘scratching’ delighted and relieved his inner 
corruption, but did nothing to heal it.510  Thus, what Aristotle finds to praise 
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about tragedy, its cathartic power, Augustine sees as tragedy’s most 
dangerous aspect.  That stage plays can ease our emotional distress, without 
healing the source of  our inner turmoil, is, for Augustine, disgusting.
Little more needs to be said about Augustine’s views on tragedy, except that 
he seemed to find nothing on the tragic stage to fit into his aesthetic vision 
of  God’s providence.  If  the tragic vision is, as Miguel de Unamuno 
describes it, a distinct “sense of  life”, then it is safe to say that Augustine, 
for better or worse, lacks this sense.511  Kathleen Sands, a feminist 
theologian, describes Augustine’s resistance as a rejection of  any sense of  
life which was open to polyvalent interpretation:
Augustine’s disdain for tragic and comic dramas, with their quite 
contrary goals, was therefore not coincidental... His theory of  sin, like 
the rationalistic and dualistic interpretations of  evil that generated it, 
was an effort to repudiate the tragicomic reality of  elemental 
contradiction, an effort to fix life’s moving questions by anchoring 
them speculatively to the story’s anticipated end.512
 To be sure, Augustine is aware of  suffering, and one can feel in his 
Confessiones the compassion of  a man who lost his beloved mother, dear 
friend, and only son.  But his sense of  sadness at the evil in the world never 
leads him to embrace that sadness as a meaningful part of  the world-story.  
Suffering is never given any real sway or significance.  Specifically within his 
theodicy, suffering plays no more significant role than as a kind of  waste 
product generated by sin, which must be processed philosophically, ethically, 
and aesthetically in order not to contaminate creation’s beautiful ecology.  
For Augustine, though the problem of  suffering must be dealt with, it is no 
more fitting a subject for reflection than sewage.513 
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1.2. Theodicy and the Tragic Paradox
1.2.1. Tragedy and Pain.  The aesthetic theme of  tragedy within theodicy aims 
to correct, or contradict, this trend in classical theodicy by finding value in 
reflecting on suffering.  If  we must find a poetic banner to fly over tragic 
theology, we may perhaps turn to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, where the prince, 
dying, charges Horatio, “absent thee from felicity awhile... to tell my story.”  
Hamlet here clearly recognizes the difficulty which Horatio will have to 
endure in recounting the sad events in Elsinore.  That Hamlet charges him 
“in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain” suggests the agony of  the 
world but also the difficulty of  speaking through racking sobs of  grief.  Yet 
it is assumed here in Hamlet that there is value in recounting even sad tales 
such as these, though they force us to ‘absent ourselves’ from happiness for 
a while.  Taking this as a very preliminary guide to tragedy, we may say that 
in the art-form, and, by extension, the vision of  life, is an attempt to see 
something we do not naturally desire to see: suffering.
Thus, at the beginning, we must say that at the core of  the tragedy there is 
something which places even more pressure on the theodicist.  Suffering is 
undesirable, an evil which can be defeated, but which still hurts, forcing us to 
ask more urgently the perennial ‘why’ question.  However we define the 
tragic, in drama or theology, at the core of  our understanding of  the theme 
must be an attempt to resist softening the painful reality of  suffering, at 
least for a time.  In order to work – even if  it offers only the cathartic 
release of  emotions – tragedy must first grip us through an encounter with 
the agony of  another.  This experience must be, in some sense, painful.  Iris 
Murdoch comes close to saying this when she writes, “Tragedy must break 
the charmed completion which is the essence of  lesser art”.514
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Here it is brokenness which Murdoch points toward, in that tragedy offers us 
a unified vision of  a shattered whole.  She describes the form as something 
inherently uncomfortable, that keeps us gripping the seat, never fully 
relaxed.  As she writes, “The statement must be impressive but not too 
complete... The intelligent truthful creator must keep his material open 
enough, must keep, as it were, pulling it apart.”  Northrop Frye likewise 
points to a unique quality in tragedy which sets it apart from other literary 
genres.  For Frye, the varied ‘mythoi’ of  Western literature fit with the four 
seasons, comedy (spring), romance (summer), and satire (winter), all offer a 
vision of  life which is, in some sense, desirable.  Even satire, as Frye 
explains, offers a kind of  icy humor.  Yet, “Without tragedy,” Frye notes, 
with its autumnal sadness, “all literary fictions might be plausibly explained 
as expressions of  emotional attachments, whether of  wish fulfillment or of  
repugnance: the tragic fiction guarantees, so to speak, a disinterested quality 
in literary experience.”515  In essence, Frye sees tragedy as the only poetic 
genre which shows us something we do not want to see.  
This suggests, then an inherent tension between tragedy and theodicy.  If  
theodicy is at heart an attempt to maintain the credibility of  God’s good news, 
and tragedy is at heart an attempt to tell us the bad news: the two must be, at 
least in part, at odds with one another.  We may well ask at the outset, in 
accord with Augustine, what tragedy as an aesthetic theme may contribute 
to theodicy?  This chapter, concluding with a discussion of  the work of  
Wendy Farley, is an attempt to answer this question.
1.2.2. Tragedy and Pleasure. The second dimension of  tragedy in art, so far as 
it embodies the tragic paradox of  which Augustine speaks, is that it also 
gives pleasure at the perception of  suffering.   Augustine found this sort of  
pleasure immoral, as if  it were a more rarified form of  the gladiators in the 
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coliseum, but others have found within tragedy great value, suggesting 
hidden powers of  consolation within the spectacle, which are not visible 
from the vantage of  cosmic harmony.  Though thinkers have differed on 
the consolations of  tragedy (ranging from mere catharsis to supreme 
consolation for all life’s evils), many theologians have found, by looking 
through the lens of  tragic poetics, positive meaning for the Christian faith 
despite the vision of  suffering it provides.  Romeo, in seeing Juliet, whom he 
takes for dead, utters words which encapsulate this triumphant quality 
“Death, that hath suck’d the honey of  thy breath /Hath had no power yet 
upon thy beauty. / Thou art not conquered”.516  Tragedy offers us a sad 
spectacle which yet retains a beauty which is not defeated, despite the 
prevalence of  evil.
This exultant quality to the tragic vision is the necessary accompaniment to 
the attendant agony of  the form, and has significant import for aesthetic 
theodicy.  If  tragedy can help us to see suffering clearly, and yet see, in the 
midst of  suffering, positive meaning for humanity, then it is worth 
exploring.  In order to explore the tragic vision, I will first briefly look at the 
poetics of  tragedy (a complicated and varied literature to which I cannot do 
justice), then I will briefly turn to various versions of  the tragic vision, 
Christian and otherwise, in order to gain a sense of  the way that tragedy is 
interpreted philosophically and theologically.  Concluding this examination, 
I will look at the work of  Wendy Farley as a preeminent attempt to use the 
tragic vision as a resource for theodicy.  Finally, by examining some of  the 
critiques of  the tragic vision, I hope to emerge with some positive insights 
which deepen aesthetic theodicy and ultimately fit together with the best of  
Augustine’s model of  the world, as well as an understanding of  what tragedy 
yet lacks as an aesthetic theme.
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2. Tragedy and Philosophy
2.1. Tragedy and Theory.  Given its frequent overuse in contemporary 
discourse, where everything from school shootings to the elimination of  a 
sports team from the semi-finals may well be called ‘tragic’, it is important, 
in looking at tragedy, to spend some time with the traditional significance of 
the word. 
Chaucer’s monk in Canterbury Tales gives voice to a simple and 
straightforward perception of  the form of  tragedy as we encounter it in art:
Tragedie is to seyn a certain storie,
As olde bookes maken us memorie,
Of  hym that stood in greet prosperitee,
And is yfallen of  a heigh degree
Into myserie, and endeth wrecchedly.517  
For all its simplicity, Chaucer here gives a good description of  the form as it 
is commonly perceived; specifically, this brief  definition gets correct the 
centrality of  plot in tragic theory: tragedy is a certain ‘storie’.  Though there 
are paintings and photographs which grip us with pity and fear, when we 
speak of  tragic art, it is normally in terms of  a temporal progression of  a 
narrative.  Whether speaking of  a miscarriage, a drug addiction, a car 
accident, or a divorce, when we apply the modifier ‘tragic’ it is often in 
response to something that has happened over a course of  time.  Moreover, 
things have gotten worse (something has ‘yfallen’), and ‘myserie’ of  one sort or 
another has ensued, ending in a more ‘wrecched’ state of  affairs.  
This emphasis on ‘storie’ in Chaucer accords with Aristotle’s writings, who 
calls plot the “soul of  tragedy”.518  Aristotle enumerates three key elements 
to the tragic plot: reversal of  fortune (peripeteia), recognition (anagnorisis), and 
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a scene of  suffering (pathos).519  The stories of  Oedipus, Hamlet, and 
Beowulf  all follow this pattern, as they depict the fall of  a royal person, who 
succumbs to the defeat: each take on a task for which they are uniquely 
situated and qualified (to discover the cause of  the plague on Thebes; to 
scour the ‘rottenness’ of  Denmark; to destroy the monsters), yet which even 
they cannot accomplish.  
If  the focus of  Aristotle’s or Chaucer’s poetics, the downfall of  a great man, 
is less commonly invoked in our anti-authoritarian age, works such as 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet and James Cameron’s Titanic, both sad stories 
of  ‘star cross’d’ lovers whose romance ends poorly, retain their significance 
as examples of  the tragic theme.  Lost love is immediately recognizable and 
perennially relevant to us, as we often see the heights of  youthful optimism 
clash with the sad social contingencies of  a world where race, class, and 
other differences keep couples apart.  The tragic conclusion of  Romeo and 
Juliet includes all three elements, as the clever plan to unite the two offspring 
of  warring families falls through: the crucial message does not arrive 
(reversal).  Romeo takes Juliet for dead and commits suicide; subsequently, 
Juliet wakes sees her dead lover and likewise kills herself  (recognition and 
suffering).  
Returning to the beginnings of  tragic theory, one finds in Aristotle a clear 
and coherent account of  the form in his Poetics.  In seeking to elucidate the 
poetic logic of  tragedy, Aristotle is entirely more positive about the 
rationality of  artistic creation than is Plato in Ion, who describes the artist as 
little more than an unknowing captive of  the muse, whose creative powers 
are largely irrational.520  Aristotle’s requirements for tragedy as “an imitation 
of  an action that is complete, and whole, and of  a certain magnitude,” 
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which conforms to the unities of  place, time, and character, as well as the 
necessities of  the tragic plot as described above, and a list of  other 
necessary elements, is therefore a high compliment to the form as a skillful 
enterprise worthy of  reflection, and beneficial for viewing.521
By offering an essentially cognitivist account of  drama, which argues that 
the emotional effect of  the drama is based on its interaction with our beliefs 
about the world, Aristotle helpfully pairs together the structure of  the play 
and its effect on our emotions.  A well-crafted tragedy will result in a natural 
“tragic wonder”, in which we feel terror and pity.522  This feeling of  
sympathy toward a character, and yet antipathy toward the events of  the 
play, has held strong through the years as a helpful mark for understanding 
tragedy.  Like the paradox of  ‘tragic pleasure’, but distinguishable from it, 
the dual emotions described by Aristotle dictate a structure to the 
proceedings, and proscribe certain plots.  The philosopher, for instance, 
notes that the downfall of  a purely virtuous man arouses neither pity nor 
fear, but provides only “shock appeal”; while the ruination of  a villain, 
though morally satisfying, elicits no “tragic wonder”.  The notion that 
tragedy could consist of  the good fortune of  a villain, Aristotle finds merely 
silly.523  An effective tragedy requires a delicate mix of  ingredients in order 
to fill us with a sense of  commiseration and fear.    
Here Aristotle is not alone, as I. A. Richards notes that the relation between 
pity and terror gives tragedy its “peculiar poise”.524  For Aristotle, the 
perfect alloy of  pity and terror arises when a great man falls, but this man is 
flawed with error or frailty.  Aristotle spells out why the fall of  Oedipus or 
Thyestes should elicit fear and pity: our sense of  fear is derived from the 
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injustice of  the suffering before us; our pity is derived from our 
identification with the one who suffers.  Iris Murdoch describes the tension 
between the pitiable injustice and fearful identification as a basic conflict of  
justice: “Tragedy is a paradoxical combination of  a fearful sense of  rightness 
(the hero must fall) and a pitying sense of  wrongness (it is too bad that he 
falls).”525   Tragedy often plays on these contrasting values.  Oedipus falls 
from the heights of  greatness to the depths of  misery.  Tragedy gives us 
pleasure, but at the sight of  agony.  The tragic hero is both innocent and 
guilty.  
Yet, though Aristotle’s Poetics represents a monumental kick-start to critical 
reflection on the genre, his description of  and prescriptions for tragic art 
are, at places, unhelpfully restrictive.  The norms which Aristotle lays out for 
tragic drama, such as the necessary magnitude of  the drama, the unity of  
time and place, and the nature of  the reversal, tend to apply best to his most 
frequently mentioned tragedy, Oedipus Rex, and with lesser success to other 
tragedies of  the stage.  The problem of  tragic poetics often revolves around 
this dilemma, as Northrup Frye notes that “most theories of  tragedy take 
one great drama as their norm”.526  Thus, as helpful as Aristotle’s initial 
account may be in identifying the features and function of  tragedy as he 
sees it, it cannot be applied equivocally to tragic art.  Indeed, finding a single 
account of  tragedy, or even a solid definition of  the genre has proved 
contentious or even unhelpful.  Terry Eagleton, in his recent survey of  the 
state of  tragic theory, spends an entire chapter charting the mistakes of  
countless attempts to find the “Holy Grail of  a faultless definition”.527  
Even so, the temptation to make pronouncements on what is or is not tragic 
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is perennial in even the most perceptive critics.  Iris Murdoch attempts to 
draw this line when she writes,
To say of  this and that that it is not tragic, or not a tragedy, implies a 
positive concept.  Yet it may be easier to see why certain sad or 
frightful things in art are not tragic, than to say what sort of  art is 
tragic.  Someone has got to die, it has to be a play, it has to be poetry, 
it has to be very good.528 
Yet, suggestive as Murdoch’s description is, death and tragedy do not always 
go hand in hand.  To be sure, death is (for most dramatists) a definable 
conclusion to the story, and thus ending the story ‘wrecchedly’, but tragedy for 
Aristotle did not require death, but only downfall.  For instance, 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, if  a problematic play, is widely considered 
tragic despite the fact that the protagonist lives.  
This temptation to exclude certain plays from being truly tragic extends to 
other thinkers as well.  Milton, like Murdoch, felt it necessary to rule out 
certain forms of  tragedy.  For Milton, the comic or the vulgar was unseemly 
to the dignity of  the form.  Yet, again, Shakespeare’s work proves to be a fly 
in the ointment of  Milton’s theory as Hamlet, Macbeth, and Lear should all be, 
in a Puritan fashion, scolded for inclusion of  low and funny characters in the 
midst of  the darker story.  As Paul Fiddes has shown, the works of  
Shakespeare often display a line of  tension between tragedy and comedy.  
The comedies contain dark elements, the shadow of  death, and tragic 
characters, while the tragedies contain jokes, humorous characters, and notes 
of  lightness and victory: as Fiddes notes, “Shakespearian comedies do not 
end in total sweetness and light...” and there is “a movement towards 
fulfillment and triumph in tragedy”.529  This intermixture of  tragic and 
comic elements in Shakespeare provides a powerful warning sign for literary 
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critics not to pronounce too strongly about what constitutes ‘proper 
tragedy’.  If  our best definition of  tragedy excludes the best of  tragic drama 
(and it is hard not to affirm Shakespeare as one of  the form’s guiding lights) 
then some part of  the equation has gone wrong.  
Seeing the shortcomings of  tragic critical theory, we side with John Kekes, 
when he writes that 
The attempt to define ‘tragedy’ yields diminishing returns.  The more 
embracing the definition is, the less likely it is that all the plays that 
fall under it will have philosophically interesting features.  On the 
other hand, if  we restrict the term to plays possessing the deep 
significance that concerns us here, then we are bound to exclude 
plays legitimately regarded by knowledgeable and thoughtful literary 
critics.530 
Kekes puts his finger on the problem of  definition here, as he highlights the 
importance of  “philosophically interesting features”, which complicate 
definition.  Tragedy has often been as much of  interest to the philosopher 
as to the critic (beginning with Plato and Aristotle).
Further, the various dramas of  the stage, ranging from differing centuries 
and cultures, will not inhere perfectly as a unified whole.  Cultures often 
have differing opinions about prohibitions and standards, as well as what 
they find laudable and shameful.  As George Steiner has written, “All serious 
art, music and literature is a critical act.”531  As such, dramas are already 
interpretations of  the world with their own sets of  commitments, respective 
to their various creators, and thus will differ in their interpretations of  the 
world.  What seems truly sad to one person may leave another person 
unmoved.  While the death of  a king may affect some quite strongly, others 
may see here only the inevitable result of  grasping for power, or even feel 
glad at the overthrow of  authority.  Teenage love likewise evokes mixed 
229
530 John Kekes, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 33-34.
531 George Steiner, Real Presences, 11
feelings.  While young people may feel pity for these ‘star cross’d lovers’, 
older heads may only shake at the improprieties of  youth.
That tragic theory often ends in being either overly specific or overly 
catholic, and ultimately fails to distill the essence of  the drama to a single 
definition, however, does not, to my mind, necessitate failure.  Or, perhaps 
more poetically, we may recognize tragic nobility in the form of  poetics 
itself.  Murdoch writes of  tragic poetry that the “statement must be 
impressive but not too complete”; we may well add that much the same 
goes for any definition of  the dramatic form.  Completeness can be a 
hindrance in discerning the power of  tragedy to help us understand more of 
life. Thus, though one agrees with Terry Eagleton, who writes, “The truth is 
that no definition of  tragedy more elaborate than ‘very sad’ has ever 
worked,” one must also keep in mind that even definitions which suffer 
from some crucial flaw (hamartia) still work in enabling recognition 
(anagoresis) of  salient features of  the tragic.532  Hence, though I think that 
there is no ‘Holy Grail’ definition for tragedy, I believe that even incomplete 
definitions can be helpful in philosophizing about the world.  In order for 
tragedy to be applied to life, as a tragic vision, even more disservice may be 
done to the form as a whole, as philosophers alight on one or two key 
aspects of  the form and apply it to their notions of  the world.  These 
varying theories, though, may just as easily be seen as a compliment to the 
tragic form, as its complexity lends itself  to a variety of  interpretations, 
inspiring others differently.533
Because of  the inherent imprecision of  tragic poetics, it may be helpful, 
before turning to the work of  Wendy Farley, to look at some of  the ways 
that tragedy has been appropriated by philosophers and theologians who 
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wish to look at the world, as Shakespeare says, as if  “all the world’s a 
stage”.534  In the last chapter we saw that Augustine’s aesthetic theodicy was 
partially driven by an attempt to ‘make credible’ the Christian faith against 
the background of  Pagan philosophy.  Augustine sought to rescue 
Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic aesthetic insights for his cosmic 
theodicy, while avoiding the pitfalls of  pagan theology.  Tragedy likewise 
straddles pagan and Christian thought.  Within Christian and secular 
thought, tragedy retains a fair amount of  significance, but with differing 
import for either side.  In a series of  brief  summaries, I hope to show a 
number of  ways that tragedy has been utilized as an aesthetic theme, as a 
way of  helpfully backgrounding our discussion of  Wendy Farley’s aesthetic 
theodicy.
2.2. Secular Tragic Vision.535 
In the recent, secular philosophical literature, there is great variety of  
reflection on tragedy as a category for thought about everyday life.  Perhaps 
most notably, among the range of  thinkers who reflect on tragedy, is a 
common thread, which looks to tragedy as a source of  consolation in the 
midst of  suffering.
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I’ll refer to this quote toward the end of  the chapter, but for now it is worth questioning the 
validity of  Murdoch’s life-art segregation.  There seem to be two main problems with this denial.  
First, that it flies in the face of  what we have seen from the way that people use the term tragedy 
across circumstances.  Philosophers, poets and every people clearly can use the term meaningfully, 
and thus it is silly to deny content to its everyday usage.  Second, we may add that the sauce for the 
goose is the sauce for the gander, and that a separation of  tragedy from life may render art-tragedy 
itself  nonsensical.  If, contra Aristotle, we cannot identify human events as tragic how can we 
identify the human events of  the play as tragic?  If  real-life cannot be tragic, can art?  
2.2.1. Nietzsche. This tragic consolation is nowhere more apparent or explicit 
than in Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of  Tragedy from the Spirit of  Music.  
Though Nietzsche claimed to be the world’s first tragic philosopher, this was 
certainly not the case; others such as Hegel and Schopenhauer had dwelt on 
tragedy, integrating it into their divergent philosophies.536  What Nietzsche 
saw in tragic drama was–despite the inherently destructive forces at work 
(the Dionysian prevailing over the Apollonian)–an irreducibly pleasurable 
experience at the core of  life.   What Nietzsche seeks to champion is tragedy 
at its worst and darkest, yet somehow also at its most glorious.  He writes:
This is the most direct effect of  Dionysian tragedy: generally, the 
state and society, the gap between man and man give way to an 
invincible feeling of  unity which leads back to the heart of  nature. 
The metaphysical consolation, which as I have already indicated, true 
tragedy leaves us, that at the bottom of  everything, in spite of  all the 
transformations in phenomena, life is indestructibly powerful and 
delightful...537
For Nietzsche, it is the experience of  chaotic and destructive pleasure which 
provides the greatest benefit of  tragedy, a metaphysical consolation which 
functions, in effect as a “theodicy”.538  If  indeed, at base, life is 
indestructibly delightful, then even, as Nietzsche says, in the “worst world” 
we can find reason for existence.539  This central insight is prominent in 
Nietzsche’s first work, yet remains present even as his thinking shifts.  As 
Nietzsche moves the focus of  his criticism to Christianity (beginning with 
Daybreak in 1881, and reaching its height with The Genealogy of  Morals in 
1887, where he fully denounces the slavish weakness of  Christian morals), 
232
536 See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of  Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1989), 273.
537 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of  Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 45.
538 Ibid., 130.
539 Ibid., 28.
he retains his emphasis on the significance of  tragedy and Dionysian joy.  In 
1888, he writes,
Dionysus versus the “Crucified”: there you have the antithesis.  It is 
not a difference regarding their martyrdom - it is a difference in the 
meaning of  it.  Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, 
created torment, destruction, the will to annihilation.  In the other 
case, suffering - the “Crucified as the innocent one” - counts as an 
objection to this life, as a formula for its condemnation.  One will see 
that the problem is that of  the meaning of  suffering: whether a 
Christian meaning or a tragic meaning.  In the former case, it is 
supposed to be the path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is 
counted as holy enough to justify even a monstrous amount of  
suffering.  The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering: he is 
sufficiently strong, rich, and capable of  deifying to do so... The god 
on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from 
life; Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of  life: it will be eternally 
reborn and return again from destruction.540
Here the “Crucified” replaces Apollo as a foil for Dionysus.  Even more 
derided than the sun god, Christ is here a failed god, ugly in his defeat, yet 
unable to embrace and affirm his destruction.  That Nietzsche would deny 
the resurrection is beyond question, but the far more damning failure of  
Christianity here is undoubtedly, for him, that the resurrection is even 
necessary to overcome evil.  Following Nietzsche, the strong, rich, tragic man 
has no need of  such deliverances–he has understood the power and truth of 
tragedy.   
It is hard not to take a fair amount of  pleasure in the vivacity of  Nietzsche’s 
writing here.  With Dionysian joy and energy, he aims to intoxicate with a 
vision of  life so powerful that all despair may be overcome.  But it is 
difficult, though, for anyone (except perhaps a male college sophomore) to 
take seriously Nietzsche’s overall suggestion here.  That at the base of  
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experience there is an abiding creative pleasure in life which justifies the 
worst agonies imaginable is not, for most of  us, remotely believable.  
2.2.2. Russell.  Bertrand Russell’s most famous essay, “A Free Man’s Worship” 
provides a more modest tragic vision, which seeks to address the world as 
he sees it, violent, destructive and ultimately doomed, but does not go so far 
as Nietzsche in affirming the joyfulness of  life, even at its worst.  In one of  
his most poetic and widely quoted passages, Russell describes the state of  
humanity,  “Man is the product of  causes which had no prevision of  the 
end they were achieving”, he writes, “his origin, his growth, his hopes and 
fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of  accidental 
collocations of  atoms”.541  Such is the origin of  humanity, purposeless and 
accidental.  Human destiny is equally dark, as Russell describes it.  In the 
end, 
no fire, no heroism, no intensity of  thought and feeling, can preserve 
an individual life beyond the grave... all the labours of  the ages, all the 
devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of  human 
genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of  the solar 
system, and that the whole temple of  Man's achievement must 
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of  a universe in ruins.542
Phrased more simply Russell writes, “the world of  fact, after all, is not 
good”.543 Russell’s bracing honesty here is refreshing, and Nietzsche would 
surely sign off  on this picture of  the universe.  Yet Russell is keen to 
separate himself  from the latter philosopher’s response to this situation.  As 
Russell sees it, Dionysian embrace of  the forces of  destruction is the wrong 
conclusion. “The worship of  Force, to which Carlyle and Nietzsche and the 
creed of  Militarism have accustomed us,” he writes, “is the result of  failure 
to maintain our own ideals against a hostile universe: it is itself  a prostrate 
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submission to evil, a sacrifice of  our best to Moloch.”544  In place of  an 
affirmation of  existence as fundamentally joyful, even at its worst, Russell 
urges that we retain our best ideals of  the good, the beautiful, and a “vision 
of  perfection” which recognizes that the universe as we see it is not what we 
should desire.  
Later in the essay, Russell holds up tragedy as, of  all the arts, “the proudest, 
most triumphant”, for, as he says, “it builds its shining citadel in the very 
centre of  the enemy's country”.545  The most valuable element of  this tragic 
citadel is the view which we receive from the ramparts.  What the “beauty of  
tragedy... makes visible” to us, Russell writes, is
a quality which, in more or less obvious shapes, is present always and 
everywhere in life. In the spectacle of  Death, in the endurance of  
intolerable pain, and in the irrevocableness of  a vanished past, there 
is a sacredness, an overpowering awe, a feeling of  the vastness, the 
depth, the inexhaustible mystery of  existence, in which, as by some 
strange marriage of  pain, the sufferer is bound to the world by bonds 
of  sorrow.546 
Perception of  the universe, then, awakens a tragic awe at the cosmic 
vastness of  life, which is both beautiful and destructive.  Similarity to 
Nietzsche’s vision cannot be denied, but Russell’s vision is more 
fundamentally moral, in that the sorrow of  the world awakens in us the best 
of  virtues, to resist destruction and inhumanity.   That the best of  human 
existence can be destroyed, Russell is clear, and thus he attempts to find in 
tragedy a call to resistance.  Ultimately Russell says little about the shape of  
this resistance to evil, and he concedes that few will be able to pursue the 
tragic vision through despair into tragic resistance to evil.  But this does not 
really undermine what is most suggestive about his secular theodicy, which 
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is that we can look honestly into the darkness of  our own fate and yet still 
find meaning, and even beauty therein.  
2.2.3. Kekes. The commonality between these thinkers is a use of  tragedy to 
help awaken us to the destructiveness of  evil, but to find within this 
awakening, a tragic nobility.  John Kekes, in Facing Evil, lays out a somewhat 
Russellian-style argument for finding tragic meaning in a destructive 
universe; one which helpfully deepens Russell’s essential argument by 
developing an account of  ethics in a hostile universe.  First, Kekes 
recognizes that the universe and our own motivations are often hostile to 
human flourishing.  Citing King Lear as an archetype, Kekes notes that 
often our best intentions result in calamity, as Lear’s desire for love and 
respect from his daughters leads to his, and their, downfall.  Even the best-
laid plans of  human life can run afoul because of  the indifference of  nature 
and the tenuous and fragile makeup of  our own psyches.  If  external nature 
is often unresponsive to our intentions, and human nature is all too 
susceptible to evil influences, then focusing on human decisions as the 
foundation for morality makes little sense.547  Given the contingency of  life, 
we cannot know if  our best intentions will result in the best results.  Instead 
of  a focus on beneficial results for our actions, Kekes pushes for a focus on 
character-morality, which aims for positive moral choices, but is able to 
make sense of  moral decision making even when things go tragically 
wrong.548  Kekes intends to offer a more sober account of  how we can live 
good lives in the face of  evil, by urging us to be certain kinds of  people, who 
recognize the fallibility of  humans and the world, but still strive for the 
good.  This second element, following on recognition of  the state of  the 
world, is a proper resistance to evil.  
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2.2.4. Tragic Vision and Philosophical Reflection
Central to Russell’s and Kekes’ account of  tragic meaning, then, is a kind of  
Aristotelian recognition that things are fundamentally bad.  For Nietzsche, 
Russell and Kekes, awakening to the dark realities of  the world allows us to 
exercise a kind of  tragic nobility.  This form of  the tragic vision seems to fit 
well with how I. A. Richards describes tragedy: as a vision (akin to Kant’s 
sublime) which gives pleasure even in its unsettling vision of  the world.  
Richards writes,
It is essential to recognize that in the full tragic experience there is no 
suppression.  The mind does not shy away from anything, it does not 
protect itself  with any illusion, it stands uncomforted, unintimidated, 
alone and self-reliant.  Suppressions and subliminations alike are 
devices by which we endeavor to avoid issues which might bewilder 
us.  The essence of  Tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment 
without them... The joy which is so strangely the heart of  the 
experience is not an indication that ‘all’s right with the world’ or that 
‘somewhere, somehow there is Justice’; it is an indication that all is 
right here and now in the nervous system.549
Reading Richards’ appraisal of  tragedy, then, we are reminded of  Edgar’s 
line in King Lear, where he says, “the worst is not, So long as we can say 
‘This is the worst.’”550  Though our vision may fall upon a dark and 
disturbed world, we may take comfort that it is seen through clear and 
insightful eyes.  Paired together with this vision of  destruction, the secular 
philosophers above point to an inherent nobility in tragedy which we can 
participate in.  A. C. Bradley finds in Shakespearian tragedy a similar lesson:
The tragic hero with Shakespeare, then, need not be 'good,' though 
generally he is 'good' and therefore at once wins sympathy in his 
error. But it is necessary that he should have so much of  greatness 
that in his error and fall we may be vividly conscious of  the 
possibilities of  human nature.  Hence, in the first place, a 
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Shakespearean tragedy is never, like some miscalled tragedies, 
depressing. No one ever closes the book with the feeling that man is a 
poor mean creature. He may be wretched and he may be awful, but 
he is not small.551
If  art helps to reorder our perception of  the world, and enrich our sense of  
value, then this strain of  secular tragic vision, running through Nietzsche, 
Russell and Kekes is primarily helpful as a way of  recognizing the human 
position in a destructive universe, and providing a sense of  defiant human 
value. 
2.3. Tragedy and Christian Belief 
Though we may raise questions about the sufficiency of  the ‘tragic vision’ as 
we find it in a range of  secular thinkers, it is at least easy to see that tragedy 
as a category for reflection fits quite naturally with their darker visions of  
the world.  Turning now to theology, we begin to encounter more difficulty 
in incorporating a ‘tragic vision’ with the Christian worldview.  This 
difficulty is to be expected.  Tragic drama and the Christian good news exist 
in narrative tension (one arcing downward, the other upward).  
Some, however, have proclaimed the two to be completely antithetical.  I. A. 
Richards, for one, juxtaposes ‘Tragedy’ and Christian faith in the strongest 
terms possible. “Tragedy is only possible to the mind which is for the 
moment agnostic or Manichean”, he writes, “[t]he least touch of  any 
theology which has a compensating Heaven to offer the tragic hero is 
fatal.”552  Complicating Richard’s analysis may be his lofty vision of  tragedy 
(with a capital ‘T’) as “the rarest thing in literature”; therefore the most 
fragile art form, easy to taint though the addition of  impure elements such 
as a possible afterlife.  Following Richards, Romeo and Juliet is only pseudo-
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tragedy (colored as it is by the rosy hue of  Christian hope), while King Lear is 
the real thing–a howling hopeless drama.  Such a rarified poetics of  tragedy 
which excludes plays like Romeo and Juliet is, as Terry Eagleton has wittily 
argued, “like defining a vacuum cleaner in a way which unaccountably omits 
the Hoover.”553  Yet, despite what we may take to be a hubritical flaw 
(hamartia) in his literary criticism, Richards is not alone in drawing a line in 
the sand between this poetic genre and Christian theology.  In his book The 
Death of  Tragedy, George Steiner writes,
There has been no specifically Christian mode of  tragic drama even 
in the noontime of  the faith.  Christianity is an anti-tragic vision of  
the world… Being a threshold to the eternal, the death of  a Christian 
hero can be an occasion for sorrow but not for tragedy… The 
Christian view knows only partial or episodic tragedy...554
Tragedy is dead within the Christian era, Steiner believes, because hope is 
always present; specifically the continual hope of  atonement with God.  
“Real tragedy,” he writes, “can occur only where the tormented soul believes 
there is no time left for God’s forgiveness”.555  Thus Steiner finds, from 
Dante’s Divina Commedia to the story of  Goethe’s Faust, continual 
movement toward joy, especially in the case of  Faust, whose final 
deliverance from the devil happens at a moment beyond apparent hope.  In 
Goethe’s version, Faust has sold his soul to the devil, and finally dies, 
seeming to seal the deal.  Yet here, as Steiner writes, “romantic melodrama is 
sound theology when it shows the soul being snatched back from the very 
verge of  damnation.”556  The Christian story is itself  melodramatic in this 
way, as Steiner describes it,
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The Passion of  Christ is an event of  unutterable grief, but it is also a 
cipher through which is revealed the love of  God for man.  In the 
dark light of  Christ’s suffering, original sin is shown to have been a 
joyous error (felix culpa).  Through it humanity shall be restored to a 
condition far more exalted than Adam’s innocence.557  
 
Using this brief  sketch, the Christian narrative can be cast as a riches, to 
rags, to even-greater riches story.  If  there is, as Northrup Frye suggests, a 
truly disinterested element in tragic drama, the Christian story as Steiner tells 
it is just the opposite, a Hollywood crowd-pleaser with a ‘wow ending’.  
Therefore, it is difficult to disagree with the basic import of  what Richards 
and Steiner say, when they contrast tragic drama and Christian truth.  We 
find in the New Testament a deep and abiding call to faith, hope, and love 
which remain with us even through the worst of  circumstances.558  But it is 
hard to agree with Steiner on a much deeper level than to affirm that The 
Gospel of  John and Oedipus Rex tell very different stories.  This a priori contrast 
is not so much incorrect as incomplete, and cuts off  conversations between 
two ‘dramas’ which have much to say to one another.  By far the most 
unhelpful aspect in Steiner’s elucidation of  the shape of  the Christian drama 
is that it is so limited as to compress all suffering into a singular dip in the 
one-dimensional curve of  redemption.  This sketch of  Christianity works in 
thumbnail size, but it excludes the reality that, seen in full, Christianity is 
more than a parable of  redemption.  It is an entire worldview that seeks to 
encompass all of  life; to account, not only for the witness of  scripture and 
its theological ramifications, but, on a soteriological level, for multifarious 
human experience, including our experience of  suffering.  Despite their 
rose-colored view of  ultimate reality, Christians still suffer pain, doubt and 
death.  That Steiner invokes the questionable notion of  “Felix Culpa”, 
though it is by no means dogmatically held in theodicy, is even more 
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suspicious in this context as it seems to equate all suffering with Adam’s sin 
and therefore assume an equally splendid defeat of  evil for any present 
suffering.   To place partial or episodic tragedy outside the scope of  ‘real’ 
tragedy, therefore, also suggests that tragedy has nothing to show us about 
living in the midst of  evil; experiencing what may well be nothing more than 
‘temporary setbacks’, but which nevertheless plague and pain us in the 
present.  A number of  Christian thinkers have tried to point out the 
presence of  tragedy (if  only partial and episodic) as nevertheless a ‘real’ 
experience.559 
3. Wendy Farley’s Aesthetic Theodicy: Poetic Injustice and Christian 
Resistance
3.1. The Borderlands of  Theodicy
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finds in Christianity an existential hope for the immortality of  all things which exists even in the 
face of  dire contradiction.  A description of  Unamuno’s driving desire might well be summed up by 
a line from Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, where it is said of  Marcius “He wants nothing of  a god but 
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possibility of  consciousness after death - while one’s deepest desires scream the opposite.
It is the Christian who, above all for Unamuno, can ride the razor’s edge between this reason and 
the desire, on the “saving incertitude”, which is, as he says, our “supreme consolation.”(104)  This 
contradiction, that one hopes for that which one cannot truly believe - as Unamuno phrases it, 
“The contradiction of  my heart that says Yes and my head that says No!” - this is the tragic, 
perpetual struggle of  human life (12).  In keeping with this pattern, many of  the exemplars of  
Christian thought, such as Athanasius, Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, possess this same 
“audacity of  faith” which refuses to abandon that which rationalism opposes (58).  These “Men of  
flesh and bone” as Unamuno describes them, are burdened with wisdom rather than knowledge 
(16).  Unamuno places more trust, then, in the work of  “idiots”, simple-minded, headstrong men of 
the church than in scholastics or philosophers such as Kant.  Thus it may be apt to call Unamuno’s 
vision ‘Quixotic’ as much as ‘Tragic’ in that it is described as a kind of  “disease” of  the mind, which 
refuses to settle for the merely rational (16).  A Quixotic vision of  reality is one that is constantly 
‘tilting at the windmills’ of  reality, in all its apparent hopelessness, out of  a sort of  grandiloquent 
defiance of  these giants of  rationality.  Perhaps what makes Unamuno’s sense of  life tragic, then is 
his emphasis on the mutual dependence, and mutual enmity of  faith and reason.   “Reason and 
faith are two enemies,” Unamuno writes, “neither of  which can maintain itself  without the 
other.” (99).  This mutual struggle is, in this way, Hegelian or Aeschylian in shape, in that it arises 
from two good desires which must exist in conflict.  The proper shape of  philosophy is to 
heroically embrace this struggle, doomed though it may be.  Thus, Unamuno’s philosophy may well 
be summed up as follows: “My religion is to seek truth in life and life in truth, even though 
knowing full well that I shall never find them so long as I live” (99).
The work of  Wendy Farley is worth discussion at length in this context, 
because the tragic vision, as she utilizes it, stands so clearly in line with the 
thinking of  other tragic philosophers (it is representative, without being 
derivative), and yet her theodicy aims to contribute, not to a secular 
theodicy, but to Christian theodicy.  Working within the context of  Christian 
theodicy, Farley mounts a direct critique of  the classical aesthetic theodicy 
of  harmony which she finds unhelpful.560  As quoted in the first section, 
Farley rejects the medieval view of  the harmonious universe as an unhelpful 
distraction: “[A]esthetic metaphysics turns our eyes to the beauty of  the 
cosmos,” she writes, “by rendering particular sufferings invisible.”561  
Defining her critique, however, (in place of  elaborate theological 
deviations), is not a direct repudiation of  all things traditional, but a 
refocusing of  the theodicy question on human life, as it is affected by God, 
creation, sin and especially suffering, while gathering together her insights 
under the rubric of  tragedy.
Fitting with tragedy as an aesthetic motif, Farley refocuses the problem of  
evil, as she says it, by placing “suffering rather than sin at the center of  the 
problem of  evil”.562   This shift is necessary to make room for tragedy 
within the theodicy conversation.   This refocused theodicy is no longer 
‘framed’ in the same way as traditional theodicy, by the ‘U-shaped’ story of  
sin summarized as Paradise, Paradise Lost, and Paradise Regained.  Of  this sort 
of  narrative, Farley is suspicious. “The drama of  salvation is firmly 
contained within a moral vision while anticipating a comic outcome”, she 
writes, “It is the neatness of  this vision that disturbs me.”563  Here she 
shares much with theologians such as Paul Fiddes, who question the validity 
of  this structure as a normative pattern.   Fiddes, writing about the 
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traditional ‘U-shaped curve’ in Freedom and Limit, argues that scripture shows 
us a more nuanced “line of  tension” between obedience and disobedience, 
freedom and limitation, which includes aspects of  both comedy and tragedy, 
like a Shakespeare play.564  Farley likewise objects to the neatness of  the U-
shaped curve.  But Farley shares even more in common with feminist 
theologians like Rosemary Radford Ruether, who eschew speculation on the 
afterlife (as more of  a patriarchal concern), in favor of  a focus on life in the 
here and now.  “It is not our calling to be concerned about the eternal 
meaning of  our lives,” Ruether writes of  feminist theology, “Our 
responsibility is to create a just and good community for our generation and 
for our children.”565  Farley shares in this emphasis in as much as her 
theodicy is focused on the plot of  human lives, and less on the grand plot of 
humanity.  Whether or not we affirm ultimate harmony and perfect justice, 
the fact remains that here and now we experience great suffering and 
difficulty.  Wendy Farley says it best when she writes:
Confidence in cosmic justice cannot completely obscure the rapacity 
of  suffering as it devours the innocent and the helpless.  Hopes in 
future vindication do not make hunger, racism, war and oppression 
theologically irrelevant.566 
The proper starting place for a tragic vision, within Christian theology, then, 
is not at the level of  the cosmic, but at the level of  the particular.  If  
nowhere else, there may be room for tragedy in the Christian worldview to 
do what Hamlet charges Horatio, to ‘absent’ ourselves from felicity a while 
and tell the story of  suffering.
In bracketing out (though not rejecting) certain aspects of  Christian 
theology, Farley’s theodicy moves into the borderlands of  theodicy, wavering 
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between an argument against, and a modification of, a justification of  God.  
Though Farley resists straying to the outer edges of  Christian metaphysics, 
as Hegel and Whitehead are wont to do, she does get her ankles wet in this 
tradition, veering toward a process theology ‘outlook’, if  not a fully blown 
process metaphysic.  Most notably, Farley breaks with “the assumption that 
the power to dominate is the appropriate model for divine power”.567 
Instead using “compassion, as a form of  love, to symbolize the 
distinctiveness of  redemptive power.”568  Yet, Farley’s suggestions are more 
in the form of  a different emphasis, rather than a rejection of  classical 
omnipotence.  Perhaps this seems like a difference of  semantics, but it is 
significant, on the whole, that what drives Farley is a difference of  concerns 
– a desire to highlight the personal and immanent elements of  theodicy, 
rather than the cosmic and transcendent elements.  “Eschatology can 
console those who find no refuge in history”, Farley writes, “It can attest to 
a hope that evil is not the last word.  But it is in history that we live, think, 
act, and suffer.”569  Thus it seems that, in seeking a historical response to 
suffering, the theodicy Farley seeks is one which is confined to the world-
stage, and thus is defined, in essence, by Aristotle’s three ‘unities’ of  place, 
time, and action.  As a theodicy, Farley’s work is best construed as an 
attempt to find meaning in the midst of  evil, by exploring the tragic 
structure of  the creation we currently live in, and finding, within this tragic 
structure, encouragement for ethical decision making and the possibility of  
a positive relationship between God, humanity, and creation.  Farley’s 
theodicy therefore does not deny traditional elements of  Christian thinking 
such as omnipotence and eternal life, so much as she draws our eyes away 
from them in order to attempt to see tragedy more clearly and thence to see 
the possibilities of  redemption therein. 
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3.2. The Spectacle of  Suffering: Tragedy’s Relevant Response. 
Farley calls for theology to take tragedy seriously, then, because it offers a 
wider frame in which to view radical suffering.  Tragedy, she argues, is more 
“inclusive” a category because it does not attempt to reduce all suffering to 
the effects of  sin.570  Tragic drama, then, at the very outset, intends to enrich 
our perception of  suffering by pushing it to the center of  the stage.  To be 
sure, all forms of  drama about humanity touch on the subject of  suffering, 
but neither epic prose, nor romance, nor comedy intend to treat suffering as 
the crux of  the story, and the central spectacle.  Farley praises tragedy for its 
ability to foreground suffering.  She writes, “The tragic vision peers into the 
face of  suffering and is forever marked by what it sees... A tragic vision is a 
way of  preserving the undisguised horror of  human suffering as an essential 
component of  theological reflection.”571  Or, as Hegel writes, tragedy means 
looking the negative in the face, and “tarrying” with it.572  
Drawing on the work of  W. Lee Humphreys, Farley offers a brief  definition 
of  tragedy which presents, in précis, her use of  this distinct sense of  life.  
“[A]t the heart of  the tragic vision lies human suffering,” Humphreys writes, 
“suffering triggered in important ways by the action of  the hero, yet 
suffering that is necessary at the very core of  the human situation in the 
world.  In the face of  this necessary suffering the hero does not remain 
passive.”573  Whatever other strengths or weaknesses tragic theology may 
have, if  one takes tragedy to be a crucial aesthetic theme, then, it will remain 
impossible to overlook suffering in the course of  theodicy.
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The difference in emphasis which Farley’s theodicy offers, however, is 
counterbalanced by a noticeable similarity to the Augustinian structure.  
Though Farley repudiates traditional theodicy’s “cool justifications of  evil”, 
her work addresses essentially the same issues as Augustine’s theodicy, as she 
lays out a careful account of  evil, creation, and morality and filters it 
through the lens of  aesthetics.574  For the rest of  Section 3, I will discuss the 
various ways that Farley employs and elaborates on this basic definition, 
specifically looking at the relevance Farley finds in the tragic theme, the way 
that tragedy provides a framework for understanding creation, and finally 
what tragedy suggests about how we can respond to evil.
3.3. Creation’s Tragic Structure
3.3.1. Beauty, Creation and Evil.  In Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion, Wendy 
Farley examines the way that tragedy provides insight into the structure of  
creation itself, in all its dangerous beauty, and with many attendant hazards.  
Like Augustine, Farley ruminates on the beauty of  creation, insisting that a 
“[t]ragic vision is not gnostic, it shares with classical Christian theology a 
belief  that creation is good.”  Citing Genesis 1, Farley takes time to note 
God’s affirmation of  “good” creation; citing Psalm 104, Farley notes the 
way in which God seems to delight actively in springs, trees, goats, and lions, 
“rejoicing” in his “works.”.575  God’s goodness is manifest in creation, Farley 
argues as the “characteristic movement of  the divine is ecstatic, self-
transcending love that bestows beauty and therefore existence on a beloved 
cosmos.”576  
The plenitude of  creation is fundamental to Farley’s sense of  creation’s 
beauty.  “Multiplicity and variety enrich and perfect creation”, she writes, in 
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words that could just as easily have come from the pages of  Augustine.577  
Farley further stresses that each level of  creation, from the individual 
natures of  creatures, to their diverse variety, to the mutual relationships, all 
possess inherent goodness: “Because individual creatures exist in social and 
ecological relationships with each other, creation is better than it would be if 
each entity were an isolated monad.”578  Yet, as Farley is quick to note, the 
nature of  creation is such that its beauty and goodness are not without 
inherent difficulties.  Developing her tragic vision in three parts, Farley 
descends from a vision of  creation’s goodness, into an elucidation of  its 
tragic structure, and finally into the rupture of  creation through sin and 
suffering.   Eschewing speculation about the fall of  humanity and creation, 
Farley argues that finitude, conflict, and fragility follow from the creation of 
that which is other than God and therefore lie at the root of  human 
suffering.579  
3.3.2. Finitude, Conflict and Fragility.  Farley is keen to stress that her tragic 
vision is never a denial of  the goodness of  material creation, and thus 
begins her three part discussion with an apologetic for God’s structuring of  
the world as necessitated by the nature of  beauty.  God brings about 
ephemeral beauty which, by definition, does not last.580  The beauty of  a 
flower, or a sunset is at least partly derived from its coming to being, and 
passing away again.581  Likewise, in creating a world with great diversity, with 
lions and lambs, mountains and valleys, summers and winters, there is always 
the possibility of  natural conflict: as Austin Farrer calls it, the “mutual 
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interference of  systems”.  It is crucial to keep in mind how strongly Farley 
praises creation’s beauty:
The good of  creation comes from the fact that something other than 
God is granted the gift of  existence.  But what is other than God 
cannot share the unchanging serenity of  love or the endless youth of  
eternity or the harmonious unity of  the divine life.  The beauty of  the 
world lies in its variety and diversity.  Yet conflict will inevitably arise 
as the multitude of  creatures pursue opposing ends. Tigers will prey 
on young gazelles. Ice ages will waste entire populations and 
ecosystems.  Agriculture will beat back the jungle.  From these 
conflicts, sorrows, and losses emerge the fierce beauty of  creation.  
Sorrow must accompany beauty, but it need not overthrow the 
poignant loveliness of  nature.  Creation is tragically structured, but 
tragedy is neither the barrenness of  nothingness nor the wickedness 
of  evil.  Tragedy is the price paid for existence – but the fecund grace 
of  nature makes it appear that the price is not too high.582  
This defense of  metaphysical evil, or the “Shadowside” of  creation, seems 
fully traditional in its acceptance of  the necessary limitations of  creating 
diversity.  Here Farley comes closest to offering a traditional aesthetic 
theodicy in that she holds up a good (creation’s variety), which shows itself  
to be desirably beautiful, yet carries with it a price tag of  suffering.  Yet the 
above quotation is potentially misleading.  Tyron Inbody quotes this passage 
approvingly in his book, The Faith of  the Christian Church, but seems to 
assume that Farley somehow accepts the price paid for creation without 
further reservation.583  The finitude, conflict and fragility of  creation which 
Farley describes have far more dire consequences for the realms of  human 
life.  
Conflicting values are a perennial theme in tragedy.  As Hegel has observed, 
as well as more recent critics such as Helen Gardner, tragedy often arises 
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because of  a conflict of  “opposite but equally justified ethical power[s]”.584  
As in the case of  Orestes who, in The Libation Bearers, wavers between 
avenging his father’s murder and letting the murderess (his own mother) go, 
our ethical decisions are often caught between two unattractive options.  
Thus, even the diversity of  human life, as Farley argues, with its multiplicity 
of  values, cultures and nations generates an environment which is 
susceptible to conflict.   Farley writes:
Tragedy describes suffering that is caused, at least in part, by some 
aspect of  reality over which the hero has no control.  The 
environment of  tragedy is usually either an external, non-human 
power (such as the Fates or Zeus) or a set of  intrinsically conflicting 
values.  In the first case, tragic suffering comes about because the 
hero’s moral passion is in conflict with ultimate powers of  the 
cosmos… In the second kind of  tragedy, the conflict among values is 
presented as an element of  the world order.  Tragedy is not traced to 
a malevolent cosmic force but rather to the essential irreconcilability 
of  equally important obligations.585
The work of  Nicholas Berdyaev stands behind much of  Farley’s thinking, as 
Berdyaev argues, rather darkly, that “man is bound to be cruel because he is 
confronted with the necessity of  sacrificing one value for the sake of  
another... of  sacrificing his country or of  the struggle for social justice.”586  
Farley’s thought also recalls the work of  Donald MacKinnon, who 
repeatedly focused on the “intractable” conflicts in human life which 
inevitably arise.   
The world of  Racine is very different from that of  Shakespeare, and 
both alike from the worlds explored by the ancient Greek tragedians.  
Yet if  one bears in mind Plato’s searching criticism of  tragic drama as 
a suitable form for the presentation and exploration of  ultimate 
issues, one finds that the most important aspect of  what he 
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repudiated was the sense that from tragedy we continually renew our 
sense of  the sheerly intractable in human life.587
Hemmed between these two poles, the predicament of  the tragic hero 
echoes and clarifies, as Max Scheler would say, “a feature of  the world’s 
makeup”.588
  
Even living without such dire choices, it is obvious that simple values are 
often in conflict.  As Farley notes, “the pursuit of  scientific or artistic 
excellence may leave little time to react to social and political problems.”589  
For Farley, then human embodiment in a world of  diversity is of  value, but 
is also a source of  danger, as it exposes us to the inevitability of  pain, fear, 
grief, disease, and untimely death.  “[T]ragic suffering” Farley writes, “[is] 
meant to exemplify a world order in which intolerable and unjustifiable 
suffering is inevitable.”590  Like tinder laid underneath a fire, the goods 
which God brings about can also easily lead to destruction if  they are 
misused or misunderstood.  
Yet Farley does desire to avoid any sense of  determinism derived from the 
apparent “inevitability” of  suffering:
Tragedy recognizes something in the world order recalcitrant to 
human freedom and well-being, which qualifies and even corrupts 
obligation. But tragedy resists the temptation to elevate this enigmatic 
necessity to a strict determinism or predestination that would erode 
responsibility.591 
Placing repeated emphasis on freedom, Farley lays out a vague but workable 
account of  freedom as that in humans which cannot be “reduced to 
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biological drives or sociological forces.”592  Freedom for Farley is the inner, 
distinctive force which navigates human life and ensures continuity and 
responsibility.  Yet even here, Farley notes, the finitude and conflict inherent 
in creation affect freedom and restrict its steadiness.  Because of  the tragic 
structure of  creation, conflict and finitude, freedom is fragile.  Anxiety and 
desire, flip sides of  the effect of  creation’s multiplicity on the human 
psyche, hinder the capacity for the right expression of  human freedom, and, 
a la Farley, condemn freedom to betrayal and defeat.  Very often, because of 
real or perceived scarcity, humans must compete in zero-sum games, 
whether competing for basic resources, jobs, or romantic partners.  Further, 
because of  the infinite variety of  alluring options, we are given to 
restlessness and dissatisfaction with our choices.  Pulled and pushed by our 
inner fears and desires in this way, Farley sees freedom as a “stamp of  
greatness”, though at the same time a “tragic flaw of  human existence”.593  
Thus Farley seems to locate much of  the worst of  human behavior in the 
structure of  creation, despite the fact that she affirms freedom as an 
essential component of  human existence.
Already we can see that Farley locates the roots of  suffering in the structure 
of  the world.  Unlike Augustine, who draws a clear line between unfallen 
and fallen creation, the former possessing no taint of  deformity or 
destruction, and, even after the fall, remaining well-ordered, Farley finds no 
such clear division between the creation and the fall, seeing instead an initial 
value in creation which warrants beautiful creation, but which because of  
the inherent structure of  creation, soon engenders discord and suffering.  
Pausing here, one might well imagine Farley to have offered a theodicy 
notably different from, but not entirely alien to, contemporary justifications 
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of  God.  Farley situates much of  human suffering in the necessities of  
creation, which is beautiful, but dangerous; which, because of  its finitude 
(again, an Augustinian theme) allows for human frailty and harmful 
contingency, and thus can be more clearly understood as the work of  a 
loving creator.  Yet, from here, Farley instead presses on, pushing away from 
her initial justification of  creation’s finite and fragile beauty, and exploring a 
much darker side of  creation.
3.4. The Rupture of  Creation. 
Having developed an account of  creation’s tragic, but beautiful, structure, 
Farley argues, “[s]uffering and sorrow are present to all human life without 
obscuring the goodness of  creation.”594  She notes that various kinds of  
evils can be incorporated into traditional conceptions, by being accounted 
for “as punishment for sin, as elements of  a larger aesthetic harmony, as 
purgation or pedagogy, or as presaging eschatological correction”.595  But 
central to Farley’s work is a focus on the sorts of  evils which cannot fit into 
the conceptual schemes of  traditional theodicy.  None of  these accounts, on 
Farley’s reckoning, can make sense of  “radical suffering”, which in her 
words, “rips the mask of  beauty and wonder off  the face of  creation.”596  
Radical suffering is not garden-variety death and disease, but agonized 
experiences which are deeply destructive to human life and are irreducible to 
human guilt.  Here she lists the genocide in Cambodia and Germany, the 
abuse of  women and children, or torture such as took place under the 
Pinochet regime in Chile.597  The testimony of  a Chilean mother provides 
an especially powerful example of  radical suffering:
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At one point, I realized that my daughter was in front of  me.  I even 
managed to touch her: I felt her hands.  “Mummy, say something, 
anything to make this stop,” she was saying... They took her to an 
adjacent room and there, there I listened in horror as they began to 
torture her with electricity!  When I heard her moans, her terrible 
screams, I couldn’t take it any more.  I thought I would go mad, that 
my head and my entire body were going to explode.598
To be tortured in such a way, or even to be unable to stop one’s daughter 
from being tortured, can be incredibly destructive to anyone’s spirit.  That our 
best laid plans for life, health and love can be so thoroughly undermined 
may cause us to ‘give up’ on the pursuit of  the best human life has to offer.  
John Hick advocates “soul-making” as a powerful explainer for why God 
would allow suffering, but severe suffering of  this kind withers character-
development and undermines our most basic trust in others.  It is hard to 
imagine recovering from such an atrocity.599  
The story further engages our emotions in such a way that we cannot 
imagine anyone with the power to stop it allowing it to continue.  Hearing of 
such torture, the reader wishes that he or she could somehow reach into the 
story and stop this torture (like the man in the Old West  who, upon 
watching a production of  Othello, reportedly shot the actor playing Iago 
because he was so malevolent).600  Reading the story, especially as parents, 
our guts churn with outrage at the torture of  a young child.  Why would 
God not have stopped such an atrocity?  What could the poor girl have 
done to deserve being tortured by electricity?  Such suffering, she is keen to 
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stress, cannot be explained.  Thus radical suffering is simply ‘surd’ or 
irreducible. 
Farley finds consonance between this radical suffering and the attentiveness 
to suffering we find in the genre of  tragedy.  She writes, “Tragedy explores 
evil by focusing on the kind of  suffering that dehumanizes the sufferer and 
cannot be understood as deserved.”601  The archetypical tragic hero, 
Oedipus, exemplifies radical suffering as his utter ruin.   The downfall of  
Oedipus, as Farley writes, “cannot be traced to any wickedness or selfishness 
on his part.”602  The opposite is true: it is Oedipus’s moral zeal to investigate 
the cause of  the plague upon Thebes which leads to the unveiling of  the 
destructive truth about his patricide and incest.  Elsewhere in Greek tragedy, 
Farley points to Prometheus, whose morality is the cause of  his suffering, as 
it clashes with the controlling powers of  the universe.  In Prometheus Bound, 
the god for whom the play is named is bound to a rock, for defying Zeus 
and bringing fire to humanity.  As a human spectator, the reader naturally 
sympathizes with the hero, finding the decree of  Zeus unjust, and agreeing 
with Hephaestus, the blacksmith god who must secure Prometheus to the 
rock: “Woe's me, Prometheus, for thy weight of  woe!”  The purpose of  the 
play is primarily to drive home this point, as we see Prometheus’s sufferings, 
and we pity him for them.   Both plays center around the awful perception 
of  suffering, in related ways.  When we hear Prometheus say, “See, see, / 
Earth, awful Mother! Air, That shedd'st from the revolving sky / On all the 
light they see thee by, / What bitter wrongs I bear!”, the play folds in upon 
itself  and the spectator fulfills the command.603  In Oedipus Rex, the heroic 
king blinds himself  after seeing his mother-wife’s suicide by hanging.  
“Never have my own eyes / Looked on a sight so full of  fear”, Oedipus 
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declares, and the chorus agrees, “Too terrible to think of, or to see.”604  
Oedipus cannot undo, however, the fact that he has seen horrors, nor “The 
flooding pain / of  memory, never to be gouged out.”605  Tragedy not only 
helps us see suffering, but shows us suffering which is too terrible to see.  
The vision of  radical suffering, which cannot be “gouged out”, together 
with its irreducibility to fault, suggests, to Farley, that evil is “surd”, 
indicating the irrationality of  evil, and irreducibility of  evil to any moral 
calculus.606     
Farley’s discussion of  evil’s surdity recalls again Donald MacKinnon whose 
work most closely parallels Farley’s here as both find in certain evil events a 
complete inexplicability which defies explanation.  In an important essay 
discussing tragedy, MacKinnon focuses on the “riddle of  Iscariot” as a 
paradigm case of  one who suffers greatly, but whose suffering was 
seemingly necessitated by the destiny of  Christ’s passion.607  That there are 
such people as Judas, for whom it would have been better to “have not been 
born”, suggests that “[i]t is sheer nonsense to speak of  the Christian religion 
as offering a solution to the problem of  evil.”608  This nonsensical quality to 
certain evils likewise leads MacKinnon to point to a “surd” quality within 
creation, which we see in the Christian gospels and in tragic drama.609  Yet, 
for Farley (and MacKinnon), the surdity of  suffering does not suggest a 
sheerly irrational element, as if  suffering was a mere ‘Jabberwock’ 
incomprehensible and ultimately nonsensical.  Its ‘surdity’ lies in its 
unassimilable qualities, in the way that it mis-fits with the rest of  what we 
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believe about God’s providence.  In discussing tragedy as Christian 
theologians, both thinkers are correct to focus, not on all forms of  evil, but 
on those evils which resist being seen as morally intelligible, because, as we 
have seen above, the warp and woof  of  the Christian cosmic drama does 
not easily allow for a tragic view of  the world.  But as MacKinnon and 
Farley see rightly, a Christian theology of  providence does not make all evils 
suddenly morally intelligible, but, in fact, makes many evils completely 
incomprehensible.  If  our world is dominated by capricious and competing 
Olympian deities, then the destruction of  ‘great men’ is sad but conceivable.  
But if  it is overseen by an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God, 
then the terrible suffering of  those who did nothing to deserve it is even 
more abhorrent.610  
Because of  the destructive nature of  the worst kinds of  suffering, and the 
inability of  human guilt to explain why these experiences befall us, Farley 
takes this kind of  evil to be unexplainable and unjustifiable.  In perhaps her 
most distinctive break with the Christian tradition, Farley rejects any 
possible explanation for radical suffering (yet we will see that she is not 
alone here).  No theodicy, she believes, can make a dent in the formidable 
256
610 C. S. Lewis, in A Grief  Observed (New York, NY: Bantam, 1976) in dealing with the death of  his 
wife, struggled with precisely this problem.  Unable to reconcile what he believed about God’s 
goodness with the pain and abandonment he was feeling, Lewis struggled to maintain his faith in a 
good God.  The pain Lewis felt in these days is vividly recorded in his diaries as he rages against the 
God who he once thought he could trust, who now seems to be a cosmic sadist.  A firm believer in 
miracles, Lewis thought for a time that his wife’s bone cancer had been healed.  Their hopes were 
encouraged by “false diagnoses, by X-ray photographs, by strange remissions, by one temporary 
recovery that might have ranked as a miracle.” (34).  But none of  these hopeful moments added up 
to a healing, but instead were the prelude only to more painful sickness and finally death.  The pain 
the famous apologist is feeling is apparent in his words, as he ‘yells’ at God for not dong what was 
plainly within His power: “Step by step we were ‘led up the garden path’,” Lewis writes, “Time after 
time, when He seemed most gracious He was really preparing the next torture.”(35)   Though his 
faith does not founder on the shoals of  suffering, Lewis arrives at the keen and lasting observation 
that belief  in the Christian God does not make suffering easier to stomach, it often makes it 
unbearably difficult.  In one of  his best passages, he writes:
Talk to me about the truth of  religion and I’ll listen gladly.  Talk to me about the duty of  
religion and I’ll listen submissively.  But don’t come talking to me about the consolations of 
religion or I shall suspect that you don’t understand. (28)
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edifice of  terrible evils.  “I find myself  in the company of  Ivan Karamazov,” 
she writes, 
who refuses to be comforted by any theodicy – purgation, 
punishment, vindication, harmony, retribution.  None of  these can 
make it all right that children are tortured by their parents or their 
governments.  At best these explanations make it easier not to mind 
other people’s suffering so much.  Moralism moves too quickly to 
palliatives that obscure the cruelty of  evil.611
That the moralism of  Augustine is rejected by Farley is beyond doubt.  For 
Farley, that Augustine would even speculate on the suffering of  innocents as 
possible punishment for sinful parents (as he does in De libero arbitrio), places 
his theodicy outside the pale of  respectability.  Farley is firm that there 
cannot be a justifying reason for radical suffering.  In language which is 
consonant with Ivan Karamazov’s fervent protest, Farley writes, “The 
screams of  children and the silence of  despair cannot be drowned out by 
theodicies or justified by the cosmic wonder of  nature.”612  Since, as Farley 
believes, humans tragically suffer far greater agonies than their sinfulness 
warrants, she finds no consolation in the forgiveness which comes from 
God in the atonement. “Even the death of  a Messiah” she writes, “cannot atone 
for the anguish of  the world.”613  
There are clearly issues with the acceptability of  Farley’s conclusion here.  
First, Farley assumes, much too hastily, that the atonement is located 
exclusively in the passion and death of  Christ, and not also in the wider 
story of  his incarnation, resurrection and ascension: his resurrection, 
especially, being the first fruits of  our eventual redemption.  This is not to 
say that Farley has no place for Christ in Christian theodicy.  In numerous 
places, Farley points to the crucifixion as an example par excellence of  God’s 
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redeeming power seen through the suffering of  the Son.  She writes, “[t]he 
utter desolation and helplessness of  crucifixion is, for Christians, the 
ultimate revelation of  God’s power to redeem human beings.”614  The 
“incarnation... is a breathtaking and radical element of  the “good news”, 
Farley argues, and “[h]istory itself–mundane, boring, ambiguous, exciting, 
and evil history–is the place where God is present with redemptive 
power.”615  She further sees the church’s work in the world, in history, as the 
proper continuation of  the incarnation, working as it does to resist evil and 
love compassionately in the midst of  evil.  However, her limited reflection 
on the atonement leaves us with little notion of  how the death of  Christ 
informs and transforms our concept of  tragedy.616 
Furthermore, having bracketed out the afterlife as ‘beyond history’ and 
therefore beyond the scope of  her theodicy, Farley is left only with this-
worldly resources for resolving the problem of  suffering.  The appeal to the 
greater glories of  heaven as a compensation for this-worldly suffering is a 
perennial theme in theodicy, and without it, theodicy is greatly impoverished 
(Rom. 8:18-21).  Farley’s rejection of  eschatology as solution to the problem 
of  tragic suffering cuts off  her theodicy from a necessary, and fully 
Christian, resource.
In her second break with tradition, the absolute rejection of  a morally-
sufficient reason for God’s allowance of  evil sets Farley more firmly against 
traditional theodicy.  The plain unacceptability of  this position for 
traditional Christian orthodoxy goes without saying, and it opens a rather 
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serious rift in theological discourse.  If  certain kinds of  suffering are beyond 
justification in any sense, we must ask, why would God allow it?  And if  
God could not stop such suffering (either by some limitation of  power or 
divine respect to human autonomy), we must wonder why God chose to 
create in the first place?  The result of  admitting such conflict into theology 
must be either a cruel God, a weak God, no God, or a severely weakened 
theodicy.617 
3.5. A Theodicy of  Tragic Resistance and Redemption.
As a theodicy, Farley’s work here would seem to have foundered on the 
shoals of  tragic suffering, but she finds within tragedy further resources for 
hope and a renewed trust in God.  Perceiving that the tragic vision does not 
resolve the problem of  evil, but rather intensifies it, because there is no 
justification for radical evil, Farley attempts to avoid the worst consequences 
of  this position, and seeks to do so by appeal to central elements of  tragic 
perception.  Through the tragic vision, Farley writes, these twins “tragedy 
and resistance to tragedy, are born together.”618 As such, Farley sides with 
the way Ricoeur describes Aeschylean tragedy as “both a representation of  
the tragic and an impulse toward the end of  the tragic.”619  Two key features 
of  Farley’s tragic vision, compassion and resistance, which correspond 
roughly to the affective elements of  tragedy, pity and fear, enable her to 
offer a hope which can transcend tragedy: 
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A tragic vision is branded by suffering, but the mark of  tragedy is 
defiance rather than despair.  The beginning of  a tragic vision is anger 
and sorrow in the face of  suffering.  The horror of  suffering 
provokes resistance.  As such, it is an ethical (and ultimately 
theological) response to suffering: it begins and ends as 
compassion.620
Integrating her account of  divine love, Farley sees the tragic vision as a part 
of  God’s gentle, non-oppressive, persuasion to enable us to overcome 
suffering.
3.5.1. Compassion.  Beginning with an account of  beauty, Farley lays the 
groundwork for her tragic response to radical suffering.  Through 
impassioned appeal to the beauty of  creation, Farley displays an awareness 
of  the ‘call’ which aesthetic excellence places on our person.  Suffering 
operates in a similar way, Farley notes, as “the beauty and suffering of  one’s 
environment constantly impinge upon consciousness and dispose one 
toward the world in a compassionate way.”621   Though the goodness of  
creation is ruptured, this attentiveness and sensitivity to creation remain 
intact, and we respond to suffering with compassion.
This compassionate element of  the tragic vision, is, of  course, central in all 
tragic art.  Martha Nussbaum rightly identifies compassion as the basic 
social emotion, a necessary response for any functioning human and also an 
essential element in tragic art.622  Farley makes this connection as well, 
seeking to nuance the traditional Aristotelian language of  “pity” with the 
more fulsome “compassion”, which she sees as “a form of  love [which] 
includes a recognition of  the value and beauty of  others.”623  In Greek 
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drama, the suffering of  Prometheus is seen to be unjust, with an attendant 
response of  compassion for one who suffers because of  his good actions.  
Thus, radical suffering cannot defeat compassion, because compassion is 
elicited in others by the vision of  suffering.  Thus Farley describes 
compassion as a certain way of  seeing, a “way of  organizing and interpreting 
the world”.624  
Compassion’s vision, however, can become blocked by callousness to 
human suffering.  When we focus on the short-fallings of  a people-group 
through casual racism, we can lose sight of  the individual beauties and 
difficulties of  each and every person.  One particularly pernicious barrier to 
recognizing another person’s suffering with compassion, is the notion that 
God visits misery in return for wickedness.  Acknowledging that the 
Hebrew prophets often saw punishment in the light of  divine retribution, 
Farley also takes time to cite other passages in scripture which do not see all 
misery as the expression of  divine wrath (Ps. 44:17-19).  Most troubling, for 
Farley, is that a further sense of  God’s love for us may be eradicated, if  all 
suffering is divine punishment.  An Augustinian theodicy, in this way, can 
conceal from us God’s tender love when we might need it most.  If  
suffering is the result of  personal sin, Farley argues, then compassion is 
transformed into “cruelty, callousness and legalism” and “the tools which 
we are given to taste the beauty of  the divine–scripture, the church, religion, 
theology, even the Messiah–cease to be windows to God and become 
mirrors that reflect back our own stupidity and cruelty.”625  Thus the ‘tragic 
vision’ opens up new windows for compassion because it sees much 
suffering as irreducible to fault and therefore undeserved.626  To further 
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suggest that God’s goodness is expressed in terms of  compassion, rather 
than in terms of  condemnation, makes clear that our suffering is not the 
result of  divine judgment.  John Munday describing Farley’s view, says it well 
when he writes, “Radical suffering becomes more understandable and even 
more bearable if  it is framed in relation to divine love rather than 
sovereignty.”627
3.5.2. Resistance.  Together with compassion, resistance to evil is born out of  
the tragic vision, as we recognize suffering as unjust.  The tragic hero, for 
whom we have compassion, provides a model for us in his dealings with 
evil:   
Even in defeat, a vision of  justice remains to vindicate the tragic hero. 
The defiance of  the hero enacts and recovers human dignity even in 
the teeth of  destruction.  If  suffering and destruction cannot be 
overcome, they can be resisted.  It is in the resistance itself, in this 
refusal to give up the passion for justice, that tragedy is 
transcended.628 
Prometheus is again held up by Farley as a model of  defiant virtue, who, in 
the midst of  his suffering, refuses to forswear his virtue.  
Resistance, however, is not a matter of  revolutionary might but of  
redemptive love.  Since Farley insists that radical suffering “cannot be 
atoned for”, compassionate resistance seeks to alleviate suffering rather than 
to avenge it.629  This is a key point to keep in mind, that compassion cannot 
be defeated by tragedy because it does not look for success in traditional 
terms.  We are reminded here of  the writings of  John Kekes and Bertrand 
Russell, who point to tragedy as a category for ethics and meaning which is 
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planted firmly in the knowledge of  the harshness of  reality.  Kekes’ tragic 
model for morality is focused on the character of  the agent, not the 
likelihood of  success or reward.  Farley’s vision for resistance to tragedy 
likewise sees our call to moral action as one which holds on to a vision of  
goodness and justice even in the face of  evil and destruction.  
Yet, this is not a godless vision of  tragic meaning. “Divine love as the source 
of  tragic world order is also the source of  the vision of  justice, vindication, 
and compassion that transcends tragedy,” Farley writes, indicating the source 
of  human meaning, in resistance to the tragic structure of  things through 
compassion.630  Compassion is also a necessary component of  this 
resistance, as it sees the frailty of  those who enact evil as well.  Thus, 
resistance is tempered by an understanding of  the fragility of  the oppressor 
as well, and a refusal to demonize those who inflict suffering.   John Munday 
describes Farley’s theology of  resistance like this:  “She seeks the clue to 
finding the actual presence of  God in history in resistance to evil. Resistance 
in the face of  overwhelming evil and suffering comes from compassion. 
Divine compassion becomes incarnate in that resistance. This is where hope 
arises.”631 For Farley, Christ provides a model for resistance to evil and 
healing of  evil, as he refuses to participate in an ongoing cycle of  violence 
even as his mission and message are undone by violent oppressors – even 
forgiving those who crucify him.632  The tragic vision, as is established by 
Aristotle, is marked by pity.  To see tragically, for Farley, enables us to see 
how all humanity has fallen into sinfulness (at least partially) because of  the 
contingencies and conflicts of  life, and because of  our own frailty.  Just as 
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we recognize the tragic hero’s nobility and faults, we can see this same 
phenomenon in the tragic world around us.
3.6. Reflection and Critique.  
Though there are many points of  Farley’s theodicy which deserve further 
discussion and critique, the overall shape of  her theodicy should be 
apparent.  Farley’s tragic vision fits with the way that tragedy has been used 
philosophically, in that she too, looks to suffering and finds hope, not from 
without, but from within the experience of  tragedy.  Tragedy, as Farley 
argues, draws our eyes to undeserved suffering.  As in the theater, we see the 
wrongness of  what has happened.  Yet we also see the possibilities of  
nobility and redemption within the spectacle of  suffering.  For Farley and 
other tragic thinkers, to see tragically is to transcend tragedy.
Yet, it is difficult to see how Farley’s theodicy, taken as a whole, is 
compatible with traditional Christian theodicy.  In denying that radical 
suffering can be atoned for, or justified in any sense of  the word, Farley cuts 
the feet out from any robust Christian theology.  To deny to God perfect 
goodness, even in a vague way, will ultimately destroy any fundamental hope 
we can have for trusting God or desiring relationship with Him.  A theodicy 
must strive, or at least hope, for a satisfying reason why.  Perhaps this vision is 
not granted in this life, but to deny the possibility of  such a reason makes 
nonsense of  any language which affirms the goodness of  God.
Further, to occlude from sight the hope of  the afterlife consigns to utter 
hopelessness those who have suffered and died.  In his sharp critique of  
tragic theology (see Appendix B for a fuller description) David Bentley Hart 
accurately describes the tragic vision as an attempt at “avoiding banality, 
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bland optimism and idiot complacency in the face of  evil.”633  Yet, it is here, 
Hart finds, that tragic theology fails so spectacularly, as it sees evil in a light 
which Hart finds, “far too comforting”.634  Hart points especially to the 
elitism of  the tragic vision as only available to those who have not been 
utterly eradicated by radical evil.  Only the self-aware can find this kind of  
tragic meaning, and their compassion and resistance to evil does no good to 
the dead of  Auschwitz or the innocent victims like them.  Thus, to find any 
deep comfort in the tragic vision is, perhaps, as Augustine warned of  
tragedy, to find consolation in a spectacle which should only upset us.  Iris 
Murdoch also picks up on this idea, when she writes that, 
When in real life unhappiness we ‘live in the tragic’ or ‘see something 
as a tragedy’ something false may be involved, possibly a forgivable 
reaching for consolation... Real life is not tragic.  In saying this one 
means that the extreme horrors of  real life cannot be expressed in 
art... Art offers some consolation, some sense, some form whereas 
the most dreadful ills of  human life allow none.  Auschwitz is not a 
tragedy.635
Thus, we cannot accept Farley’s theodicy as complete qua theodicy, but we 
can still reflect on the tragic vision she elucidates and see how it may 
complement or critique our understanding of  the aesthetic theme in 
theodicy.
3.7. Conclusion.
There remains a need to stand back from some of  the large themes of  
Farley’s work and assess, as much as possible, the validity of  the tragic 
aesthetic theme for our study.  In the first part of  this thesis, I argued that 
theological aesthetics could deepen the theodicy discourse by increasing our 
ability to perceive the workings of  providence in the midst of  evil.  In the 
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second part, I have looked at the aesthetic theodicy of  Augustine  as a 
foundational model for seeing through the lens of  aesthetics as offering 
insight into God’s providential ordering of  the world.  Noting, however, the 
shortcomings of   Augustine’s aesthetic theodicy, we have turned to the 
tragic vision as a critique of  Augustine which assumes the validity of  
aesthetics as a theological resource, yet takes issue with the cleanliness of  
the Augustinian vision.  
In place of  a cosmically-scaled aesthetic, the tragic vision, as Farley presents 
it, focuses on the experience of  suffering, which is something that 
Augustine’s theodicy has very little interest in, except as the concomitant 
punishment for sin.  Yet, as Balthasar notes, in appreciating the big picture 
Augustine paints we do not need to take all the unfortunate missteps in his 
thinking.  As Balthasar writes, “It is possible to be true to [Augustine] 
without accepting the tragic consequences of  his static model of  the 
world.”636  Breaking free from Augustine’s moment-to-moment vision of  
harmony, and his perfect symmetry between sin and misery, we can make 
room for the reality of  human tragedy.
Farley offers a beautiful vision of  creation, which like Augustine’s vision, is 
not gnostic, but affirms the goodness and beauty of  this varied, finite, and 
fragile world.  Yet Farley also offers a human-scaled picture of  suffering 
which is undeserved, and, in her mind, inexcusable even for God to allow.  
Farley here seems to swing to the other end of  the pendulum, away from 
the clean theodicy of  Augustine, into a murky blackness that would seem to 
suggest atheism.  Yet, from this outer edge of  theodicy, Farley seeks to find 
light in the midst of  darkness and to wrest hope and meaning from the 
worst of  situations.  Finding God in the midst of  radical suffering, Farley 
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holds up compassion and resistance as hallmarks of  the tragic vision.  
Fitting with the nobility of  the tragic hero who, in the teeth of  destruction, 
holds firm to his vision of  the good, the tragic vision is not dissuaded by the 
apparent futility of  moral action because it does not look for success in 
traditional terms.  The tragic vision is also informed by the knowledge of  
injustice, and finds therein compassion in the midst of  suffering, akin to the 
pity which we feel for the tragic hero.  This contemporary theodicy, then, is 
intended as a way of  stopping radical suffering from descending into utter 
meaninglessness and nihilism.  
The value of  Farley’s tragic vision rests on her attempt to offer a vision of  
divine compassion present in humanity which cannot be defeated by 
injustice and suffering.  She writes, 
Divine compassion is the power of  redemption, realized in history 
within its tragic structures and in the midst of  rupture.  Redemption, 
therefore, cannot mean that radical suffering and sin are not 
destructive, or that their destructions are irrelevant or unreal, let alone 
deserved.  But precisely in the depth of  this destruction a power 
remains to resist it, to thwart it, to preserve the possibility of  
healing.637
Further, this hope within defeat is intended by Farley to be a theological 
reflection of  the crucifixion and resurrection.  Though she seems to ignore 
the eschatological defeat of  evil as a valuable consideration, Farley affirms 
the resurrection as a sign of  hope for this-worldly triumph over evil.  
However, it is difficult to see exactly how the resurrection offers deep and 
lasting comfort if  we exclude eschatology from consideration in theodicy.  
More than the resurrection, the crucifixion for Farley (and other tragic 
theologians) must remain central.  It is Christ’s model of  compassion and 
resistance in the face of  great suffering to which we turn as a model of  
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tragic meaning.  In holding up the compassion and resistance that can 
accompany a tragic vision, Farley therefore offers us signs of  how this 
vision can enable hope in the midst of  suffering.
Yet, we must wonder if  there can be any reconciliation between the tragic 
vision and a broadly Augustinian picture of  cosmic justice and beauty?  
Having broken free from Augustine’s picture of  moment-to-moment 
harmony and perfectly symmetrical balancing of  sin and misery, it is 
possible to grant that there can be a genuine experience of  injustice and 
unwarranted misery which is, at least in the here and now, tragic.  Affirming 
even that the Christian story is, in the big picture, a U-shaped curve, we can 
still grant that Christians experience genuine, undeserved, tragic suffering in 
the here and now.  Tragedy has been woven into the fabric of  the Christian 
worldview, even though that worldview is (in the largest, universal sense) a 
divine comedy.  
Paul Fiddes, in discussing the complexities of  Shakespeare’s comedies and 
tragedies, which mix together light and dark elements in differing  
proportion, argues that this reflects the realities of  human life:
The Christian story is basically a ‘divine comedy’, as Dante entitled it; 
it ends well with a new creation.  But there are also tragic elements 
within it; there is cross as well as resurrection, and in the vision of  the 
Seer of  Patmos the lamb in the midst of  the throne still has the 
marks of  slaughter upon him (Rev 5:6).  It seems that resurrection 
does not wipe out death, but absorbs it into life.  The question then is 
which alternative pattern of  the Christian story best illuminates the 
kind of  blend of  tragedy and comedy, laughter and tears, with which 
Shakespeare confronts us.638
This mixture of  comedy and tragedy, which is itself  a part of  a larger 
“Divine Comedy”, seems to offer itself  as a potential model for aesthetic 
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theodicy to utilize.  When looking at the big picture, it seems that 
Augustine’s vision can be an illuminating one.  But looking more closely at 
the world, we find an unexplained remainder of  suffering which does not 
fit, at least in the short run, into the harmonious whole.  Tragedy, therefore, 
seems to offer a way of  seeing suffering which in itself  is ennobling and 
engenders resources for compassion and resistance which might otherwise 
be missed if  we stayed only at the level of  the cosmic.  Yet, the tragic vision 
itself  can be seen to be incomplete.  It does not offer nobility, and the 
possibility of  redemption to all who suffer.  And so it is necessary to continue 
to look at other aesthetic themes which may complement, or critique, the 
tragic aesthetic theme.  
APPENDIX B. David Bentley Hart on the Tragic Vision
The most direct critique of  the tragic aesthetic theme comes from David 
Bentley Hart, who, in The Beauty of  the Infinite, attacks the tragic vision in 
theology as a shallow attempt to reconcile our existence with the reality of  
suffering.  Against thinkers such as Donald MacKinnon (discussed, briefly 
above) and Nicholas Lash, who do not intend to offer a theodicy, but who 
do comment on the nature of  evil, Hart finds an essential contradiction in 
their embrace of  the tragic vision.  Tragic thinkers (such as Farley), Hart 
argues, embrace tragedy as a way of  “avoiding banality, bland optimism and 
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idiot complacency in the face of  evil.”639  Yet it is here, Hart finds, that 
tragic theology fails so spectacularly, as it sees evil in a light which Hart 
finds, “far too comforting”.640  
Tragedy, as Hart argues, seeks comfort in the suffering itself, and thus, 
finding meaning therein, tacitly approves it. “[F]rom the holocaust of  the 
particular,” Hart writes of  tragic theology, “one can always pluck an ember 
of  meaningfulness, a stabilizing ‘message’ that makes of  the sacrifice itself  a 
good (or necessary) thing; an interior and golden light can always be rescued 
from the ashes of  the other in the interests of  my hope.”641
Such an attempt, he finds, must tacitly ratify such violence as well.  Hart 
concludes:
And for Christian faith the only tragic wisdom is that there is no final 
wisdom in the tragic; Christianity was set against tragic wisdom from 
the first; far from failing to glimpse behind evil a transcendent 
horizon, a chthonian depth. (387)
Hart’s critique of  tragic theology, focused as it is on MacKinnon and Lash, 
nevertheless holds much weight for Farley as well.  Hart here points to the 
inherent elitism of  the tragic vision, in that tragedy provides a helpful way to 
view suffering, but it is a vantage which is not available to those destroyed 
by evil.  But more poignantly, Hart gets to the heart of  tragic theology’s 
deeper attempt to rescue meaning from the midst of  suffering, and 
therefore to transcend suffering.  
That tragic theology is too willing to make peace with the totality of  
violence in creation is not disputed.  Farley’s theodicy so long as it remains 
“tragic” cannot provide the justice which we desire from God.  That 
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creation is both beautiful and dangerous we affirm, alongside Farley, but 
cannot rest content to see the resurrection as a symbol of  perennial hope in 
the midst of  suffering.  By taking the resurrection seriously Hart argues, this 
"requires of  faith something even more terrible than submission before the 
violence of  being and acceptance of  fate, and forbids faith in the 
consolations of  tragic wisdom; it places all hope and all consolation upon 
the insane expectation that what is lost will be given back, not as a heroic 
wisdom (death has been robbed of  its tragic beauty) but as the gift it always 
was." 
The basis of  Hart’s critique rests on any system of  theology which would 
look to tragedy as an ultimate comfort.  The story of  the cross and the 
resurrection, however, for Hart, contradicts any final meaning suffering can 
provide.  Returning to the pronouncement of  George Steiner that 
Christianity is “anti-tragic”, we above agreed that the Christian narrative and 
the tragic plot-line have two divergent arcs.  If  Christ is the ultimate symbol 
of  redemption, and the “first fruits” of  a new creation, in whose death and 
resurrection, we find not only meaning but a concrete hope for the future, 
then we cannot embrace tragedy as the dominant motif  for theodicy.  Thus 
we side with Hart when he writes, “for Christian faith the only true, tragic 
wisdom is that there is no final wisdom in the tragic”.642  
But we cannot go so far as to agree that “[in] the light of  Easter, the 
singularity of  suffering is no longer tragic (which is to say, ennobling), but 
merely horrible, mad, everlastingly unjust”.643  To hold that suffering is 
ultimately insignificant is as troubling as affirming that suffering is ultimately 
significant.  To deny to evil any greater depth than its ugly, painful surface is 
to deny the power of  God to bring about positive meaning in the midst of  
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evil.  Christian theodicy does not aim to account, in totality, for all evil–but 
it does affirm that evil itself  is not without positive meaning.  To choose evil 
is degrading: perverting God’s good gifts and ultimately enslaving to the 
sinner.  None of  this is ‘ennobling’.  But to choose evil ‘freely’ rests on a 
deeper truth which is ennobling, and which does give to sin, suffering, and 
even death some partial sense of  justice.  
The Christian stands in opposition to any Attic affirmation of  cosmic 
violence, but not to every form of  tragedy.  Hart holds up Shakespeare’s 
King Lear as more representative of  a properly Christian tragedy, where the 
death of  Cordelia is shown to be “absolutely without meaning, without 
beauty, imparting no wisdom, resistant to all assimilation into any 
metaphysical scheme of  intelligibility or solace”.644  That Lear dies, believing 
his daughter to live by some imperceptible movement of  her lips (“Do you 
see this?” Lear utters, “Look on her, look, her lips, Look there, look there!”) 
prevents the play from any grand closure.  The genius of  Shakespeare’s Lear 
should not be denied, nor the astoundingly bleak, howling climax, which like 
Ecclesiastes or Beowulf, is more (not less) perceptive of  the darkness because 
of  its vision of  the light.  True, Lear dies deluded.  But to deny to Lear, 
dying on the heath, any measure of  tragic significance is simply false.  That 
the King dies, wishing to hear Cordelia speak again but thinking her voice 
too soft for hearing (“Her voice was ever soft, Gentle, and low–an excellent 
thing in woman”), is a perfect echo of  the first scene in the play, where 
Cordelia’s refusal to avow in false words her love for her father (“What shall 
Cordelia do? Love, and be silent”) is a catalyst in their corporate ruin.  That 
Lear dies wishing to hear the voice of  one whom he once chided, “Cordelia! 
mend your speech a little”, gives (partial) solace and (partial) intelligibility to 
Lear’s plight.  This, if  anything, must be tragic meaning.
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That this sort of  solace is not ultimate cannot be denied: the theology of  
King Lear cannot stand on its own as a testament to divine justice.  The 
theodicy which best explains Lear is not Edgar’s (“The God’s are just, and of 
our pleasant vices / Make instruments to scourge us”), but Glouchester’s 
(“As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods. They kill us for their sport”).  
But neither the tragedies of  Lear, nor the tragedies of  Shakespeare on the 
whole, necessitate a theology of  cosmic violence in order to possess 
intelligibility and meaning.  The over-reaching revenge of  Hamlet, the over-
reaching ambition of  Macbeth, the over-reaching love of  Romeo and Juliet 
all possess tragic significance which is assimilable into Christian theology.  
That there is, within Shakespeare, a continual turn toward reconciliation (as 
in Romeo and Juliet), recognition (as in Macbeth), or a dark and partial 
redemption (as in Hamlet), suggests that there is room for partial or episodic 
tragedy therein. 
Further, if  Hart, in denying tragedy as a theological category, intends to 
deny any positive significance to suffering, we must plainly disagree.  To 
posit that suffering in the form of  death and destruction are always without 
meaning–that suffering is in need, not of  beautiful re-presention on the 
stage in order to become meaningful, but only of  the defeat of  its 
meaninglessness in the eschaton–presents an opposing challenge to 
Christian theodicy, in that it renders the dark side of  the human story 
insignificant, and the story as a whole a chaotic admixture of  the beautiful 
and the horrendous, with no meaningful principle standing in between the 
two.  A denial of  the logic of  tragedy may also, ironically, lead to a denial of  
comedy as well, which further complicates any “anti-tragic” Christian 
aesthetics.  That the structure of  comedy depends on disruption of  proper 
order cannot be denied.  Though it rarely involves death, the comedies of  
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Shakespeare are not without knowledge of  suffering, pain, hatred, 
deception, lust and other forms of  evil, yet the transformation of  these evils 
into a harmonic whole (at least for most of  the players), supposes that evils 
can be comprehended and meaningfully overturned even within the realm 
of  the immanent.  To overturn the “meaning” of  suffering strips our own 
stories of  meaning, by turning all of  our experiences of  evil into moments 
that are, following Hart, in the light of  Easter “merely horrible, mad, 
everlastingly unjust”.645
A more sensible solution, not throwing the tragic baby out with the tragic 
bathwater, is to dethrone tragedy from ruling over all of  theology or 
theodicy (as Farley seemingly does), and instead allowing tragedy to possess 
a tentative meaning within (or alongside) our vision of  ultimate harmony.  
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CHAPTER 5
 THE MONSTERS AND THE CRITICS: THEODICY AND MARILYN ADAMS’ 
VISION OF HORRENDOUS EVILS
There are chords in the hearts of  the most reckless which cannot be touched 
without emotion. Even with the utterly lost, to whom life and death are equally 
jests, there are matters of  which no jest can be made.
    EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Masque of  the Red Death
A couple of  years before, under the guidance of  an intelligent French-speaking  
confessor, to whom, in a moment of  metaphysical curiosity, I had turned over a 
Protestant's drab atheism for an old-fashioned popish cure, I had hoped to deduce 
from my sense of  sin the existence of  a Supreme Being. On those frosty mornings 
in rime-laced Quebec, the good priest worked on me with the finest tenderness and 
understanding. I am infinitely obliged to him and the great Institution he 
represented. Alas, I was unable to transcend the simple human fact that whatever 
spiritual solace I might find, whatever lithophanic eternities might be provided for 
me, nothing could make my Lolita forget the foul lust I had inflicted upon her. 
Unless it can be proven to me – to me as I am now, today, with my heart and my 
beard, and my putrefaction – that in the infinite run it does not matter a jot that 
a North American girl-child named Dolores Haze [Lolita] had been deprived of 
her childhood by[ me,] a maniac, unless this can be proven (and if  it can, then life 
is a joke), I see nothing for the treatment of  my misery but the melancholy and 
very local palliative of  articulate art.
    VLADIMIR NABOKOV, Lolita
From the sixth hour until the ninth hour darkness came over all the land. About 
the ninth hour Jesus cried out in a loud voice, "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?"—
which means, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” When some of  
those standing there heard this, they said, "He's calling Elijah." Immediately one 
of  them ran and got a sponge. He filled it with wine vinegar, put it on a stick, 
and offered it to Jesus to drink. The rest said, "Now leave him alone. Let's see if 
Elijah comes to save him." And when Jesus had cried out again in a loud voice, 
he gave up his spirit.  At that moment the curtain of  the temple was torn in two 
from top to bottom. The earth shook and the rocks split. The tombs broke open 
and the bodies of  many holy people who had died were raised to life. They came 
out of  the tombs, and after Jesus' resurrection they went into the holy city and 
appeared to many people. When the centurion and those with him who were 
guarding Jesus saw the earthquake and all that had happened, they were terrified, 
and exclaimed, "Surely he was the Son of  God!"
    MATTHEW 27: 45-54
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1. Introduction
1.1. Tragedy and Horror
Exploring the tragic vision in conversation with Wendy Farley, we sought to 
defend the value of  the vision which tragedy offers us of  undeserved 
suffering, which is met with compassion and resistance.  The category of  
the tragic gives us a “sense of  life” in which there is injustice, and yet also 
resources for meaning and morality in the wake of  injustice.  The tragic 
vision intends to offer us both a perception of  suffering and a response to 
suffering which is generated, or at least facilitated, by this vision.  The 
presence of  this vision is a helpful corrective to an Augustinian picture of  
cosmic harmony, which interprets the reality of  misery through the 
exclusive lens of  sin, and therefore cannot clearly see suffering as anything 
but willful rebellion.  It is also helpfully critiques the Augustinian tendency 
to constantly turn to the beauty of  the cosmos as the only vision of  value.  
The danger of  the tragic vision is, like the Augustinian picture of  harmony, 
when it becomes totalizing.  Farley’s theodicy, though positive about the role 
of  humans as agents of  compassion and resistance, is nevertheless limited 
to benefitting those who possess the tragic vision or experience compassion 
from those who do.  The tragic vision does not benefit the dead, or those 
whose psyches are so shattered by evil that they can no longer function.  
Here, the value of  the tragic vision applies only to the spectator, not the 
human spectacle.  As David Bentley Hart has pointed out, tragic theodicy, 
ironically, suffers from the defect of  remaining overly optimistic about the 
possibility of  positive meaning in the world, while untold millions suffer 
hideously, without a cogent explanation of  how untold millions of  victims 
can find meaning for themselves.  The purely (or even predominantly) tragic 
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vision cannot therefore be compatible with a Christian theodicy which aims 
to offer ultimate hope.   In seeking a more Christian picture of  providence, 
then, it is necessary to look elsewhere for a more accurate depiction of  evil.  
One of  the most recent developments in the problem of  evil literature 
offers a compelling alternate vision of  evil, an aesthetic theme which would 
critique the tragic vision along these lines: horror.
Horror may prove a valuable conversation partner here, because as a general 
theme, it reorders our perception of  evil by pointing to what is 
incomprehensible, inane and pointless.  Unlike a tragic vision, which at some 
level, ennobles the sufferer through positive comparison, horror is a dark 
and nihilistic way of  understanding evil.  As an artistic category, horror 
trades in the random and meaningless: hence, this description of  The Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre, a movie whose story of  innocent tourists caught in a 
house of  horror clearly portrays cruelty and violence as meaningless, and 
thus defies positive description:
The film’s archetypal structure is borrowed from fairy tales: this isn’t 
far from Hansel and Gretel, with its children lost in the woods who 
find an attractive house inhabited by a fiend who kidnaps and wants 
to eat them.  But while fairy tales tend to serve the function of  
preparing children for the rigors of  adult life, and thus present a 
positive face for all their often considerable violence, Texas inverts 
their traditional values and presents an apocalyptic vision of  
unremitting negativity.646
This unremitting negativity, described above, further calls into question even 
the value of  horror as an art-form for consumption.  What value lies in 
watching or reading about horrible acts?  If  Augustine despised tragic drama 
for its immoral pleasure-taking in the spectacle of  pain, he surely would 
object to art-horror as well, as it revels in the dark and disgusting all the 
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more.  So what, then, is horror, and what value may it have for 
understanding theodicy in light of  aesthetic themes?  
1.2. The Poetics and Power of  Horror
1.2.1. Art-Horror as a Genre.  Horror is a relative late-comer to the field of  
genre study.  Among the traditional genres there are the happy ones: 
Comedy and Romance (or adventure); and there are the dark ones: Tragedy 
and Satire.  Northrop Frye assigns seasons to these mythoi: Spring, Summer, 
Fall and Winter (respectively).647  If  comedy is the budding of  life and love, 
then it is fitting that tragedy is the withering of  these things.  Romance takes 
place in idyllic high summer, a series of  escapades full of  vitality, and satire 
takes place in its dark mirror-world, where black is white and compassion is 
buried under a foot of  icy humor.  
Looking for a place to locate horror, a genre not discussed by Frye, but one 
which enjoys its own section at the video store or library, one wonders 
where to put it.  Horror exists at the outer edges of  tragedy, and easily 
descends into absurdity.  The most popular medium for horror, the horror 
film, often plays upon a mixture of  fright and humor.  The closeness of  
tragedy and dark humor is understandable.  One of  the often defining 
features of  horror is the presence of  the grotesque, whether in the form of  
a monster or an alarming turn of  events.  The grotesque can terrify, but also 
as, Philip Thompson notes in his book on the subject, its “unresolved clash 
of  incompatibles”648 results in a mixture of  “both the comic and the 
terrifying”.649  It is notable that popular horror movies walk a fine line 
between black comedy and terror, mixing both together, as in the Halloween 
or Scream movies, or descending from terror to comedic satire, as George 
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Romero’s zombie movies have successively done.  Both humor and horror 
depend upon the jarring and incongruous.
Thus, horror is easily distinguishable from tragedy in its phenomenological 
effect. Though real-life atrocities are often referred to as tragic, the 
experience of  horror in art does not engender “fear and pity” (using 
Aristotle as a guide) but rather “fear and revulsion.”  Philosopher of  art, 
Noël Carroll writes, “Art-horror requires evaluation both in terms of  threat 
and disgust.”650  Stephen King, no philosopher but an expert in his own 
way, defines three characteristics of  the genre, terror, horror, and 
revulsion.651  If  tragedy retains an element of  beauty, despite its portrayal of 
injustice and suffering, horror must be said to wallow in ugliness.  Horror 
does not aim to elevate the view, but to engage the viewer – even if  that 
requires frightening the viewer very badly.652 
In viewing a tragedy, we grow to identify with the hero, especially with his 
inherent virtue, which is ultimately undone.  In horror, however, what 
sympathy there exists between the viewer and the victim will likely be visceral 
more than emotional.  Seeing a woman hung on a meat hook, as Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre invites us to do, isn’t “very sad” it is terrifying and 
nauseating.  Rather than experience a cathartic purge of  the emotions, we 
are more likely to want to purge the contents of  our stomachs.  The 
connection between spectator and spectacle is further seen in the way that 
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characters within horror fictions mirror those of  our own.653  As Carroll 
points out, this is not the case with every genre of  fiction.  He writes, 
Aristotle is right about catharsis, for example, the emotional state of  
the audience does not double that of  King Oedipus at the end of  the 
play of  the same name.  Nor are we jealous, when Othello is.  Also, 
when a comic character takes a pratfall, he hardly feels joyous, though 
we do.  And though we feel suspense when the hero rushes to save 
the heroine tied to the railroad tracks he cannot afford to indulge 
such an emotion.  Nevertheless, with horror, the situation is different.  
For in horror the emotions of  the characters and those of  the 
audience are synchronized in certain pertinent respects, as one can 
easily observe at a Saturday matinee in one’s local cinema.654
This mirroring effect is found frequently in horror fiction, as described by 
Jack Finney in Invasion of  the Body Snatchers.  In the book, the hero, Miles 
Bennell, encounters two of  the alien pods that eventually take the form of  
humans.  Finney describes Bennell’s reaction as he seeks to destroy them:
They were weightless as children’s balloons, harsh and dry on my 
palms and fingers.  At the feel of  them on my skin, I lost my mind 
completely, and then I was trampling them, smashing and crushing 
them under my plunging feet and legs, not even knowing that I was 
uttering a sort of  hoarse, meaningless cry – “Unhh! Unhh! Unhh! – 
of  fright and animal disgust.655
Bennell’s horror at the trampling of  the soon-to-be-human pods is easy to 
identify with.  Other similar examples can be seen in nearly any horror story 
where the protagonist or secondary character must enter a forbidding 
basement, venture out into the dark, or confront the monster.  Like the 
character in the story, we are intended to feel fright and revulsion.
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653 As Noël Carroll writes in The Philosophy of  Horror: or Paradoxes of  the Heart (NY: Routledge, 1990):  
“In horror fictions, the emotions of  the audience are supposed to mirror those of  the positive, 
human characters in certain, but not all respects.  Our responses are supposed to converge (but not 
exactly duplicate) those of  the characters; like the characters we assess the monster as a horrifying 
sort of  being” (28).
654  Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of  Horror: or Paradoxes of  the Heart (NY: Routledge, 1990, 18.
655 Jack Finney, Invasion of  the Body Snatchers (New York, NY: Scribner, 1998), 114.
The close pairing of  the reaction of  characters within horror fictions, and 
our own reactions, suggests that some very specific aspect of  horror fiction 
generates this phenomenological response.  Cognitivist studies of  horror 
have tried to elucidate what it is about horror that elicits fear and 
revulsion.656 Noël Carroll associates the experience of  art-horror with 
monsters, which he defines as “any being not believed to exist now 
according to contemporary science.” Monsters, being impossible, therefore 
will not fit our categories (like the killer doll ‘Chucky’ from Child’s Play, who 
crosses the boundary between living and inanimate things) and so will likely 
be seen as both “threatening and impure.”657  Sigmund Freud offers an early 
analysis of  the uncanny which bears much resemblance to Carroll’s 
definition of  horror.  In The Uncanny, Freud proposes to describe the effect 
of  fright where the familiar becomes “unheimlich” (uncanny, eerie, or, more 
accurately, unhomely).658  He references Ernst Jentsch's study "Über die 
Psychologie des Unheimlichen" which places special emphasis on ambiguity 
about whether a thing is living or dead:
When we proceed to review the things, persons, impressions, events 
and situations which are able to arouse in us a feeling of  the uncanny 
in a particularly forcible and definite form, the first requirement is 
obviously to select a suitable example to start. Jentsch has taken as a 
very good instance 'doubts whether an apparently animate being is 
really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might not be in 
fact animate'; and he refers in this connection to the impression made 
by waxwork figures, ingeniously constructed dolls and automata...659
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656 Cynthia Freeland defines cognitivist as a general attempt to treat “emotions as part of  our 
cognitive outlook on the world; emotional arousal accompanies audience members’ active 
interpretation and thinking about a film.” Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the 
Appeal of  Horror (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 9.
657 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of  Horror, 28.  While I agree that monsters are a major source for the 
experience of  horror, Carroll’s definition of  them as “impossible beings” seems painfully limited.  
Examples of  non-horrifying impossible beings are easy to provide (e.g. Superman).  Does the fact 
that Superman gets his powers from earth’s yellow sun, when the rest of  us just get skin cancer, 
make him a monster?  Of  course not.  Carroll anticipates this and notes that not all monsters are 
horrifying monsters (28).  Still, to call Superman a monster seems inaccurate, or at least 
uncharitable. 
658 Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," in The Standard Edition of  the Complete Psychological Works of  
Sigmund Freud, ed. & trs. James Strachey, vol. XVII (London: Hogarth, 1953), pp. 219-252.
659 Ibid.
Freud especially invokes the example of  the living doll from the story by E. 
T. A. Hoffman as a premier example of  the uncanny.660  The example of  a 
living/dead doll offers a perfect example of  a seemingly impossible being, 
as it defies our experience of  the reality, to be a doll entails being inanimate 
and unfeeling, but at the same time it tugs at our simultaneous perception of 
the doll as life-like and nearly-human.  Other monsters likewise possess 
characteristics that are frightening at least partly because they are impossible.  
Dracula’s immortality and the Wolf-Man’s shape-shifting, for instance, defy 
our categories of  what is real.
Carroll’s definition of  monster as “impossible being” seriously suffers, 
however, against examples like Psycho’s Norman Bates, or the shark from 
Jaws, or the examples given by Ivan Karamazov.  Here are horrors, to be 
sure, that terrify and disgust; yet they are immanently possible. Impossibility, 
without modification, does not provide an adequate definition for art-
horror, if  this were the case, then the sheerly nonsensical verse of  Lewis 
Carroll should, in some way, disgust and terrify.  The poem, “The Walrus 
and the Carpenter”, for instance, contains the lines “The sun was shining on 
the sea, / Shining with all his might: / He did his very best to make / The 
billows smooth and bright – / And this was odd, because it was / The 
middle of  the night.”  That the sun could be shining, and yet the hour be 
“the middle of  the night” is, of  course, logically contradictory.  Yet the 
effect is hardly terrifying.  Monsters do not terrify because of  their 
impossibility.  Indeed, if  this were so, then fictional characters such as 
Superman should terrify as well, but they do not.  Cynthia Freeland, author 
of  The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of  Horror, critiques Carroll 
on this same point, citing Psycho and other movies as examples of  horror 
despite the absence of  supernatural elements.  Regardless of  the fact that 
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killers like Hannibal Lecter and Norman Bates are “real-to-life rather than 
supernatural beings,” Freeland writes, “they are monsters.”661 
Carroll seems to be driven to such a limited definition by his interest in the 
roots of  Gothic horror, which sprang up as the “underside of  the 
Enlightenment.”662  Carroll charts four disjunctures between Enlightenment 
characteristics and horror.  They are Rational vs. Emotive; Objective vs. 
Subjective; Natural vs. Supernatural; and Progressive vs. Regressive.663  
Horror involves disruption, and the Enlightenment provides a lofty yet 
fragile ideal, begging to be smashed.664  Perhaps nowhere is this seen more 
clearly than in Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus, a Gothic which 
combines horror elements with elements of  Romanticism, which in itself  is 
a reaction to the Enlightenment; its subtitle subtly warning against the 
"over-reaching" of  modern man.  Yet, Carroll somehow seems trapped by 
Enlightenment dichotomies as he continues to think in scientific categories 
when defining what is, or is not, horrifying.  The roots of  horror may well 
be partially grounded in the Enlightenment emphasis on science and 
objectivity, but the way that horror affects us goes well beyond its historical 
roots. 
Cynthia Freeland’s account of  art-horror is the wider and better than 
Carroll’s, as she focuses on “monsters as beings that raise the specter of  evil 
by overturning the natural order, whether it be an order concerning death, 
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661 Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of  Horror (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
2000), 182.
662 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of  Horror, 55.
663 Ibid., 56.
664 Frankenstein is a good example of  embodying this underside, as we see the horror that lashes 
back at the hubris and emotional shallowness of  Victor Frankenstein, as the book’s subtitle calls 
him a “modern Prometheus.”  The monster violates Frankenstein’s safety, killing his young brother;  
entering the honeymoon chamber and killing Frankenstein’s new bride; and, perhaps worst of  all, 
Frankenstein’s faith in progress and his own lofty ideals.
the body, God’s laws, natural laws, or ordinary human values.”665  The key 
element is a sense of  violation.  Where notions of  order are less strongly 
held, interruption will be less disturbing.  Thus, horror is often rooted in 
what feels most safe and secure - the home (The Haunting or The Sixth Sense), 
the family (The Exorcist or The Shining), innocent or mundane activities such 
as checking into a motel or baby-sitting (Psycho or Halloween).   For both 
Carroll and Freeland the effect of  art-horror is generated by the violation of 
our sense of  rightness.  Carroll’s definition, however, is so limited as to 
apply only to art-horror favorites such as Dracula, the Wolfman, or Freddy 
Krueger.  Freeland’s wider construal of  horror not only matches up better 
to art-horror but real-life horror as well.  The violation of  order can apply 
to a wide range of  horrific experiences in a wide range of  arenas, whether 
moral, social, spiritual or existential, as we shall see in the next section.
1.2.2. Horror in Human Context.   Horror involves the violation of  order (real 
or perceived), and when we use the term horror, in art or in life, we usually 
invoke an extreme level of  disproportion, disorder or incongruity of  states 
of  affairs.  Martin Amis, writing on the rise of  terrorist violence, feels the 
need to invoke this moral/aesthetic category: 
Suicide-mass murder is more than terrorism: it is horrorism. It is a 
maximum malevolence. The suicide-mass murderer asks his 
prospective victims to contemplate their fellow human being with a 
completely new order of  execration.666
Amis is clearly correct in identifying the mass-murder of  thousands of  
innocent victims as “horror”, for clearly we have in such acts an 
incongruous and disturbing disregard for human value.  Terrorist attacks 
violate our sense of  safety because they undermine the most basic levels of  
respect between human beings.  These acts are truly horrible because it is so 
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665 Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead, 8.
666 Martin Amis, “The Age of  Horrorism (Part Two)” The Observer, 10 September, 2006.
difficult to even imagine a state of  affairs that would ever warrant them, 
which undermines any moral grievance the perpetrators may cite as an 
inciting reason.  Rather than uphold the moral order, an act of  horror (even 
if  motivated by a sense of  injustice), obliterates the moral order.  
1.2.3. Horror and Privation.  Freeland’s understanding of  horror as a violation 
of  proper order, then, ironically, fits well with an Augustinian framework for 
creation, and the vision of  monstrosity which Augustine elucidates.  In De 
civitate Dei, Augustine reflects on whether Adam’s or Noah’s sons begat any 
monstrous races reported in “profane histories.”  Augustine describes men 
with one eye, or backwards feet, or hermaphrodites “both begetting and 
bearing children in one body”, as well as mouthless men “living only by air 
and smelling”, as well as pygmies, and one-legged men who are wonderfully 
swift and sleep under the shade of  one large foot, as well as the 
Cynocephali, “that had dogs’ heads, and barked like dogs”.667  These 
pictures of  monstrosity Augustine describes all feature distortion, disorder, 
or an incongruous mixture of  attributes, in essence, all lack the form which is 
proper to a human.  Thus, for Freeland and Augustine, the essence of  
horror, a sense of  the violation of  order, depends on a sense of  proper 
order, and its palpable privation.668  
The notion of  evil as privation has, at times, been deemed too flimsy to deal 
with horror as a category.  For instance, Susan Neiman, in her book, Evil in 
Modern Thought, critiques Augustine’s famous metaphysical formulation of  
the privatio boni:
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668 Christopher Mathewes’ recent book, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition, examines Augustine’s still-
relevant legacy as it appears in thought of  Reinhold Neibuhr and Hannah Arendt.  Mathewes notes 
how Neibuhr uses Augustine’s notion of  perversion as central in his concept of  sin, while Arendt’s 
famous report on the “banality of  evil” is informed by Augustine’s notion of  evil as privation.  His 
book is just one sign of  interest in the relevant legacy of  Augustine.
“Evil” carries theological resonance even when explicit theological 
foundations are rejected.  And if  the definition of  evil as absence, 
which the Middle Ages inherited from Augustine, seems inadequate 
to express anything about contemporary horror, no other 
metaphysical foundations have been – perhaps mercifully – 
proposed.669
It is true that ‘privation’ alone offers nothing to help us understand or 
express horror, but only in the same way that the word ‘not’ offers little 
understanding without other words to negate. Hence, Augustine’s use of  
privatio is not helpful without Augustine’s boni.  The Augustinian “grammar of 
evil”, as Rowan Williams calls it, is actually very helpful, given the 
Augustinian vision of  a world ordered in such a way that each thing is good 
in itself  and in relation to every other thing.  Virtue is a right ordering of  the 
loves – an “ordo amoris”.670  Beauty is proportionate – “a good congruence 
of  the members”.671 Nature is well-ordered – “everything from earth to 
heaven ascending in a scale of  goodness”.672  Given this line of  thinking: 
the evil-willing person has become dis-ordered, monstrous inside, a jumble 
286
669 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 68.
670 CD 15.22.
671 CD 22.19.
672 CD 11.22.
of  desires.673  (Psycho’s Norman Bates is a good example: one moment 
wishing that he could flee “mother” then alternately calling her his “best 
friend”.)  Evil’s aesthetic will always move toward the grotesque and 
incongruous. (Pennywise the shape-shifting clown from IT is an example of  
this revolting incongruity as it refuses to take stable form, and thus cannot 
be described except as ‘It”).  Further, because, following Augustine, 
everything has its place in the scale of  goodness, and therefore something is 
evil/frightening when it does not fall within its ‘place’. (Seth Brundle from 
The Fly exemplifies the disgust we feel when something is not what it should 
be – neither man nor fly). 
Augustinian aesthetics and metaphysics provides a background against 
which the “sensible illogic” of  horror - disproportion and incongruity - can 
be felt.  Thus, Neiman’s critique of  privation seems unfounded.  Horror and 
privation fit well together, so to speak.  Brian Horne writes,
Order is characteristic of  the work and love of  God… Disorder is 
the sign of  sin: evil is the privation, the absence, of  order… The 
absence of  order – the attempted perversion of  what is – can be felt 
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673 Though the Augustinian framework further shows us how perpetrated horrors, while evil 
actions, need not necessarily be willfully evil.  The example of  poor Norman Bates, both pitiable 
and terrifying, both victim and perpetrator, is certainly a monster.  Yet, though he is the locus of  
evil, his fractured psyche, more than his will, is the root of  his problems.  Hannah Arendt famously 
reported on the “banality” of  evil in her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem.  The problem for the 
prosecution in the Eichmann trial, she indicates, was that “the prosecution wasted much time in an 
unsuccessful effort to prove that Eichmann had once, at least, killed with his own hands.”  “[T]he 
indictment for murder was wrong,” Arendt writes, but the prosecution pursued this charge 
because, Arendt goes on, “[when] intent is absent… we feel no crime has been committed” (22). 
Eichmann, like Norman, is certainly a monster.  That the vacuum-oil-salesman-turned-Nazi had no 
desire to kill Jews is irrelevant.  What is relevant is that he valued bureaucratic toadying over the 
lives of  5.8 million.  Eichmann’s banal loves cost countless lives.  But this is not to say that 
Eichmann was not culpable, rather, as Susan Neiman notes, Arendt “insisted on the need for moral 
theory which locates guilt and responsibility in something besides intention” (Neiman “What’s the 
Problem of  Evil?”, 43). 
Arendt is willing to grant to Eichmann that he may well have not desired the killing of  Jews, but 
this does not prevent his monstrosity.  Even if, as in Sodom and Gomorrah,  the moral tenor has 
become so out of  tune that all are implicated in the evil, this does not excuse the moral 
hideousness.  However, Eichmann’s case does not imply, contra Neiman, that “the lack of  bad 
intentions does not even mitigate” culpability (Neiman, “What’s the Problem of  Evil”, 44).  
Eichmann had bad intentions, for which he was extremely culpable, they were simply not quite as 
obviously correlated to the evil they brought about as with other Nazis (cf. philosophical 
discussions of  “moral luck”). 
and depicted even while, paradoxically, we can say that it is an 
absence.674
What horror does overturn, if  not the notion of  evil as privation, is any easy 
trust in the ultimate order of  creation.675  Horror, in art or in life, violates 
our sense of  proper order, and thus undermines our ability to trust the 
order of  the world, or to positively relate ourselves to the world around us.  
1.2.4. Horror and Human Meaning.  “A meaningful life” writes Robert 
Emmons in his book, The Psychology of  Ultimate Concerns, “is one that is 
characterized by a deep sense of  purpose, a sense of  inner conviction, and 
assurance that in spite of  one’s current plight, life has significance.”676  As 
we would expect, Emmons finds that “indicators of  meaningfulness predict 
psychological well-being, while indicators of  meaninglessness are regularly 
associated with psychological distress and pathology.”677  Ranging over a 
wide selection of  psychological research, Emmons finds that post-suffering, 
“Growth is possible to the degree to which a person creates or finds 
meaning in suffering, pain, and adversity.”678  Citing various psychological 
studies, Emmons finds that sufferers such as HIV-infected men were often 
able to find “high meaning” that helped integrate the illness or loss into a 
framework.  HIV could be seen as a “catalyst for personal growth”, 
“spiritual growth”, or as enabling a sense of  “belonging” among co-
sufferers.679  Religious meaning is especially helpful. Emmons references a 
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674 Brian Horne, Imagining Evil, 28.
675 Augustine displays a rather calm composure in the face of  monstrosity when he writes,
[T]he same reasons we can give for this or that extraordinary birth amongst us, the same 
may be given for those monstrous nations; for God made all, and when or how he would 
form this or that, He knows best having the perfect skill to beautify this universe by 
opposition and diversity of  parts.  But he that cannot contemplate the beauty of  the whole 
stumbles at the deformity of  the part, not knowing the harmony that it has with the whole. 
(CD 16.8)
676 Robert A. Emmons, The Psychology of  Ultimate Concerns (NY: The Guilford Press, 1999), 138
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid., 144.
679 Ibid., 146.
study about coping with Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), “Those 
parents who had found meaning within a religious framework had 
significantly less distress 18 months postloss as well as greater positive well-
being.”680  Emmons observes however, that for religious believers well-being 
(happiness) was often accompanied by high levels of  emotional distress.  
The suggestion being that the manageability of  suffering which religion 
provides did not reduce the tangibility of  suffering.681  This looks quite 
positive for religious belief, including Christian belief, to offer both honesty 
in the face of  suffering and hope. 
What does one do, however, when evils defy not only human meaning but 
religious meaning as well?  HIV and SIDS ‘spell’ fear for large groups of  
people, yet seem to lie closer within the range of  what might be integrated 
into a meaningful whole.  But horrendous evils even more obviously defy 
attempts at personal or religious integration.  While it is true, as Emmons 
writes, that a “religious or spiritual world-view provides an overall 
orientation to life that lends a framework for interpreting life’s challenges,” 
horrors are not easily understood within a religious framework, they are, 
seemingly, more difficult to make sense of.682  The violating power of  
horror can jar our confidence in there being a stable system of  value within 
which we can positively relate ourselves to the wider world.  Terri Jentz’s 
autobiographical account of  being randomly attacked by an axe-wielding 
maniac illustrates this.  Jentz tells of  her initial sense of  confidence – feeling 
“bullet-proof ” after surviving with only semi-serious axe wounds – but then 
also tells of  her subsequent struggle to rebuild her picture of  the world:
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Some part of  me at the edges of  consciousness had lost trust in the 
order of  things.  I no longer believed that life was following a script 
in which certain things would never happen.  Evidence of  this truth 
turned up in the newspaper one day.  The story of  a boy on vacation 
in Yellowstone Park who walked onto a dock to view the geyser 
pools. When a vapor kicked up obscuring his vision, he stumbled into 
the water.  By the time they fished him out, a matter of  minutes, his 
bones were boiled clean. This last detail really made an impression on 
me.  That something so out-of-the-world horrific could happen on 
vacation in one of  America’s glorious national treasures like 
Yellowstone.  By the end of  my twenties I was mysteriously 
debilitated… It seemed to me a great risk to inhabit a body.683
Jentz’s traumatic incident, which violated her natural sense of  the social and 
moral sense of  the world, gave her (at first) a sense of  extreme good luck.  
But this sense of  extreme fortune soon turned into a sense of  extreme 
foreboding that something just as random and meaningless could happen in 
the future.  Other examples of  freakish accidents likewise reenforced the 
idea that life no longer had a ‘script’, and thus was completely unpredictable.  
Horror cuts against all our expectations (and in doing so, frightens us).  It 
thrives on the incongruity, incoherence, and deformity of  the monster/act 
of  violence in order to frighten us.  It works on us because it works against 
our expectations.  Thus, despite Robert Emmons’ suggestions about the 
positive effects of  finding meaning in misfortune, horror, by its very nature, 
cuts against this effort by presenting itself  as random and meaningless.  The 
experience of  artists and other thoughtful writers shows that there is a 
widespread sense of  certain kinds of  evils as fundamentally clashing with 
our sense of  the way the world ought to be.  As we shall see, it has a similarly 
disruptive effect upon theodicy. 
In human life, then, horror is understood against a background of  world 
order, which it disrupts by seemingly cutting against it.   Yet it is much easier 
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to make sense of  why horrors occur without the idea of  a good and 
powerful God also looming in the background.  The Christian has an even 
more extreme “unresolved clash of  incompatibles”, moreover, as the notion 
of  an all-powerful, all-loving, all-wonderful God is juxtaposed against an 
event for which there seems to be no good reason.  It is easy to sense the 
disjuncture between the Christian God and the Holocaust.  God’s love 
affirms human purpose; horrendous evils seem to deny it.  What, then, can 
theodicy ‘do’ with horrors?
2. Horror in Philosophy: Horror and the Rejection of  Theodicy
Unlike tragedy, horror is rarely used as a category for Christian theology.  
There is no long standing, respected “horrific theme” to accompany the 
“tragic theme” of  theodicy.  The category of  horror is used, almost 
exclusively, by those arguing against the goodness of  God. 
The most famous example of  horror as an aesthetic theme in theodicy is 
surely the dialogue between Ivan Karamazov and his brother, Alyosha, in 
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.  There is hardly a more vivid 
rejection of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme of  harmony to be found anywhere.  
Ivan Karamazov begins his renunciation of  the idea of  “higher harmonies” 
by going through a long list of  tales of  cruelty, where children are harmed in 
novel ways: babies ripped from wombs by bayonets, children torn apart by 
dogs, and an infant smiling sucking on a gun held by a soldier, who then 
pulls the trigger.  These stories are intended to shock and disgust, and are 
lacking any qualifying historical context or motivation.  They are simply 
horrible.  It is these stories that Ivan uses as a basis for his moral rejection 
of  God.  
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If  God created this world and oversees it, Ivan senses, then everything must 
be permitted for a purpose.  Thus, Ivan assumes that in the end, all of  
God’s reasons for allowing these outrages will be revealed and there will be 
reconciliation and healing.  This state of  affairs Ivan then associates with the 
notion of  ultimate harmony (an eschatological state where all is explained 
and justified).  Yet, Ivan argues,
If  all must suffer to pay for the eternal harmony, what have children 
to do with it, tell me please?  It’s beyond all comprehension why they 
should suffer, and why they should pay for the harmony.  Why should 
they, too, furnish material to enrich the soil for the harmony of  the 
future?684
Ivan can find no sensible reason why innocent children should be allowed to 
suffer like this and refuses to accept any solution to the problem and thus he 
hands ‘back the ticket’ to God.”685 
I renounce the higher harmony altogether.  It’s not worth the tears of 
that one tortured child who beat itself  on the breast with its little fist 
and prayed in its stinking outhouse with an unexpiated tear to ‘dear, 
kind God’!  It’s not worth it, because those tears are unatoned for.  
They must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony.  But how?686
Even Alyosha, at Ivan’s prodding, admits that, if  he were God, he would not 
consent to creating a world which contained such horrors.687  
Contemporary philosopher Peter Fosl likewise pursues a Ivan-sounding 
argument in his essay “The Moral Imperative to Rebel Against God”.  Fosl 
begins his essay by describing the murder of  two young boys by their 
mother, Susan Smith, who pushed a car in which the two were seatbelted 
into a lake.688  Fosl invites the reader to place themselves imaginatively in the 
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688 Peter S. Fosl, “The Moral Imperative to Rebel Against God” Cogito 11: 3 (1997):159-160.
minds of  those two boys for two minutes, thinking about what it must have 
felt like to cough and choke and sputter as their car sank into the water.  
Fosl then asks the reader, “What was the experience like?” and shares his 
own reaction: 
As the father of  two sons, one about the age of  Smith’s oldest, I 
found the experience particularly difficult.  Among the feelings I 
confront are the horror of  suffering and death as well as the terrible, 
terrible sadness that gripped the people of  the United States in the 
face of  this event, the sensation that brought many to open sobbing 
as they considered what had happened.689
It is likely that any other thoughtful, sensitive person likewise felt nausea and 
disgust, and perhaps a much deeper sense of  outrage, at the example given 
by Fosl, he argues that this emotional response is “philosophically 
significant” and should be examined in light of  what we believe about God.   
More than simple sadness and revulsion, Fosl argues that at the “core of  
this sensation... is also an emotion whose object is nothing less than the 
universe and existence as a whole.”690  
This outrage at the universe Fosl also finds expressed in the famous 
dialogue between the Karamazov brothers quoted above.  Fosl chart’s Ivan’s 
argument and outlines what he takes to be its core premises and conclusion:
1. If  any being is aware of  some evil, is able to stop or prevent that evil, 
and does not stop or prevent that evil, then that being is morally 
reprobate  [Moral Principle].
2. The suffering and death of  children is evil [Moral Fact].
3. God is aware of  the suffering and death of  children [Theological 
Fact].
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4. God is able to stop and/or prevent the suffering and death of  
children [Theological fact].
5. God does not stop and/or prevent the suffering and death of  
children [Empirical Fact].
Conclusion: God is morally reprobate. 691
Here Fosl helpfully unpacks Ivan’s implicit argument, and shows where its 
real strength lies.  The lynchpin of  Ivan Karamazov’s and his own argument, 
Fosl argues, is Premise 1.  The weakness of  Premise 1 however, is that it is 
not self-evident that a good being should stop every kind of  evil.  There 
seem to be lots of  smaller evils that might well be justified by some greater 
purpose, either allowing for some greater good (as the pains of  long-
distance exercise teach us endurance amidst hardship), or smaller evils might 
prevent some greater evil (just as the pains of  dentistry prevent the greater 
pain of  rotting teeth).  Fosl’s argument here parallels William Rowe’s 
argument from gratuitous evils (see note), as he nuances his first premise to 
include the assumption that the evil in question does not allow for some 
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greater good or prevent a worse evil. 692  Thus, Fosl’s argument hinges upon 
the blunt description of  evils “of  the magnitude manifest in the suffering 
and death of  children” and subsequently asking whether any moral being 
could justifiably allow them.  Fosl’s conclusion, like Ivan’s, is that there is no 
justifying reason for the kinds of  evils perpetrated on innocent children 
(such as in the Susan Smith case).  Also like Ivan, Fosl keeps the logical 
apparatus of  his argument to a relative minimum.  What he relies on instead, 
like Ivan Karamazov, is the repeated invocation of  examples of  innocent 
suffering.  By comparing God to Susan Smith, watching while two small 
children suffer, or by comparing God to a negligent lifeguard who lets 
children drown in water which he is paid to oversee, Fosl intends to awaken 
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Though both the evils described are, according to Rowe, gratuitous, the latter is gratuitous for a 
different reason.  Where the former is pointless, the latter is such a horrendous moral evil that we 
cannot imagine God having any justifying reason for allowing it.  So the evidential argument goes, 
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Yet, even if  it could be shown that there was no other way for God, in His infinite resourcefulness, 
to bring about a certain good without allowing the specific evil in question, this may not do the 
trick.  The evil might still be gratuitous.  Even if  the drunken boyfriend could experience 
repentance in no other way we might still be led to conclude that the value of  the good did not 
outweigh the disvalue of  the attendant evil. 
in us a sense of  the monstrosity of  God.693    Fosl further imagines a situation 
where we may be asked to turn over our young child to a powerful 
magician-king, who would torture, molest and kill the child but then 
“produce eternal world peace and prosperity” in return.694  There is no 
necessary connection between the child’s suffering and the world peace, 
these are simply the magician-king’s conditions.  The answer to this 
hypothetical seems obviously to be no, this magician-king is truly a monster.  
But, as Fosl writes, “Don’t Christians believe that God, in fact, did such a 
thing with his only son?… I would observe how strange it is that people 
don’t find the JCI God monstrous.”695
The significance of  Fosl’s method is, again, not the detail of  his argument 
(which is simple) but the way that he utilizes vividly horrible examples and 
details in order to evoke in the reader a sense that there can be no sufficient 
reason for God to allow the evils he does.  The use of  horror in 
philosophical discourse seems, in these two cases, to be primarily about 
giving us a sense of  the incredible disvalue of  a state of  affairs, and 
expecting that sense to outweigh all possible responses that we can offer to 
it.  Horror, in these cases, works to stump theodicy into silence.  
Reflecting on the extreme examples of  cruelty and torture invoked by Ivan 
Karamazov, Christian theologian David Bentley Hart praises the genius of  
Ivan’s argument from horror as “the only challenge to a confidence in divine 
goodness that should give Christians serious cause for deep and difficult 
reflection.”696  The reason for the effectiveness, Hart argues, is how, in Ivan’s 
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argument, “there are already foreshadowings of  a deeper Christian riposte 
to the argument.”697  Neither Ivan Karamazov, nor Peter Fosl, deny 
Christianity the full scope of  theological resources which it can bring to bear 
(such as appeal to the afterlife), but rather rest their objections on a deep 
and seemingly inviolate sense of  revulsion at the occurrence of  horrors.  
Further, this sense of  revulsion is not dispelled by the presence of  a 
Christian view of  the world.   “Those Christian readers who have found it 
easy to ignore or dispense with the case Dostoyevsky constructs for Ivan 
have not,” Hart argues, “fully comprehended that case (or... adhere to so 
degenerate a version of  Christian doctrine that they can no longer be said to 
understand the God revealed in Christ).”698    
Likewise, I must agree that horror functions, in its expression of  revolting 
disvalue, as the sharpest critique of  divine providence which any aesthetic 
theme could offer.  Horrors focus our attention on the darkest and most 
horrible details of  human suffering and therefore give us a powerful sense 
of  evil.  In the next section, we will look at how Marilyn McCord Adams 
develops on this aesthetic theme, utilizing these insights in developing her 
aesthetic theme of  horrendous evils.  Yet, we will also see how Adams 
tailors her theodicy to respond to horrors in a fundamentally Christian way.
3. Marilyn Adams’ Aesthetic Theodicy: Horrendous Evils and Divine Victory
What makes Marilyn McCord Adams significant for this study is her clear-
sighted sense of  the destructiveness of  the worst evils (horrors), as well as 
how she incorporates many of  the insights gained from them into a 
Christian theodicy.  Like Wendy Farley, Marilyn Adams breaks with certain 
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elements of  traditional Christian theology, but, her insights are still (I 
believe) readily assimilable by a more traditional approach to theodicy.  By 
focusing on horror, an aesthetic theme which Christian theodicists have 
often avoided, Adams aims to see something about what must be ‘done’ 
with, not just any evils, but the worst evils, in order for God to be good to 
us.  
3.1. What are Horrendous Evils? 
In her book, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of  God, Marilyn Adams defines 
horrendous evils as “evils the participation in which constitutes prima facie 
reason to doubt whether a participant’s life could be a great good to him/
her on the whole”.699 Adams cites “the rape of  a woman and the axing off  
of  her arms... betrayal of  one’s deepest loyalties... child pornography, 
parental incest, slow death by starvation, the explosion of  nuclear bombs 
over populated areas” and other life-destroying events.700  As such, the kinds 
of  evils Adams is talking about fit with the kinds of  arguments put forward 
by Peter Fosl and Ivan Karamazov.  These are hideous actions which do not 
carry with them any obvious positive meaning.  Further, these are horrifying 
events which challenge our trust in God and our sense of  divine providence. 
Yet, more than Peter Fosl or Ivan Karamazov, Adams devotes a great deal 
of  time to analyzing what makes horrors so particularly challenging, and 
thus digs deeper into why exactly they are so difficult for Christian theology 
to deal with. 
First, as Adams describes them, horrors stretch beyond normal categories 
(such as moral trespass) we use to evaluate evils.  The sinfulness of  an 
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action has no standard correlation to whether it is horrendous.  Likewise, 
culpability is no guarantee that horrors will or will not affect a person, as 
they degrade both the victim and the perpetrator.  Some horrendous evils 
may involve no immoral action at all: as in the case of  accidentally running 
over one’s child with the car.  Nor is the category reducible to harm 
incurred, as Adams notes the example of  “a mother’s eating the corpse of  
her already dead son”.701  In the former case the death was accidental, but 
the collusion of  coincidence makes the death far more painful than if  the 
son had died, say, in an unrelated bicycling accident.  In the latter case no 
additional harm is incurred, the son is already dead, but the mother’s eating 
of  her son is still destructive.  These evils take on deeply negative 
significance in the life of  a person, gnawing away at other positive structures 
in a person’s life.  “[A]rguably,” Adams writes, “the worst evils and the best 
goods are symbolic. What makes evils horrendous is their power to degrade 
by being prima facie ruinous of  personal meaning”.702  What makes these 
evils so bad is not that they spring from a truly depraved mind, or are a 
symbol of  extreme malice, but how they affect the individual who 
experienced them.  In the case of  the two most recently mentioned evils, the 
terrible occurrence strikes at the heart of  one of  the most treasured roles in 
life: that of  parent.  To accidentally kill or be forced to cannibalize one’s 
child gnaws at the very core of  one’s identity.  
Horrors strike humans at the point of  their greatest strength, as thinking, 
conscious beings with a great capacity for interpretation of  events.  They are 
unlikely to affect other species (so far as we know), because, as Adams 
writes,
On my conception, horrors afflict persons insofar as they are actual 
or potential meaning-makers.  With this focus, I leave to one side the 
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question of  whether God is good to individual inanimate objects or 
plants.  Likewise, my analysis of  both problem and solutions will 
pertain to animals only to the extent that their cognitive and affective 
capacities constitute something like meaning-making powers. 703
Horrors erode meaning as they cut at the core of  our identification with 
sources of  great value.  Using the examples given by Adams, we can see 
how incest would cut away at our identification with family; how rape and 
mutilation would cut away at a woman’s sense of  femininity; how deep 
betrayal would cut away at our connection to all human relationships; and 
how the explosion of  nuclear devices would cut away at our connection to 
the entire human race.  
Being able to positively relate oneself  to the world in which one lives, is, of  
course, an important part of  the human experience.  This brings in the 
aesthetic dimension to Adams’ discussion of  horrors, as she argues that our 
sense of  meaningfulness is partially constituted by our ability to understand 
the world as exhibiting orderliness, and being able to manage variety with 
simplicity (which Adams believes to have positive aesthetic value).  It is 
important, Adams argues, for us to be able to organize reality in a 
comprehensible fashion:
Experiencing the world as ordered in a way that is congruent enough 
with reality is constitutive of  human sanity.  Experiencing the world as 
chaotic, or losing one’s taste for the orderings that match up with the 
‘objective’ world, is part of  what it is to be insane.704
Thus, a part of  our ability to see our lives as meaningful is being able to 
comprehend and positively interact with reality.  As Adams sees it, our lives 
are like works of  art, which we attempt to organize by such principles as 
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“unity, integrity, harmony and relevance”.705  Just as with a particularly 
effective horror movie, the outbreak of  horrendous evils shatters what 
previous understanding we had for the “plot” of  the story.  As in the classic 
film Psycho, where the murder in the shower comes as a total surprise, 
horrors jump out of  nowhere and suddenly interrupt our expectations.  The 
story of  Terri Jentz’s surprising axe-attack comes to mind as an example of  
a horrendous event which left her feeling that life was no longer following a 
“script”, and thus unravelling her sense of  trust in the world.  Thus Adams 
finds common ground between art-horror and real-life atrocities when she 
utilizes the aesthetic categories of  “disproportion and incongruity” to 
identify why they “overwhelm meaning-making capacities...furnishing strong 
reason to believe that lives marred by horrors can never again be unified and 
integrated into wholes with positive meaning”.706 
The occurrence of  horrors, whether perpetrated by us or done to us, can 
eradicate a sense of  meaningfulness in our lives even if  they entail very little 
physical harm to us. Regardless of  our physical well-being, as Robert 
Emmons stated, “indicators of  meaningfulness predict psychological well-
being, while indicators of  meaninglessness are regularly associated with 
psychological distress and pathology.”707  Thus, because of  their close 
connection to self-understanding, horrors are (so far as we can tell) confined 
to the neighborhood of  humanity.  Appropriately, then, it is exclusively with 
individual persons that Adams is concerned. 
Adams’ person-centered approach marks out her work as notably different 
from Augustine’s.  Where the Bishop of  Hippo is concerned to fit together 
all the various parts of  creation into a cohesive and beautiful whole, Adams 
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is more narrowly concerned with the welfare of  each individual.  Her 
definition of  horrendous evils, then, as “evils the participation in which 
constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether a participant’s life could be 
a great good to him/her on the whole”, is intended to be weighed directly 
against the the theological affirmation of  the goodness of  God.708  For 
Adams, the primary challenge in the problem of  evil discussion is the 
apparently logical incongruity between the goodness of  God and 
horrendous evils.   In her own way, then, Adams also pushes back against 
the Augustinian focus on cosmic harmony because she believes that in order 
for God to be good, God must be good to each and every human person 
God created.  A free will theodicy which does not have an account for how 
a victim who suffers horribly at the hands of  free agents can have a life 
which is a great good to him/her on the whole is incomplete.  Thus, for 
Adams, any discussion of  the goodness of  God which does not take into 
account how God is good to those who experience horrendous evils is 
impotent to resolve the problem of  evil.
3.2. Horrors and Morally Sufficient Reasons
The second key area Adams investigates with reference to horrendous evils 
is her break, like Ivan Karamazov and Peter Fosl, with traditional theodicy’s 
attempt to compile a list of  morally sufficient reasons that might excuse 
God.  Adams rejects such an attempt, and believes that “horrors are so bad 
that to treat any of  the reasons we can think of  as reasons God found (or 
would have found) sufficient turns God into a monster, an evil genius of  
worse than Cartesian proportions.”709  If  for Adams, there can be no 
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morally sufficient reasons that would explain why God might allow evils, is 
she not in the same boat as Ivan Karamazov, floating down the stream 
toward atheism?
The answer is no, as Adams makes two parallel moves to avoid giving up on 
the goodness of  God.  She begins by conceding that it is not as if  “God had 
any obligation to do otherwise or to be good to us; the ‘size-gap’ means that 
God has no obligations to creatures,” she says.710  This might seem to be 
sufficient for the job.  If  this claim is accepted, it resolves the problem of  
gratuitous evil by challenging the idea that a good God would always stop 
horrendous evils from occurring.  Yet it raises a deeper and more troubling 
question about how we can meaningfully speak about God’s goodness if  we 
cannot include God (in some sense) in our moral community (for a more 
detailed critique of  this position see Appendix C).  In this way Adams’ work 
is similar to Wendy Farley’s, in that both see certain kinds of  evil as 
completely unjustifiable and inexcusable in any normal sense.  Also akin to 
Farley, Adams does not rest with the doubts that evils raise, but seeks to 
press on and find a greater opportunity for hope.  Adams’ approach, 
however, differs from Farley’s in that her chosen theme of  horror seemingly 
contains no inherent value or significance.  Thus Adams’ response to evil is 
focused on showing, not how these evils can be put to use, but how these 
evils can be ultimately defeated.
3.3.  Horrors and Divine Goodness
3.3.1.  The Defeat of  Evils.  In her work, Adams draws on the essay, “The 
Defeat of  Good and Evil,” by Roderick Chisholm, which details what is 
necessary for the defeat of  evils.  In contrast with evils that are balanced off 
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by other goods, evils that are defeated must be so incorporated into the 
positive whole that we do not regret their presence.  Chisholm writes that 
“when evil is balanced off in a larger whole, we may, when considering the 
whole, regret or resent the presence of  evil there.”  But in the case of  a 
positive whole, one should say of  constituent evils that “the badness of  the 
part that is bad makes the whole better than what we would have had had 
the bad part been replaced by a neutral negation.”711  Therefore, evils that 
have been defeated have become so identified with a larger, positive state of 
affairs that their existence is no longer regrettable (though it still stands to 
reason that badness itself  must always be viewed negatively).712  
Chisholm also details the difference between defeasible and indefeasible 
states of  affairs.  Indefeasible evils pose a problem because they will always 
detract from the value of  any larger state of  affairs in which they are 
present, and also raise questions as to why God might have created a world 
containing indefeasible evils.  Chisholm does not have a problem with the 
existence of  intrinsically evil states of  affairs.  But, he writes, “[I]t would 
seem that a world that is at least as good as any other possible world would 
contain states of  affairs that are intrinsically bad – provided that the badness 
of  each of  these states of  affairs is defeated.”713  There therefore ought to 
be no indefeasible evils in a world created by God.  Chisholm writes:  “It is 
clear, I think, that the theodicist must appeal to the concept of  defeat – that 
he can deal with the problem of  evil only by saying that the evils in the world 
are defeated in the sense that I have tried to describe.”714
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On the subject of  whether indefeasible evils exist, however, Chisholm is 
agnostic.  He seems fully comfortable with the idea that there may exist 
indefeasible evils when he writes, 
It may be, for all we know, that the evil in the world is defeated by 
some state of  affairs that is absolutely good.  And it may also be, for 
all we know, that the goodness in the world is defeated by some state 
of  affairs that is absolutely evil. 
 
This sort of  agnosticism, apparently, does not sit well with Marilyn Adams, 
as her book aims to bring to light those evils that seem the most 
indefeasible, prima facie, and show that they can be defeated after all.  By 
doing this, it seems that Adams can go a long way in proving Chisholm’s 
agnosticism to be unnecessary.  Showing how God’s goodness overcomes 
horrendous evils seems to make both cases by highlighting God’s absolute 
goodness as well as the defeasibility of  what would seem to be the worst 
(and therefore most threatening) evils.   Defeasible evils are those that have 
been defeated or are logically possible to defeat, and Adams sets out to 
show how it is logically possible to defeat horrendous evils.   She writes:
My suggestion is that we can explain the compossibility of  God and 
evil (even the evils of  entrenched horrors) if  we can offer a (logically 
possible) scenario in which God is good to each created person, by 
ensuring each a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole, and 
by defeating his/her participation in horrors within the context, not 
merely of  the world as a whole, but of  that individual’s life.715
Adams’ book goes through a wide variety of  ways God can be good to us 
and thus defeat horrendous evils.  I want to focus on three related areas, the 
aesthetic imagination, Christology and the afterlife:   
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3.3.2. Evil and the Aesthetic Imagination.  Utilizing Chisholmian language of  
defeat, Adams highlights the role of  the imagination as a part of  the defeat 
of  evil:
The ability to contribute to the positive meaning of  a person’s life by 
overcoming evil with good is in part a function of  the aesthetic 
imagination, of  the capacity to weave evils into complex goods 
through subtle irony and reversal.716
Emphasis here on the “aesthetic imagination” is notable, as Adams is 
pointing to a key way that the negative meaning of  evils can be reversed.  
Meanings of  events change as their context changes.  David Mamet’s book, 
The Three Uses of  the Knife: On the Nature and Purpose of  Drama, derives its title 
from this characteristic in stories.  He quotes an old blues song that says “I 
used my knife to cut my bread, so I could have strength to work.  I used my 
knife to shave my face so I could look good for her.  I used my knife to cut 
out her lying heart.”717  In the song, the knife’s meaning is fluid and goes 
good, better, worse as the context changes.  In a similar way, Adams notes that 
the “meaning of  participation in evil varies with the contexts in which it is 
embedded – from a literary point of  view, with the plots into which it is 
woven.”718 
Adams discusses the ways that the whole aesthetic value of  a person’s life 
can be such that it outweighs and even defeats evils.  According to Adams, 
God, the great artist, is reworking our lives into works of  art.  Yet, Adams 
stresses that God is not like the classical artist, interested primarily in poise 
and perfection. Rather,
God must be a modern artist, ready, willing, and able to turn horror-
torn individual careers into Guernica’s, to house distortion to 
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produce wholes of  outstanding merit, at least some of  which can 
eventually be appreciated by the individual him/herself…719
Under this model, the evils in our lives can be integrated much like the ugly, 
green bilious patches are worked into Monet’s beautiful painting of  the 
Rouen cathedral.720  By recognition of  the pattern of  God’s work humans 
come to realize the beauty of  their life, a beauty whose uniqueness is 
somewhat derived from the way that God has overcome their own personal 
horrors.  Thus, Adams is insistent that horrors must be defeated in the life 
of  a person by their own story being made into something bigger, larger and 
more beautiful.  The key to defeating the evils, though, still rests upon 
human recognition of  the divine “craftsmanship.”  Once a person 
recognizes God’s work that person may feel that his life is a great good after 
all.  A key question which arises, however, is how this can be accomplished?
One of  the key points of  insistence for Marilyn Adams is the impotence of  
generic approaches to the problem of  evil.  For Christians, Adams argues, it 
is necessary to marshal the widest range of  resources for answering the 
problem of  evil.  While some theodicists have attempted to employ more 
religion-neutral responses to the problem of  evil, Adams sees the necessity 
for invoking Christian resources in order to respond to horrors.  Among the 
range of  areas of  Christian thought that are sometimes neglected, Adams 
discusses Christology and Eschatology as especially relevant.
3.3.3. Evil and Christology. In Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of  God as well as 
a more recent book, Christ and Horrors, Adams uses horrors as a lens 
through which to view the story of  Jesus.  For those who suffer horrors, 
Adams further holds up the benefit which Christ offers them as a fellow 
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horror-participant.  As one who suffered like them, they can experience  
honoring identification even in the midst of  horror.721  Following Adams, 
God may overcome evils in the lives of  those who suffer, by providing them 
with “symbolic honor.”  She writes,
Honor is the currency of  the powerless; it is what clients short on material goods 
can offer to patrons… Myopic focus on concrete values tempts both 
victim and onlooker to believe that there is no way for God to be 
good to a person while pain, suffering, and material deprivation 
remain.  But honor is a good that can be conferred on people even while concrete 
benefits are still lacking.722
The incarnation is, for Adams, the prime example of  God’s honoring 
identification with humanity, and is therefore a source of  comfort for 
anyone, including those who suffer greatly.  
Yet, there is an even closer and more specific correlation of  the incarnation 
with the theme of  horrendous evils.  One of  the effects of  suffering greatly, 
of  breaking free of  the “script” of  life, can be a sense of  alienation from 
others and from the universe.  As Adams notes, “we human beings 
commonly exhibit a drive to self-transcendence, to relate to something 
beyond ourselves”.723  Yet horrors shatter our confidence in being able to 
relate positively to the world, and instill in us a sense of  revulsion at our 
own person.  Alienation is one natural result of  suffering from horrendous 
evils.  However, as Adams points out, alienation may be replaced with a 
sense of  comfort, by finding another who has been through a similar 
circumstance.724  The fact that Christ has suffered on the cross, not merely 
death, but a truly degrading and dishonoring crucifixion means that Christ is 
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a horror-sufferer as well.  Within this context, the famous images within 
Christian art of  the scourged and suffering Son of  God can be understood 
as art-horror: the deliberate presentation of  events which are grotesque, 
frightful and revolting.  Horror victims may thus see, all around them in 
classical Christian imagery, a sign of  God’s identification with them.  Adams 
says it well, when she writes, 
God in Christ crucified cancels the curse of  human vulnerability to 
horrors.  For the very horrors, participation in which threatened to 
undo the positive value of  created personality, now become secure 
points of  identification... Retrospectively, I believe, from the vantage 
point of  heavenly beatitude, human victims of  horrors will recognize 
those experiences as points of  identification with the crucified God, 
and not wish them away from their life histories.725
The incarnation in general, and specifically Christ’s co-suffering with us, 
provides a clear, accessible source of  honor and identification.  Even in the 
midst of  horrors, Christ is “the One in Whom all things hold 
together” (Col. 1:17):
In the realm of  God, the worst that we can suffer, be, or do, is not 
only ruinous because God invents a new organizational grid that 
endows us with amazing meaning (for example, gruesome degrading 
caricatures of  human beings become instances of  identification with 
God in Christ crucified).726 
However, Christ’s passion and death are not merely a source of  
identification (in that God comes down and suffers with us) but are also a 
source of  inspiration (in that we are granted a vision of  how horrendous 
evils can be defeated in the resurrection).  The image of  the cross points 
beyond itself  to the image of  the resurrection, as even in the darkest 
moments of  Christ’s sense of  God-forsakeness, there is still an affirmation 
of  his divinity (Matt. 27: 45-54).  Thus, Adams writes, “the symbol of  Christ 
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crucified is bivalent, integrating negative into positive aesthetic values in the 
redemption and consummation.”727  Thus it is that many Christians who 
have suffered greatly have found comfort in the bloody and brutal spectacle 
of  the cross.  Not because they delight in the suffering of  the son of  God, 
but because the Son of  God’s story, even its darkest moments of  desolation, 
has been taken up into the story of  God’s ultimate redemption.  Christ’s 
story is the pre-eminent example of  God’s ability to expand the scope of  
the story to overcome the text’s apparently dark meaning.
In Christ and Horrors, Adams describes this as Stage I defeat of  horrors, the 
this-worldly making available of  resources which can allow horrors to be 
defeated.  As Adams describes it, this is “establishing a relation of  organic 
unity between the person’s horror-participation and his/her intimate, 
personal, and overall beatific relationship with God”.728  However, Adams 
points to two other stages of  horror-defeat which require a further work of  
God for the persons who experience them.  This leads Adams to talk about 
the afterlife as a crucial resource for combatting horrors.
 
3.3.4. Evil and Eschatology.  Unlike Wendy Farley, Adams does not bracket out 
eschatological considerations as peripheral to the problem of  evil 
discussion.  Stages II and III defeat of  evil, as discussed in Christ and Horrors, 
may well take place after death, as God’s ministering power to us enables 
our ability to see those points of  connection and identification which God 
has made actual through Christ, as well as those events within our own lives 
which would help us to see the more subtle and complex plot which God 
has crafted.729  Stages II and III, as Adams describes them, are stages which 
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Christ points to himself, in that his post-mortem state is now more 
circumspect and seemingly aware of  the bigger picture of  what God is 
doing (he has maintained, seemingly a total understanding of  his mission 
and attained peace about it), but also that Christ is now beyond vulnerability 
to horrors.730  His body is corporeal but also seemingly beyond harm.
Adams sees these stages as necessary to help us to attain the proper 
perspective on our lives and the world around us, but also to ensure that we 
can no longer fall under the sway of  horrors again.  Eschatology offers us a 
sturdy hope that God’s attempts to establish solidarity with us, and God’s 
work in weaving horrors into a larger and more lovely whole, can truly be 
accomplished for each individual. 
However, Adams also points to a final resource for theodicy: the beatific 
vision, which is the unsurpassable contemplation of  the divine which will be 
a part of  heavenly life.  This enjoyment of  the divine is, for Adams, a deeply 
aesthetic experience.  She writes, “I join Christian Platonists in taking Divine 
perfection, the Good that God is, to include beauty”.731  The good that 
God’s beauty provides is, according to Adams, “immeasurable and 
incommensurate with any and all created goods or ills.” 732  Its effect is to 
provide a good so immense that it counterbalances all the evils in a person’s 
life.  She writes, 
Further, I assume that aesthetic contemplation that appreciates the 
object for its own sake, can itself  be intrinsically valuable; in 
particular, that contemplation of  unsurpassable beauty is itself  
immeasurably good for the beholder.  It would follow that any such 
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contemplation of  Divine Beauty not only balances off  but engulfs 
participation in horrendous evils.733
Here Adams echoes Romans 8, where Paul notes that these present evils will 
not be “worth comparing” to the glory which shall be revealed.  Thus, 
Adams essentially concludes her reflections on evils which are ‘off  the 
charts’ in terms of  disvalue, with a call for a final resource with infinite 
value.  The aesthetic disvalue of  grotesque and incongruent horrors, then is 
matched and overcome by the immense value of  the beatific vision.  By 
showing how humans can have access to such an immense source of  value, 
then, Adams points to divine resources for benefiting each and every 
created person. 
3.3.5. Aesthetic Benefits as Fifth Framework?
Referring back to Chapter 1 (where I laid out four possible philosophical 
frameworks for theodicy) Adams’ work here almost suggests a fifth 
framework for theodicy, where morally-sufficient reasons are eschewed in 
favor of  an exclusive account of  how God can be good to even those who 
suffer the worst evils.  By drawing out the aesthetic dimension of  the beatific 
vision, as well as the aesthetic dimension of  seeing how evils can be positively 
integrated into our lives, Adams suggests how aesthetics can inform theodicy 
which is focused on the well-being of  each created person.  I reserved 
mention of  Adams’ framework for theodicy because I wanted to wait until 
this chapter to discuss it, but also because I do not think that, in and of  itself, 
Adams’ focus on defeating (instead of  explaining) evils is a sufficiently 
developed paradigm for theodicy for inclusion in that context.  (For a more 
detailed discussion of  why this is, see Appendix C.)  However, the aesthetic 
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dimension of  the eschatological goods which Adams proposes (seeing one’s 
life as an integrated whole, and the beatific vision) cannot be overlooked.  
Here we find, however, that the aesthetic dimension of  Adams’ suggested 
benefits fits very well into the framework derived from Stump that aesthetics 
may serve theodicy in aiding our perception of  God’s goodness.  Both the 
beatific vision and the integration of  evils into a larger, positive whole, can be 
thought of  in moral or relational terms which are not predominantly aesthetic.  
In highlighting the aesthetic dimensions of  these benefits, Adams is enabling 
a clearer perception of  their value (very much in the way that Stump suggests).  
What is most significant, for this study, is not the aesthetic nature of  the 
goods which Adams holds up, so much as the fact that horror, as an aesthetic 
theme, so clearly calls for them.  The theodicists cannot merely explain why 
horrors occur, the theodicist must also explain how God can defeat horrors.
3.4. Conclusion.
Horror concludes our examinations of  three related, but differing, aesthetic 
themes.  Horror, I suggest, is a valuable aesthetic conversation partner for 
harmony and tragedy for a number of  reasons.  First, though its view of  sin 
is essentially Augustinian in that it is aesthetically the opposite of  the good: 
disproportionate and disordered, its view of  the world is more akin to 
tragedy, where unjust, and seemingly inexcusable, suffering occurs.  Unlike 
the tragic vision, however, horror finds no reason for hope or meaning in 
the evils it examines, except for hope in the defeat of  evil.  Horror forces us 
to look outside of  the totality of  creation for deliverance, and to look to 
God’s paradigm defeat of  evil as defined in the cross.  As David Bentley 
Hart has pointed out, tragedy may, ironically, suffer from the defect of  being 
too optimistic about evil because it retains (and even magnifies) the dignity 
of  humanity in the face of  evil.  In opposition to this, the aesthetic theme of 
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horror may push us closer to a fully Christian vision of  evil, because it is 
more nihilistic and brutal.  Horrors destroy lives, and seem to contradict the 
goodness of  God to each and every person.  Thus, I am inclined to agree 
with Marilyn Adams insofar as she sees that theodicy is bankrupt without an 
account of  the possible defeat of  evil for each person.  Horror helps us see 
that the story on evil cannot be complete given what we see in the world.  
Horrors, as Adams writes, “like the blood of  Abel, they cry out from the 
ground”.734  Thus horror demands from theodicy more than mere 
explanations, the hideous distortion we see in horrendous evils demand an 
eschatological response.  If  horror does not cancel out the Augustinian 
notion of  cosmic harmony, it must, at the very least, cancel out the 
Augustinian affirmation that we experience this harmony in the here and now.  
Adams sees rightly that more must be done for participants in horrendous 
evils.  
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APPENDIX C: A Critique of  Adams
While theodicists such as Plantinga, Swinburne, and Hick all approach the 
issue by exploring reasons why a moral person might allow evil, and thus 
defend God qua moral person, Adams seeks to show that her client is above 
the jurisdiction of  the court, yet at the same time convince the jury that He 
is the good person, wanting the best for each and every one of  us.  Both 
parts of  Adams “defense” strike me as problematic.  
First, her desire to strongly affirm the radical disjuncture between God and 
humanity.  “God and creatures are metaphysically incommensurate” she 
writes, “as St. Anselm goes so far as to say, in relation to God, creatures are 
‘almost nothing.’”735  Morally, however, Adams implies that we are not 
‘almost’ but actually nothing:
because of  the size gap, nothing we could be or do could count - 
simply by virtue of  what it is - as an appropriate move in relation to 
God, any more than a worm’s wiggling to the right could be 
intrinsically more respectful of  humans that wiggling to the left.736
To some degree, God can overcome this gap. “Just as human civil law 
confers value, turns paper worth a few cents into $100 bills,” Adams writes, 
“so Divine legislation establishes statutory definitions of  what will count as 
fitting or appropriate response by finite creatures to God.”737  Some of  this 
seems clear, as in the case of  Sabbath observances.  “Why Saturday instead 
of  Tuesday?” we ask.  God replies, “Because I say so.”  The action of  
resting on Saturday is not good “simply by virtue of  what it is”, but is this 
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true of  forming the intention to obey God and thus rest on Saturday?  Based on 
my reading of  Adams, she isn’t clear on this point.  What is clear is that she 
does not locate human sin in the will.
Famously, Adams ontologizes sin, defining it as uncleanness and locates it in 
the “twin metaphysical necessities” of  human existence.738  Humans are 
defiled not because of  what we do, but because of  what we are.739  Because 
“God and creatures are metaphysically incommensurate” we cannot relate 
properly to God.740  And because of  our “metaphysical straddling” (neither 
merely spirit nor merely animal) we are unclean in a way similar to Levitical 
pigs - neither clearly one thing nor another.741
Thus Adams aims to construct a “theodicy without blame”, but raises 
perplexing issues about God’s purposes.742  Katherin Rogers presses the 
question, “Are the metaphysical size gap and the “uncleanness” 
necessary?”743  “Adams never questions the assumption that the free agents 
posited by the Augustinian tradition are metaphysically closer to the image 
of  God than are her unclean infant humans,” Rogers writes, “Her argument 
is just that we are the latter and not the former.”  One wonders, given 
Adams’ confidence about a post-resurrection state where we are “no longer 
vulnerable to horrors”, why God did not create that state first?744  If  sin is a 
function of  what we are, rather than what we do, why could God not have 
made us better?
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Further, one may wonder, alongside C. S. Lewis, if  being an ontologically 
unclean being is not worse than being a voluntarily unclean one?745  Lewis 
writes, in The Problem of  Pain, “the fact that we are vermin, so far from being 
felt as an excuse, is a greater shame to and grief  to us than any of  the 
particular acts which it leads us to commit.”746  Perhaps there is something 
to do with universalism in Adams’ push for lowering human dignity.  If  
humans are given freedom of  self-determination they may head themselves 
straight for hell.  But there are ways around this dilemma.  Perhaps, as 
Rogers suggests, voluntary heaven and forced heaven.747
The culmination of  Rogers’ critique attempts to press Adams’ line of  
thought to its conclusions, arguing that if  “We are all the same, vast, 
distance from God” and “our uncleanness is metaphysically necessary” then 
“Hitler and Mother Teresa are both the same metaphysical distance from 
God and equally unclean” thus “there is no value difference between them 
viewed objectively and in relation to God.”748 Rogers: 
If  this is the case, then our human understanding of  the term “good” 
cannot be carried over to God.  But if  God is not “good” in some 
way which human beings can grasp, then discussion predicated on His 
possession of  that attribute is vain.749
Lewis makes this point more strongly in The Problem of  Pain, “If  He is not 
(in our sense) good, we shall obey, if  at all, only through fear - and should 
be equally ready to obey an omnipotent Fiend.”750  Further, the gap between 
God and humans seems so broad that the incarnation will not serve to 
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bridge it, because, “Even should He reach across the gap and assume our 
nature, His nature, modus operandi, and goals must remain opaque to us”: thus 
Rogers concludes that Adams’ “abolition of  sin means denying meaningful 
goodness to God.”751
I’m not interested in rendering verdict on the Adams v. Rogers match.  But 
some of  the critiques at least raise doubts about Adams’ attempt to widen 
the traditional size-gap – pushing God up and humans down.  If, at times, 
theodicists have collapsed the distance, it is at least noteworthy there may be 
problems with the opposite attempt as well.
Second, I wish to examine Adams’ attempt to show that God is “good to each 
created person, by ensuring each a life that is a great good to him/her on 
the whole.”752  Besides an inherent tension, it seems, between God 
“honoring us”, as Adams emphasizes, and our lowly estate as “maggots,”753 
there may remain questions about how good God can be to us without 
providing morally sufficient reasons for His actions.  
Patrick Sherry, in his essay, “Redeeming the Past” points to two conditions 
that “would have to be fulfilled for us to regard a new pattern of  events as 
redemptive.”754  The first is that reconciliation would have to be made 
between victims and wrongdoers.  The second is that sufferers would have 
to “see the meaning… of  our sufferings, both those brought about by other 
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people and those occasioned by natural causes”.755  Sherry imagines an 
eschatological opportunity for people to “see such connections in the case 
of  all their sufferings, realize that the goods brought out of  them by God 
could not have been brought about in any less painful way without violating 
our freedom,” and thus feel “the whole process worthwhile”.756  
Julian of  Norwich sets precedent for Sherry’s case, since she believes that 
“part of  the bliss and fulfillment of  those who are saved will be that… they 
will see the true reason why God has done all the things he has.”757  While 
Sherry’s insistence seems a bit strong–maybe all of  us do not need to see all 
the connections–his point is suggestive.  Even if  God did not give us 
reasons why bad things had to happen to us specifically (e.g. for the 
purposes of  soul-making), but instead provided large scale, generic reasons 
(e.g. free will, or the orderly operation of  the natural world), it seems that 
having some sense of  why God allowed bad things to happen to humans 
would provide a necessary part of  God being good to us, and helping us 
understand and love Him.  Part of  redemption and healing may involve 
coming to understand reasons why a certain event happened.  Certainly, in 
common life, reasons often play a key role in reconciliation and redemption.  
A quick thought experiment: Imagine you are a plaintiff  in a class-action 
lawsuit against an industrial tycoon who dumped toxic materials in your 
town’s water table.  The defense refuses to discuss what reasons the tycoon 
had for his actions but promises that the tycoon is so wealthy and clever that 
he can make it up to each and every cancer-ridden plaintiff  and their 
deformed children.  In fact, is so resourceful that he can make it so that 
your lives are better than before you ingested toxic waste!  Thus, even 
319
755 Ibid., 175.
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid., 171.
though he will not apologize for or attempt to explain why he dumped the 
waste, he asks for you to drop your charges against him.  The typical 
response, I would think would be to continue to press the charges no matter 
how nice the fellow seemed.  If  he were really so concerned about us, why 
did he dump the toxic waste in the first place?  While this example is a bit 
unfair to Adams (the tycoon and God are still far too dissimilar), it at least 
suggests that we might feel residual outrage at God if  we never were privy 
to any of  his reasons for allowing evil.  Giving a reason, like an apology, can 
be a powerful way of  atoning oneself  to others.
Thus Adams’ defense cuts out two elements I think important for meaning-
making: God’s including us in His moral community (though, of  course, not 
as equals) and God’s paying us the divine respect of  ultimately answering 
our why questions.  While neither of  these are fatal flaws, they may 
disconcert us enough to give traditional theodicy a second look.  
The problem which horrors present to theodicists, because of  the 
insufficiency of  morally sufficient reasons to fully justify God’s allowance of 
them, forces us to take seriously an “agnostic thesis” (such as the one that 
William Alston advances) that allows for us to deflect potentially destructive 
attacks of  theism, without needing to offer a total theodicy (or without 
defaulting into skepticism).  Taking on the question of  why God allows very 
serious evils, Alston writes,
I will not be proceeding on the basis of  any general skepticism about 
our cognitive powers either across the board or generally with respect 
to God.  I will, rather, be focusing on the peculiar difficulties we 
encounter in attempting to provide adequate support for a certain very 
ambitious negative existential claim, viz., that there is (can be) no 
sufficient divine reason for permitting a certain case of  suffering…758 
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Alston aims to take down the idea that there is no good reason for God to 
allow certain evils, without attempting a total theodicy. Alston combats the 
idea that our cognitive powers are incapable of  understanding evil at all by 
assembling a list of  partial reasons why God might allow evils: including 
punishment for sin, free will, soul making, and the redemptive power of  
suffering.759  Despite the fact that none of  these reasons seem to strongly 
outweigh the gratuitous evils Adams brings up does not mean that Alston’s 
attempt fails.  True, no single reason or set of  reasons we can think of  acts 
as the trump card to horrendous evil, but the fact that we can think of  a 
wide range of  reasons for serious, but not horrendous evils, leads us to 
believe that it is likely that there are such reasons, we just can’t quite grasp 
them.760  
Our inability to summon perfect reasons Alston chocks up to six factors:
  
1. “Lack of  data,” including full knowledge of  the past and future, the 
workings of  the human psyche, and so on.  
2. “Complexity greater than we can handle.”
3. “Difficulty determining what is metaphysically possible or necessary.”
4. “Ignorance of  the full range of  possibilities,” our imaginations are often 
limited in what they can conceive.
5. “Ignorance of  the full range of  values.”
6. “Limits to our capacity to make well-considered value judgments.” 761
These points are compelling.  That we cannot readily conceive of  morally 
sufficient reasons why God allows horrendous evils does not mean that any 
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such reasons God might have are monstrous; nor does it imply that God is 
not morally good. The problem more obviously lies with our ability to make 
large-scale, complex moral judgments.
Returning to aesthetic analogies again, it seems very likely that God’s epic 
story is too large and dense for us to easily grasp.  “[W]hy can a child clearly 
discern the literary merits of  a comic book but not Henry V?” Daniel 
Howard-Snyder asks, the answer is obvious, because Henry V involves 
“much more than he is able to comprehend… Value is often veiled in 
complexity.762  Balthasar takes us a similar line in Love Alone is Credible, where 
he offers the analogy of  a Mozart symphony as an example of  complexity 
which dwarfs our imaginative capacities:
In the experiences of  extraordinary beauty–whether in nature or in 
art–we are able to grasp a phenomenon in its distinctiveness that 
otherwise remains veiled.  What we encounter in such an experience 
is as overwhelming as a miracle, something we will never get over.  
And yet it possesses its intelligibility precisely as a miracle; it is 
something that binds and frees at the same time, since it gives itself  
unambiguously as the “self-manifesting freedom” (Schiller) of  inner, 
undemonstrable necessity.  If  Mozart’s Jupiter symphony has a finale–
which is something that I cannot anticipate, derive, or explain on the 
basis of  anything within myself–then it can be only the finale that it 
has; the symphony possesses its own necessity in this particular form, 
in which no note could be changed, unless it be by Mozart himself.  
Such a convergence of  what I have invented and yet at the same time 
possesses compelling plausibility for me is something we find only in 
the realm of  disinterested beauty.763
Drawing on Alston, my answer, then, to why God allows horrendous evils 
is, “I don’t know.”  Or, more accurately, “God knows” (Job 42).  This 
hopeful agnosticism prevents horrendous evils from signifying that God is 
impotent, or evil, or hates us, or that we are irrelevant to Him.  It attempts 
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to affirm the plausibility of  God’s love for us and our worth in His eyes by 
defending God’s moral goodness and placing humans in an important role 
as moral agents (a la Augustine or Plantinga), despite the fact of  horrors.
But a hopefully agnostic theodicy does nothing to reverse the meaning of  
specific horrendous events.  Horrors remain so far as we can see 
disproportionate and incongruous.  Contra Augustine, horrors are not yet 
fully integrated into the harmonious whole.  Thus, the aesthetic dimension 
of  horrors, besides challenging overly-simple answers in theodicy, also 
challenges the notion that all is well.  The unresolved remainder left at the 
end of  the theodicy solution, the aesthetic dimension of  horror cries out for 
resolution.  Fortunately, Christian theodicy, as opposed to generic theism, 
has a crucial resource for meaning-making in the midst of  evil.  Horrors 
point us to the cross, which offers us the one, true story of  God’s defeat of  
horrendous evils.  
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CONCLUSION
In the plan of  the Great Dance plans without number interlock, and each 
movement becomes in its season the breaking into flower of  the whole design to 
which all else has been directed.  Thus each is equally at the centre and none are 
there by being equals, but some by giving place and some by receiving it, the small 
things by their smallness and the great things by their greatness, and all the 
patterns linked and looped together by the unions of  a kneeling with a sceptred 
love.  Blessed be He!
      C. S. LEWIS, Perelandra
At the conclusion of  The Last Battle, the final book in C. S. Lewis’s popular 
Narnia series, the magical land of  Narnia comes to an end.  Following the 
titular ‘last battle’, the heroes of  Narnia, Eustace, Jill, King Tirian and Jewel 
the Unicorn are all thrust into a stable, which they assume to be simply filled 
with hay, troughs, and riding tackle, but is actually a gateway to a heavenly 
country: a brighter, cleaner, better version of  Narnia.  What they took to be 
an ignominious end, defeat in battle, being shoved into a stable, likely to be 
killed, has actually turned out as well as could be imagined.  However, along 
with the heroes of  the book, a group of  dwarfs are also thrust through into 
the stable, but instead of  enjoying the beauty around them, they perceive 
themselves to still be in the dark, dirty animal stable.  Even though the 
dwarfs are clearly visible to the book’s protagonists, the dwarfs themselves 
still perceive the world around them as the world of  the stable.
In the chapter titled, “How the Dwarfs Refused to Be Taken In”, Lewis 
describes the somewhat amusing contrast between the pleasure of  the 
heroes of  the book and the misery of  the dwarfs.  In an attempt to get the 
dwarfs to understand where they truly are, one of  the heroes takes a 
bouquet of  freshly-picked wild violets and holds them to the dwarf ’s nose, 
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saying, “Can you smell that?”764  In reply, the dwarf  strikes out at the well-
meaning hero and says, “How dare you! What do you mean by shoving a lot 
of  filthy stable-litter in my face?  There was a thistle in it too.”765  Eventually 
Aslan (the Christ-figure of  Narnia) comes into the scene and explains that 
the dwarfs are trapped   in this mental prison by their strong desire (as the 
title of  the chapter suggests) not to be “taken in”.  “[T]hey are” Aslan 
explains, “so afraid of  being taken in that they cannot be taken out [of  the 
stable].”766  The dwarf ’s cautiousness about being “taken in” prevents their 
perception of  the wider, more wonderful, world.
This thesis explored the relationship which contemporary theodicy has with 
theological aesthetics.  It would be the height of  arrogance to suggest that 
all contemporary theodicists exhibit dwarfish churlishness with relation to 
theological aesthetics, but there is a similarity between the trends within the 
theodicy literature and the dwarfish rejection of  the new and the strange.  
Specifically, the prevalent suspicion of  aesthetic values, categories and 
metaphors in the theodicy literature (not to mention its widespread neglect) 
suggests that this is an area where theodicy has opted for safety, to the 
detriment of  its ability to see (as well as taste, touch and smell) the range of  
values which are waiting to be used.  
In an attempt to correct what I took to be a philosophical bad habit within 
theodicy, I first looked at the ‘economic models’ within which theodicy 
carried out the ‘business’ of  defending God from the problem of  evil.  Here 
I found, by examination of  the most influential theodicists in recent years, a 
trend to look at the problem in largely moral terms,  specifically in seeking 
out morally-sufficient reasons why God allows evils.  The problem with this 
approach for aesthetics, I suggested, was that categories and values 
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associated with the aesthetics tend to function rather poorly as morally-
sufficient reasons.  Furthermore, I suggested, to avoid guilt-by-association, 
many theodicists have avoided aesthetic values such as beauty because of  
the ineffective way that beauty has been used by process theodicists in their 
attempts to explain the divine allowance of  evil.  This “thistle” in the 
aesthetic bouquet, has no doubt further warranted suspicion of  the 
usefulness of  aesthetics.  In order to “make room” for values such as beauty, 
I suggested, we need to re-frame the question so as to allow more space for 
alternate ways of  seeing.  Through conversation with Eleonore Stump, I 
suggested that a valuable part of  the theodicy discourse involves an account 
of  perception: of  seeing God’s work and God’s world in the proper way.  A 
perennial problem in human life is the way that familiarity can dull our 
perception of  the world, and desensitize us to palpable value, or the way 
that focus on little details can occlude the bigger picture of  the world.  
Thus, I argued for theological aesthetics as a field which can help to enrich 
theodicy by offering it new vistas from which to view the problem of  evil.  
Relying on Hans Urs von Balthasar and Dorothy Sayers as guides, I explored 
what it means to take seriously the Christian logos as a starting point for 
theological aesthetics, and how, bringing with us our Christian convictions 
to the field of  theodicy, we should not go about thinking about aesthetics, as 
Dorothy Sayers phrases it, “as if  the incarnation had never happened.”  
Rather, following Sayers, I argued that the theology of  incarnation suggests 
that creative, poetic expression can enable new understanding.  Specifically, I 
argued that we can focus on two features of  poetics to illuminate our 
understanding: in that the arts can re-order and enrich our perception of  the 
world.  Using this as a guide, I set out to look at three large scale ‘aesthetic 
themes’ within theodicy.
326
The first, the Augustinian theme of  cosmic harmony, was naturally 
suggested in two ways.  First, because Augustine is himself  the fountainhead 
for much of  the aesthetic tradition within Christian theodicy, and second, 
because Augustine’s aesthetic theme has been the focus of  the most 
prolonged and eloquent attacks on aesthetics in theodicy (as displayed ne plus 
ultra by John Hick in Evil and the God of  Love).  Defending Augustine’s 
intentions and effectiveness against these attacks, I argued that the theme of 
cosmic harmony is not prima facie morally pernicious, but accords with and 
supports the Christian proclamation of  ultimate justice.  Further, I argued 
that an avoidance of  themes such as beauty in theodicy can lead to an equal 
and opposite problem, which is a theodicy which is sternly moral, excluding 
those features of  life which make life worth living.  However, taking issue 
with some of  the details of  Augustine’s aesthetic theme, I argued that it 
suffered from a certain tone-deafness to the discordant notes within the 
universe at any given moment.  Contrary to what Augustine argues, it does 
not seem defensible to argue for perfect moment-to-moment justice in the 
world.  Thus, while some would say that Augustine’s picture of  the world is 
too far reaching, I argue that Augustine’s picture is not, ironically, big 
enough to encompass the reality of  tragedy in this world. 
Following then, from Augustine, I leapt forward many centuries to look at 
two more recent attempts to interweave aesthetic themes with theodicy.  
First, looking at the tragic theme in theodicy, I spent time in dialogue with 
the work of  Wendy Farley, who stands in the tradition of  other 
philosophers who have utilized tragedy as a conceptual resource for their 
thinking.  A tragic theodicy, as Farley phrases it, “enters into the hiatus 
between the longing for justice and the reality of  suffering,” and thus, she 
argues, resists the short-fallings of  traditional theodicy’s “cool justifications 
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of  evil”.767  Tragedy opens up a space for us to see and feel suffering which 
is recognized and felt as unjust, yet at the same time finds some value and 
meaning in the moment of  suffering.  As Farley argues, tragedy helps us see 
suffering, but also to see beyond suffering to the resistance and compassion 
which are born from it.  Tragedy, therefore, carries with it some of  the 
antidote to evil, valuable resources which Christians can integrate into their 
theodicies, and which may well be overlooked without this aesthetic theme.  
The danger of  theodicy, as David Bentley Hart eloquently points out, is that 
tragedy can succumb to a kind of  ‘ratification’ of  suffering, and thus ‘make 
peace’ with an enemy, when we should instead be plotting the enemy’s 
defeat.  I agree here, and suggest that the trend within tragic theodicy can 
too easily lead us to overlook the need for an even further defeat of  evil, 
and can also lead us to find too much meaning in innocent suffering.
The final aesthetic theme under examination is horror, a relative newcomer 
to the theodicy literature.  Seeking to offer a critique of  tragedy, I dialogued 
with the work of  Marilyn McCord Adams, whose theodicy takes horrendous 
evils as a starting point and fundamental touchstone for any justification of  
God.  Through appeal to the category of  horror, we can see more clearly 
that not all evils are possessed of  a kind of  tragic grandeur, which naturally 
engenders resistance and compassion, but can degrade and crush the moral 
agent like an ant under the heel of  a work boot.  Horror also offers a 
critique to the Augustinian aesthetic theme, in that it offers for reflection 
states of  affairs which are not only intellectually repellent but emotionally 
disturbing, and therefore should upset the calm, collected demeanor of  any 
theodicist who claims to have a final answer to the problem of  evil.  One 
key advantage of  horrors, however, is that their unrelentingly negative vision 
drives us to look beyond them for some larger framework wherein they can 
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find resolution.  Whereas tragedy aims to offer some solution to the 
problem of  evil within the realm of  the immanent, horror demands 
eschatological resolution.  This pressing demand therefore calls us to make 
explicit appeal to the full range of  Christian resources, as well as to look to 
our exemplar in all things, Jesus Christ, to offer us a vision for the ultimate 
defeat of  evil.  
Horror does not, however, overturn either the value of  tragedy or the 
ultimate vision of  cosmic harmony, but rather, forces us to take account of  
the darkest details of  the “great dance” (as C. S. Lewis describes the 
providential ordering of  the universe), in order to see (or to attempt to see) 
how these dark details can be incorporated into some larger and more lovely 
work of  art.  In a twist of  genres, then, it is horror which forces us to look 
to those most beautiful and hopeful of  details in the Christian story.  
Returning, then, to the initial metaphor with which I began this section, it 
has been the attempt of  this thesis to drag the theodicy conversation a bit 
more out of  the stable to which it has become accustomed, in order to 
enrich theodicy’s vision with some additional vistas from which to view 
God’s providence.  Through some conceptual reframing and additional 
conversation partners, theodicy, as a discourse practice, can learn to see, 
smell, taste, touch and hear some new features of  God’s providence, which 
extends not just to the favored dimensions of  truth and goodness, but also 
to beauty, which, as Hans Urs von Balthasar describes it, “dances as an 
uncontained splendor around the double constellation of  the true and the 
good”.768  ‘Dancing’ with beauty (and the imagination) may be difficult, at 
first, for theodicy to begin to do.  But as I have argued, the benefits for 
theodicy which theological aesthetics has to offer are sufficient to force 
theodicists out onto the dance floor.  
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